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1. PREFACE 
“On a cosmic scale, our life is insignificant, 
 Yet this brief period when we appear in the world  
Is the time in which all meaningful questions arise” 
Paul Ricoeur, 1985  
 
In a sense this project began almost a decade ago. In 2005 I as a young graduate 
philosophy student together with two fellow students initiated a small project 
called Thoughts Across - which for some not entirely clear reason managed to 
obtain funding from a major Danish Bank. With an immoderate eagerness 
characteristic of young students in general – and young philosophy students in 
particular – our self-proclaimed, bold and perhaps immodest ambition was to 
engender and facilitate a wider interdisciplinary scholarly dialogue between 
philosophers (of course!), economists, political scientists, sociologists, biologists, 
theologians and many others to identify “the most important trends of the 21st 
century”. Nothing more, nothing less. Furthermore, we decidedly wanted our 
participants to abstain from the conventional academic practice of hedging all 
claims with a battery of caveats, reservations and precautions. In short, what we 
wanted was a philosophical mode of reasoning attuned to the challenges of our 
own time – not the past. A dialogue firmly rooted in intra-disciplinary knowledge, 
but daring enough to move beyond and engage with, as Paul Ricoeur would have 
it, all the meaningful questions that arise in the brief period when we appear in the 
world.  
On the top of a long list of potential participants we put the name Ove Kaj 
Pedersen, who we thoroughly believed could satisfy our rather high intellectual 
expectations, but frankly did not expect to be willing to participate. However, 
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when I called him, he – with a generosity I should later learn to be one of his 
hallmarks – immediately and without hesitation accepted. No precautions, no 
caveats, no payment – just pure reason.  
Thoughts Across was a tremendous success – if not exactly in terms of audience or 
impact – than at least according to our own unrelenting standards. Of course the 
project did not quite manage to break down disciplinary boundaries for good. But 
for just one afternoon in the spring they were briefly transcended. Not least thanks 
to Ove Kaj Pedersen, who in one singular session artfully discussed and connected 
Axel Honneth’s theory of Social Recognition, Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of 
Civilizations, N.F.S. Grundtvig’s writings, Hegel’s philosophy of Right and the 
emerging Competition of Nations - which he by re-phrasing Carl von Clausewitz 
proposed constituted “a continuation of war with other means.” Just the kind of 
wide-ranging, contemporarily relevant if solidly anchored reasoning the three 
young philosophers had been yearning for. After thoughts had been crossed, the 
dust settled and the remaining share of the banks funding not already spend on 
some remarkably expensive, but utterly ineffective billboard posters had been put 
to good use as stimulus of aggregate Danish demand, each went their separate 
ways into the 21st century. And that might just have been the end of it.  
However, while Thoughts Across did not accomplish very much in itself, on that 
afternoon I decided I wanted to work with, study under and learn from professor 
Ove Kaj Pedersen. Even if it meant I had to vacate my intellectual comfort zone, 
cross zealously guarded disciplinary dividing lines and pursue research within a 
scientific discipline fairly foreign to the one in which I was originally educated. 
Hence upon finishing my graduate studies I once again contacted Ove. And once 
again he immediately accepted to become my supervisor and help me draft an 
application for a PhD-project in what he called new institutional theory. A theory I 
qua being trained in philosophy had not heard of before and had to go look up. 
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In fact, during my PhD-studies I have had the rare and exquisite privilege of being 
trained by not one but two of the – to my mind - most intelligent, innovative and 
original men in Denmark. Indeed the very idea for Thoughts Across stemmed from 
my prior employment as student researcher at the Danish think tank and 
journalistic weekly Monday Morning. Established by editor and CEO Erik 
Rasmussen quarter of a century ago, the organization to this day remains a 
journalistic powerhouse, unrivalled as one of Denmark’s most dynamic and 
dedicated political and intellectual incubators. For 25 years Monday Morning have 
been Danish leaders read and through a distinct form of political-economic – 
almost guerilla-like - journalism insisted to dig deeper than daily headlines, to 
connect the dots and to identify common denominators behind the ever-fluttering 
and frightfully forgetful stream of collective consciousness we call News. The 
unequivocal, impressive and inspiring result of Erik Rasmussen’s remarkable 
drive, dedication and truly far-sighted leadership.  
I first met Erik during the media frenzy of the Danish Cartoon Crisis in 2005 - 
which he characteristically insisted should not be understood as a risk of a 
Huntingtonian civilizational cataclysmic clash, but as an opportunity for renewed 
cross-cultural dialogue and learning. At the time I was but a very young, spiky-
haired undergraduate philosophy student and very inspired by some very old 
(dead) thinkers, who for quite a while had not been making many headlines. 
Hardly prime material for a hardcore political and economic think tank. However, 
one afternoon I approached Erik Rasmussen. While waving enthusiastically with a 
quickly hand-drawn, odd-sized septagram, I suggested – literally - that the Cartoon 
Crisis could be understood as a clash of - not 7 civilizations - but 7 discursive 
interpretations of clashes, by which different actor classes and coalitions 
discursively contest and re-construct the crisis as a particular type of societally 
antagonistic dichotomous conflict, of which they themselves played an important 
co-constitutive part, and from which they in turn harvested social power.  
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Monday Mornings seasoned editor-in-chief was not immediately convinced with 
this not entirely colloquial outcome of my first rudimentary fiddling with 
discourse-theory. In retrospect one can only wonder why.  
Even so, he challenged the young philosopher to go home and re-write the idea so 
at best everyone else – or just someone else – could understand it. Each of the 7 
clashes, 10 lines, not more, not less, my table, tomorrow, at nine. I wrote the entire 
night, and was quite thrilled and anxious when I half past eight next morning laid 
three pages on Erik Rasmussen’s desk. But he published it. 
When I several years later again approached him with the only modestly more 
sane suggestion, that he ought to fund my PhD scholarship – of which the present 
dissertation is the tangible outcome - he again seized an opportunity where most 
others would have shied away from a risk. Once again the results of my labor 
remains a quickly drawn matrix figure of the different ways nations perhaps – 
perhaps not – can become and remain competitive in our contemporary epoch of 
globalization. (But to be sure, this time around the figure was not hatched 
overnight.)  
Turning risks into opportunities, is not just a slogan at Monday Morning. It is Erik 
Rasmussen’s ingrained inspiring, enticing and highly contagious mode of seeing 
the world. My time at Monday Morning was and is a profound and professional 
character defining experience. I am beyond words Erik Rasmussen deeply grateful 
for seeing an opportunity where most others would see a spiky-haired philosophy 
student. Thank you. 
Similarly words come short, when I am to express my deep gratitude to professor 
Ove Kaj Pedersen. He has been nothing short of the perfect supervisor, a 
tremendous intellectual and personal inspiration, a good colleague and friend. 
Throughout the preceding four and a half years he has time and time again 
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challenged and pushed me to the painful – but immensely rewarding outskirts - of 
my intellectual comfort zone, through which I have learned more, than I thought 
possible. With a distinctly philosophical tenor he has incessantly insisted upon 
always reconsidering - not only others - but first and foremost ones own 
idiosyncrasies, preconceived notions, theories and ideas. Apparently, there is 
always another structure, layer or elephant beneath. As such he has thoroughly 
confirmed my long held suspicions that in the 21st century, philosophy – or at least 
all the meaningful questions – are being addressed beyond the ivory towers of 
Anglo-Saxon Analytical philosophy departments.  
Simultaneously he has remained a rock-solid sentinel standing guard to protect - 
and if needed constrain – his PhD-student from letting an overambitious self 
destroy those things, that cannot be easily put together again. Through the entire 
excruciating exercise Ove has as supervisor not only more than fulfilled his 
academic responsibilities, but taken care of the whole person behind. What I am 
afterwards most grateful for is not the times when Ove asked me to put in a little 
more effort in the pursuit of a particular promising. It is all those times, when he 
told me to go home and take care of my family. Ove Kaj Pedersen is truly one of 
the few remaining Danish intellectuals – and Sartre’s sense. And he is a good man. 
It has been the biggest privilege of my professional life to be supervised by him. I 
only hope that with this dissertation, for once, you have not been served soup 
again. Thank you.  
Even after three and a half year of studies, I am still not sure whether the idea that 
nations compete is the most important trend in the 21st century, the most 
meaningful question of our time or whether competitiveness in the end is a 
question of being alike – or different.  
I am, however, fairly convinced that the competition of nations is not the least 
important trend. And it has been tremendously exciting to study this highly 
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pertinent question. The Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen 
Business School has provided a congenial, stimulating and supportive 
environment in which to undertake this kind of research. (I confess – It is me who 
have held your coffee cups hostage and ruthlessly cannibalized the fruit scheme.) 
Moreover, not least due to Ove Kaj Pedersen strong encouragement I was – 
through the generous support of Augustinus Fonden, Tranes Fond and Knud 
Højgaards Fond - in the spring Term of 2013 endowed with the fantastic 
intellectual opportunity to becoming a visiting scholar at the Minda de Gunzburg 
Center of European Studies, Harvard University. Here I met with some of the 
perhaps most intelligent and inspiring people on the planet, and it is an experience 
that my family and me will never forget.    
Throughout I have received invaluable feedback, highly perceptive comments and 
constructive criticism from some of the most generous and gifted scholars. 
Besides my supervisor they include Edward Ashbee, Suzanne Berger, Susana 
Borras, Robert Boyer, Eva Boxenbaum, John L. Campbell, Frank Dobbin, Peter 
Hall, Magnus Paulsen Hansen, Lasse Folke Henriksen, Torben Iversen, Janine 
Leschke, Kasper Lindskow, Anker Brink Lund, Lita Lundquist, Cathie Jo Martin, 
Jens Ladefoged Mortensen, Peter Andreas Norn, Lene Holm Pedersen, Ben 
Rosamond, Vivien Schmidt, Christiane Schultze, Kathleen Thelen and Grahame 
Thompson, who all in various ways have helped me sharpen and refine the 
arguments to be presented below. Thank you.  
 
 
* * * 
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Finally, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my family and friends for 
enduring encouragement, love and support – even in times when I have been 
completely absent-minded or just a plain social menace. 
My parents, Hanne Boje Rasmussen and Jens Møller Rasmussen, for always 
having encouraged, trusted and supported me to pursue whatever course of life I 
have chosen, regardless of how crazy or depleted of prospects it might have seen 
from the outset. Moreover for having endowed me with so much self-confidence – 
perhaps even too much – that I have always believed myself completely capable of 
choosing the risky, more difficult and painstaking but highly rewarding pathways 
forward. For sure, writing this dissertation would probably have been far less 
painful to write had I not had the confidence. But it would also – presumably – 
been of a lower quality, and most certainly far less bold and ambitious. I owe you 
so incredibly much. Thank you. 
My two daughters Maj Djørup Rasmussen, who with her arrival in 2009 provided 
with me with a strong motive for seizing the opportunity to gain a PhD degree and 
Augusta Djørup Rasmussen, who in 2013 arrived in the midst of things and thus 
provided an equally strong incentive to finish the dissertation. Finally, the best 
mother the girls could ever wish for, Stine Djørup have in between and throughout 
continuously surpassed herself in her devoted effort to keep the pieces of our 
family’s little jigsaw puzzle together. You are - above all in the world, to the end 
of time - my three answers to the most meaningful question there is. Thank you.   
It goes without saying, that this dissertation is dedicated to you. Even if some of 
you would rather want a teddy bear. (Which your father of course will go buy for 
you straightaway.) 
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2. SUMMARIES 
2.1 English Summary 
The present PhD-dissertation ” ”Is Competitiveness a Question of Being Alike? 
How United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark came to compete through their 
Knowledge Regimes from 1993 to 2007” studies the ideas which policy research 
organizations such as ministries of economics, economic councils and different 
types of think tanks – or what Campbell and Pedersen recently have defined as a 
nations knowledge regime – holds about the international competition of nations 
and what a nations competitiveness consists in, as well as whether and how these 
ideas co-varies with different national knowledge regimes particular form and 
organization. The primary argument and research result is, that even if the ideas, 
which policy research organizations in United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark 
in the period from 1993 to 2007 holds, in many ways are similar, they nonetheless 
exhibit nationally distinct features and differences. In short, the PhD-dissertation 
demonstrates, that not only does the organization of knowledge regimes vary. So 
do the ideas they produce. 
In the first chapter of the dissertation its overall problem and research question, 
structure, methodological and theoretical constraints as well as research results 
and conclusions are introduced. In the second chapter (Background) it is presented 
and discussed how the idea of a competition of nations gradually have gained 
ground among academics, governments and international organizations, which all 
in recent decades have begun to speak and act as if nations compete – regardless 
of whether they actually can be said to do so or not. It is however emphasized, that 
the idea of international competition neither is new nor uncritically embraced by 
everyone. Next it is shown, that even within the broad literature on 
competitiveness, there is many ways to define the concept – and three typologies 
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are reviewed, which in different ways distinguish between forms of 
competitiveness. Against the backdrop of this review a range of apparent 
immediate similarities and commonalities are extracted.  
In the third chapter of the dissertation (Theoretical Background) the theoretical 
development within the social-scientific discipline of comparative political 
economy is presented and discussed. It is argued, that also this discipline – if 
however implicitly and in a more sophisticated theoretical vocabulary – have been 
concerned with the question of whether competitiveness of nation essentially is a 
question of being alike or different. That is, whether there basically exist one or 
more different ways, for a nation to become and remain competitive in an age with 
increasing globalization and international competition.   
Moreover it is argued, that the theoretical development within the discipline can 
be understood as having transpired through four different stages, where each new 
stage have had a critical relationship with the preceding stage. A first stage – 
termed neo-liberal convergence theory – has claimed, that all political economies 
as a consequence of globalization have converged or are in the process of 
converging upon the same, neo-liberal politico-economic model. In contrast, a 
second stage – in the dissertation termed systemic institutionalism – have claimed, 
that different forms of national politico-economic models can remain stable and 
competitive, in spite of growing external pressures. In the third stage – termed 
dynamic institutionalism – it is again in response conversely claimed, that political 
economies are less stable than assumed by systemic institutionalism, and that they 
in fact undergo gradual, incremental change, by which they converge at a slower 
pace.  Finally, a relatively recent and fourth new stage – in the dissertation coined 
teleonomic institutionalism – challenged the third, with the argument, that it might 
be the case that political economies undergo gradual and institutional incremental 
change. But it does not necessarily mean that they also converge. Rather this stage 
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of theory development suggest, that all political economies change as a 
consequence of increasing globalization and competition, but that this change 
takes place along diverging trajectories and towards different outcomes (telos).  
The fourth chapter (Theory) presents and discuss that sub-branch of comparative 
political economy –termed cultural political economy – which claims that scholars 
on a par with socio-economic institutions themselves also ought to examine and 
study the ideas, which political and economic actors hold about the political 
economy in which they are situated and act, since increased theoretical attention to 
this aspect potentially might contribute to explanations of how and why socio-
economic institutions remain stable or change. It is further emphasized, that the 
sub-branch itself suffers from a set of shortcomings, which ought to be addressed, 
before it fully can contribute to the theoretical development within comparative 
political economy. Especially it is emphasized, that scholars within cultural 
political economy, first, must do a better job of defining and specify, what they 
understand by an idea; secondly, grant more theoretical attention to the bearers of 
ideas – such as e.g. ministries of economics, economic councils and think tanks; 
and thirdly develop and apply stronger, more transparent and reproducible 
methodologies by which they can study ideas.  
Subsequently a group of the literatures theoretical typologies of ideas are reviewed 
and compared, and it is observed that the literature a.o. Distinguish between more 
general and more particular ideas, of which the former posses a potential capacity 
to constrain the set of particular ideas, which political actors finds appropriate, 
relevant or expedient. But it is maintained that cultural political economy still miss 
a sufficient method, by which it might approach and study more general ideas. 
Next, it is argued, that Campbell and Pedersen with their recent study of different 
national knowledge-regimes, significantly have expanded the available scholarly 
knowledge on the carriers and bearers of ideas. But it is maintained, that even if 
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Campbell and Pedersen has demonstrated national variation in the ways in which 
national knowledge regimes are organized, and important task remains vis-a-vis 
demonstrating, that also the ideas produced by policy research organizations 
situated in different knowledge regimes varies.  
Against the backdrop of the preceding theoretical discussion, the dissertation 
therefore continues in its fifth chapter (Analytical Framework) by presenting and 
defining the central analytical categories – discourse, narrative and 
commensuration – which it claims address a range of cultural political economy’s 
shortcomings, and on the basis of which the dissertation endeavours to conduct a 
discourse analysis of whether and how ideas vary in different national knowledge 
regimes. It is simultaneously discussed what methodological and theoretical 
constraints a discourse-theoretical approach to the study of ideas implies, just as it 
is pointed out what epistemological status discourse-theoretical claims and 
propositions necessarily must have.  
In the sixth chapter (Methodology) the dissertation proposes a method, by which 
these analytical categories are sought investigated empirically. A three-level 
research design is established distinguishing between different types of national 
knowledge regimes, different types of policy research organizations, as well as 
different types of policy publications. On the first level the knowledge regimes of 
United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark are sampled. From each of these – at the 
second level – four different types of policy research organizations are sampled: 
Ministries of Economics, Economic Councils and two different types of think 
tanks (referred to as scholarly and advocacy tanks). From each of these policy 
research organizations three different types of policy publications are sampled: 
Annual Economic Reports, Commission Reports and White Papers, and 
Competitiveness indexes. In sum the dataset consists of more than 10.000 pages of 
policy publications, published by 12 different organizations in three different 
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nations in the period from 1993 to 2007. Finally the coding scheme as well as the 
coding procedure by which the dataset have been subjected to analysis is 
specified.  
In the seventh, eighth and ninth chapter of the dissertation the particular discourse 
analysis of the ideas in the three different knowledge regimes, and in the tenth 
chapter of the dissertation (Summary of Analysis) the results of three individual 
analyses are compared and summarized. A range of national similarities is 
observed such as e.g. in the way policy research organizations periodize the 
international competition of nations; the metrics by which they establish and 
estimate competitiveness as an object; the roles and responsibilities for increasing 
competitiveness they ascribe to the state as well as other societal actors vis-a-vis 
the market; the outcomes by which competitiveness is perceived to be revealed as 
well as the aspects of a political economy which is deemed to constitute a source 
of competitiveness. But a range of differences is also pointed out. First, there are 
national differences as to whether policy research organizations emphasize 
productivity, employment, labour supply or working hours as primary source of 
increased growth potential and competitiveness. Secondly, different national 
views are expressed with regards to whether policy measures to enhance social 
protection, inclusion, cohesion and equality and/or environmental sustainability 
improve or impede national competitiveness. 
Upon this foundation the eleventh chapter of the dissertation (Discussion and 
Implications) propose its contributions to the existing literature on knowledge 
regimes, commensuration and cultural political economy respectively, and further 
discuss the potential implications of the dissertations research results. 
Furthermore, the chapter address tentatively how future researchers within 
comparative political economy potentially might address the question of how 
ideas assert an influence upon processes of institutional stability and change. And 
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finally the analysed ideas are compared with the theories and assumptions 
predominant within systemic, dynamic and teleonomic institutionalism so as to 
probe their relative fit or correspondence. On this background it is claimed, first, 
that it has been difficult to reconcile the results of the dissertation with the 
theoretical claim, that all political economic ideas in recent decades best can be 
described as neo-liberal, as it is claimed that the dissertation have found and 
demonstrated the presence of indeed significant non-neo-liberal elements in the 
ideas held by policy research organizations situated in both United Kingdom, 
Germany and Denmark. Secondly, the dissertation argue that both systemic, 
dynamic and teleonomic intstitutionalists with advantage could squint more to 
ideas, when they develop the theoretical models by which they wish to study 
political economies, and especially grant the choice of particular theoretical 
explanans and explanandum more attention.  
In the twelfth and final chapter (Conclusion) the research results and central 
conclusions are briefly summarized. 
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2.2 Danish Summary 
Nærværende PhD-afhandling ”Is Competitiveness a Question of Being Alike?: 
How United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark came to compete through their 
Knowledge Regimes from 1993 to 2007” undersøger hvilke ideer videns-
producerende organisationer som Økonomiministerier,  Økonomiske Råd og 
forskellige former for tænketanke – hvad John Campbell og Ove K.  Pedersen 
samlende har betegnet som viden-regimer (”Knowledge Regimes”) – har om 
nationers indbyrdes internationale konkurrence og hvori en nations 
konkurrenceevne består, samt hvorvidt og på hvilken måde disse ideer ko-varierer 
med forskellige nationale viden-regimers særlige udformning og egenart. PhD-
afhandlingens primære argument og forskningsresultat er, at selvom de ideer som 
videns-producerende organisationer i henholdsvis Storbritannien, Tyskland og 
Danmark i perioden fra 1993 til 2007 giver udtryk for, på mange måder ligner 
hinanden, udviser de alligevel nationalt specifikke træk og forskelligheder. Kort 
sagt, PhD-afhandlingen påviser, at ikke kun organisationen af nationale videns 
regimer varierer. Det gør de ideer de producerer også.  
I afhandlingens første kapitel introduceres afhandlingens overordnede 
problemstilling, struktur, metodiske og teoretiske begrænsninger samt 
forskningsresultater og konklusion.  I det andet kapitel (Baggrund) præsenteres og 
diskuteres hvordan ideen om nationers konkurrence gradvist har vundet større 
indpas blandt foskere, regeringer og internationale organisationer, der alle i de 
senere årtier er begyndt at tale og agere som om nationer konkurrerer – uanset om 
de faktisk kan siges at konkurrere eller ej. Det pointeres dog, at ideen om nationers 
konkurrence hverken er ny eller ukritisk accepteret af alle. Herefter påvises det at 
selv inden for forskningen i konkurrenceevne, er der mange måder at forstå 
begrebet på – og der gennemgås tre typologier, der på forskellig vis sondrer 
imellem former for konkurrenceevne. På baggrund af disse typologier uddrages en 
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række tilsyneladende umiddelbare fællestræk og ligheder blandt de forskellige 
forståelser af konkurrenceevne.  
I afhandlingens tredje kapitel (Teoretisk Baggrund) præsenteres og diskuteres den 
teoretiske udvikling indenfor disciplinen komparativ politisk økonomi. Der 
argumenteres for at denne disciplin på lige fod - omend implicit og på en mere 
sofistikeret måde - har beskæftiget sig med spørgsmålet om hvorvidt 
konkurrenceevne for nationer grundlæggende er et spørgsmål om at blive ens eller 
at blive forskellig – dvs. om der grundlæggende eksisterer en eller flere forskellige 
måder for at land at blive og forblive konkurrencedygtig i en tid med tiltagende 
globalisering og international konkurrence.  
Det hævdes endvidere, at teori-udviklingen indenfor disciplinen kan forstås som 
havende gennemgået fire forskellige faser, hvor hver ny fase har forholdt sig 
kritisk til den forudgående. En første fase – betegnet neo-liberal konvergens teori -  
har hævdet at alle verdens politiske økonomier som konsekvens af 
globaliseringen, har eller vil konvergere på den samme, neo-liberale politisk-
økonomiske model. Som modsvar hertil, har en anden fase – i afhandlingen 
betegnet systemisk institutionalisme – hævdet, at forskellige former for nationale 
politisk-økonomiske modeller kan forblive stabile og konkurrencedygtige, til trods 
for voksende eksterne globale pres. I tredje fase – betegnet dynamisk 
institutionalisme – påstås det i modsætning hertil, at politiske økonomier er 
mindre stabile end hævdet af fortalere for systemisk institutionalisme, og at 
politiske økonomier faktisk undergår en gradvis, inkrementel forandring hvorved 
de i et lavere tempo konvergerer. Endelig har en forholdsvis ny, fjerde fase – i 
afhandlingen betegnet teleonomisk institutionalisme – udfordret tredje fase, med 
det argument, at nok forandrer politiske økonomier sig gradvist og inkrementelt. 
Men det betyder ikke nødvendigvis at de også konvergerer. Snarere hævder denne 
fase af teori-udvikling at alle politiske økonomier undergår forandring som 
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konsekvens af tiltagende globalisering og konkurrence, men at denne forandring 
foregår i forskellige retninger og imod forskellige mål (telos).  
I afhandlingens fjerde kapitel (Teori) præsenteres og diskuteres den del-disciplin 
af komparativ politisk økonomi – i afhandlingen kaldet kulturel politisk økonomi -  
der hævder at forskere på lige fod med de socioøkonomiske institutioner selv også 
bør undersøge og studere de ideer som politiske og økonomiske aktører har om 
den politiske økonomi i hvilket de er situeret og agerer, idet øget teoretisk 
opmærksomhed omkring dette aspekt potentielt kan bidrage til at forklare hvordan 
og hvorfor socioøkonomiske institutioner forblive stabile eller forandrer sig. Det 
påpeges dog endvidere, at denne del-disciplin selv lider af en række teoretiske 
utilstrækkeligheder og mangler, der først bør adresseres, førend del-disciplinen til 
fulde kan bidrage til den teoretiske udvikling indenfor komparativ politisk 
økonomi. Særligt understreges det at forskere inden for kulturel politisk økonomi, 
for det første, skal blive bedre i stand til klart at definere og specificere, hvad de 
forstår ved en ide; for det andet skal skænke bærerne af ideer – såsom 
økonomiministerier, økonomiske råd og tænketanke – større teoretisk 
opmærksomhed; samt for det tredje udvikle og applicere stærkere, mere 
transparente og reproducerebare metodologier ved hvilke de kan studere ideer.  
Efterfølgende gennemgås og sammenlignes en række af litteraturens teoretiske 
typologier for forskellige former for ideer, og det observeres at der inden for 
litteraturen bl.a. sondres imellem mere generelle og mere partikulære ideer, hvoraf 
de første besidder potential kapacitet til at begrænse det sæt af partikulære ideer, 
som politiske aktører finder passende, relevante eller formålstjenestelige. Men det 
fastholdes, at kulturel politisk økonomi stadig ikke har udviklet en tilstrækkelig 
metode, ved hvilken den kan studere mere generelle ideer. Dernæst, argumenteres 
der for, at Campbell og Pedersen med deres seneste studie af forskellige nationale 
viden-regimer, markant har forøget den tilgængelige viden om bærere af ideer. 
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Men det fastholdes, at til trods for at Campbell og Pedersen har påvist en national 
variation i den måde viden-regimer er organiseret på, udestår der stadig in vigtig 
opgave i forhold til at demonstrere, at også de ideer som forskellige former for 
viden-producerende organisationer situeret i disse viden-regimer producerer 
varierer.  
På baggrund af den teoretiske diskussion, fortsætter afhandlingen derfor i sit femte 
kapitel (Analytisk Rammeværk) med at præsentere og definere de centrale 
analytiske kategorier – diskurs, narrativ og kommensuration -  som det hævdes 
adresserer en række af de utilstrækkeligheder som kulturel politisk økonomi 
rummer, og på baggrund af hvilke afhandlingen tilstræber at gennemføre en 
diskursanalyse af hvorvidt og hvordan ideer varierer i forskellige nationale viden-
regimer. Det diskuteres samtidig hvilke metodiske og teoretiske begrænsninger en 
diskursteoretisk tilgang til studiet af ideer indebærer, ligesom det påpeges hvilken 
epistemologisk status diskurs-teoretiske udsagn og propositioner nødvendigvis må 
have.  
I afhandlingens sjette kapitel (Metodologi) fremsættes en metode, ved hvilket 
disse analytiske kategorier søges undersøgt empirisk. Der etableres et tre-lags 
forskningsdesign der sondrer imellem forskellige typer af nationale viden-regimer, 
forskellige typer af viden-producerende organisationer samt forskellige typer af 
policy publikationer. På første niveau inddrages videns-regimerne i Storbritannien, 
Tyskland og Danmark. Fra hver af disse – på andet niveau – inddrages fire 
forskellige typer af videns-producerende organisationer: økonomiministerier, 
økonomiske råd, samt to forskellige typer af tænketanke. Fra hver af disse 
organisationer inddrages 3 typer af publikationer: Økonomiske Årsrapporter, 
Kommissionsrapporter og hvid papirer samt konkurrenceevne indekser. Samlet 
dækker datasættet mere end 10.000 siders policy publikationer, publiceret af 12 
forskellige organisationer i 3 forskellige lande i perioden fra 1993 til 2007. 
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Endelig specificeres det kodeskema samt den kodnings-procedure ved hvilket 
data-sættet er blevet underkastet analyse.  
I afhandlingens syvende, ottende og niende kapitel gennemføres den egentlige 
diskursanalyse af ideerne i de tre forskellige videns regimer, og i afhandlingens 
tiende kapitel (Sammenfatning af Analyse) sammenlignes og sammenfattes 
resultaterne af de tre enkeltstående analyser. Der observeres en række ligheder 
landene imellem f.eks. i den måde hvorpå de periodiserer den internationale 
konkurrence imellem nationer; de metrikker ved hvilke de etablerer og estimerer 
konkurrenceevne som objekt; de roller og ansvar for at fremme konkurrenceevne 
de tilskriver stat såvel som andre aktører i forhold til markedet; i de målestokke 
ved hvilke konkurrenceevne måles; og i forhold til hvilke aspekter af en politisk 
økonomi som hævdes at udgøre kilder til konkurrenceevne. Men der påpeges også 
en række forskelle. For det første, er der nationale forskelle på hvorvidt videns-
producerende organisationer fremhæver produktivitet, beskæftigelse, 
arbejdsudbud eller antal arbejdstimer som primær kilde til at øge vækstpotentialet 
og konkurrenceevnen i en politisk økonomi. For det andet, er der forskellige 
national syn på hvorvidt politiske tiltag til at øge social beskyttelse, inklusion, 
sammenhængskraft og lighed og/eller miljømæssige bæredygtighed bidrager eller 
reducerer et lands konkurrenceevne. 
På den baggrund fremsætter afhandlingens ellevte kapitel (Diskussion og 
Implikationer) de bidrag afhandlingen har gjort til den eksisterende litteratur om 
henholdsvis viden-regimer, kommensuration og kulturel politisk økonomi, og 
diskuterer de implikationer afhandlingens resultater potentielt kan have for disse 
foretagender. Endvidere adresserer kapitlet tentativt hvordan fremtidige forskere i 
kulturel politisk økonomi potentielt kan adressere spørgsmålet om hvordan ideer 
udøver indflydelse på institutionelle stabiliserings- og forandringsprocesser. Og 
endeligt sammenholdes og sammenlignes de analyserede ideer med de teorier og 
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antagelser der er fremherskende indenfor henholdsvis systemisk, dynamisk og 
teleonomisk institutionalisme. På baggrund af den sammenligning hævdes det, for 
det første, at det synes svært at forene afhandlingens resultater med den teoretiske 
påstand, at alle politisk økonomiske ideer de seneste årtier bedst kan beskrives 
som neo-liberale, idet det hævdes at afhandlingen har påvist endog betydelige 
non-neo-liberale elementer i de ideer de videns-producerende organisationer i 
både Storbritannien, Tyskland og Danmark har fremført. For det andet, hævder 
afhandlingen at både systemiske, dynamiske og teleonomiske institutionalister 
med fordel kunne skele mere til ideer, når de udarbejder de teoretiske modeller 
ved hvilke de ønsker at studere politiske økonomier, og særligt give valget af 
teoretisk explanans og explanandum større teoretisk bevågenhed.  
I afhandlingens tolvte og sidste kapitel (Konklusion) sammenfattes afhandlingens 
forskningsresultater og centrale konklusioner. 
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4. INTRODUCTION 
“On résiste à l'invasion des armées,  
On ne résiste pas à l'invasion des idées.” 
- Viktor Hugo, Histoire d'un crime, 1877 
 
 “What is the most resilient parasite?  
Bacteria? A virus? An intestinal worm?  
An idea. Resilient. Highly contagious.  
Once an idea has taken hold of the brain it's almost impossible to eradicate.  
An idea that is fully formed – fully understood – that sticks.”  
- Cobb, Inception, 2010 
 
Nations compete.1 This seemingly simple idea has recently reemerged as one of 
the most resilient and highly contagious notions of our age. Indeed, the idea that 
nations compete has taken hold of the brains of many public pundits and 
policymakers. Newspaper editors and directors of think tanks, business managers 
and union leaders, politicians and other practical men, who believe themselves to 
be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, have apparently distilled the very 
same idea from the very same academic scribbler. At least since the publication of 
Michael Porter’s The Competitive Advantage of Nations in 1990, the idea has 
proven almost impossible to eradicate within contemporary political-economic 
discourse.2  
That the idea of international competition between nations is so deeply entrenched 
in contemporary political-economic discourse is all the more surprising because it 
 
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1 Pedersen 2011 
2 See p. 57 below 
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is exactly that: an idea. It is one belief or perception of what the world is like but 
perhaps not the most accurate one. Nobel laureate Paul Krugman immediately and 
vociferously derided the idea as a “dangerous obsession” and the product of faulty 
economic reasoning. To him, the idea was wrong because any allegedly 
outcompeted nation would not disappear from the surface of the earth in the way a 
firm put out of business would disappear from the market, and it was dangerous 
because it might ensnare politicians with the mercantilist notion that international 
trade is a zero-sum game where someone wins and others lose.3 
Even so the idea sticks. As of today, policymakers in advanced political 
economies all speak and act as if nations compete with one another4 regardless of 
whether they in fact do so and regardless of the potential societal, political and 
moral consequences of speaking and acting as if they do. Indeed, those who have 
the ostensibly dangerous obsession with competitiveness have increasingly been 
criticized for neglecting the potential unintended consequences of an overly one-
eyed pursuit of it at the expense of a nation’s wider societal and democratic 
responsibilities. For instance, in line with many great sociologists of Modernity 
who have observed that the gesellschaft gradually hollows out the very societal 
underpinnings of the gemeinschaft upon which it rests.5 Wolfgang Streeck has 
recently argued that any contemporary democratic, capitalist state is torn between 
satisfying two essentially irreconcilable principles of resource allocation—the 
principle of marginal productivity by which resources are distributed according to 
merit in the market, and the principle of social entitlement by which resources are 
distributed according to political rights—and that any such state, given the 
 

3 See p. 60 below.  
4 Pedersen 2010. 
5 Weber 1921, Tönnies 1887, Habermas 1981 Polanyi 1944, Scott 1985 
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perceived inexorable imperatives of globalization, prioritizes the former at the 
expense of the latter.6    
Indifferent to or just oblivious of such criticism, nations keep calm and carry on 
competing. But how do nations compete? Or more accurately, how do the actors 
situated within a nation think it competes? And do they perceive competitiveness 
to be necessarily at odds with wider societal requirements such as providing a 
decent level of social protection? Indeed, it is remarkable how persistent and 
resilient this worldview is. Once one begins to scratch the surface of this highly 
contested idea, one becomes surprised by just how differently different actors 
understand the concept. 
In fact, while virtually everyone today accepts that nations compete, just as few 
agree as to what the competitiveness of a nation entails.7  Where some argue that it 
 

6 Streeck 2011. In fact, Wolfgang Streeck’s argument is a little more sophisticated than that. 
According to him, the fundamentally irreconcilable conflict between marginal utility and social 
entitlements is only ever artificially and temporarily resolved. The inherent incommensurability 
of the demands of the market and the demands of society is continuously glossed over by 
different societal actors who take turns to assume responsibility for fueling growth by taking on 
increasing amounts of debt. Thus first the Keynesian state of the Golden Age of capitalism 
fueled growth by deficit spending but inflated away the resulting debt through expansive 
monetary policies. However, when this opportunity was reined in by the insistence on stable 
inflation and independent central banks adopting an assertive ascending monetarism, the state 
resorted to a fiscal policy to stimulate growth through accumulating budget deficits. However, 
deprived of access to a printing press, worries of states’ ability to repay mounting piles of 
sovereign debt emerged and sent interest rates skyrocketing. Thus, also public spending had to 
be curbed lest the state by caught in a downward death spiral of accumulating debt and interest. 
Someone else – the private sector – had to take the wheel. As first firms took the lead and 
incurred massive amounts of debt, apparently under impression that immense profits could be 
earned from investments in the promising New Economy. But with the bursting of the Dotcom-
bubble in the late 1990s, the appetite for debt of firms was suddenly satiated. Instead households 
came to the fore and picked up the debt baton. Through innovative, new financial vehicles such 
as subprime mortgage lending, the former state privilege of spending beyond your means 
became democratized and available to every citizen who could produce a paycheck. Hence, four 
decades on the wonderfully ironic outcome of Thatcherism, which held that the Keynesian 
deficit-spending state should be managed more like a household, was that households had to be 
run more like Keynesian deficit-spending states. (So much for the frugal virtues of Margaret 
Thatcher.)  
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consists of a nation’s ability to export, others argue that it consists of the ability to 
increase economic growth. Where some argue that competitiveness consists of the 
ability of a nation to attract foreign direct investments, others believe that 
competitiveness depends on the ability to adapt the economy to changing 
international demands and new technology. Where some believe that comparative 
wage, price and tax levels essentially determine competitiveness, others contend 
that the ability to produce high-quality, knowledge-intensive goods and services is 
crucial for a nation’s competitiveness. For some innovation is highly important; 
for others, it is superfluous. And so on ad infinitum. The various concepts of 
competitiveness at times seem so disparate that one is left wondering whether all 
competitors participate in the same league or game. In light of the high stakes—
the very livelihood of a nation’s population—it is curious that there as of yet one 
commonly accepted—publicly and scientifically agreed on—definition of 
competitiveness does not exist.  
And then again perhaps it is not that curious after all. If competitiveness, as held 
by Streeck, is the implicit evaluative yardstick of political-economic and societal 
merit by which resources, power and privileges are apportioned in contemporary 
democratic, capitalist political economies, then one should perhaps not be entirely 
flabbergasted that the idea is shrouded in a fair share of political contestation, 
controversy and conflict.  
 
* * * 
 
Within the social-scientific discipline of comparative political economy, the 
question of competitiveness has likewise been pivotal, even if it has been posed 
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
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using a slightly different and more sophisticated theoretical vocabulary. For 
decades, a central theoretical controversy within comparative political economy 
has been whether only one or several ways exist for a nation to become and 
remain competitive in an age of increasing globalization. In short, is 
competitiveness essentially about being different or being alike? In particular, 
scholars have addressed whether all advanced political economies are converging 
upon the same (ostensibly neoliberal) socioeconomic model and, if they are, the 
pace at which the convergence is taking place. Accordingly the scholarly 
pendulum has oscillated back and forth between different theoretical positions 
emphasizing, variously, convergence and divergence through a host of 
intermediate theoretical discussions and battles.8 
First, a group of scholars in the early 1990s argued deterministically that 
globalization would force the governments of all advanced political economies to 
willfully or reluctantly adopt a similar set of policies—cut personal and corporate 
taxes; privatize former public enterprise and infrastructure; deregulate capital, 
product and labor markets; disempower labor unions; and retrench the state—and 
thus facilitate convergence on a distinctly neoliberal model.9 Second, a body of 
scholarship, which for the purposes of the present study will be termed systemic 
institutionalism, directly contested such claims and suggested that different 
national institutional systems would prove equally viable and stable despite the 
external pressures of globalization since these provided firms with different 
comparative institutional advantages. And thus, scholars adopting a systemic 
institutionalist approach maintained that national political economies would 
continue to diverge.10  
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8 See p. 79 below. 
9 See p. 81 below. 
10 See p. 85 below 
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Third and more recently, other scholars have begun to contest and challenge 
systemic institutionalism for providing an overly static and syncopated account of 
institutional stability and change within contemporary political economies. Their 
approach, termed dynamic institutionalism, posits that despite apparent 
institutional stability, political economies nevertheless undergo piecemeal, gradual 
change through a host of small incremental shifts, moderations and alterations, 
miniscule changes which in isolation seem inconsequential but in aggregate have 
the capacity to change institutions profoundly. Hence dynamic institutionalism 
suggests that the advanced political economies of the world nonetheless are 
converging as a response to globalization, albeit at a slower pace than initially 
envisioned.11   
Finally, and most recently, an emerging body of scholarship has contested 
dynamic institutionalism. Not for its demonstration of incremental institutional 
change but for its more or less explicit assumption of equifinal institutional 
change. While contributors to this school of thought accept that political 
economies in recent decades have been in flux, they nonetheless reject that this 
facilitates convergence. Instead, they argue that political economies evolve, 
develop and change along different trajectories towards different end-states or 
telos. Hence the latter wave of research is termed teleonomic institutionalism.12 
Just as the concept of competitiveness is highly contested in public political-
economic discourse, so the heated scientific debate continues regarding whether 
systemic, dynamic or teleonomic institutionalism constitutes the most appropriate 
theoretical framework for studying contemporary political economies. 
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11 See p. 87 below 
12 See p. 91 below. 
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* * * 
 
Tangentially to this core exchange, a theoretical discussion has addressed whether 
comparative political economists—besides studying the institutions of advanced 
political economies themselves—ought to seriously consider granting analytical 
attention to the ideas actors situated within such political economies hold 
regarding these political economies.13 In short, whether ideas matter has likewise 
remained a widely discussed and contested topic. The question is whether the 
manifold ways in which social actors make sense of the political economy in 
which they are embedded should be included in the explanatory toolbox of 
comparative political economy or merely considered an epiphenomenal byproduct 
essentially reducible to, in some sense, a real, concrete socioeconomic materiality. 
That this at all is a matter of dispute is perhaps surprising in as much as the main 
progenitors of systemic, dynamic and teleonomic institutionalism implicitly 
assume a role for ideas in their theoretical elaborations of what an institution is.14  
However, perhaps these approaches are not entirely to blame for not having fully 
appreciated the theoretical value ideas. Indeed the branch of comparative political 
economy which believes ideas matter—referred to as cultural political economy—
suffers from several theoretical and methodological shortcomings, which easily 
explains why core comparative political economists do not grant it much attention. 
John Campbell has argued that scholars of ideas must do a far better job, first of 
providing conceptually clear and rigorous definitions of what an idea is, second of 
specifying more carefully who the actors are which produce and ostensibly bring 
ideas to bear on institutions, and third of developing and employing sufficiently 
transparent, reproducible and reliable methodologies for such research, if they are 
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14 See p. 97 below. 
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to be taken seriously within the mainstays of comparative political economy’s 
larger edifice. 15 
Recently, some breakthroughs have occurred, though. In particular, Campbell and 
Pedersen in forthcoming research have addressed the second shortcoming with 
one of the hitherto most comprehensive and encompassing studies of what they 
term “national knowledge regimes,” that is, the field of “policy research 
organizations like think tanks, government research units, political party 
foundations and others that produce and disseminate policy ideas”16 and how such 
fields are internally organized in nationally distinct ways.17  
However, put crudely, their study curiously stops just short of demonstrating that 
knowledge regimes matter. 18  More precisely, while Campbell and Pedersen 
succeed in demonstrating that the organization of knowledge regimes exhibits 
great, nationally conditioned variation, they do not demonstrate (beyond 
preliminary tentative indications19) that the substantive content of ideas co-varies 
with the organizational variation within the national knowledge regime they 
observed. As such, they leave a potentially dangerous flank open to attack. In 
short, if the organization of knowledge regimes varies but the ideas remain the 
same, it is not obvious that comparative political economists should bother much 
with the study of knowledge regimes.   
 
* * * 
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15 See p. 99 below. 
16 Campbell and Pedersen 2014, p. 6. 
17 See p. 108 below. 
18 See p. 112 below.  
19 In fact, Campbell and Pedersen do examine the substantive content of the ideas held by policy 
research organizations situated in different knowledge regimes. But they constrain their analysis 
to one type of policy research organization, which even if it is carefully selected in a 
methodologically balanced way, constrains the generalizability of their study.  See p. 112 below.   
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The present study picks up the baton left by Campbell and Pedersen and attempts 
to shore up this important breach in the defense of the knowledge regimes 
approach. It will do this by demonstrating that different types of policy research 
organizations situated in the knowledge regimes of the United Kingdom, Germany 
and Denmark in the period from 1993 to 2007 came to make sense of the 
international competition of nations, and what it means for a nation to be 
competitive, through ideas which in many ways were similar but also exhibited 
variety in accordance with national knowledge regimes. Thus, the study will 
further corroborate the view that not only do national knowledge regimes vary, so 
do the ideas they produce.  
In so doing, the study simultaneously addresses the remaining two shortcomings 
of cultural political economy. First, it outlines an analytical framework by which it 
proposes to conduct a discourse analysis of the ideas held in three different 
knowledge regimes.20 In so doing, it hopes to complement the ongoing efforts of 
scholars of ideas to develop and devise more nuanced, meticulous and productive 
analytical frameworks and categories by which to approach and study ideas and 
their ostensible impact upon advanced political economies.  
In particular, the study proposes to study ideas understood as discourse and 
narratives. The concept of discourse will be defined as a context of rationality that 
enables social actors to make sense of social practice as if that practice is rational 
or irrational.21 But the study contends that such discourse is not immediately given 
to social scientific analysis. Rather it must be approached indirectly and for this 
purpose, the study—on the basis of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy—elaborates the 
concept of a narrative.22 This, in turn, is argued to be the product of social actors’ 
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20 See p. 115 below. 
21 See p. 115 below.  
22 See p. 117 below.  
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commensuration of their social reality—a (cognitive) process described by 
Espeland and Sauder as the transformation of a potentially infinite multitude of 
heterogeneous qualities into finite, discrete quantities that share a common form.23 
As such, social actors make sense of an overwhelmingly complex social reality by 
imposing upon it distinct timescales, metrics, identities and functions. By using 
these, they become able to differentiate dichotomously between temporal events 
(some events happen before other things, others after), subjects and objects (some 
entities of social reality constitute an object measurable by a metric; other entities 
are cognizant subjects in possession of identity) and functional inputs and outputs 
(some objects constitute the input in a function, others an outcome.) Thus instead 
of observing it directly, a social scientist may reasonably assume a discourse to be 
present if a dispersed multitude of social actors invoke narratives which 
commensurate social reality through a sufficiently similar and comparable set of 
timescales, metrics, identities and functions.  
On this basis, the study will demonstrate that in the knowledge regimes of the 
United Kingdom24, Germany25 and Denmark26—even if they exhibited significant 
national and in itself quite interesting variation—sufficiently similar narratives of 
competitiveness came to be expressed by the policy research organizations situated 
there27 and that one therefore can reasonable assume a common discourse—the 
discourse that nations compete—to have been present.  
Second, the study develops a three-layered research design and methodology by 
which the discourse analysis is carried out. The design distinguishes between the 
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23 See p. 122 below 
24 See p. 175 below. 
25 See p. 213 below. 
26 See p. 251below.  
27  That is, most policy research organizations “periodized” the “history” of international 
competition according to a similar timescale, just as they categorized their political economy 
according to similar metrics, functions etc. 
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three layers of knowledge regimes, policy research organizations and policy 
publications. 28  As such the study is deeply indebted to the prior work on 
knowledge regimes by Campbell and Pedersen and hopes to complement the 
already ongoing extensive effort of scholars of ideas to obtain still clearer and 
empirically nuanced specifications of whom the actors are who ostensibly bring 
ideas to bear on institutions. The ensuing discourse analysis of the substantive 
content held by actors within knowledge regimes is based on data drawn from 
three different types of policy publications published by four different types of 
policy research organizations situated in three different types of knowledge 
regimes. In total more than 10,000 pages of policy documents29 published by 12 
different policy research organizations30 in the period from 1993 to 2007 have 
been sampled, coded and analyzed with the qualitative data analysis software 
package Atlas.ti 6.31 
 
* * * 
 
However, before introducing the study’s findings and main conclusions, it is only 
appropriate to highlight the study’s theoretical and methodological limitations and 
shortcomings. Any scientific proposition is only as convincing as its underlying 
methodological foundation, and no research design is flawless or complete. The 
one applied in the present study most certainly is not. And while some 
shortcomings could have been reasonably addressed in a world of unlimited time 
and resources, other limitations stem from the deliberate, intentional choices 
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28 See p. 129 below. 
29 See p. 163 below. 
30 See p. 146 below. 
31 See p. 170 below.  
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inherent to the analytical framework and research design. It is important from the 
outset to be fully clear about the present study’s theoretical, methodological and 
analytical limitations so as to avoid generalizations beyond what the study’s 
methodology warrants.  
In terms of theory, the study only deals with the political-economic aspects of 
globalization and the international competition of nations. However, globalization 
is a highly heterogeneous and multifarious phenomenon entailing, for example, 
many cultural aspects as well. These latter aspects are largely bypassed in what 
follows. The policy documents have been analyzed with a view to discerning 
potential national differences and similarities in how policy research organizations 
make sense of what it means for a nation to compete with other nations, and the 
analysis has thus centered on economic policy documents. But it could easily be 
the case that things might have looked different if one had examined foreign 
policy, education policy or environmental policy.       
In terms of methodology, the present study can (at least) be challenged on three 
accounts: its sampling of policy research organizations32, its sampling of policy 
documents from these organizations 33  and the procedure by which these 
documents have been coded and analyzed.34 First, the study have sampled policy 
research organizations according to a criterion of typological maximum variation 
and thus included an advocacy organization, a scholarly organization, an 
economic council and a ministry of economics from each of the three national 
knowledge regimes. Of course, the policy research organizations could have been 
sampled according to a criterion of proper maximum variation and thus the study 
could have controlled for policy research organizations’ relative size, funding 
 
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32 See p. 152 below. 
33 See p. 168 below. 
34 See p. 172 below.  
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sources, staffing, publication strategies, avowed ideological orientation (or lack 
thereof) etc. Also it would be possible to invoke a more fine-grained 
typologization of policy research organizations than the four-fold typology applied 
below. (Indeed, one might convincingly argue that there exist several sub-types of, 
for example, advocacy or scholarly organizations.) However, both options would 
yield a far greater dataset than what the study had time and resources to manage 
adequately. Hence it settled for a more circumscribed and manageable dataset of 
policy research organizations. 
Moreover, a question could be raised as to whether the policy research 
organizations chosen in fact constitute representative exemplars of the ideal types 
they supposedly represent. For instance, it could readily be questioned whether the 
National Institute of Social and Economic Research in the United Kingdom neatly 
fits the type of an economic council35 or whether the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in 
Germany constitutes a scholarly organization. 36  The present study has been 
acutely aware that any real type always will tend to defy its theoretical ideal type 
representation and moreover that most of the policy research organizations 
examined here perhaps are better characterized as hybrid types. The study has, 
upon consulting relevant secondary literature, sought to sample policy research 
organizations which reasonably approximate the four ideal types.   
Likewise, the study perhaps might be accused of harboring a somewhat 
ideological, leftist bias since it includes the Institute for Public Policy Research in 
the U.K. (conventionally associated with New Labor), the Friederich Ebert 
Stiftung in Germany (legally associated with SPD) and the Arbejderbevægelsens 
Erhvervsråd in Denmark (funded by the Danish labor movement.) However, such 
criticism depends upon prior specification of what “leftism” means. If one as a 
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discourse analyst by methodological choice ab initio controls for such issues (that 
is, the substantive content of ideas) one would impose a particular meaning upon 
the discourse by the very (methodological) categories one employed. In other 
words, the present study has sampled policy research organizations according to 
their (ideal-typical) mode of organization and operation, not the substantive 
content of their (non-) ideological ideas and idiosyncrasies.37  
Second, the study has sampled three types of policy documents from the selected 
policy research organizations: annual economic reports, competitiveness indexes 
and commission white papers. For the two former types, only documents 
published in 1993, 2000 and 2007 have been collected. This naturally implies 
limitations. One could have chosen another periodization as well as more time 
slots within this period. One could have examined other types of documents as 
well, and one could have spent more time examining whether the chosen 
organizations in fact had published more of the three types of publications within 
the period under study.38 Also the study applied a snowballing sampling method 
by which additional publications—referred to in the publications selected by the 
above criteria—were included. But such a procedure obviously reduces the study’s 
inter-coder reliability to a degree. 
Furthermore, in the case of some policy research organizations39 it has been 
difficult to ascertain whether the organization has maintained its ideas and points 
of view over the period examined. Indeed, the findings of the study might be 
further corroborated—or challenged—by triangulating them with data drawn from 
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37 Indeed the latter alternative would have rendered the analysis tautological. See p. 152 below 
38 For instance, more time and resources could have been devoted to investigate whether the 
Sachsverständigensrat in Germany had produced additional relevant white papers or the Institute 
for Public Policy Research in the United Kingdom had produced annual economic reports. See 
p. 419 below.  
39 For instance, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Bertelssmann Stiftung in Germany and the Institute 
for Public Policy Research in United Kingdom.  
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other sources such as semi-structured interviews so as to determine whether the 
policy research organizations studied in fact would maintain their point of view if 
asked directly.40 
Thirdly, the study have coded and analyzed the data material with a coding 
scheme derived from the analytical framework and employed the sophisticated 
qualitative data analysis software package Atlas.ti 6. However, the principal 
investigator has conducted the entire coding and analysis himself, as the study did 
not have sufficient resources to recruit additional assistants to conduct the coding. 
Also the coding procedure involved a (semi-structured) technique by which text 
passages and phrases, which intuitively appeared significant but did not 
immediately fit preconceived coding categories, were nonetheless coded with a 
residual code. To be sure, the absence of additional coders and the application of 
this more open coding technique also diminish the study’s inter-coder reliability.  
However, the fact that inter-coder reliability has not been entirely battered is 
perhaps indirectly evidenced by the study’s lack of success in determining how all 
the examined policy research organizations relate to the question of the relation 
between competitiveness, environmental sustainability and social protection.41  
Finally, a set of challenges is associated with the application of the discourse 
theoretical approach. First, a question could be raised as to whether the application 
of the analytical concepts of production, policymaking and knowledge regimes 
imposes a certain meaning upon the discourse.42 Second and more importantly, the 
very epistemological status of discourse theoretical claims erects a methodological 
firewall around the range of conclusions that one can infer from the study. That is, 
the propositions which result from a discourse analysis do emphatically not 
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168 below.  
41 See p. 414 below. 
42 See p.  131 below. 
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express once-and-for-all given social-scientific knowledge (understood as justified 
true beliefs) and can never constitute more than second-order interpretations of the 
first-order interpretations of social reality held by social actors embedded in that 
social reality. As argued below, the propositions stemming from a discourse 
analysis can perhaps best be likened to what Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo 
has termed “weak thinking” and does not tell the social scientist anything about 
the world “as it really is.” However, being weak does not necessarily imply being 
inconsequential. 43 
 
* * * 
 
With due regard to this plethora of indeed highly important theoretical and 
methodological caveats and constraints, the study hopes to make vivid, on the one 
hand, that national narratives of competitiveness that have converged in many 
regards. 
	
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Policy research organizations in all three knowledge regimes periodized the 
international competition of nations similarly by distinguishing between a period 
before and a period after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, as well as a 
period before and after the New Economy.44 They also made sense of their 
domestic political economy through a similar set of quantitative econometric 
statistics (output-gaps, growth accounting and competitiveness indexes).45 And 
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45 See p. 303 below.  
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roughly half of them ascribed subjectivity to the state vis-à-vis the political 
economy as they argued that governments possess a legitimate role as corrector of 
market failures, converter of market participants’ mindsets, coordinator of their 
activities and/or combiner of supply-side and demand-side policies. 46  They 
similarly begin to argue that the competitiveness of nations should be measured 
more in terms of its ability to generate growth and less in terms of its ability to 
export47, and they argue that, beyond open deregulated markets, privatization, low 
taxes and flexible labor markets, institutions for the provision of skills and 
education, science and innovation, entrepreneurship, infrastructure, migration, 
ICT, public sector efficiency and management also constitute important sources of 
a nation’s competitiveness.48  
On the other hand, the study will also demonstrate that besides such similarities, 
national narratives of competitiveness nonetheless diverge.49 First, policy research 
organizations situated in a particular national knowledge regime tend to emphasize 
one item of the growth account—for example, productivity, labor supply, 
employment, or workings hours—more than others.50 Second, the study finds that, 
whether policy research organizations perceive policy measures to enhance social 
protection, inclusion and equality and/or environmental protection as sources or 
barriers to competitiveness to some degree depends upon the knowledge regime 
within which they are situated.51  

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46 See p. 307 below.  
47 See p. 312 below. 
48 See p. 314 below. 
49 See p. 317 below. 
50 See p. 319 below. 
51 See p. 323 below.  
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And the study observes that apparently policy research organizations situated in 
different national knowledge regimes hold diverging views of the timescale by 
which relative national competitive performance should be assessed, measured 
and evaluated. Put figuratively, while all policy research organizations hold the 
idea that nations are engaged in a competitive race where they must forge ahead, 
catch up or fall perilously behind, they disagree with regard to when—and by what 
timescale—one ought to assess whether a nation has taken the lead, been 
overtaken or lost pace. Apparently, some policy research organizations believe 
that a slow starter might end up a long-term winner.     
 
* * * 
 
As such, the study hopes to contribute to three strands of literature. First, it 
advances the scholarly knowledge of the knowledge that knowledge regimes 
produce with a discourse analysis that identifies nationally distinct narratives of 
competitiveness and hence demonstrates that the organization of knowledge 
regimes as well as the ideas they produce co-vary in some degree. As such, it 
tentatively salvages the knowledge regimes approach from a potential devastating 
criticism.52  
Second, the study shows how the theoretical concept of commensuration, as 
proposed by Espeland and Sauder, might be incorporated in the analytical 
frameworks of cultural political economic scholarship. But it will also contribute 
to this scholarly exploration by emphasizing that social actors—besides their 
commensuration—also engage in the cognitive process of what is termed in-
commensuration, as well as de- and re-commensuration. Moreover, it will make 
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vivid that not only spatial entities are subjected to commensuration; so is social 
time. That is, actors also make sense of social reality through temporal 
commensuration. Hence the study will potentially aid scholars in their ongoing 
theoretical exploration and add to the already growing understanding of the 
process of commensuration.53 
Third, the study presents an analysis with a clear definition of how it understands 
an idea that is attentive to the specific actors who produce and wield ideas, and 
which employs a transparent methodology. In so doing the study thus hopes to 
contribute to the ongoing endeavor of rendering cultural political economy so 
pertinent and palatable that core comparative political economists might come to 
take it a little more seriously.54 
 
* * *  
 
While some scholars of ideas have begun arguing that it is not a question of 
whether but how ideas matter, it probably takes a great deal more to persuade the 
staunchly convinced materialist scholar of comparative political economy that 
ideas in fact matter. Indeed, it remains, first, to be explained—not just described—
as to why national narratives of competitiveness co-vary with the internal 
organization of national knowledge regimes. Second, scholars of ideas more 
generally need to demonstrate that ideas in fact influence processes of institutional 
stability and change. The particular causal mechanisms by which ideas ostensibly 
influence institutions need to be specified in far greater empirical detail. Finally, 
scholars of ideas could, to their advantage, engage more in relating their findings 
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to the core theoretical controversy between systemic, dynamic and teleonomic 
institutionalism and address the highly pertinent question of what ideas held by 
actors embedded within political economies tell comparative political economists 
about political economies—and whether political economies remain stable or 
change, converge or diverge.55  
Unfortunately, these three tasks are significantly beyond the scope of what the 
present study has had financial—and perhaps intellectual—resources to address in 
any adequate fashion. In fact, it is worth it from the outset to emphasize what the 
present study does not do. First, having described the different national narratives 
of competitiveness, the study will—due to resource constraints—leave it for future 
researchers to explain more comprehensively why national narratives of 
competitiveness co-vary with the internal organization of knowledge regimes, 
although the study does briefly speculate on tentative explanations.56  
Second, the study will—due to methodological constraints—abstain from drawing 
any inferences with regard to the causal mechanisms by which ideas allegedly 
influence institutions. Having first adopted a discourse theoretical analytical 
framework, which essentially holds that causal relationships constitute historically 
contingent constructs or ideas held be social actors and should be studied as such, 
it would amount to crossing an inviolable methodological Rubicon to conjecture 
about the ostensible causal effect of ideas on the basis of such an analysis.57 Even 
so, the study will suggest how a more positivistically inclined scholar of ideas 
might proceed to address the question of causality in the future by building further 
upon Espeland and Sauders’ research on commensuration.  
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Finally—and due to the same methodological considerations—the study will not 
draw any strong conclusions as to whether the narratives of competitiveness as 
found in the three knowledge regimes in a strict sense have caused developments 
and patterns of institutional stability or change as predicted by either systemic, 
dynamic and teleonomic institutionalism. Again, a discourse theoretical approach 
is methodologically inadequate for drawing such inferences.    
 
* * * 
 
Nevertheless, the study will attempt cautiously to gauge the relative 
correspondence between, on the one hand, the narratives of competitiveness as 
expressed by policy research organizations situated within the three knowledge 
regimes of the United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark, and, on the other hand, 
the central theoretical contentions and conjectures by systemic, dynamic and 
teleonomic institutionalism respectively. Of course, the demonstration that 
theoretical categories employed by comparative political economists in their 
ongoing efforts to establish evermore precise and parsimonious social scientific 
knowledge of political economies corresponds—or does not correspond—with the 
ideas that policy research organizations situated within these political economies 
hold of these does not provide proper knowledge of how these political economies 
really are. In fact, it might say nothing at all.  
Even so, such a comparison is interesting in its own right. And therefore the study 
will finally reflect—albeit indirectly—upon the relative fit between its findings 
and the central theoretical contentions of the strong neoliberal convergence thesis 
as well as systemic, dynamic and teleonomic institutionalism. First, in relation to 
the strong convergence thesis, it is argued that the study’s findings simply does 
not resonate with the theoretical contention that neoliberalism has swept across the 
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advanced political economies, leveling out all national institutional differences 
and particularities. To the contrary, the study concurs and echoes Hall and 
Lamont’s recent contention that neoliberalism should not be seen “as a blanket 
laid over the world.”58 
Second, with regard to the central controversy between systemic, dynamic and 
teleonomic institutionalism, the narratives of competitiveness share features and 
thus correspond well with the theoretical contentions of each of the three forms of 
institutionalism, even if they are found to most closely reflect teleonomic 
institutionalism.59 And in light of its findings, the study encourages 
- systemic institutionalism to be more attentive to the set of institutional “sub-
components” included as putative explanans in theoretical models of 
contemporary political economies;  
- dynamic institutionalism to be more careful when specifying what institutional 
unit ostensibly changes and over what temporal sequence it does so and to 
remain attentive to whether countervailing mechanisms might offset ongoing 
processes of institutional change; and 
- teleonomic institutionalism to carefully consider what potential explanandum 
or different socioeconomic telos to include in their explanations of poly-final 
processes of institutional change, as well as the relationships between these 
telos.  
Hence, the study will ultimately argue that even if it cannot be—or has not been—
shown that ideas matter to institutions in an empirical sense, they matter to 
comparative political economy theoretically. Thus—if anything—the study calls 
for greater self-reflexive sense of comparative political economists’ own historical 
situatedness—since the very way they elaborate their models, typologies of 
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change and theoretical terrains potentially matter for the conduct of economic 
policy within contemporary political economies.   
Therefore, the study concludes on a somewhat paradoxical note not that ideas 
matter, which they might, but that comparative political economy does. It matters 
since the very categories, descriptions and theories devised by systemic, dynamic 
and teleonomic institutionalists—alongside those of many other sciences—are 
harnessed by policy research organizations and other political-economic actors in 
an ongoing, infinite and inherently political contest to discursively determine what 
it “really” means for a nation to be competitive in an age of globalization and 
intensifying international competition and whether that essentially is a question of 
being alike or different.60  
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5. BACKGROUND: 
Competitiveness – What Is in a Name? 
Today the main bulk of political discourse in advanced, capitalist economies is 
devoted to the question of how to obtain and sustain the international 
competitiveness of a nation in light of ever-increasing, accelerating, turbulent 
globalization. 61  At least since the late 1970s the scenery of an ever-more 
globalized world, where the competition of “tomorrow” is always more fierce, 
relentless and intense than “yesterday,” has constituted the predominant thematic 
backcloth of almost all governmental economic policies, programs and stratagems.  
Perhaps the idea was first formed in Academia. In the unexpected unipolar post-
Cold War world order following the fall of the Berlin Wall—with liberal-
democratic capitalism allegedly triumphant and the end of history just around the 
corner 62 —useful distinctions of “us’’ and “them,” friends and enemies, 
collaborators and competitors upon which to condition politics63 suddenly came in 
short supply.  
Perhaps this alluring blue ocean led Lester Thurow to scribble the popularly 
accessible and instant bestseller Head to Head (1993), Michael Porter The 
Competitive advantage of Nations (1990), and Michel Albert Capitalism Against 
Capitalism (1995). They all asserted that in this new era the U.S., Germany and 
Japan (and thus everybody else) were engaged in fierce zero-sum competition for 
world markets. And they all—with different points of emphasis and varying 
degrees of intellectual stringency, cogency and coherence—gave voice to an 
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emerging Weltgeist of a dawning epoch, the age where nations—much like 
firms—must compete to catch up, forge ahead or fall behind.64 
Perhaps the seeds were sown in the halls of power. In 1978, the U.S. Congress 
established the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to obtain a more precise 
assessment of the relative competitiveness of U.S. industry. In light of the 
perceived Japanese challenge, President Reagan in 1983 took initiative to create 
the President’s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness. Later, in 1986, the 
Council of Competitiveness was specifically commissioned to provide a “forum 
for elevating national competitiveness to the forefront of national 
consciousness.”65  
And thus in 1993 the ground was paved for incoming president Bill Clinton to 
give the starting signal to the competitive race of nations when he asserted that the 
U.S., as part of an increasingly global economy, must compete with nations across 
the globe. A few months later, Jacques Delors famously “picked up the glove” and 
joined the race on behalf of the European Union.66 In the white paper “Growth, 
Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st 
Century,” the view of Europe as engaged in competition was reified and a clear 
commitment was made:  
“Firms must achieve global competitiveness on open and competitive 
markets, both inside and outside of Europe. It is the responsibility of the 
national and Community authorities to provide industry with a favorable 
environment, to open clear and reliable prospects for it and to promote 
its international competitiveness.”67 
Or perhaps the idea germinated somewhere else altogether. Most likely we will 
never know. But today it is reasonably clear that the idea showed itself sufficiently 
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contagious to transgress the, in most other cases, impermeable membrane keeping 
social science and high-level politics—knowledge and power—separate.68 The 
challenge of becoming and remaining competitive in an ever-more globalized, 
competitive world has risen to prominence on the policy agendas of all advanced 
political economies. 
A series of developments have contributed to this. In recent decades various 
national as well as international organizations have created the conditions for 
politicians, public officials and pundits alike to speak and act as if nations 
compete. 69 
/ First, international organizations such as the European Commission, WTO, 
OECD, IMF, UNCTAD and the World Economic Forum all have adopted and 
promoted the vocabulary of an increasing competition of nations and 
emphasized the importance of raising domestic competitiveness of individual 
nations.70 Moreover, organizations such as the World Economic Forum, IMD 
and the World Bank publish annual global competitiveness reports which, as a 
distinct type of policy tool71, serve to benchmark and compare nations on a 
(growing) set of economic, political, social and environmental indicators in 
order to rank and determine the international competitiveness of individual 
countries vis-à-vis others. 72   
/ Second, a growing number of European governments have, with implicit 
inspiration from Ronald Reagan’s commissions and councils on 
competitiveness, established independent competitiveness knowledge councils, 
commissions and policy forums composed of various kinds of policy experts to 
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71 Le Galés & Lascoumes 2007.  
72  Curtis and Ciuriak 2010, Berger and Brislow 2009, Bruno 2009, Hospers 2004, Aiginger 
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provide them with analysis, ideas and policy recommendations on how to 
sustain and improve the international competitiveness of the nation.73 And still 
more national governments issue unique competitiveness indexes designed to 
monitor and communicate progress (or the lack thereof) in terms of measures 
to improve domestic international competitiveness (for example, the U.K. and 
Denmark). 
/ Finally other types of domestic knowledge and idea-producing organizations 
(NGOs, lobbyists, think tanks etc.) have in recent years ramped up their idea-
producing capacity and begun to produce such policy knowledge, councils, 
competitiveness indexes and more. 74 
Indeed, today few people would deny that international competitiveness has come 
to hold a pivotal position in the political and economic discourse among elites of 
advanced political economies.   
5.1 Two Caveats 
It is, however, necessary to assert two preliminary caveats regarding the claim of 
an alleged rise of international competitiveness as a predominant policy idea. First, 
the idea is far from new and is not historically isolated to our contemporary 
period. Rather the notion probably has been with us as long as the discipline of 
economics itself (if not even longer), though in different semantic guises. Second, 
the observation that most economic pundits, politicians and brokers of knowledge 
today in some form or another invoke the concepts of international 
competitiveness and competition of nations in order to legitimize and explain their 
political priorities does not mean that the terminology has been uncritically 
embraced and endorsed by everyone.  
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5.1.1 Not a New Idea... 
From a historical point of view, the idea that nations compete is not exactly new. 
It would be directly misleading to suggest that the idea first emerged, say, with the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of Bretton Woods or the onset of 
globalization. From roughly the beginning of the 16th century to the 18th century, 
writers such as Thomas Mun (1571-1641) in England, Jean-Baptiste Colbert 
(1619-1683) and Jean Bodin (1530-1596) in France and perhaps most famously 
Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804) in the U.S. formulated, favored and promoted a 
doctrine of economic thinking later to be known under the rubric of 
mercantilism.75 One of the central tenets of this body of economic thought was the 
view that the primary purpose of a state was to generate and accumulate wealth 
either through trade or, if need be, less benign means (conquest) so as to secure 
financial means and support for its remaining state-building activities. Another 
tenet was a deep-rooted perception of international trade as a zero-sum game, 
where exporters of more advanced manufactured products (e.g., cloth) stood to 
gain more than exporters of raw material (e.g., wool.) For instance Reinert 
succinctly summarized the prevailing mercantilist doctrine of early 16th century as 
a form of  
“pre-Ricardian common sense (which) seems to have reasoned that if 
lawyers make more money than lettuce-pickers, a nation of lawyers will 
be richer than a nation of lettuce-pickers.”76   
Thus, to become a “country of wealthy lawyers,” most countries in the 
mercantilist era (and in particular Elizabethan England) intervened in international 
trade to improve their own position.77 
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In 1776 these ideas was radically challenged by the political philosopher and 
(soon to be) economist Adam Smith when he, in the most seminal of all seminal 
economic books The Wealth of Nations, proposed his theory of absolute 
advantages and—while he was anyway fiddling with it—founded the discipline of 
economics. According to Smith, the mercantilists erred in the claim that gains of 
one nation necessarily come at the expense of others. Instead he famously 
suggested that all partners to trade would benefit if they divided labor between 
them and each specialized in the production of goods for which they held the 
greatest natural resources and endowments (i.e., where the individual nation held 
an absolute advantage).78 In the case where international division of labor was 
organized such that each nation specialized in the production of goods for which it 
held an absolute advantage, every nation would benefit as the aggregate total 
production would be higher. Unlike mercantilists, Smith asserted that trade 
ultimately constitutes a positive-sum game to the advantage of all.  
In extension hereof, David Ricardo in 1817 formulated his no-less-famous theory 
of comparative advantages. Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantages countered 
two criticisms raised against Smith. First, Smith’s theory of absolute advantages 
seemed to imply that two nations equally endowed with natural resources would 
derive no advantage from mutual trade. Second and similarly, two countries in 
which one possessed all the endowments and the other none would not gain from 
trading with each other. However, Ricardo with his famous two-countries, two-
goods model 79  demonstrated that even in such cases mutual trade and 
specialization would be advantageous to all. He argued that what matters in trade 
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is not the absolute production costs but the relative domestic opportunity costs 
(i.e., the value that could be created from producing the other good).80 The theory 
of comparative advantages shows that, even with completely equal or highly 
unequal trading partners, mutual trade is mutually beneficial as each individual 
country will a priori possess a comparative advantage in the production of 
something. 
In short, the question of whether nations compete to obtain advantages in trade at 
the expense of others has through time occupied the minds of many great 
economists.  
5.1.2Not an Uncontested Idea 
Just as it is misleading to claim the idea of competition among nations to be 
something new, it would be equally wrong to assert that the same idea has been 
adopted without debate or criticism. Indeed, few ideas—if any—have been 
embraced uncritically by everyone. Most notably economist and Nobel laureate 
Paul Krugman argued that applying the notion of competitiveness to a nation (that 
is, applying the originally microeconomic concept to macroeconomic matters) was 
an instance of faulty economic reasoning, nonsense and a fundamental 
misunderstanding of modern trade theory. First, echoing Ricardo, he argued that 
every nation always has a comparative advantage in something; second, nations 
unlike firms cannot go out of business if they lose in competition. They become 
poorer but they do not cease to exist.81 Third, international trade is not, as often 
depicted in policy discourse, a zero-sum game but a plus-sum game in which the 
increasing specialization and productive capacity of each participant benefits all 
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participating nations. Thus Krugman warned that “the competition of nations has 
become a dangerous obsession”82 and that  
“Anyone who writes about trade as a global struggle or war; anyone 
who compares countries to corporations; anyone who says that trade 
policy is about creating jobs … uses the concept of competitiveness as a 
drunk uses a lamppost: as a source of support, not of illumination.”83  
In an equally unconciliatory tone, Robert Reich, economist and Secretary of Labor 
during the first four years of the Clinton administration, in his review of Michael 
Porter’s The Competitive Advantage of Nations, condemned the concept of 
competitiveness as “one of those rare terms of public discourse to have gone 
directly from obscurity to meaninglessness without any intervening period of 
coherence.”84      
However, at least since the late 1980s the notion has had a remarkable renaissance 
and impact on the economic policy discourse of all advanced political economies, 
not least of all thanks to the tremendous impact of Porter’s book.85 In it, he 
famously asserted that competitiveness is also a meaningful macroeconomic 
concept, and using his now widely acclaimed diamond model, he suggested that 
beyond the competitive advantages a firm derives from its internal organization, a 
range of external conditions and characteristics of that firm’s national political-
economic context also affected its competitiveness.86  
Thus despite the initial criticisms, today the political and economic elites of all 
stripes, colors and nationalities—despite initial warnings—appear to be dangling 
around Krugman’s lamppost. Indeed Krugman with faint resignation recognized 
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that “by the 1990s the concept of competitiveness was no longer controversial 
among influential people.”87 
5.2 Definitions and Typologies of Competitiveness  
However, even if almost any policymaker, politician or public pundit today would 
nod approvingly if one tells them that their nation is engaged in fierce competition 
for investments, growth, jobs and more, it is not likely that the same people would 
even remotely agree when one asked them what “a competitive nation” actually 
looks like. Waters quickly divide and vociferous debate ensues when it comes to 
determining what international competitiveness “really” is. Indeed, despite 
widespread acceptance, international competitiveness is a very ambiguous idea. 
In the highly varied literature examining this phenomenon, one finds a plethora of 
diverging definitions.88 And several scholars readily admit that the concept of 
competitiveness is fundamentally underdetermined.89 In a recent study, Mischke 
notes that “there is no indicator that can show at a first glance whether a country is 
internationally competitive or not.” 90 And in a similar vein Boltho argues 
“There are no agreed definitions of competitiveness and the term seems 
to mean different things to different people—some may stress a 
country’s low costs or the level of its exchange rate, others a country’s 
technological or even its growth rate. “91 
Indeed, among scholars there persists a deep and enduring disagreement as to the 
definition of competitiveness. Some define it with a short equation. For instance 
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Orlowski has defined competitiveness “as the ability to sell.”92 And Michael 
Porter has repeatedly asserted that “true competitiveness … is measured by 
productivity.”93 Others expand further upon the definition. For instance Curtis and 
Ciuriak suggest that  
“Global competitiveness implies a high rate of sustained growth relative 
to peer groups of countries … the level and rate of labor productivity 
growth is also a key bottom line measure of competitiveness.”94  
Fagerberg rejects “differences in the growth of relative unit labor costs (RULC) as 
the major factor affecting differences in competitiveness” and instead contends 
“The main factors influencing differences in international 
competitiveness and growth across nations are technological 
competitiveness and the ability to compete on delivery.”95  
Aiginger has proposed the perhaps most lengthy, accumulative (and somewhat ad 
hoc) definition when he suggests that 
“Competitiveness should be defined as the ‘ability to create welfare.’ … 
The welfare of a nation is assumed to correlate primarily with its per 
capita income. The second most important component will probably be 
the employment/unemployment prospects. Broader assessments include 
distributional, social and ecological goals and some non-economic 
objectives (security, stability, life expectation). Finally, competitive 
economies must meet several ‘sustainability’ checks. The definition of 
outcome competitiveness as the welfare of a nation or as the living 
standard of its population still may lack precision, but at least this 
definition of competitiveness excludes or sidelines several alternative 
definitions, specifically those focusing on low costs and on trade 
balances.” 96 
And recently it seems that Michael Porter and his colleagues have changed their 
minds. As of 2012 what is termed, foundational competitiveness is now defined as 
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“the expected level of output per working-age individual given the 
overall quality of a country as a place to do business. This definition 
goes beyond the expected level of productivity per employed worker, 
because prosperity is ultimately rooted in the ability to both achieve high 
productivity as well as mobilize a high share of the available 
workforce.” 97    
However, disagreement is not confined to the semantic squabbles of academics. 
Similar ambiguities emerge in the policy publications by political organizations 
such as the European Commission, WTO, OECD, IMF and WEF, to provide just a 
few examples. In 1994, the European Commission defined competitiveness as “the 
ability to combine growth with balanced trade,” but OECD defined it as  
“the ability of companies, industries, regions, nations or supra-national 
regions to generate, while being and remaining exposed to international 
competition, relatively high factor income and factor employment 
levels.”  
A decade later WEF (2001) defined competitiveness of nations as “the set if 
institutions and economic policies supportive of high rates of economic growth in 
the medium term,” and the European Commission (2001) re-defined the concept 
as “the ability of an economy to provide its population with high and rising 
standards of living and high rates of employment on a sustainable basis.”98 Both 
among scholars and international organizations there persists vociferous debate on 
the exact meaning of the term.  
5.2.1 Trabold’s Typology of Competitiveness 
To manage such complexity different scholars have introduced different 
typologies of competitiveness to classify and distinguish between different aspects 
and types of competitiveness. However, these are as numerous as the stock of 
definitions. Again a few examples are illustrative: 
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First, based on an extensive literature review of more than 800 scientific articles 
on competitiveness, Harald Trabold has introduced a fourfold typology of 
competitiveness by which he distinguish four generic types of national 
competitiveness: a nation’s ability to sell, ability to earn, ability to attract and 
ability to adjust.99  
- With inspiration from Balassa100, Trabold first describes ability to sell as a 
measure of a nation’s export performance, i.e., its long-term ability to pay for 
its imports by its own exports and thus by implication its ability to retain a 
balanced or even positive trade balance and current account. In this sense 
competitiveness, in short, refers to “how competent an economy is at 
marketing its products on the world market.”101 As such, indicators such as the 
current account, trade balance, World Market Share, “Constant Market Shares” 
and/or real effective exchange rates reveal the competitiveness of a nation.   
- Second, Trabold posits the view of international competitiveness as the ability 
to earn, that is, the extent to which the national economy is able to secure high 
and growing real incomes for is citizens regardless of its export performance. 
Here Trabold explicitly draws inspiration from the view of the U.S. President’s 
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness (1985): 
“Competitiveness for a nation is the degree to which it can, under free 
and fair market conditions, produce goods and services that meet the test 
of international markets while simultaneously maintaining and 
expanding the real income of its citizens.”102 
Besides indicators of GDP, indicators such as labor productivity and the more 
qualitative technological competitiveness reveal this type of competitiveness.  
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- Third is a nation’s ability to adjust to developments and changes in its political 
and economic environment. According to this view, a political economy is 
internationally competitive when it is able to align its production structure as 
flexibly, efficiently and expediently as possible with its (changing) underlying 
factor endowments. Among several possible indicators for measuring this 
ability, Trabold points towards innovation. 
- Finally, Trabold discerns a view of international competitiveness as a nation’s 
ability to attract which he equates with “the competence of the economy in 
drawing mobile capital,” that is, whether the national economy is considered to 
be an attractive and profitable site for international capital to situate 
investments. Among the indicators to measure competitiveness qua 
attractiveness are some of the more hard indicators such as wage and price 
levels, tax levels, and levels of FDI.103  
5.2.2 Curtis and Ciuriak's Typology of Competitiveness 
Likewise Curtis and Ciuriak invoke a fourfold typology of “major policy areas” 
with influence on international competitiveness in their recent comparative review 
of the competitiveness of Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom. They 
analyze competitiveness as a product of the interplay between macroeconomic 
policies, microeconomic framework policies, microeconomic structural policies 
and social policies.104 While they don’t provide completely analytically distinct 
definitions, their approach is nonetheless instructive.  
- First, as macroeconomic policies they categorize  
“Fiscal policy, including budget deficits, public sector debt and 
stabilization. Monetary policy, including inflation interest rates and 
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exchange rates. Trade and Investment Policy, including tariffs, non-tariff 
measures, trade costs, export promoting policies, and policies regarding 
inward and outward investment.”105 
- Second, microeconomic framework policies connote the basic institutional 
preconditions of operational product, labor and financial markets, such as the 
rule of law, enforcement of property rights, and credit information as well as a 
host of public and private regulatory practices, institutions and organizations. 
The relative administrative burdens of establishing and doing business, tax 
systems and labor regulation and rules for investor protection also fall under 
this heading.106  
- Third, they employ the term microeconomic structural policies to account for 
physical as well as digital infrastructure, innovation systems and clusters and 
adoption of “future-looking environmental technologies.”107  
- Finally, they claim “the social policies that figure in global competitiveness 
evaluations are health, education and the avoidance of social conflict”108 
frequently measured by metrics of crime rates, quality of primary, secondary 
and tertiary education, availability of affordable and livable housing, healthcare 
institutions, culture and opportunities for recreation.      
5.2.3 Pedersen’s Typology of Competitiveness 
Thirdly, Pedersen, in his recent analysis of the Danish competition-state, 
distinguishes between three types of competitiveness: cost competitiveness, 
technological competitiveness and institutional competitiveness 109 and argue that 
each was perceived as a dominant policy challenge of Danish policymakers in a 
particular historical period.  
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/ First, from the 1940s to the 1960s the wage costs of labor in the eyes of Danish 
policymakers constituted the primary competitive factor, and thus much 
attention was devoted to the shortcomings, rigidities and inflexibilities of the 
labor market. These were to be addressed through tripartite labor market 
policies aiming to ensure a reasonable wage formation consistent with 
underlying productive capacity.  
/ Second, in the 1970s and 1980s, in addition to the above problem, the ability of 
Danish firms to keep pace with the technological race between the U.S., 
Germany and Japan became a central concern and a range of industrial policies 
aimed at improving the interplay between the private and public sectors to 
improve the external conditions for firms was introduced in order to further 
technological competitiveness.  
/ Third, from the 1990s and onwards the furthering of institutional 
competitiveness came to constitute the core problem for Danish policy elites. 
And the main policy challenge was perceived by policymakers to consist of 
incentivizing and motivating the labor force through a range of policies to work 
more productively, for longer hours, and more flexibly and to learn and acquire 
skills through life learning. 
But again, just as definitions of competitiveness are bountiful, the count of 
different typologies likewise grows and continues to emphasize different aspects 
of competitiveness. Indeed Mischke on a somewhat defeatist note summarizes his 
very thorough review in the following way:        
“… in order to establish a consistent definition and theory of 
competitiveness, it would be helpful if all factors and indicators were 
standing in a complementary relation with each other. Instead, the 
international competitiveness of nations rather seems to be a complex 
phenomenon that touches a multitude of economic aspects, which 
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cannot be captured easily within one overarching definition or 
theory.”110  
Clearly competitiveness means different things to different people at different 
times.111  
5.3 A Common Grammar in the Language of 
Competitiveness 
However, even though the concept of competitiveness prima facie comes across as 
essentially contested and fundamentally underdetermined, the highly varied 
literature studying this multi-faceted and illusive socioeconomic phenomenon 
nonetheless shares a set of generic features. To put it figuratively, the language of 
competitiveness is apparently organized according to a certain structural 
grammar.112  
5.3.1The Function of Competitiveness  
At the most general level it is commonplace to describe the competitiveness of a 
nation in functionalist terms. An account of the competitiveness of a nation 
distinguishes analytically a set of national sources of competitiveness (functional 
inputs) that interacts through a complex set of relationships and processes to yield 
a competitive outcome (functional output).113 While most accounts diverge in 
terms of what particular econometric variables are included as sources and/or 
outcomes, they all invoke the same analytical distinction between source and 
outcome. 114  
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111Hay and Rosamond 2003, Hay 2001, 2004 
112 I am thankful to Robert Boyer for suggesting this term to me.  
113 See e.g. Trabold 1995, Aiginger 2006, Mischke 2008, Curtis and Ciuriak 2010, Fagerberg 
1996, Wren 2001 
114 However, the list of potential econometric variables to be employed as proxy indicators of 
sources and/or outcomes is, to put it mildly, fairly immense. Mischke for instance discerns no 
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With regard to competitive outcomes, a core analytical dividing line in the 
literature is the question of whether competitiveness is most appropriately 
measured by trade performance (world market shares, export rates, terms of trade, 
for example) or by growth (GDP per capita, growth in average real incomes).115 
However, the question of whether indicators of unemployment, social security, 
environmental protection, wellbeing and/or happiness should be included as 
indicators of a competitive nation is also discussed.116  
With regard to sources, accounts of competitiveness likewise diverge with regard 
to how inclusive the list of sources should be. At one end of the spectrum one 
finds fairly minimal accounts stressing that international competitiveness is 
nothing but the product of relative average wage levels, exchange rates and terms 
of trade (sometimes referred to as price competitiveness). At the other end, much 
more encompassing accounts can be found.117  
5.3.2Is Social Protection a Source of Competitiveness? 
In particular, two (potential) sources of competitiveness stand out as objects of 
controversy. Indeed it is hotly debated whether these (“really”) improve or impair 
national competitiveness.  
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less than 24 potential indicators of competitive outcomes, and 38 potential indicators of sources 
of competitiveness. To add just minimal degree of systematics to her account Mischke 
differentiates between first macro- or micro-economic sources and/or outcomes, and secondly as 
either short-term or long-term sources/outcomes, but the impression of a very heterogeneous, 
encompassing and blurred concept remains. Indeed a great and varied range of econometric 
indicators is cited in the literature as proper proxies of either competitive sources and/or 
competitive outcomes. (see p. 125).  
 ( , which she classifies as either micro- or macro-economic as well as either short-term or long-
term. 114) 
115 Trabold 1995. 
116 Aiginger 2006, Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2009, Porter, Delgado and Kettels 2013, Curtis and 
Ciuriak 2010, Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 2012. 
117 These might, for instance, include productivity, workforce skills and educational institutions, 
industrial relations and innovation systems, and labor market and healthcare institutions.   
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First, some scholars argue that labor market policies and other types of welfare 
policies aimed at social protection, the prevention of social exclusion and the 
increase of economic equality diminish competitiveness. In this view, the 
provision of social security is perceived as incurring additional costs to firms 
through, for example, increased taxes and/or social contributions and thus ceteris 
paribus constitutes an impediment to international competitiveness. Such claims 
are not infrequently substantiated with the invocation of an alleged trade-off 
between social protection, inclusion and equality on the one hand and 
competitiveness on the other.118 Most famously, Arthur Okun once argued that 
economic efficiency necessarily is obtained at the cost of increasing inequalities in 
income and wealth.119   
However others have questioned that trade-off, suggesting that some types of 
labor market and social security policies improve competitiveness.120 Bernard and 
Boucher describe this line of reasoning well:  
“An array of social policies … can contribute to the mobilization of the 
population into a labor force that is healthy, well trained, and able to 
balance adequately it’s earning and caring work. … These policies 
represent a social investment which can pay for itself, at the societal 
level and in the long-run, because it increases the productivity of the 
economy both in the short-term (output per hour worked) and in the long 
term (hours worked over a lifetime), consequently leading to an increase 
in the fiscal capacity of societies.”121 
For instance, De Grauwe and Polan have examined the relation between social 
expenditures and competitiveness and found that those of the advanced political 
economies which spend most on social expenditures also frequently rank highest 
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118 Leeson 1997, Browning and Johnson 1984, Wilkinson and Pickett 2010, Alesina and 
Giavazzi 2006, Blyth and Hopkin 2012, Evans and Sewell Jr., 2013.   
119 Okun 1975, Blyth and Hopkin 2012. 
120 Pedersen and Campbell 2007, Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005, Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2002, Iversen 2001, 2005.  
121 Bernard and Boucher 2007, p. 226. 
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in competitiveness. 122 And Pedersen and others have argued that such policies 
promote institutional competitiveness123 just as an emerging body of scholarship 
invokes the term social investment state to describe such policy strategies.124  
5.3.3... Is Environmental Protection? 
Second, strict and demanding environmental regulation (typically to be enacted by 
governments) to protect firms’ external environment, some scholars argue, reduces 
international competitiveness while others suggest that it raises it. Coming 
primarily from the branch of economic research, some scholars argue that strict 
environmental regulation will inevitably incur additional costs to firms and thus 
give them a competitive disadvantage compared to other global firms, implying a 
decrease of competitiveness. 125  Again a trade-off between environmental 
regulation and competitiveness is perceived to exist.  
However, others—and most notably Michael Porter—have contested this claim 
and denied the existence of a trade-off. To the contrary they suggest that “properly 
designed environmental standards can trigger innovation that may partially or 
more than fully offset the costs of complying with them,”126 i.e., a variation of 
Streeck’s claim that the state through strict regulation might erect a set of what he 
terms “beneficial constraints,” i.e., regulation, which will prove costly for firms to 
adapt to and comply with in the short term but which will provide firms with a 
competitive advantage in the long term. 127  
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122 De Grauwe and Polan 2003, Delgado, Ketels and Porter 2012, Hall and Jones 1999, Rodrik 
et al. 2004.  
123 Pedersen 2010, Markussen and Kaspersen 2007, Bernard and Boucher 2007. 
124 Morel, Palier and Palme 2012, Hemmerjick 2012, Lundvall and Lorenz 2012, Giddens 1998, 
Esping-Andersen 1999, 2002, Nelson and Stephens 2012. 
125 Babool and Reed 2010, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 1989, Gray 1987, Palmer and Simpson 
1993. 
126 Porter and van der Linde 1995, p. 98.  Ambec, Lanoie et al. 2011.  
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5.3.4 When Should One Measure the Competitiveness of a 
Nation?  
Underpinning both controversies are differing assumptions about the appropriate 
time scale upon which to assess, understand and measure international 
competitiveness. That is, should competitiveness be measured in the short-term 
e.g., in the immediate ability of firms to export and gain international market-
shares, or rather in the long term, say, in the sustained and prolonged ability of 
those firms to export and maintain market shares in the future? Indeed, what 
improves competitiveness in the short term might perhaps undermine it in the 
long-term As perceptively noted by Mischke,  
“Short-term competitive advantages finally can turn out to be long-term 
disadvantages. For instance, factors like low taxes, permissive 
competition policy, and low social and ecological standards could serve, 
in the short term, to reduce costs and to increase profits for enterprises 
so that these factors could be used to stop capital flight, to become an 
attractive location for foreign companies, and to increase the 
international competitiveness of domestic companies. Though, in the 
long run, low taxes and standards could reduce the international 
competitiveness of the companies and the locational attractiveness of the 
country. Low standards can reduce incentives to innovate whereas high 
standards induce factor substitution and innovations. Furthermore low 
taxes could lead to a poor public infrastructure.” 128 
Assessments of the effects on competitiveness of various kinds of policies to 
mitigate social exclusion, inequality and environmental deprivation clearly depart 
due to an underlying analytical disagreement as to the appropriate timeframe 
within which to measure and assess competitiveness. 
 
 

128 Mischke 2008, p. 126. See likewise Curtis and Ciuriak 2010, Streeck 1997, Deeg 2005, 
Porter and Kramer 2006, Sala-I-Martin et al. 2009. 



++
5.4 Is Competitiveness a Question of Being Alike?  
However, questions as these—as well as the manifold definitions and typologies 
themselves—draw attention to a theoretically important and to be sure politically 
highly pertinent question. As succinctly put by one scholar, the question is 
whether competitiveness for a nation essentially is about being different or alike? 
129 That is, is there only one best way to become competitive, e.g., through 
competitive cost-levels, or are different pathways to competitiveness equally 
feasible and viable in conditions of increasing globalization? Many scholars from 
a great array of disciplines subscribe to a view of one “best practice” while just as 
many deny this view.130 However, just as definitions as well as typologies of 
competitiveness remain highly and essentially contested concepts, so will the 
question of one or many ways to competitive success in the age of globalization 
probably remain an object of academic and political dispute for a long time to 
come.  
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6. THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND: Comparative 
Political Economy 
The debate about the international competitiveness of nations has not been isolated 
to the public arenas nor to being the bread and butter of policymakers, public 
pundits, international organizations and think tanks. Nor has the discussion been 
insulated to the academic confines of conventional economics. The question of 
what makes a political economy competitive in conditions of increased 
globalization has been one of the pivotal preoccupations—if not the pivotal 
preoccupation—of scholars within the research field of comparative political 
economy.131 
Indeed, the question above as to whether only one type of political economy is 
able to cope with the challenges posed by increasing globalization or whether 
several different types, models or varieties of political-economic systems might 
fare equally well (if by different means) has taken center stage within this research 
discipline. In fact, scholars within the discipline of comparative political economy 
have exhibited an equally profound interest in unveiling whether competitiveness 
is a question about being different or being alike—even if they have addressed it 
in a slightly different, somewhat more sophisticated theoretical vocabulary.  
Previously a great deal of effort within this discipline has been devoted to 
uncovering, examining and understanding the nature and constitution of 
socioeconomic institutions per se. Within this tradition it has become 
commonplace to define, analyze and examine institutions in light of the formal 
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rules and the informal, routinized practices possessing a rule-like quality which 
enable particular types of behavior of political and economic actors while 
constraining and excluding others.132 And typically institutions within the spheres 
of corporate governance and finance, industrial relations, social policy and the 
organization of education and skills provision, as well as the interplay between 
them, have received the lion’s share of scholarly attention.133  
To be sure, a not altogether insignificant part of the scientific debate of recent 
decades has revolved around settling the foundational question of what an 
institution is. That is, questions as to whether institutions ought to be defined as 
formal rules or more informal norms and cultures134, whether institutions stem 
from the negotiation and compromise or conflict and power struggles among 
actors135, and whether actors act according to a utilitarian “logic of consequences” 
or a more deontological “logic of appropriateness”136 have produced voluminous 
amounts of research. By now a reasonably degree of theoretical consensus has 
been reached and calls for a second movement in institutional analysis, in which 
insights from rational choice and sociological and historical institutionalism are 
woven together to provide more comprehensive and complementary accounts, 
have repeatedly been made.137   
Instead, the question as to whether advanced political economies tend to converge 
or diverge has for a long time divided the waters. Whether different particular 
national institutional configurations or socioeconomic “models” are or can be 
largely stable, robust and resistant to the external pressure from globalization or 
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132 Hall and Taylor 1996, Campbell 2004, Morgan et al. 2010, Hall 2010.  
133 Thelen 2012, p. 140.  
134 Scott 2008, DiMaggio and Powell 1991. 
135 Thelen 2004, Hall and Thelen 2009. 
136 March and Olsen 2004. 
137 Hall and Taylor 1996, Immergut 1998, Campbell and Pedersen 2001, Peters 1999, Campbell 
2004.  
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whether, due to mounting external pressures, they gradually give in, adapt and 
converge upon the same socioeconomic and political modality allegedly best 
suited to the challenges of globalization remains an object of heated and 
contentious theoretical debate within comparative political economy. 138  This 
vibrant and highly productive debate can roughly be divided into and summarized 
as four consecutive stages of theory development. 
6.1  Coercive Globalization and Neoliberal 
Convergence 
The point of departure for this debate was a set of claims and arguments 
particularly prevalent in the late 1980s and early 1990s about the consequences of 
increasing economic globalization for the policy autonomy of national 
governments and public administrations.139 In particular it was observed that the 
external global environment facing states, firms, organizations and other kinds of 
domestic actors was undergoing radical changes significantly altering their room 
for maneuver in different ways.140 First, a wave of liberalization and deregulation 
of international and domestic capital markets beginning in the late 1970s meant 
that global investment capital became increasingly “footloose” and thus, with less 
restrictions than earlier, could be reinvested in the sites of the planet which offered 
the best business conditions and promise of profit. Second, the emergence of 
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138 Hall and Lamont 2013, Schmidt and Thatcher 2013, Ferrera 2001, Swank 2002, Mosley 
2003. 
139 Lash and Urry 1987, Boyer and Drache 1996, Held 1999, Berger and Dore 1996, Keohane 
and Milner 1996, Giddens 2000, Ohmae 1994, Sassen 1996, McKenzie and Lee 1991, 1989, 
Reich 1991 (cf. see Hall and Soskice 2001, Evans 2010, cf. Campbell 2004, p. ii). Again, to be 
sure, the term globalization means a great many different things to a great many different 
people, scholars and schools of thought. Yet it is beyond the scope of the present investigation 
to uncover and discuss them all here, and thus we will “merely” deal with globalization in 
political-economic terms. Scholte 2005, 2008, Held and McGrew 2007, Rosamond 2005, Hirst 
and Thompson 1995, 2009.   
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multinational companies and border-crossing value chains as well as still more 
sophisticated divisions of labor meant that firms increasingly were able to locate 
production where it was most advantageous. Third, the advent of new 
technologies, in particular within transportation and telecommunications, meant 
that the speed with which business transactions could be conducted across time 
and space was radically reduced, further accelerating the process of globalization. 
Finally, the rapid economic ascension and industrialization of a range of former 
developing countries in Eastern Europe, South America and Southeast Asia 
radically changed the global division of labor and implied a radical surge in the 
availability of cheap, uneducated labor, putting increasing pressure upon the labor 
markets of already advanced economies.     
Together these changes were claimed to radically diminish the scope of economic, 
fiscal, monetary, social and other kinds of policies that national governments 
could pursue.141  For instance, with regard to tax policy, it was argued that the 
heightened capital mobility stemming from liberalization and deregulation of 
financial markets led to tax competition and a race-to-the-bottom between 
advanced political economies. With more mobile capital, every individual 
government was confronted with a dilemma of either lowering tax rates (and thus 
in turn hollowing out the fiscal base of any welfare state arrangements) so as to 
remain attractive to investments by FDI and thus maintain decent growth rates, or 
to retain high and, for business, unfavorable tax rates with the risk of international 
capital flight resulting in an unattractive low-growth/low-employment scenario.142    
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142 Scharpf 1991, Steinmo, 1993, 1994, Rodrik 1997, Simmons and Elkins 2003, Oates 2001, 
Genschel and Schwartz 2011. Such arguments have not been uncritically accepted, however, 
and a series of studies have on the contrary found that tax rate convergence over time has been 
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Similar arguments have described how and explained why governments in most 
advanced economies were compelled to contribute to spreading a wide range of 
similar policies all over the planet.  By a similarly deterministic logic, it has been 
argued that globalization forced governments to privatize formerly publicly owned 
enterprises, liberalize and deregulate capital and product and labor markets; open 
foreign and domestic markets to international trade, introduce the market 
provision of public goods, disempower labor unions, slash and retrench welfare 
provisions for social protection and inclusion, induce entrepreneurial and less risk-
averse mindsets, values and motivations in citizens and corporate leaders and 
much more. 143 In short, the general claim has been that economic globalization—
with an inevitability worthy of a Marxist treatise—forced and facilitated the 
convergence of formerly heterogeneous national political economies towards a 
similar socioeconomic organization in all of the world’s political economies.144   
In turn, this model upon which all economies allegedly were destined to converge 
was very often designated as neoliberal.145 To be sure, in these studies it is not 
always clear exactly what neoliberalism connotes and the literature contains 
several different definitions of neoliberalism. But Colin Hays’ seven-point list of 
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143 Hall and Lamont 2013, Evans and Sewell, Jr. 2013. 
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145 Again, to be sure on a par with the term globalization, a highly heterogeneous set of societal 
and political developments, shifts, trends, changes and phenomena have been categorized as 
neoliberal. (See Campbell and Pedersen 2001, 2014, Lane 2005, Simmons 2008, Harvey 2005, 
Dobbin 2007, Mudge 2006, 2008, Fourcade 2006, Simmons 2008, Babb 2007, Centeno and 
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“core precepts and principles that might be said to capture the identity of 
neoliberalism” constitutes a reasonably systematic, stringent and analytically 
distinct account of what neoliberalism means: 
1. A confidence in the market as an efficient mechanism for the 
allocation of scarce resources 
2. A belief in the desirability of a global regime of free trade and 
free capital mobility 
3. A belief in the desirability, all things being equal, of a limited and 
non-interventionist role for the state and of the state as a 
facilitator and custodian rather than a substitute for market 
mechanisms 
4. A rejection of Keynesian demand-management techniques in 
favor of monetarism, neomonetarism and supply-side economics 
5. A commitment to the removal of those welfare benefits which 
might be seen to act as disincentives to market participation (in 
short, a subordination of the principles of social justice to those 
of perceived economic imperatives) 
6. A defense of labor-market flexibility and the promotion and 
nurturing of cost competitiveness 
7. A confidence in the use of private finance in public projects and, 
more generally, in the allocative efficiency of market and quasi-
market mechanisms in the provision of public goods 
In short, in the first phase of the debate a body of scholarship suggested that, as a 
response to increasing economic globalization, governments all over world—
either willfully or reluctantly—followed a policy course guided by the above 
“precepts and principles,” thus precipitating the ultimate convergence of all 
political economies upon a single, dominant neoliberal model. 
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6.2 Systemic Institutionalism: Stable Divergence of 
Varieties of Capitalism  
The first response to and critique of such accounts was advanced by scholars 
subscribing to what we might term as systemic approaches to comparative political 
economy. 146  They argued that every political economy constituted and was 
underpinned by a series of institutional subsystems enabling and constraining the 
behavior of socioeconomic actors in particular ways in particular settings and that 
such subsystems assert influence upon one another. Moreover, these scholars 
contended that in some cases different institutional subsystems mutually reinforce 
each other through so-called complementary relationships147, producing outcomes 
otherwise not possible. And as these subsystems stand in a complementary and 
mutually reinforcing relationship, external pressures as well as overt attempts to 
change them will prove difficult since each institution gathers strength from other 
institutions. Consequently, some types of individual political economies (models), 
comprising several complementary institutional subsystems, will exhibit sufficient 
resilience and remain stable. That is, even with the advent of political and 
economic globalization, some types of political economies will continue to 
diverge, i.e., remain a type, or so the argument of the systemic accounts goes.  
While a great many examples of systemic approaches to comparative political 
economy could be mentioned here148, one of the most parsimonious instances is 
the Varieties of Capitalism approach (VOC) by Hall and Soskice. Indeed this 
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theory has come to epitomize the position, serving as a widely discussed standard 
reference.149 
Their basic argument is that the particular constitution of different institutional 
subsystems—whether corporate governance, industrial relations, education 
systems and inter-company relations as characterized by coordination or 
competition150—provides firms located in the economy with what they term 
comparative institutional advantages, of which they as an example suggest a 
comparatively greater ability to engage in production processes characterized by 
radical or incremental innovation.151  
Accordingly they suggest, first, that all political economies can be characterized as 
one of two ideal-types: a liberal market economy (LME) or a coordinated market 
economy (CME). Second, that both of these ideal-types will tend to remain stable 
in spite of the external pressures of globalization, as argued by Hall and Soskice:   
“Increasing flows of trade have not erased the institutional differences 
across nations. After all, world trade has been increasing for fifty years 
without enforcing convergence. Because of comparative institutional 
advantage, nations often prosper, not by becoming more similar, but by 
building on their institutional differences.”152  
Two sets of criticisms have been raised against this approach. First, that these 
types of accounts sacrifice empirical detail for the sake of theoretical parsimony. 
For instance, VOC has been accused of not being varied enough.153 The VOC, so 
the argument goes, oversimplifies an empirical reality which is vastly more 
complex and nuanced, and thus scholars have suggested distinguishing between 
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three154, four155 or even five156 different ideal-types of political economies.157 
However, it is an open question whether there is any real theoretical controversy 
here. First and obviously, every possible world will turn out more complex than its 
ideal-typical representation. As they are fairly cumbersome, cartographers don’t 
do maps in a 1:1 scale. Second, even if one accepts that more than two different 
ideal-types are viable in an age of increased competition and globalization158, the 
general point of VOC (and systemic approaches as such) remains unscathed: 
namely that more than one type of political economy is viable.     
6.3 Dynamic Institutionalism: Gradual Convergence 
by Varieties of Institutional Change  
The second and perhaps deeper criticism cuts straight to the heart of this assertion. 
Recently systemic approaches such as the above have been accused of being 
overly static 159  and for relying on a temporally syncopated account of 
institutions160, that is, for perceiving political economies and their underpinning 
institutional subsystems as overly stable and as evolving along “path-dependent” 
lines161 only liable to change if struck by a major external shock.162 Kaspersen 
 
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154 Schmidt 2002, 2007, Coates 2000.  
155 Boyer 2004. 
156 Amable 2003. 
157 For instance, increasingly the Nordic or Scandinavian “variety of capitalism” has drawn the 
attention of scholars as a distinct type. Campbell, Hall and Pedersen 2006, Hull Kristensen 
2012, Martin and Swank 2012, Acemoglu, Robinson et al. 2012, Katzenstein 1985, Rodrik 
1997, Berman 2006, Sapir 2006, Cox 2001, Pontusson 2009.  
158 Which Peter Hall by the way himself does as of today. In a recent paper Hall, besides the 
continental CME and Anglo-American LME types, discerns a Nordic, Scandinavian and a 
Southern Mediterranean variety of capitalism (see Hall, forthcoming).  
159 Deeg 2005, Djelic and Quack 2007, 2003, Crouch and Farell 2004, Deeg and Jackson 2007, 
Schmidt 2002,  Lieberman 2002, Thelen and Steinmo 1992.  
160 Hall 2010. 
161 Pierson 2000. 
162 Thelen 1999, 2000. 
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contends “only dead institutions do not change”163 and similarly Kathleen Thelen 
has claimed that systemic accounts are theoretically insufficient inasmuch as they 
impose “rather high demands on ‘real’ change to be recognized as such.”164 
Therefore this avenue of criticism points out that systemic accounts—theoretically 
and empirically—overemphasize institutional stability and thus fail to account for 
and appreciate the myriad small, incremental and cumulative changes, alterations, 
and moderations which might appear insignificant in themselves but which in 
aggregate and over time have the potential to change institutional systems and 
political economies profoundly.  
In short, against systemic institutionalism, a growing body of literature, which one 
perhaps might term dynamic institutionalism, draws attention to how institutions 
also change through miniscule incremental changes. 165  The most frequently 
discussed instance of this approach is the Varieties of Institutional Change (VIC) 
framework proposed in an edited volume by Streeck and Thelen.166 On a par with 
VOC they propose a typology of four ideal-typical (incremental yet 
transformative) mechanisms of institutional change167: Displacement, which refers 
to the slowly rising salience of subordinate relative to dominant institutions; 
Layering, which refers to the addition of new potentially transformative elements 
upon old institutions; Conversion, which entails the redeployment of old 
 
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163 Kaspersen and Marcussen 2007, p. 190. 
164 Thelen 2010. See also Thelen 2004. 
165 Greif and Laitin 2004, Streeck and Thelen 2005, Streeck 2008, Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 
Glyn 2006, Howell 2006, Baccaro and Howell 2011, Trampusch 2009, Aoki 2005, Greif 2005. 
166 Streeck and Thelen 2005, Mahoney and Thelen 2010. 
167 In line with theoretical convention, Streeck and Thelen define institutions as a set of formal 
or informal “rules stipulating expected behavior and ‘ruling out’ behavior deemed to be 
undesirable.” Furthermore they argue that “the enactment of a social rule is never perfect, and 
that there always is a gap between the ideal pattern of a rule and the real pattern of life under 
it.’” This, they suggest, in turn allows for “a significant amount of ‘play’ in the rules actors are 
expected to follow.” Thus, in the crevice between the ideal and actual enactment of an 
institution, actors have sufficient wriggle room to change institutions (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 
pp. 11-14).   
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institutions to new purposes; and Drift, which connotes the deliberate neglect of 
institutional maintenance in spite of external change resulting in slippage in 
institutional practice.168 On a par with VOC, the VIC framework is fast becoming 
a widely debated and much cited standard reference within comparative political 
economy.169  
However, VIC reiterates central tenets of the neoliberal convergence thesis. While 
analysts invoking Streeck and Thelen’s framework argue that institutions change 
by different mechanisms, a majority nonetheless describe institutional changes as 
liberalizations and thus as gradual steps towards convergence upon a single 
socioeconomic model (if not necessarily neoliberal). In short, while studies find 
differences in the mechanisms of change, they all find change to take place in a 
similar direction.170  
Dynamic institutionalism and VIC have recently also encountered two severe 
criticisms. First and ironically, the critique of VOC can equally be leveled against 
VIC, as this approach also sacrifices empirical complexity for the sake of 
parsimony. VIC implicitly reduces all institutional processes to change, wherewith 
the approach risks neglecting the ways in which what might prima facie appear to 
constitute short-term incremental changes in fact might be countered, blocked, 
diverted or ricochet in the long term.171 Just as everything looks like a peg for 
someone with a hammer, a researcher equipped with VIC risks committing a 
typological fallacy, i.e., applying a theoretical framework, which by its very 
 
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168 Streeck and Thelen 2005, p. 31. Note originally Streeck and Thelen distinguished between 
five different modes, including exhaustion.  
169 Greve 2012, Schmidt 2008, Schmidt 2010, Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, March and Olsen 2006, 
Hall and Thelen 2009, Djelic and Quack 2007, Campbell and Pedersen 2007.  
170 Consider as an illustration Streeck and Thelen’s original volume (2005) in which virtually all 
case studies in some way or another address institutional liberalization processes towards 
convergence. Crouch 2005, Deeg 2005, Hacker 2005, Rothstein 2005.  
171 Campbell and Pedersen, 2014. 
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analytical categories predisposes her to approach, study and understand political 
and socioeconomic phenomena, events and processes as an instance of 
institutional change where there in fact might be institutional stability.172  
Put differently, arguments for the occurrence of institutional change require a 
careful theoretical specification of both the institutional unit, which allegedly 
changes, and the scope of the temporal sequence in which this change ostensibly 
takes place. If the unitization is vague, the scholar risks misconstruing superficial 
changes as real institutional change. And with an unclear specification of the 
relevant temporal scope she risks misconstruing long-term institutional stability as 
short-term change. Obviously, the theoretical unitization and temporal 
specification of comparative political economic analysis has tremendous 
implications for the warranty of subsequent observations of institutional stability 
or change.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
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172 For instance, it is not entirely unimaginable that political-economic actors could advance to 
shore up institutions as a response to perceived unfolding processes of institutional 
displacement, layering, conversion and drift and thus counter change through countervailing 
mechanisms of what could be termed institutional replacement (reverted displacement), 
institutional peeling (reverted layering), institutional reformation (reverted conversion), and 
institutional anchoring (reverted drift). By remaining theoretically inattentive to such 
possibilities, the VIC-equipped scholar might inadvertently come to overemphasize change and 
neglect long-term stability.  



-
6.4 Teleonomic Institutionalism: Gradual Divergence 
along Varied Trajectories 
The second and perhaps more potent criticism concerns the trajectory, direction or 
intended end (telos) of institutional change in such accounts. Dynamic 
institutionalism and VIC remain either largely silent about the particular direction 
in which institutional change is headed or, in the vast majority of cases, contend 
that change is in the direction of increased liberalization: more markets and less 
state, more competition and less coordination, more convergence upon the LME-
model and neoliberal modes of socioeconomic organization.173  
Recently Kathleen Thelen has argued that the controversy between systemic and 
dynamic institutionalism (VOC and VIC) has reached an impasse and “devolved 
into a disagreement of whether the glass is half empty or half full.”174 According 
to her the debate is 
“… played out in the more familiar disagreements focusing on how far 
liberalization has taken CME’s toward LME-type arrangements—thus 
effectively situating countries on a single continuum and reducing the 
question of change to movement along that continuum.”175 
That is, VIC appears to have re-assumed the same bifurcated bimodal worldview 
suggested by the VOC approach, only to argue that this dichotomy is in the midst 
of collapsing. As such, VIC ironically ends up reifying the very same theoretical 
framework that it set out to challenge. And the scholar employing the VIC 
framework therefore neglects two not entirely insignificant theoretical 
possibilities. First, institutional change might take place on a “two way street” and 
some changes might be headed in “the opposite direction.” 176  Second, that 
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173 Hall and Thelen 2009, Streeck 2008, Glyn 2006, Howell 2003, Coates 2005. 
174 Thelen 2012, p. 139. 
175 Thelen 2012, p. 143. 
176 In more specific analytical terms it is completely possible to theoretically accept (i) that 
institutional change is occurring and (ii) that political economies are converging upon one 
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processes of institutional change occur “at a crossroads” in the analytical junction 
of two (or more) trajectories (continuums) along which political economies can 
change (in either direction).177  
The latter possibility is explored in Kathleen Thelen’s most recent research.178 
First she argues that scholars studying institutional change invoke a too broad, 
encompassing and vague term when they characterize all of the great many 
institutional changes of recent decades as being instances of liberalization.179 As 
she suggests, 
“There is certainly a family resemblance between some aspects of the 
reforms associated with Danish ‘flexicurity’ and some of the measures 
introduced by Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom in the 1980s, 
and both can reasonably be treated as cases of liberalization, broadly 
defined. However, it is not clear that the term provides us with the 
precise and discriminating analytic tool we need to grasp the rather 
different implications of different ‘liberalizing’ moves.”180    
Instead she claims that the many institutional changes of past decades—which one 
coarsely might characterize as “liberalizations”—took on many different forms 
and led to highly varied outcomes in different domestic contexts, and thus that we 
need more analytically stringent and precise analytical categories to describe such 
differences.  
This more precise and discriminating tool Thelen develops through a careful re-
examination and recasting of the VOC framework where she suggests that 
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common model without necessarily endorsing (iii) that this point of convergence will be in 
either end of the VOC continuum (i.e., neoliberal convergence). For instance, if one invoked the 
categories of VOC, one might suggest that LMEs are gradually becoming more like CMEs.  
177 Again, in analytical terms, one might (i) accept that institutional change is occurring but (ii) 
either reject or accept that political economies are converging and maintain (iii) that trajectories 
of institutional change need to be charted along more continuums than just the one suggested by 
VOC, opening up a two-dimensional analytical space.  
178 Thelen 2012, Thelen 2014.  
179 See Thelen 2012, p. 145, Hall and Thelen 2009 pp. 22-24. 
180 Thelen 2012 p. 145.  
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scholars of comparative political economy begin to disentangle and differentiate 
analytically between coordinated capitalism and egalitarian capitalism and their 
different outcomes.181 By distinguishing between the two and remaining agnostic 
to their mutual relation, Thelen intends to reopen “the analytic space to 
disentangle the complex (and nonlinear) coevolution of egalitarian capitalism and 
coordinated capitalism”182 and thus “to propose a new framework that can take us 
beyond the usual distinctions between CMEs and LMEs and allow us to 
distinguish among divergent trajectories of change.”183  
 
	
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With this analytical innovation it is made vivid that different processes of 
institutional change, which all might roughly be squared with the term 
“liberalization,” in fact  occurs “at a crossroads” (i.e., in the analytical junction of 
two continuums) and thus follows different trajectories of institutional change and 
results in different outcomes on different parameters. 184    
 
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181 According to Thelen coordinated capitalism has attracted the interest of comparative political 
economists in virtue of its (potential) Williamsonian outcomes of particular institutions (and 
system of institutions), whereas egalitarian capitalism instead has been the object of interest due 
to is ostensible Durkheimian outcomes. The former connotes, the extent to which firms, as a 
consequence of being embedded in the institutional context of a particular political economy is 
in a better position to overcome coordination problems, reduce transactions costs and enhance 
efficiency, through various kinds of negotiation, compromise and coordination of activities. The 
latter instead connotes the extent to which a particular institutional configuration of a political 
economy leads to better performance in terms of solidarity, societal cohesion and equality. See 
also Streeck 2011, p. 153. The attentive reader will note the neat resemblance of the distinction 
between Williamsonian and Durkheimian outcomes and the debate within the competitiveness 
literature of whether the competitiveness of a nation is most appropriately measured by its 
ability to trade and export, by its ability to grow or rather by its ability to secure high levels of 
employment, social security and cohesion, equality and environmental sustainability. See p.72 
above. 
182 Thelen 2012, p. 145.  
183 Thelen 2012, p. 139 
184 Specifically, Thelen distinguish between three ideal-typical forms of liberalization or as she 
term “trajectories of institutional change”: deregulation, dualization and embedded 
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Recently a growing group of scholars has begun to argue along similar lines as 
Thelen. Like her they contend that while institutions of most advanced political 
economies have been in a flux in recent decades and thus a plethora of 
institutional changes have occurred, they nonetheless also argue that institutional 
change is not a unidirectional, equifinal and monolithic process and thus reject 
that all changes lead to the same outcome. In short, they accept that institutions 
change but reject that political economies as a consequence hereof converge. 185 
For instance, Cathie Jo Martin draws attention to what she terms the “conundrum 
of institutional continuity within change.”186 Hall and Lamont in their recent 
discussion of the alleged global diffusion of a neoliberal regime of governance 
urge that  
“Neoliberalism must not be seen, however, as a blanket laid over the 
world. The process whereby neoliberal schemes acquired influence over 
policymaking and popular beliefs is ultimately best described as a 
syncretic social process. … Their social impact was inflected by the 
creativity with which political actors used them and conditioned by the 
contexts into which they were introduced.”  187 
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flexibilization. First, liberalization qua deregulation, by which she refers to the active political 
dissolution of the ability to coordinate activities among both employers and labor. Secondly, 
liberalization as dualization, as for instance when strong employment protection is maintained 
for a stable core of regular, well-organized workers, while a growing share of “irregular” 
workers as they emerge remain disorganized and less protected. In this way, different 
institutional subsystems – which are not necessarily mutually complementary, are allowed to 
grow alongside each other. Thirdly socially embedded flexibilization, referring to the different 
forms of active labor market policies associated with the Nordic flexicuriy- arrangements in the 
labor market Thelen 2012, p. 147. See also Campbell and Pedersen 2007, Martin and Swank 
2012, Hull Kristensen and Lilja 2012, 
185 See illustrative accounts Peck and Tickell 2002, Hall and Thelen 2009, Fourcade-Gourinchas 
and Babb 2002, Hall and Lamont 2013, Evans and Sewell, Jr. 2013, Campbell and Pedersen 
2014, Halliday and Carruthers 2010.    
186 Martin forthcoming 2013, Petigrew et al 2001.  
187 Hall and Lamont 2013, p. 10. 
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7.  THEORY:  Ideas in 
Comparative Political Economy 
Tangential to this core controversy within comparative political economy, a 
growing body of scholarship has evolved trying to settle the question of whether 
and how ideas—broadly understood as the ways social actors situated in a political 
economy perceive and make sense of that political economy—matter to processes 
of institutional stability and change. That is, this sub-branch of comparative 
political economy generally holds that increased theoretical attention to ideas 
might complement and aid comparative political economists in devising more 
encompassing and complete explanations of how and why, for instance, some 
types of political economies remain stable, some types of institutional change 
occur and some types of outcomes result.  As succinctly put by Blyth, “structures 
don’t come with an instruction sheet,”188 by which he suggests that, before a social 
actor can either adhere to or defy institutional rules, that actor first needs to make 
sense of them by the invocation of ideas. 
At the most general level, this literature shares the assumption of many great 
philosophers and sociologists that beliefs about social reality held by actors 
embedded in social reality matters to social reality (in more than a merely 
epiphenomenal sense), and that ideas perhaps even possess the potential to 
transform the very social reality they are ideas of.189 The sub-branch has variously 
been labeled Discursive Institutionalism190, Constructivist Institutionalism191 or 
 
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188 He thus implies that agents need ideas to make sense of the institutional constraints imposed 
upon them in order to adhere by them. Blyth 2003. 
189 Weber 1915, Polyani 1944, Merton 1948, Foucault 1977, Scott 1998. 
190 Campbell and Pedersen 2001, Schmidt 2002, 2006, 2008. 
191 Hay 2002, 2006, 2011. 
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Ideational Institutionalism192 or as a Cultural Political Economy.193 Regardless of 
the particular epithet, the core common denominator of this literature is that “ideas 
matter”194 to the study of political economies and the turn to ideas within the 
comparative political economy reflects a broader social-scientific awareness of the 
need to make better theoretical sense of how social actors make sense of 
themselves, others, their time, history and context.195  
Again Peter Hall pioneered the field with a study of how ideas influenced British 
macroeconomic policymaking in the 1970s196, and following in his footsteps still 
more scholars have begun to study the interplay between ideas, discourse and 
institutions. 197   
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192 Hay 2001. 
193 Jessop 2012.  
194 Mehta 2011. 
195 As argued by Jessop, this turn to the study of ideas reflects a broader, ongoing and 
postdisciplinary re-orientation within humanities and social science—variously termed “the 
cultural turn, the narrative turn, the rhetorical turn, the discursive turn, the argumentative turn, 
the performative turn, the reflexive turn, the visual turn”—towards emphasis upon the 
independent theoretical value of studying the modalities and conditions of “social production of 
intersubjective meaning.” Jessop 2012, pp. 59-60.   
196 And allegedly orchestrated a broader “paradigm shift” from Keynesianism to monetarism 
during Thatcher’s government in the 1970s. See Hall 1993.  
197 Indeed, it is somewhat paradoxical that the study of ideas has not preoccupied comparative 
political economists more. After all, if ideas about political economies, institutions, 
globalization, competitiveness and other matters stand in no relation whatsoever to those objects 
they are about, then why would scholars want to devote hours, years and entire careers to the 
meticulous elaboration of such ideas (theories) in the first place?197 Campbell and Pedersen even 
suggest that the study of ideas “constitutes the third analytic leg of a three-legged stool along 
with the analysis of policymaking and production regimes upon which comparative political 
economy should rest. Until now that leg has been largely missing.” (2014, p. 11) For a few 
examples of studies of ideas, see, for example, Campbell and Pedersen 2001, Campbell 2004, 
2008, Schmidt 2002, 2006, 2008, Hay 2001, 2006, Blyth 2002, Beland and Cox 2011, Skogstad 
and Schmidt 2011, Gofas and Hay 2010, Schmidt and Thatcher 2013, Berman 1998, McNamara 
1998, Abdelal et al. 2010, Rodrik 2011, Rosamund 2012 , Jessop 2012, Culpepper 2008. 
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7.1 Ideas in Systemic, Dynamic and Teleonomic 
Institutionalism 
As a matter of fact, both systemic, dynamic and teleonomic institutionalism 
implicitly or explicitly ascribe an explanatory role to ideas in their respective 
approaches to the study of institutions and processes of institutional change. First, 
systemic accounts rely on ideas. For instance when addressing the question of how 
institutions are formed in the first place, Hall and Soskice addressed the 
organizational and institutional preconditions for elaboration, diffusion, 
deliberation, contestation and subsequent institutionalization of ideas.198 However, 
beyond these brief assertions, Hall and Soskice do not pursue the issue further. 
Second, ideas apparently also play a role in dynamic institutionalism accounts. For 
instance, ideas figure prominently, albeit implicitly, in the VIC framework. In 
their very definition of an institution, Streeck and Thelen distinguish between the 
“ideal” and “real” pattern of behavior in an institution and thus already assume 
some role for ideas, even if they on a par with Hall and Soskice do not pursue the 
question in any significant detail. 199 Finally ideas constitute an important part of 
 
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198 In particular, they argued that CMEs—but strangely enough not LMEs—host what they 
termed deliberative institutions and claimed they carry out three tasks. First, deliberative 
institutions encourage actors to engage in sharing of information and collective discussion on 
distribution of risks and gains associated with cooperation. Second, they improve the confidence 
between cooperating actors. Third, they can enhance the capacity of actors in the political 
economy for strategic action when faced with new or unfamiliar challenges. See Hall and 
Soskice 2001, pp. 11-12.  See also Hall and Gingerich 2004.  
199 Streeck and Thelen, 2005. For example, it is difficult to imagine how layering or conversion, 
could occur without someone having an idea about what layer to add to the institution or what 
new purpose the institution should be redeployed towards. Indeed, absent an account of how 
ideas might influence social actors’ perceptions of the relative advantage of continued adherence 
or deviation from an institution, an actor’s behavioral deviation from institutional constraints in 
theoretical terms seems to be so spontaneous that it renders the very concept of an institution 
virtually vacuous. If it involves so little cognitive effort on behalf of actors to utilize the room 
for play and deviate from institutional constraints, the good question is whether it all makes 
theoretical sense to speak of an institution in the first place. A similar consideration informs 
Pierson’s worry of the “abyss of agency unleashed” —that is, the observation that a staunch 
theoretical insistence on the complete capacity of actors to alter every aspect of an institution 
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the theoretical vocabulary of teleonomic institutionalism. For instance Hall and 
Lamont in their recent analysis of how the diffusion of an allegedly similar 
neoliberal policy paradigm nonetheless led to widely differing outcomes in 
different domestic contexts examine the influence of collective imaginaries, by 
which they understand  
“the overarching narratives that tell people what their society is about, 
what its past embodies and its future portends, who belongs to it, and 
what kinds of behavior merit social respect.” (p. 4, see also p. 17, Hall 
and Lamont 2013)   
Hall and Thelen argue that in order to understand both institutional stability and 
change, it is important to grant attention to “meta-institutions for deliberation”:  
“When the world throws up shocks that unsettle the benefits flowing 
from the existing institutions, deliberative forums facilitate the re-
equilibration of cooperative endeavor, by allowing for (i) “diagnosis,” 
where the issue is to agree on the cause-and-effect relations generating 
the problem and pertinent to the solution, and for (ii) ‘agreement on 
distributive justice’, where the issue is to apportion the risks and benefits 
that can flow unequally from cooperation.” 200 
Indeed ideas play a prominent role in most of the studies of teleonomic 
institutionalism201  
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always already obliterates the very theoretical concept of an institution. In short, if institutions 
are so easily changed, perhaps they are not really institutions. Pierson 2004, Thelen 2010. See 
also Hall 2010.    
200 Hall and Thelen 2009, p. 12.  
201 See also Evans and Sewell, Jr. 2013, pp. 36-37, Campbell and Pedersen 2014, Martin and 
Swank 2012, Martin 2013.  
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7.2 If This Is Your Idea of an Idea… 
However, as difficult as it is to deny the potential relevance of ideas to 
comparative political economy, as difficult has it been for scholars within 
mainstream comparative political economy to take most research of ideas 
seriously.202 But perhaps the core of comparative political economy is not entirely 
to blame for this mishap. Recently, Campbell has argued that if scholars taking 
ideas and discourse seriously themselves are to be taken seriously, they must 
become able to manage three central challenges to this body of scholarship: 203   
- Conceptual Clarity: First, scholars need to do a much better job of providing 
clear definitions of ideas and differentiate more precisely between different 
types of ideas through more rigorous and analytically clear typologies of ideas.  
- Attention to Actors:  Second, scholars should pay much more attention to the 
actors who wield and field ideas and be able to specify empirically who they 
are, how they act, coordinate and compete, how they are organized, and their 
varied roles in the deliberation, dissemination, contestation and potential 
implementation of ideas. 
- Transparent Methodology: Finally, scholars must devise and specify 
appropriate and sufficiently transparent and reproducible methodologies for the 
empirical study of different types of ideas as well as the various actors who 
carry them.  
The provision of satisfactory answers to these three challenges is a necessary (but 
not sufficient) condition if scholars of ideas are to be taken seriously within the 
larger edifice of comparative political economy and connect the insights from the 
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202 Schmidt 2010. 
203 Campbell 2004, p. 92. See also Campbell 2002.  In fact Campbell discerns five challenges 
inasmuch as he also argues that scholars should be better at specifying under what conditions, in 
what contexts and at what temporal pace different types of ideas are most likely to assert 
influence upon institutions.   
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study of ideas to these broader research agendas. The three challenges are 
addressed in greater detail in the following section.  
7.3 What Is an Idea? 
First, the literature on ideas, ironic as it seems, does not have a common clear idea 
of what an idea is. A great many seemingly synonymous terms flourish in this 
branch of literature—sometimes applied discriminately but most often 
interchangeably and with weak analytical distinctions. Among the many terms 
invoked (besides ideas), one finds blueprints204, ideologies, beliefs, perceptions, 
philosophies (in the plural), policies, narratives 205 , cultures 206 , episteme 207 , 
problematizations208, epistemologies209, paradigms210, frames and programs211, 
world views212, collective imaginaries213 and bricolages.214  
Among the more analytically rigorous accounts, one finds the following 
definitions of ideas. In their forthcoming volume, Campbell and Pedersen define 
policy ideas as 
“… arguments that specify causal relationships, such as that between tax 
or welfare policies and economic performance, over certain periods of 
time. They are based on paradigmatic theoretical or ideological 
assumptions. They are often substantiated with data and analyses of 
various sorts. They are often framed rhetorically in ways designed to 
appeal to policymakers and their staff, the general public or other 
audiences, sometimes by invoking widely held values, opinions and 
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204 Blyth 2002. 
205 Bates 1998.  
206 Swidler 1986. 
207 Foucault 1966. 
208 Also Foucault 1997. 
209 Pedersen 2010. 
210 Hall 1993. 
211 Campbell 2004. 
212 Swidler 1986, Hall and Lamont 2013. 
213 Jessop 2012, Hall and Lamont 2013.  
214 Campbell 2005. See Campbell 2007 and 2004 for a similar listing of concepts of ideas. 



.
attitudes in society. And they are often articulated in explicit opposition 
to competing ideas.” 215   
And Mark Blyth has suggested that  
“Economic ideas provide agents with an interpretive framework, which 
describes and accounts for the workings of the economy by defining its 
constitutive elements and “proper” (and therefore “improper”) 
interrelations. Economic ideas provide agents with both a “scientific” 
and a “normative” account of the existing economy and polity, and a 
vision that specifies how these elements should be constructed. That is, 
economic ideas also act as blueprints for new institutions. In sum ideas 
allow agents to reduce uncertainty, propose a particular solution to a 
moment of crisis, and empower agents to resolve that crisis by 
constructing new institutions in line with these new ideas.” 216   
However, as should be clear, several features of ideas are touched upon in these 
definitions which need to be carefully disentangled. Within the literature, then, so 
as to provide some degree of orderliness, it is common to elaborate a typology of 
ideas.  
7.3.1 Hall’s Typology of Ideas 
In his seminal article from 1993, Peter Hall distinguish between three types of 
ideas and, accordingly, between three types (or “orders”) of policy change. First, 
specific settings of policy instruments are a type of idea, and Hall suggests calling 
a change in such a setting a first-order change.217 Next, he discerns instruments 
defined as “the basic techniques used to attain” overall goals of policy and argues 
that we might speak of second-order change when instruments and their settings 
change while “the overall goals of policy remain the same.”218 Finally Hall, 
drawing on Thomas, defines policy paradigms as  
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“a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of 
policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but 
also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. … 
They specified what the economic world was like, how it was to be 
observed, which goals were attainable through policy, and what 
instruments should be used to attain them. They became the prism 
through which policymakers saw the economy as well as their own role 
within it.”219  
Third-order changes thus describe changes where “the hierarchy of goals behind 
policy” is changed and one paradigm replaces another.220 
7.3.2 Mehta’s Typology of Ideas 
In a recent account, Mehta (2011) defines an idea as an entity “which defines how 
policymakers should act” 221  and then discerns three types of ideas: policy 
solutions, problem definitions and public philosophies. First, he defines a policy 
solution as the instrument, tool or measure which is deemed appropriate to address 
a certain problem, in that particular case where this “problem is given … and the 
idea provides the means for solving the problem.”222 Second, he defines a problem 
definition as “a particular way of understanding a complex reality” as being 
problematic. The two types of ideas are related, inasmuch as problem definitions 
by their very articulation circumscribe and delineate the scope of potential, 
effective or appropriate solutions for addressing that problem, while excluding 
others as ineffective and/or inappropriate. As Mehta claims, “the way a problem is 
framed has significant implications for the types of solutions that will seem 
desirable.”223 Finally Mehta invokes the work of Hugh Heclo (1986) when he 
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220 To be sure, Hall find such paradigm shifts to be very rare events, and he cites the broad 
“movement from a Keynesian mode of policymaking to one based on monetarist economic 
theory” during the government of Thatcher as the most prominent example of such a paradigm 
shift. 
221 Mehta 2011, p. 25, 
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considers a third and more general type of idea, namely public philosophies (or 
zeitgeists), which he defines as a view about the “appropriate role of government 
given certain assumptions about the market and society”224 and which determine 
“(a) who is at the table, (b) how those actors think, and (c) the types of actions that 
will be seen as desirable or legitimate.”225  
7.3.3 Campbell’s Typology of Ideas  
John Campbell has also proposed a typology of ideas based on two analytical 
distinctions. He suggests that ideas might either be in the foreground of the debate 
figuring explicitly in writings, publications and other statements by policymakers, 
politicians and others.  Or an idea might reside in the background of the debate in 
the form of taken-for-granted assumptions that implicitly underlie and ground the 
foreground ideas.  Second, an idea might be either cognitive or normative. That is,  
“at the cognitive level, ideas are descriptions and theoretical analyses 
that specify cause-and-effect relationships, whereas at the normative 
level ideas consist of values and attitudes.”226  
These distinctions provide him with four different types of ideas: programs, 
defined as “cognitive concepts and theories that enable or facilitate decision-
making and institutional change by specifying for decision makers how to solve 
specific problems”; paradigms, defined as ideas which “constrain decision-
making and institutional change by limiting the range of alternatives that decision-
making elites are likely to perceive as useful and worth pursuing”; frames, defined 
as foreground ideas that “enable elites to legitimize their programs and 
institutional changes to their constituents”; and public sentiments, defined as 
background ideas that “constrain decision-making and institutional change by 
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limiting the range of programs that decision-making elites are likely to perceive as 
acceptable and legitimate.”227 
7.3.4 Schmidt’s Typology of Ideas   
Schmidt has also introduced an analytical distinction between coordinative and 
communicative discourses. Generally she defines discourse as 
“... not only the substantive content of ideas but also the interactive 
processes by which ideas are conveyed. Discourse is not just ideas or 
“text” (what is said) but also context (where, when, how, and why it was 
said). The term refers not only to structure (what is said, or where and 
how) but also to agency (who said what to whom).”228 
In turn, coordinative discourses describe discourse between socioeconomic elites 
about current political challenges and communicative discourse connotes the 
communication between such elites and broader electorates and societal groups in 
which these challenges are conveyed and legitimized.229  
7.3.5 Common Features of the Typologies of Ideas 
As should be clear, these definitions and typologies share several features. First 
and foremost, ideas are defined as being different from institutions, as commonly 
understood within mainstream comparative political economy.230 Second, they 
tend to conceptualize ideas according to a generality spectrum where some types 
of ideas (such as paradigms or discourse) are considered to have a more general, 
encompassing, basic or fundamental reference than other more particular, specific 
and confined ideas (such as settings or policy solutions.) Third, in turn more 
general ideas possess the capacity to constrain the less general ideas available to 
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
227 Campbell 2004.  
228 Schmidt 2008, p. 305. 
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(as for instance when Mahoney and Thelen distinguish between the “ideal pattern of a rule and 
the real pattern of life under it”), and institutions might figure as part of ideas, just as ideas 
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policymakers by rendering some of these particular ideas more legitimate, 
appropriate, rational or effective than others. Fourth, the more general an idea is, 
the more hidden in the background, unquestionable and inaccessible to scrutiny it 
tends to become for actors. More general ideas can come to be so taken for 
granted that actors think, act and behave according to them without doing so 
consciously or intentionally.231 Finally, it is common to distinguish between ideas 
as descriptive factual statements about socioeconomic reality232 and normative 
value-laden judgments about appropriate courses of political action. 
7.4 Three Remaining Problems 
Even so, while advances have been made in defining more analytically clearly and 
rigorously what types of ideas there are, these analytical concepts can nonetheless 
still be subjected to three not entirely insignificant criticisms. First, one has not 
demonstrated that ideas matter by showing that it is possible to distinguish 
between different types of ideas. Again, to do so would be to commit a typological 
fallacy.233 Second, it is not obvious that these conceptual categories are as well 
suited to conduct cross-national comparative studies—which after all is the core 
preoccupation of comparative political economy—as they are for conducting 1n-
case studies of ideas within single countries.  
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the question remains as to how social 
scientists in terms of methodology at all can approach, operationalize and study 
the more general, taken-for-granted ideas, paradigms, zeitgeists, or discourses 
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232 Objective ideas do not only refer to (allegedly) factual knowledge claims about the world 
(such as, e.g., “proper economic interrelationships,” “causal relations,” “problem definitions” 
etc.) but also to actors’ epistemological claims about proper procedures through which an actor 
might come to obtain knowledge about the world. See Campbell and Pedersen 2014.  
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which they argue reside in the background of the debate, inaccessible to the social 
actors who unconsciously accept them. Prima facie, several of these analytical 
conceptualizations seem to presuppose a privileged epistemological position on 
behalf of the scholar of ideas by which she can access and scrutinize that which is 
inaccessible and unavailable to scrutiny by the social actors themselves. 
Moreover, even if it is possible to assume such a privileged epistemological 
vantage point—and specify methodologically how to do so—the additional 
challenge of what James C. Scott with usual eloquence has termed the Social 
Heisenberg Principle remains.234 That is, how can the scholar of ideas be certain 
that she is not transforming the object of her study (discourse, paradigms) while 
studying it? Where do ideas come from?   
Turning to the second issue, scholars of ideas have also been troubled with 
providing adequate accounts of where ideas come from in the first place. That is, 
who are the actors, who develop and disseminate ideas and how are they 
organized? For instance, Hall argues that the “marketplace of economic ideas” 
expanded dramatically during the Thatcher years, as a host of new research 
institutes and think tanks devoted to the elaboration and dissemination of ideas 
about economic affairs flourished. 235  Employing a different concept, Haas 
suggests studying epistemic communities, which he defines as a 
“Network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in 
a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”236 
Sabatier instead argues that scholars ought to scrutinize clusters of actors that he 
terms advocacy coalitions. According to Sabatier, 
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“An advocacy coalition consists of actors from many public and private 
organizations at all levels of government who share a set of basic beliefs 
(policy goals plus causal and other perceptions) and who seek to 
manipulate the rules of various governmental institutions to achieve 
those goals over time.”237  
With an almost synonymous term, Hajer has suggested that scholars examine 
discourse coalitions.238 And increasingly scholars have encouraged studies of how 
different types of academic professions (such as economists but also others) 
through a host of profession-specific ideas seek to assert influence upon processes 
of institutional change and stability.239   
However, on a par with the analytical conceptualizations of ideas, such approaches 
to define actors who hold ideas suffer problems which emerge primarily because 
epistemic communities, advocacy and discourse coalitions and professions etc. are 
analytically defined with reference to the substantive content of particular ideas.240 
This is of course sufficient if one wants to describe these clusters of actors and the 
particular outlook of their epistemic and professional idiosyncrasies by 
themselves.   
But they are inherently inapt for studying more general ideas (paradigms, public 
philosophies etc.). Recall for instance, how Hall argues that paradigms constitute 
the prism by which policymakers see their own role within the economy241, or how 
Mehta suggests that public philosophies designate “who is at the table.” More 
specifically, the very status of community, coalition or profession is not a 
prediscursively independent ontological fact of the social world but a status 
conferred to it by the very constitution of a given general idea. Since more general 
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ideas not only specify policy problems but also confer identity, agency and 
responsibilities on social actors—that is, social actors are constituted as actors in 
virtue of certain general ideas of agency—analytical approaches which define 
actors according to the substantive content of ideas paradoxically by their very 
theoretical framework come to reify the very ideas and communities they propose 
to study by considering epistemic communities, professions etc. as ontologically 
given and immediately available for social-scientific study, which they are not.  
Peter Hall’s original definition of a marketplace of ideas consisting of all 
organizations that invokes ideas to influence policy processes far better addresses 
the challenges. In these footsteps, the literature has examined the formation and 
organization of different types of idea-producing organizations such as think 
tanks, research institutes and councils of economic advisers.242 But much of this 
has suffered from an Anglo-American bias and seldom engaged in more thorough 
and cross-nationally comparative analysis of how different marketplaces of ideas 
might be organized and structured differently in different national political and 
economic contests.  
7.4.1 Knowledge Regimes 
However, recently Pedersen and Campbell have addressed this gap in the literature 
on cultural political economy in their comprehensive and empirically rich study of 
what they term national knowledge regimes243, as well as how the latter have 
developed since the end of the Golden Age of Capitalism until today. They argue 
that a political economy basically can be considered to consist of three types of 
regimes: a production regime, a policymaking regime, and a knowledge regime. 
First, they define a production regime, which they claim  
 

242 See, for example, Cockett 1994, McGann 2007, Abelson 2002, Stone and Denham 2004, 
Rich 2004, and Pautz 2012 for accounts of the emergence of think tanks. 
243 Campbell and Pedersen, 2014, forthcoming, 2011. 



.-
“… involve[s] the organization of economic activity through markets and 
other market-related institutions, which govern the inter-relationships 
among firms, customers, employers, employees and owners of capital.”244 
Thus drawing heavily upon central tenets of systemic institutionalism 245  (in 
particular VOC), Campbell and Pedersen argue that production regimes can be 
(ideal-typically) distinguished by the extent to which interactions between market 
participants are governed by market principles (e.g., competitive behavior 
mediated by the price mechanism) or other institutional nonmarket principles (e.g., 
coordination through various kinds of mechanisms facilitating cooperation and 
consensus among market participants).   
Second, they argue that “policymaking regimes involve the organization and 
governance of states, political parties and other political institutions”246 and thus 
draw upon the literature which argues for “bringing the state back in.” 247 This 
body of scholarship emphasizes that the particular organization of the state, the 
bureaucracy and its parliamentary processes can have a profound influence upon 
specific policies.248 Finally they define a knowledge regime as the set of 
“policy research organizations like think tanks, government research 
units, political party foundations and others that produce and 
disseminate policy ideas. … Knowledge regimes are the organizational 
and institutional machinery that generates data, research, policy 
recommendations and other ideas that influence public debate and 
policymaking.”249 
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As such, a knowledge regime is assumed to be analytically distinct from both 
production and policymaking regimes. 
In turn, they demonstrate that the particular outlook of national policymaking and 
production regimes structures the particular organization of a knowledge regime, 
and on this basis argue that the particular organization of a national knowledge 
regime structures the substantive content of the ideas held by actors situated in that 
knowledge regime. Finally, they argue that ideas potentially can affect the 
structure and functioning of policymaking and policymaking regimes.  
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With regard to Campbell and Pedersen’s second set of claims, they on the one 
hand demonstrate that some degree of organizational isomorphism (i.e., 
convergence) occurred between national knowledge regimes. First, they find that 
since the late 1970s policy research organizations in all national knowledge 
regimes strengthened their outward communication capacity, embracing the 
Internet and new types of social media to enhance external exposure and 
disseminate their ideas to targeted audiences. Second, all of the organizations, 
regardless of knowledge regime, also enhanced their social-scientific analytical 
capabilities and increasingly began to employ sophisticated econometric 
methodologies, techniques, statistics and metrics.  
On the other hand, besides these convergent features national knowledge regimes 
nonetheless retained distinct national characters. Hence they argue that the 
particular configuration of national policymaking and production regimes 
continued to assert an influence upon the way the national knowledge regime was 
organized and find limited convergence of knowledge regimes:  
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“Although each knowledge regime underwent significant change 
national differences persisted in how each one was organized and 
operated. In short, we found patterns of only limited convergence that 
were at odds with what many organizational and economic sociologists 
and others would have expected.”250 
With regard to the third set of claims, Campbell and Pedersen assert that the 
substantive content of ideas produced in the four national knowledge regimes also 
converged in some regards but nonetheless—on a par with the organizational 
structure of the regime—retained a unique national character.  
To examine the content of ideas, they conducted a comparative case study of 
annual economic reports published by four different national economic councils. 
They found that those reports differed both in terms of the substantive content of 
ideas advocated and the relative pace or steadiness with which that content 
changed (or did not change) over time. In short, they argue that a more erratic flip-
flopping of ideas in the reports of the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors reflects 
the more competitive nature of U.S. knowledge, policy and production regimes, 
and conversely that the more “steady hand” of the German Sachsverständigensrat 
is the product of a more consensus-oriented knowledge, production and 
policymaking regimes.251 
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251 In the case of U.S. Council of Economic Advisors, they observe the ideological content of 
ideas to vary greatly depending on the political color of the current administration. Ideas “flip-
flopped” and flowed with the changing tides of political power. Where Campbell and Pedersen 
find that the annual economic reports published during the presidency of both George W. Bush 
and Ronald Reagan exclusively speak in favor of neoliberal ideas, during Clinton’s 
administration the picture is seemingly more mixed as neoliberal ideas are complemented with 
ideas favoring a more interventionist state which should move to correct inherent market 
failures. 251  In contrast, the authors find the reports published by the German 
Sachsverständigensrat much more consistent over time and exhibiting a continuous mix of 
neoliberal policies such as privatization, fiscal austerity, deregulation, tax cuts, and 
liberalizations with government-based supply policies aimed at improving educational systems 
and enhancing labor market mobility. 
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7.4.2 Shortcomings of the Knowledge Regime Approach  
Campbell and Pedersen’s analysis of the substantive content of ideas (the alleged 
product of national knowledge regimes’ unique organization), comprehensive and 
impressive as it is, leaves some questions unanswered. 
First and foremost, Campbell and Pedersen’s thorough and meticulous analysis of 
the substantive content of ideas is based on data drawn from just one type of 
policy research organization. Having first demonstrated a significant and 
nationally specific variation in how many different types of policy research 
organizations are organized in different knowledge regimes (and finding that some 
types are much more prevalent in some knowledge regimes than in others), it is 
somewhat curious that Campbell and Pedersen by methodological choice restrict 
their subsequent content analysis to merely one type of policy publication (annual 
economic reports) from just one type of policy research organization (councils of 
economic experts) even if they provide good methodological reasons for 
restricting their study to this type of organization.  
While it of course might be the case, it is not entirely obvious that ideas held by 
councils of economic experts are representative of the ideas generally held by 
other types of policy research organizations situated in a knowledge regime. Nor 
can it be assumed that such ideas exclusively or primarily find expression in 
annual economic reports published by policy research organizations. Indeed, the 
publication portfolio of these types of organizations is vast, and the annual reports 
might constitute the tip of the iceberg.  
Finally, while they tell us that policy research organizations converged in their 
common adoption of similar sophisticated econometric methodologies and 
techniques, they curiously do not shed much light on the particular form, content 
and function of these advanced econometric methodologies and techniques.   
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7.4.3 Complementing the Knowledge Regime Approach 
In short, our knowledge of the knowledge that knowledge regimes produce could 
be greatly enhanced by a content analysis of the ideas (as well as econometric 
techniques employed to substantiate such ideas) held by a greater variety of policy 
research organizations as expressed in a greater variety of policy publications 
based upon a more explicit and clear analytical framework. 
In fact, Campbell and Pedersen in a postscript to their recent book on knowledge 
regimes call for further research along these lines: 
“More effort is required to determine whether the overall structure and 
practices of a knowledge regime influences the type of ideas it tends to 
produce. Our analysis of this was suggestive but by no means definitive 
because it was based on documents from only one policy research 
organization in each of our four knowledge regimes— national councils 
of economic advisors. More systematic research is in order and would 
involve analyzing reports from a broader sample of policy research 
organizations in each knowledge regime. Documents from at least the 
most prominent organizations in each should be sampled for different 
time periods to determine whether changes in the knowledge regime 
affected the type of ideas they tended to produce.”252 
This is exactly were the present study sets in. In particular, the primary purpose of 
the present study is to pick up the baton after Campbell and Pedersen and advance 
the knowledge regime research agenda by conducting a discourse analysis of the 
ideas held by a greater variety of policy research organizations in order to 
determine whether and how such ideas co-vary with national knowledge regimes.  
In fact more is at stake for the knowledge regime approach than first meets the 
eye. If it cannot in a methodologically convincing way be demonstrated that ideas 
held by policy research organizations situated in different knowledge regimes 
vary, then there is really no good reason for comparative political economists to 
take knowledge regimes seriously. After all, if knowledge regimes vary but the 
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ideas they produce remain the same, why bother to study knowledge regimes in 
the first place?   
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8. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: 
Discourse and Narratives 
Hence, the present study will examine whether and how the substantive content of 
the ideas held by policy research organizations vary—and vary systematically—in 
accordance with the national knowledge regimes within which they are situated. 
And it will demonstrate that a common discourse of international competition 
among nations has been present in the period from 1993 to 2007 in the three 
national knowledge regimes of the United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark but 
that this discourse nonetheless came to be expressed and understood in nationally 
specific ways through, in some aspects, similar but nonetheless sufficiently 
distinct national narratives of competitiveness.   
This it will do by means of an analytical framework—elaborated in the present 
chapter—in which the central analytical categories of a discourse of international 
competition and national narrative of competitiveness are presented, defined and 
explained. In the subsequent chapter, a cross-national, three-layered methodology 
and research design is presented by which the study intends to operationalize and 
apply the analytical framework laid out below.   
8.1 Discourse Defined 
The concept of discourse, as applied in the present study, refers to the set of 
conceptual conditions or rules for intersubjective communication implicitly 
accepted and understood by a multitude of actors embedded in a given social 
context at a given historical time. By virtue of discourse, such actors become able 
to assess, interpret and evaluate the speech and behavior of others and differentiate 
rational, purposeful speech and action from irrational, futile folly and nonsense. 
As such, discourse constitutes a context of rationality which allows actors to 
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interpret and make sense of themselves and others as if that practice is rational or 
irrational, regardless of whether it in fact is. And it consists of the historically 
prevailing quasi-transcendental conditions of sense-making, which any social 
actor is bound to observe insofar as she intends to make herself intelligible and 
understood by—that is appear as rational to—others who share these conditions. 
253 Of course, the great challenge associated with studying a discourse is that it 
cannot be observed directly. As should be intuitively clear, the historically 
prevailing quasi-transcendental possibility conditions for intersubjective 
communication are not immediately given to the social scientist who hopes to 
study them.  
Even so a discourse can reasonably be assumed to be present if, in the comparison 
of different instantiations of the discourse, there can be discerned a common logic 
or sufficiently clear pattern. Put differently, one can as a social scientist 
reasonably assume discourse to be present if a plurality of temporally and spatially 
dispersed situated social actors makes sense of their social world in sufficiently 
similar and comparable—if different and distinct—ways.254 
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Mouffe 2001. 
254 Note however, that the point is not that a discourse is present if and only if all actors 
instantiate these dichotomies in exactly the same way through exactly similar narratives. Rather 
the point is that a discourse can be assumed to be present if multiple actors situated in different 
contexts tell narratives which are different but that all employ the dichotomies in a manner 
sufficiently similar to allow for their meaningful comparison and contrast. If several narratives 
are structured according to the same logic—e.g., the same timescale, metrics, identities and 
functions—then one can reasonably assume a discourse to be present.  
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8.2 Paul Ricoeur’s Concept of Narrative 
These particular instantiations of a discourse are, in the present study, defined as 
national narratives of competitiveness. In so doing, the study draws heavily upon 
the philosophical concept of a narrative as proposed by Paul Ricoeur. In his 
brilliant philosophical treatise “Time and Narrative” (1983) he suggests that   
“the plot of a narrative … ‘grasps together’ and integrates into one 
whole and complete story multiple and scattered events, thereby 
schematizing the intelligible signification attached to the narrative taken 
as a whole.”255  
To Ricoeur, a narrative rests upon the philosophical premise that to any human 
being a priori two fundamentally different—and prima facie mutually 
incompatible—ways to apprehend and make sense of time are available. On the 
one hand, time can be understood as cosmological time that refers to the uniform 
sequence of an unending multitude of unqualified, undifferentiated moments. In 
short everything that has happened, happens and will happen. On the other hand, 
time can be understood as lived or human time. This refers to the lifespan of some 
human being, i.e., the sequence of experienced events, moments and occurrences 
of which some, upon recollection, stand out as more meaningful and important 
than others. The simultaneous presence of two so different temporal modalities 
constitutes a fundamental, virtually insurmountable paradox to any human being. 
How can the same moment be both qualitatively significant (human time) and 
quantitatively insignificant (cosmological time)?  
Paul Ricoeur argues that narratives resolve the paradox. The narrative “grasps 
together,” qualifies and delimits the unqualified, cosmological multitude in an 
apprehensible whole which accentuates and attributes significance to some 
moments at the expense of others. As such the narrative resolves the allegedly 
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paradoxical tension between cosmological and human time. Or in Ricoeur’s own 
words, historical time becomes human time 
“to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; and 
narrative attains its full significance when it becomes a condition of 
temporal existence.”256  
As such the act of narrating is not a pure or scientific exercise of depicting and 
obtaining knowledge about the world in and of itself. Through narratives, human 
beings continuously construct and interpret, reconstruct and reinterpret history in 
certain ways, with certain emphases and punctuations, regarding some aspects and 
moments as more significant, important and meaningful than others.  
However, the point is not that narratives can be constructed in an infinite range of 
imaginable ways. Any meaningful narrative must necessarily relate to 
cosmological time. Rather, the point is that narratives constitute contingent 
constructs, not necessary truths, and thus any narrative always could have been 
told differently.257 This, in turn, has the implication that any given narrative—
apparently a descriptive account of an extant temporal socioeconomic reality—is 
always already inscribed with a particular meaning and holds a certain 
significance inasmuch as some moments by some actor at some point are “carved 
out” of cosmological time and put forward as significant at the expense of other 
potentially significant moments. In short, the very act of description necessarily 
involves a moment of normative judgment. History could always have been told 
otherwise but not in an infinite number of ways.  
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256 Ricoeur 1983, p. 3. 
257 For instance, two different narratives might ascribe importance and significance to different 
chains of moments and events occurring in the stream of cosmological time and thus constitute 
different narratives, yet these would be considered equally truthful (i.e., equally related to 
cosmological time). However, the two narratives share the feature of having some relation to 
cosmological time. 
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8.3 Ontological Assumptions of Discourse Theory 
Paul Ricoeur’s concept of a narrative shares a set of assumptions with discourse 
theoretical approaches in general.   
8.3.1 The Never-Once-and-for-All-Givenness of Knowledge 
First, the discourse theoretical approach emphasizes the contingency of any 
purported objective, necessary knowledge claim of social reality. Regardless of 
the strength of the epistemological foundation, a given knowledge claim rests 
upon that epistemological foundation itself, which is always historically given, 
context dependent and contingent.   
Thus the discourse theoretical approach points towards the never-once-and-for-
all-givenness of any purported knowledge claim about social reality 258  and 
proposes that any idea should not be assessed as being either true or false but 
understood as an interpretation of ostensible facts by a historically situated 
cognizing subject. In particular it underscores this as such:  
- That interpretation is guided by a historically given, contingent and not 
infrequently contested norm, procedure or epistemology for the appropriate 
interpretation of alleged facts, where 
- What constitutes a fact is given by historical assumptions about ontology, that 
is, assumptions about what entities exist in the world, and where 
- What constitutes a subject is guided by historically given norms and 
conventions for who may (and may not) legitimately and with sufficient 
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258 If for no other reason then for the fundamental reflexive character of knowledge of social 
reality, i.e., any purportedly objective knowledge of social reality is always (and necessarily) 
known by some subject situated in that social reality. As such that knowledge, in turn, is added 
to social reality as soon as that knowledge becomes known by other participants also embedded 
in that social reality and they begin to adjust their behavior according to that knowledge.       



&.
competence apply epistemological procedures for assessing and interpreting 
facts.  
The task, then, is to construct a second-order interpretation of the first-order 
interpretations of social reality through which the epistemological and ontological 
assumptions underpinning these are laid bare, revealed and explicated.259 Thus the 
discourse theoretical approach seeks to render social actors taken-for-granted first-
order interpretations of social reality a little less taken for granted and more 
historically contingent through the careful, meticulous and comparative 
reexamination and reinterpretation of these first-order interpretations.  In short, to 
demonstrate that history could have been told otherwise.  
8.3.2Three Dichotomies of Discourse 
Second, the approach contends that the range of possible narratives is not infinite. 
That is, just because any knowledge claim necessarily is historically contingent 
(i.e., emphasizes some aspects of cosmological time at the expense of others), this 
does not imply that any claim whatsoever could come to count as knowledge in 
any socio-historical context. 260 In other words, the range of tellable narratives is 
constrained by a set of (quasi)-transcendental, generic possibility conditions of 
intersubjective communication, conditions any human being, regardless of 
historical context, must observe. For instance, a narrative told without the 
invocation of temporal categories is a priori meaningless and unintelligible. These 
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260 Indeed, there exist a variety of discourse theoretical approaches, of which some are of a more 
radical and strong ontological tenor than those discussed here. Some strands of strong discourse 
theory contend that inasmuch as any description of the world is mediated by language, and 
moreover since all language is socially constructed, then there is no “objective” nonconstructed 
basis upon which any kind of knowledge claim (including a narrative) can be founded. For 
examples of such approaches, see Woolgar 1988, Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay 1983. 
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can be expressed as a set of discursive dichotomies.261 Any narrative which 
purports to be meaningful must necessarily invoke the following: 
1) The Dichotomy of Temporality: As famously noted by the French philosopher 
Henri Bergson, time is what keeps everything from happening all at once. 
Accordingly, in a narrative all objects, subjects, causes and events must 
necessarily be described as taking place in temporal sequences, where 
something happens before other things and something happens after. The 
temporal dichotomy differentiates cosmological time with the categories of 
“before” and “after.”   
2) The Dichotomy of Subjectivity and Objectivity: Likewise a narrative must 
ascribe the quality of objectivity as having being to some entities, i.e., as 
possessing the quality of being objects present for observation. Likewise, the 
narrative must ascribe the quality of subjectivity to some entities, i.e., as 
possessing the quality of subjectivity and consciousness. That is, someone or 
some group of someones has to be defined as cognizant social actors which are 
first in an epistemological position to observe objects qua their being objects 
and subsequently able to engage, interact with and potentially change those 
objects. The dichotomy thus differentiates and set differences in cosmological 
space with the categories of subject and object. 
3) The Dichotomy of Functionality: Finally a narrative must carve out and assume 
connections and relationships between objects and subjects. Such relationships 
can assume one of two generic forms. Relationships between two objects 
constitute causal relationships, where one object is described as effect and the 
other as the cause of that effect. Relationships between an object and a subject, 
instead, constitute an instrumental relation in which a conscious subject relates 
to and understands a given object as a potential means to the obtainment of an 
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end or, conversely, as an end for which another object is perceived as a means. 
In short, the difference between a causal and instrumental relationship is the 
intentionality of a subject which consciously apprehends a causal relationship 
as a potentially manipulable instrumental function for the obtainment of an end. 
This dichotomy thus differentiates social reality through categories such as 
causes, means, sources or inputs on the one hand and effects, goals, outcomes 
or outputs on the other.  
8.3.3 The Assertion of Discursive Dichotomies through 
Commensuration  
Recently Espeland and Sauder have described how this “carving out” and 
assertion of dichotomies is operationalized and practiced through the (essentially 
cognitive) process of commensuration. They argue, that in its most simple form, 
“commensuration is characterized by the transformation of qualities into 
quantities that share a metric; a process that is fundamental to 
measurement. … Commensuration shapes what we pay attention to, 
which things are connected to other things, and how we express 
sameness and difference.”262 
In fact, in a prolongation of Espeland and Sauders’ claim, one might argue that a 
distinct form of commensuration applies to each of the three discursive 
dichotomies above:  
• The discursive dichotomy of temporality is cognitively asserted through a 
process of temporal commensuration, by which a multitude of qualitative and 
undifferentiated moments, events and sequences are quantified and ordered 
according to common a timescale or cycle. 
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the sociologically well-described process of commodification, through which vast, dispersed 
and qualitative information of an ostensible social entity is reduced to a quantitative price. But 
commensuration is more general than commodification and can assume several forms. See 
Espeland and Sauder 2007, p. 34. 
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• The dichotomy of objectivity and subjectivity is asserted through the dual 
processes of objectifying commensurations, by which a multitude of qualitative 
data and phenomena are categorized and subsumed according to a common 
metric or scale, and subjectifying commensurations, by which the mass of all 
human beings are analytically differentiated and recollected according to 
common (potentially collective) identities (such as a government).  
• The dichotomy of functionality is asserted through processes of relational 
commensuration, by which a multitude of undifferentiated, qualitative events 
are recategorized according to the common form of a causal relation or 
function. 
As such, processes of commensuration affect which aspects of their social world 
actors grant attention to and perceive as relevant and thus structure the form of 
their attention by decontextualizing the potentially infinite, bewildering and hyper-
complex amount of qualitative, context-based information of cosmological time in 
the form of common metrics, timescales, identities and functions.  
According to Espeland and Sauder, commensuration alters and simplifies the 
cognitive horizon of social actors in two ways. On the one hand, it delegitimizes 
and eliminates huge amounts of information possessed by actors as being 
irrelevant. On the other hand, it reorganizes the remaining information by 
imposing a common form upon it. As such commensuration unitizes social reality 
by reifying certain social phenomena as having being but simultaneously 
hierarchizes it through the evaluative differentiation and distinction made possible 
by the evaluative yardsticks implied by the common metrics, timescales, identities 
and functions. For instance, Espeland and Sauder contend that commensuration 
constrains the cognition of agents in virtue of   
“how the common metric relationship is constructed, as well as from the 
relations of relevance and irrelevancy, visibility and invisibility, that are 
conferred. Difference between entities is expressed as an interval on a 



&(
shared metric. Commensuration takes other categories for expressing 
difference irrelevant as they are subsumed into this metric. ”263 
8.4 The Scylla and Charybdis of Discourse Analysis 
Of course, the good methodological question is how one as a social scientist 
should approach the task of analyzing the not immediately given and visible 
discourse. It is not an entirely unproblematic exercise to explicate the discursive 
possibility conditions upon which knowledge claims taken for granted by socially 
embedded actors are premised. Obviously the question readily arises as to what 
the epistemological assumptions underpinning the second-order interpretations—
which the discourse theorist attempts to establish from the first-order 
interpretations—they are?  
Put differently, when the discourse theorist intends to reveal ostensible objective 
knowledge claims as contingent constructs, on what epistemological grounds does 
the discourse theorist put forth her own knowledge claim about the knowledge 
held by actors? If not extremely careful, she runs the risk of repeating the very 
same mistake as she accuses her study object of committing, namely of laying 
claim to a privileged epistemological vantage point from which the social world as 
“it really is” can be perceived, accessed, described and understood once and for 
all.    
The methodological challenge for the discourse theorist consists of remaining on 
the same epistemological plane as the social actors she studies while retaining the 
possibility of demonstrating that the actors’ knowledge of the social world are 
perceptions and thus historically contingent. To invoke the sophisticated term of 
Louis Althusser, the challenge consists of avoiding reassuming the very same 
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relation of exteriority264 that one attempts to reveal. Put figuratively, the discourse 
theorist must steer the hazardous methodological course between the Scylla and 
Charybdis of empiricism and theoreticism, theoretical approaches which both 
assume a relation of exteriority but in different ways.  
Empiricism assumes, put simply, that “the facts are out there.” As such, the object 
of study is immediately given to the discourse theorist in some real-concrete 
sense. Accordingly the cognitive task consists of nothing more than abstracting, 
generalizing and extracting the essence of the real through inductive reasoning 
from facts to theory. Yet, this path is methodologically blocked since this would 
amount to an unwarranted claim to a privileged epistemological vantage point, of 
being somehow “closer” to the facts than the actors themselves. In short, it would 
constitute a deliberate and methodologically unjustifiable neglect of the 
fundamental point that not only are social actors always already situated within a 
socially meaningful and mediated context, so is the discourse theorist. In this 
sense, the facts are never out there but always already mediated, and this has to be 
taken into account.   
Theoreticism conversely assumes,  no less simply, that  “the theories are out 
there,” i.e., that the bewildering mass of scattered events and phenomena 
constituting the social world principally can be subsumed under empirically 
verifiable causal laws or general theories and that knowledge can be obtained 
through empirical verification or falsification of hypotheses derived from these 
more general, well-established theories. Accordingly, the cognitive task for the 
discourse theorist consists of, first, the theoretical deduction of a set of analytical 
categories and concepts, after which the first-order interpretations held by social 
actors could be examined to analyze the relative conformation or deviation 
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between categories and “data.” However, this path is also blocked. Again she 
would need to explain in what sense, upon what epistemological basis, her own 
deductively derived concepts constitute a more appropriate or superior set of 
concepts to approach the social world than those held by the actors themselves. 
That is, one would need to account for how one as a theorist would be “closer” to 
the “real” theories of social reality than other social actors. Thus theoreticism 
carries a severe risk that the discourse theorist in her eagerness to ascertain 
second-order interpretations would overimpose and force a particular set of 
theoretically categories and concepts upon the first-order interpretations—as it 
were, “import” a preconceived meaning into the already meaningful discourse—
herewith neglecting the specificity and particularity of the notions held by the 
social actors themselves.   
Instead, the discourse theorist must steer a third course between Scylla and 
Charybdis. She can reject the empiricist and theoreticist approaches and proceed 
through what one, in desperate need of a precise phrase, could term “double 
conceptual judo,” that is, an analytical strategy through which the epistemological 
strength of one narrative is played out against that of another. By such an exercise, 
the prima facie necessity or taken for grantedness of one narrative is compared to 
and contrasted with the equally prima facie necessity of another narrative, by 
which they both ultimately are rendered a little more contingent.   
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8.5 Epistemological Status of Discourse Theoretical 
Claims: It’s Just Another Story 
However, the approach thus also implies that the propositions asserted by the 
discourse theorist (i.e., the second-order interpretation of first-order 
interpretations) remain and can never be more than just another interpretation of 
social reality among many. In epistemological terms, the approach is not more 
privileged than others and in terms of empirical (positivist) predictive power they 
are inherently insufficient. Put figuratively, once one as a scholar makes the 
methodological choice to open Pandora’s hermeneutic box and let the genie of 
Ricoeur out of the bottle, it is not easily closed again. As such, the propositions of 
the discourse theorist can perhaps best be likened to what Italian philosopher 
Gianni Vattimo has termed “weak thinking.” A type of thinking or philosophy 
which, when contested or challenged consciously (and conscientiously), refrains 
from taking epistemological recourse to stronger ontological first principles or 
capital-letter categories such as God, Nature, History, Science, State or Market.265  
However, being weak does not necessarily imply being inconsequential. The 
epistemological weakness of the discourse-theoretical approach constitutes its 
very strength. Exactly because the discourse theoretical analysis possesses the 
potential to question the taken for grantedness of first-order interpretations upon 
epistemological and ontological premises already accepted by such 
interpretations, it obtains a position from which it becomes possible to 
demonstrate that history (always) could have been told differently. Perceived 
imperatives might be political choices. By pointing out how and in what aspect 
taken-for-granted narratives are different from other such equally taken-for-
granted interpretations, the analytical power of the discourse-theoretical approach 
 

265 Vattimo 2006. 



&,
resides in its ability to continuously reopen the social horizon of imagination.266 
On a par with the skilled judo fighter who turns the strength of her enemy to an 
advantage, the epistemological weakness of the discourse-theoretical approach 
constitutes its very strength, as through this dual conceptual judo it becomes 
possible to reveal the soft epistemological underpinnings of any ostensibly strong 
ontological claim.  
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9. METHODOLOGY: Advancing 
Our Knowledge of the Knowledge 
Knowledge Regimes Produce 
And now for something completely different.267 In the following, a methodology 
and research design is elaborated by which it becomes possible to demonstrate 
that, in the period from 1993 to 2007 in the national knowledge regimes of the 
United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark, nationally distinct—if in some regards 
similar—narratives of competitiveness came to be expressed by the policy 
research organizations (PROs) situated in those knowledge regimes and by which 
it subsequently becomes reasonable to assume that a discourse of international 
competition of nations in fact has been present in this period.268 
The study applies a three-level research design to study the substantive content of 
national narratives of competitiveness.   
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• On the first level, three national knowledge regimes—the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Denmark—have been selected for analysis.  
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268 As argued, it is only in virtue of variance between national narratives of competitiveness that 
one as a discourse theorist is allowed to assume the presence of a discourse For instance, a 
discourse of “international competition of nations” could not be reasonably said to be present if, 
say, the issue of competitiveness was not addressed in one or two knowledge regimes at all. It is 
in virtue of the fact that all PROs in all of the knowledge regimes in some way or another 
discuss what it takes for a nation to be competitive in an increasingly competitive global 
environment—but in different ways with different emphasis elaborating different 
conceptualizations of the very concept of competitiveness—which warrants the argument that a 
discourse of “international competition of nations” is present. 
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• On the second level, from each these knowledge regimes a typologically 
representative set of four different types of PROs—an advocacy 
organization, a scholarly organization, an economic council and a ministry 
of economics—has been selected.  
• On the third level, from these PROs three types of policy documents—
annual economic reports, commission white papers and indexes of 
competitiveness—have been included in the dataset and subjected to a 
thorough coding and content analysis.    
Thus the full dataset covers more than more than 10,000 pages of policy 
documents and publications published by 12 different organizations situated in 
three different national knowledge regimes. The specific methodological rationale 
for the selection of the particular cases at these three levels of analysis is laid out 
and explained in greater detail in the following. 
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9.1 Sample of Knowledge Regimes 
At the first level of analysis, the national knowledge regimes within the political 
economies of the United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark have been selected for 
analysis, the United Kingdom and Germany because these within the wider 
literature of comparative political economy are commonly cited as prototypical or 
ideal-typical policymaking and production regimes (LMEs and CMEs, 
respectively) and thus provide a good ground for a productive and relevant cross-
national comparison.269  Furthermore, Denmark has been included since scholars 
within comparative political economy increasingly have begun to grant this case 
more attention, with some arguing that it constitutes a hybrid case that combines 
features of other ideal-types.270  
9.1.1Two Caveats 
Before moving forward, it is important to assert two caveats with regard to the 
sampling of the three national knowledge regimes.  
First, as should be clear from the discussion of discourse analysis above271, the 
very theoretical positing of ideal-typical models and regimes—production, 
policymaking and knowledge regimes—as well as claims regarding the potential 
presence or absence of complementary, mutually reinforcing relationships 
between them, could be problematic from a discourse-theoretical view. That is, 
these constitute themselves as abstractions deduced from general theories common 
to comparative political economy and thus the study could be accused of implicit 
theoreticism. 272  For instance, as will be evident shortly, policy research 
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270 See Campbell, Hall and Pedersen 2006, Hull Kristensen 2012, Martin and Swank 2012, 
Acemoglu, Robinson et al. 2012, Katzenstein 1985, Rodrik 1997, Berman 2006, Sapir 2006, 
Cox 2001, Pontusson 2009.  
271 See p. 115 above. 
272 See p. 124 above. 
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organizations situated in knowledge regimes in fact themselves invoke ideas of 
distinct types of political economies, as is the case in Germany (at times referred 
to as “Modell Deutschland”273) or Denmark (the labor market of which is at times 
characterized as a flexicurity model)274  
However, this should not constitute a severe problem as long as one, as a 
discourse theorist, remains aware of the problem and, during analysis, remains 
open and attentive to the specific ways “models,” regimes and systems are being 
discursively constructed and conjured by the objects of analysis (i.e., the policy 
research organizations) and keeps them separate from his or her own 
methodological categories. Moreover, as long as the analytical categories by 
which one as a discourse analyst approaches a discourse are sufficiently generic 
(i.e., remain at the level of the discursive dichotomies) and thus do not overimpose 
or predetermine the meaning of the discourse by the very analytical categories one 
approaches it with, the problem is manageable. After all, one has to approach the 
discourse from somewhere in order to study it. The view from nowhere is reserved 
for philosophers.    
Second, in the following, the particular national characteristics of the production, 
policymaking and knowledge regimes of the United Kingdom, Germany and 
Denmark are briefly presented. The reviews are based on secondary literature and 
surely could have been more comprehensively, evenly and systematically 
elaborated than is the case here. However, the production, policymaking and 
knowledge regimes have already elsewhere been very well described and detailed 
by core comparative political economists. And as the present study merely hopes 
to describe rather than explain275 the cross-national variation of ideas, this does 
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not constitute a significant shortcoming. Of course, had the intention been to 
establish convincing explanations of cross-national variation, then the descriptions 
below would probably have been too crude and insufficient for the task. But it was 
not and, given the time and resource constraints, the study committed the majority 
of its resources to the substantive content analysis of discourse and narratives. 
9.1.2 The Knowledge Regime of United Kingdom: A Liberal 
Marketplace of Ideas 
The policymaking regime of the United Kingdom hosts a two-party system and a 
winner-takes-all system. Whichever of the Labor or Conservative parties win an 
election holds control of the legislative and the executive branches of government, 
which grants any given U.K. government considerable more policy autonomy and 
room to maneuver. In contrast to Germany, the British state is centralized, and the 
prime minister and the British government has far greater policy autonomy and 
initiative freedom than elsewhere. The state bureaucracy is likewise strong, well-
established, and professionalized and remains in place with the coming and going 
of electoral majorities. The civil service thus possesses a significant degree of 
policy expertise and competence accumulated over time. 
The United Kingdom is—besides the U.S.— often highlighted as a prototypical 
liberal market economy276, that is, as a type of political economy in which 
interactions between various stakeholder groups in the market (between boards 
and management, between management and employees, between competing firms 
etc.) are resolved through the price mechanism, i.e., as transactions within a 
market without any formal or informal institutional rules or constraints guiding 
such an exchange. At least since the Thatcher government, the direct influence and 
involvement of the social partners—in particular the labor movement—in the 
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drafting and implementation of economic policy have been severely constrained 
and cosmetic. The typical CEO of a U.K. firm is typically less encumbered by and 
not subjected as often to having to take into account the interests of various 
stakeholder groups, which means he or she can move quickly and unilaterally 
without interruption when required. In terms of corporate finance, following the 
“big bang” of financial market liberalizations since 1986277, a deep and strict 
divide has separated the interests of the financial sector from those of U.K.’s 
manufacturing industry.278 Thus British firms must secure financing either through 
retained earnings or equity financing, and financial institutions investing in British 
firms are far more interested in short-term turnover, earnings and value of market 
shares than in the longer-term nurturing of the firm. Consequently, British firms 
have been far more vulnerable to hostile foreign takeovers. 
According to Pautz, in recent decades the British knowledge regime has seen a 
proliferation of new think tanks and advocacy organizations where new 
organizations with a particular partisan inclination typically have emerged in 
periods where their favored political party has been in opposition. Prior to the 
election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, a group of think tanks had been founded, 
such as the Institute for Economic Affairs (1955), the Adam Smith Institute (1977) 
and the Centre for Policy Studies (1974). The emergence of these organizations 
have often been used to explain Thatcher’s ascension to power as they (allegedly!) 
helped pave the ground for her free-market-oriented ideas and policies as well as 
aided in the intellectual discrediting of Keynesianism.279 Similarly during the late 
1980s and 1990s, with the Labor Party out of office, new advocacy think tanks 
with a progressive ideological orientation were established, groups such as the 
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Demos, the Social Market Foundation, the Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Catalyst and the Smith Institute. And the electoral defeats of the Conservatives 
from 1997 through 2007 have given rise to a new bulge of center-right-oriented 
think tanks such as the Policy Exchange, ResPublica, Politeia and Civitas. 280 Thus 
in the British knowledge regime, it seems, the budding and blossoming of new 
PROs ebbs and flows synchronously with the tides of political power. One might 
term the British knowledge regime as a liberal marketplace of ideas.  
9.1.3 The Knowledge Regime of Germany: A Coordinated 
Marketplace of Ideas  
Likewise the political economy of Germany—Modell Deutschland—is a fairly 
well described and thoroughly analyzed object of study within the literature of 
comparative political economy.281 And the bountiful tales of its many deep-rooted 
structural deficiencies282 have led several scholars to suggest that the model has 
stepped onto a pathway of gradual but fateful secular decline.283  
The Germany policymaking regime, in contrast to the British, is a multi-party 
system composed of two major political parties—the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)— and three smaller parties—
the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Green 
Party. As is the case in these multi-party systems, a single party seldom holds a 
sufficient majority to form a government and thus broad coalitions (at times 
involving both major parties) are the rule rather than the exception in the German 
policymaking regime. As a consequence, policymaking tends to be more slow-
moving and less radical and involves more compromises from government to 
government than two-party systems.  
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Likewise the German state is a federal state composed of 16 Länder, each with a 
separate regional government and bureaucracy. These states within the state are 
not only responsible for the implementation of federal policies once enacted but 
also hold independent and rival jurisdiction over significant policy fields such as 
education. Also, since the Länder controls the Bundesrat (the German legislature’s 
second chamber), federal governments must regularly consult with the Länder to 
get policies passed. In times of “divided government,” where opposing parties or 
fractions hold the majority in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, policymaking 
virtually grinds to a halt.284  
In turn the federal state bureaucracy is comparatively small and fragmented. As 
noted by Kitchelt and Streeck, “the entire federal bureaucracy has fewer 
employees than a single U.S. government department”285 and thus holds far fewer 
opportunities for lifelong careers for civil servants. As a consequence, specialized 
policy expertise and competences within the state bureaucracy are less extensive 
and relatively limited compared to other countries and to the bureaucracies of the 
Länder. Also each ministry operates with significant autonomy from the federal 
chancellery but under the constraints implied by the legislative division of labor 
between the Länder and the federal government.  
Also the German welfare state is decentrally organized and fragmented. Described 
by Esping-Andersen as a conservative, Christian democratic variant of the welfare 
state, where social security provisions are designed to prevent decline in social 
status for individuals and social services are provided by private nonprofit 
organizations (e.g., churches), organized according to occupations and sectors and 
have transfer incomes proportional to contributions paid through payroll taxes. As 
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such, the German welfare state is less progressive and redistributive than its 
social-democratic counterpart.286   
In contrast to the market-based production regime in the U.K., the production 
regime in Germany is (or has been) characterized by various formal and informal 
institutionalized mechanisms for facilitating interactions and transactions among 
market participants fostering coordination and collaboration on range of issues as 
well as competition. With regard to the organization of capital, strong informal 
inter-firm relationships, personal networks and well-organized employers’ 
associations, as well as close collaboration between the private sector and state 
agencies, have facilitated cooperation among major and medium-sized firms 
around the generation and acquisition of important inputs to the production 
process (trained labor, technology process innovation) while maintaining market 
competition in other fields.287 The much acclaimed “dual system” of vocational 
training, in which employers share the risks of extensive investment in significant 
and long-term vocational training in entry-level apprentices, is one of the most-
cited examples of an institutionalized practice within the German economy which 
fosters coordination among firms. But also the system of corporate finance—the 
Hausbank system, where major German banks traditionally have held majority 
stockholder positions in large Germany firms, which in turn has allowed German 
corporate managers to plan for the long term of their firms without the risk of 
hostile takeovers—is such an example.288 Likewise labor is far more organized in 
Germany than in liberal market economies. More workers belong to a union—
even if this figure has been declining—and more workers are covered by 
collective agreements established through collective wage bargaining organized to 
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a principle of Tarifautonomie. This implies that the state does not involve itself in 
processes or policies of wage formation. By federal law (the 
Betriebsverfassungsgezets) in large German firms employees are ensured of 
representation in works councils in which they are informed, consulted with and 
involved in corporate decisions regarding nonwage issues such working 
conditions, hours and mass layoffs.289   
Thus on the basis of these and other corporatist measures, since the end of the 
Golden Age of Capitalism, the Modell Deutschland arose as what some observers 
have dubbed a strong export juggernaut with particular competitive strengths in 
traditional, capital and energy-intensive industries such as automobile production 
and petrochemicals.  
This particular configuration of the policymaking and production regimes in 
Germany has conditioned the emergence of a distinct national knowledge regime. 
In a comparative perspective, its perhaps most notable feature is the great 
involvement of the federal state in the knowledge regime. While the German 
federal state is not engaged directly as an actor which itself produces all of its 
policy research, it nonetheless plays a large indirect role. It looms large as a 
facilitative and financial safeguard ensuring that public debate and policy research 
on political and economic matters is and remains sufficiently open and inclusive, 
entailing a broad spectrum of divergent ideological ideas.   
The German knowledge regime can be described as consisting of several 
components. First is a predominant group of scholarly organizations specialized 
within advanced economic analysis which receive significant shares of their 
funding from the federal government, the Länder and the ministries.  They are 
operated more like scientific research centers than think tanks. They publish 
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regularly in recognized peer-reviewed academic journals and in many regards, as 
it were, function as the private extended analytical arm of the public bureaucracy. 
They are not oriented to advocacy work and lobbyism and pride themselves on 
being independent, neutral and objective producers of policy-relevant economic 
knowledge.  Among these, the most prominent are Zentrum für Europäische 
Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Münchener Gesellschaft zur Förderung der 
Wirtschaftswissenschaft (CESIfo), Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 
(DIW), Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI) and Institut für 
Makroökonomie und Konjunkturforschung (IMK). 290   
Second, another notable feature of the German knowledge regime is its Council of 
Economic Experts. The Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der 
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (SACH) is perhaps the prototypical example 
of the kind of quasi-public or “para-public institutions” which inhabit—as do 
many other PROs of the German political economy291—the murky borderlands 
between the private and public sector in Germany. This highly esteemed and 
recognized economic council of scientific experts advises the federal government 
on all matters pertaining to political economic policy issues. The members of the 
council, who “must possess a specialized knowledge of economic science,”292 are 
formally appointed once every five years by the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 
und Technologie (BmWI). The SACH is fully funded by the federal government 
but is formally fully independent of its funder.293 
In 1963, the SACH was established by federal law in the passing of Gesetz zur 
Bildung eines Sachverständigenrates zur Begutachtung der 
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gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. In the law’s second article, the task of the 
SACH is specified as follows:  
“In its Annual Report the Council of Experts will describe the current 
economic situation and its foreseeable development. … The Council of 
Experts will point out undesirable developments and the possibility of 
avoiding or suppressing such developments, without, however, 
recommending any specific measures of economic and social policy.”294 
Thus, accordingly, once a year (in November) SACH solicits a very elaborate, 
detailed and lengthy report—Jahresgutachten—which contains an assessment of 
the current condition of Germanys economy as well as forecasts of the domestic 
and international development with the federal government and all others involved 
with economic policymaking in Germany as addressees. The SACH is obliged to 
assess the extent the current economic policy stance is viable in terms of ensuring 
“stability of the price level, a high rate of employment and equilibrium in foreign 
trade and payments, together with steady and adequate economic growth.”  
Third and comparatively unique for the German knowledge regime is the system 
of party foundations. Each political party with seats in the Bundestag has secured 
financing for the operation of an independent PRO—a party foundation (Stiftung). 
Each of the party foundations, typically founded in the early post-war era, is 
affiliated with a political party with which they are ideologically “in tune” even if 
the party foundation is formally and practically independent of the party. Thus 
each foundation receives financial resources in an amount matching the number of 
seats which its affiliated party holds. These resources are spent upon a range of 
activities directed to affect the public opinion, and the Stiftungs are explicitly 
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politically committed to advancing a clear ideological agenda.295 In this line, the 
Social Democratic party has the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the Christian Democrats 
have the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the Christian Social Union the Hanns Seidel 
Stiftung, the Green party the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, and the Left Party has the 
Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung.296 
Fourth, besides the well-established scholarly organizations, party foundations and 
the economic council—which all trace their history back to the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War297—a small group of advocacy organizations 
has in the most recent decades gained a foothold and blossomed alongside the 
more traditional actors. Among these are the Initiative Neue Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft (founded in 1999), the Bertelsmann Foundation (founded in 
1978), the Quant Foundation and the Foundation Market Economy. These 
organizations do not produce their own research in-house but either commission it 
from others or synthesize already existing studies and policy research. Thus they 
are far more oriented to influence the public opinion on broader and more 
ideological questions than they are to scrutinize specific instances of policy 
legislation. And while they claim to be politically neutral and nonpartisan, they 
nonetheless typically boast an ill-conceived ideological stance. Thus compared to 
the U.K. knowledge regime, one might describe the German knowledge regime as 
a coordinated marketplace of ideas.    
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9.1.4 The Knowledge Regime of Denmark: A Negotiated 
Marketplace of Ideas  
The Danish policymaking regime is also a multi-party system, which during the 
last century has grown increasingly abundant. The four old parties—the Social 
Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterne), the Liberal Party (Venstre), the Social 
Liberal Party (Det Radikale Venstre) and the Conservative Party (Konservative)—
have for decades held sway as well-defined representatives of distinct class-
interests representing variously the interests of workers, the agrarian sector and 
business. However, during the 20th century several new and not immediately 
class-associated parties have entered the stage. As of 2014, no fewer than eight 
different political parties are represented in the parliament. Beyond the four old 
parties, the four newcomers are the Socialist Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti) formed 
in 1956, the Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten) formed in 1989, the Danish 
People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) formed in 1995 against the backdrop of the 
mildly chaotic breakup of an earlier tax-denier Progress Party (Fremskridspartiet) 
and the recently emerged Liberal Alliance founded in 2007, which came into 
being as a more libertarian offspring of the Social Liberal Party.   
Thus, the multi-party structure in Denmark, as in Germany, facilitates a more 
consensus-oriented culture in which two or more parties most often engage in a 
broader coalition to form a government and hence political compromise and 
negotiation both within governments and outside is the order of the day. 
Accordingly, Danish policymaking tends to follow a less abrupt and more 
incremental pattern.   
However, in contrast to Germany but similar to the United Kingdom, Denmark is 
a centralized state and a very strong one. The central administration is staffed with 
a permanent and thus highly skilled and specialized civil service which wields 
significant policy expertise which matches and often supersedes that of individual 
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parliamentarians and party secretariats. And the Danish ministries—in particular 
the strong Ministry of Finance—possess far greater policy autonomy vis-à-vis 
regions and municipalities than is the case, for example, in Germany.  
On a par with Germany, the Danish production regime also has at times been 
categorized as a coordinated market economy. But some significant features 
nonetheless set it apart from the German variety of capitalism, and thus 
increasingly scholars have begun to address Denmark—alongside other small 
Scandinavian states—as a distinct national type of political economy298 and have 
variously dubbed it a “hybrid” political economy299 or a “negotiated economy.”300  
First, of all Danish workers are considerably more organized than in Germany, for 
example. As of 2007, 68% of workers held membership in a union (compared to 
23% in Germany) and 82% were covered by collective wage agreements 
(compared to 63% in Germany). 301 Likewise, more than half of all employers are 
organized under the auspices of the Confederation of Danish Employers (Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening). In turn, the social partners’ high degree of organization has 
precipitated and facilitated an encompassing, multi-level system of interlocking 
tripartite negotiations and dialogue, where these actively engage in the formulation 
and implementation of policies at both national and subnational levels—and not 
only within labor market issues. And over time the “negotiated” economy has 
become even more so as additional societal interest groups have increasingly been 
included in the inclusive, deliberative Danish policy loop.302 
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Second, the tax-financed, universal Danish welfare state—characterized by 
Esping-Andersen as a “social democratic” welfare regime303—has traditionally 
been far more generous than its German counterpart. Third, and in turn this more 
generous social security system has constituted one of three legs in the so-called 
flexicurity model. In this ostensible “model,” the combination of a tightly knit net 
of social security, very liberal regulation of employment protection and active 
labor market policies for bringing unemployed labor back in employment, e.g., 
through continuous re-skilling and further education programs, is found to provide 
for a well-functioning labor market with a comparatively high job churn, high 
mobility, low unemployment and a high degree of individual security in the case 
of unemployment.304 
As a consequence, the Danish knowledge regime stands somewhat out from the 
knowledge regimes in the United Kingdom and Germany. With the latter, it shares 
the presence of an economic council but there are also Danish equivalents to the 
German party foundations. However, the most conspicuous difference is that the 
Danish knowledge regime for a long time has been far less densely populated by 
PROs then elsewhere. Indeed, from a comparative perspective, the Danish 
knowledge regime is virtually empty as from a historical perspective very few 
nongovernmental advocacy and/or scholarly organizations have managed to gain a 
foothold here.  
Of course, there is no rule without exceptions. The Rockwool Foundation has 
since 1987 worked much like a scholarly organization, occasionally publishing 
reports on issues such as migration, labor supply and tax evasion. And in 1989 the 
weekly newspaper Monday was established and quickly evolved into an 
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advocacy-style think tank.305 Also very recently, things have begun to change. 
Since 2004, when the advocacy organization Center for Political Studies (CEPOS) 
was established, several self-declared think tanks—DEA, CEVEA, KRAKA, 
CONCITO and as of 2014 EUROPA—have been founded.  
But before 2004 the presence of PROs which were not in some way affiliated with 
or funded by the state was limited. Instead significant policy research capacity 
rested—and remains—within the central administration, ministries and agencies as 
well as in quasi-public, publicly funded and formally independent scholarly 
organizations such as the Economic Council (DØR)306, the Danish Center for 
Social Research (SFI) and The Danish Center for Governmental Research 
(KORA). Besides these, it was apparently only the social partners that could 
muster sufficient economic muscle to organize and finance independent PROs 
beyond the reach of the strong arm of the Danish state.  The Confederation of 
Trade Unions (LO), the Confederation of Danish Employers (DA) and the 
Confederation of Danish Industry (DI) all posses policy research expertise and 
capacity at a level close or equivalent to that of the Danish ministries.  
Hence, given the prolonged predominance of state, governmental, quasi-public 
and scholarly organizations funded by the social partners—and thus the virtual 
absence of contending competitors—within the Danish knowledge regime, a 
strong tradition for negotiation, compromise and coordination has evolved. 
According to Campbell and Pedersen, these forms of coordination take place 
within PROs as well as between PROs. 307  Thus, compared to the liberal 
marketplace of ideas of the U.K. and Germany’s coordinated marketplace of ideas, 
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the knowledge regime of Denmark is perhaps best described as a negotiated, 
hybrid marketplace of ideas. 
9.2 Sample of Policy Research Organizations  
To ensure a sufficient internal validity for the present study, from each of the three 
knowledge regimes four different ideal-typical PROs have been selected: two 
private and two public or state-based. In particular, an advocacy organization, a 
scholarly organization, an economic council (if available) and the ministry of 
economics have been selected.  
9.2.1A Typology of Policy Research Organizations  
As noted, Campbell and Pedersen argue that a knowledge regime to consists of 
“policy research organizations like think tanks, government research 
units, political party foundations and others that produce and 
disseminate policy ideas.”  
To distinguish such organizations, they propose a typology according to which 
they distinguish between three ideal-types for PROs.308 The first type is advocacy 
research units or what in common parlance would be termed think tanks.309 These 
are privately funded and highly partisan organizations concerned more with 
affecting the public climate of opinion and policymaking than with producing new 
research and applying social scientific methods to perceived political and 
economic challenges. They primarily operate by adding a distinctive, often highly 
ideological spin to already existing academic research and are typically funded—
through in some national contexts fairly generous tax codes—by private interests 
(firms, foundations, interest groups and wealthy individuals, specifically) to do 
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so.310 It is think tanks such as these (e.g., the Heritage Foundation and Cato 
Institute in the U.S. and the Adam Smith Institute in the U.K.) which Hall, among 
others, has held (partly) accountable for the emergence and the ensuing ostensible 
predominance of monetarist and supply-side ideas since Reagan and Thatcher. 311 
Thus, the many different activities in which these PROs are engaged—such as 
commentary, publishing of policy briefs, reports and articles, media appearances, 
testimony for committees, or public seminars—are all directed towards what 
Campbell would term the foreground of the debate and thus designed to leave a 
mark upon communicative discourses in the vocabulary of Schmidt.  
The second type is scholarly organizations, which are sometimes referred to as 
“universities without students.”312 Their main activity consists of the production 
and dissemination of new, original policy research in a range of different policy 
domains (tax policy, education policy, or fiscal policy, for example) with a quality 
close to or at times at the level of academic peer review. However, their primary 
target audience is not academics, universities and the institutions of science proper 
but public policymakers (i.e., actors in production and policy) and public opinion 
more broadly. Thus their scholarly activities are not directed towards advancing 
the scientific frontier of knowledge but rather to directly influencing 
policymaking. This they hope to do through the application of advanced social 
scientific methodologies (in particular economics, econometrics and advanced 
statistics) to perceived policy challenges.  
To be sure, the relative scholarliness of these PROs varies and should not be 
overemphasized or conflated with proper universities, that is, universities with real 
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students and research responsibilities. Scholarly organizations, in contrast to most 
universities, are characterized by being highly attuned to influencing public 
opinion through the dissemination of publications designed to lure journalists, 
policymakers and public officials. Thus in contrast to advocacy organizations, 
scholarly organizations intend to issue, publish and disseminate work which 
influences the coordinative discourses in the background of the debate.313    
In terms of funding, scholarly organizations typically rely on private sources, but 
this can be combined with and complemented by state and even party funding 
sources. In fact, Campbell and Pedersen discern an additional type of PRO, one 
which in fact is best characterized as a subtype of the scholarly organization. 
These party research foundations, which are prevalent in the German knowledge 
regime, are formally associated with political parties even if they operate 
independently at arm’s length from political parties.314 However, besides their 
formal affiliation with parties, in most regards these PROs in practice very much 
resemble scholarly research organizations. 
The final type is state-based organizations. These units are either directly situated 
within specific government departments and ministries or created outside the 
central administration. They are officially designed to produce economic analysis 
and policy advice on issues deemed important to the political economy. In contrast 
to their advocacy and scholarly counterparts, state-based organizations are, in 
terms of funding, largely apart from the private market and the funding to finance 
their knowledge production and dissemination activities comes exclusively from 
public sources. As such, they enjoy a relatively greater scholarly independence 
from the interests of the market. And where advocacy and scholarly organizations 
target discourses in the foreground or in the background of the debate, 
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respectively, state-based organizations work to influence both communicative and 
coordinative discourses, to use the words of Schmidt.   
State-based organizations come in (at least) two varieties. On the one hand are 
economic councils (and other forms of permanent, publicly funded PROs), which 
often are established with the explicit intention to create an independent platform 
from which neutral, objective (economic) science can “speak truth to power,” that 
is, politicians and civil servants, on matters of general public interest.315 The most 
prominent examples of this type are perhaps the quasi-public, quasi-tripartite 
advisory councils found in many coordinated market economies, for example, 
SACH in Germany and Det Økonomiske Råd in Denmark (DØR). On the other 
hand are research units or departments from within the state bureaucracy itself. 
Like economic councils, these also purport to provide balanced and neutral policy 
analysis directed towards the public debate. But, obviously, given their location 
inside the policymaking regime, they are far less independent from the 
parliamentary system and its associated pressures. 
To be sure, the authors readily admit that both regime types and the types of PROs 
are ideal-types. And in concrete cases it can be difficult to determine what type a 
given PRO actually is. PROs often blend features of different types and mimic the 
behavior of other PROs in the knowledge regime. 316 Likewise, for practical and 
theoretical purposes, it can (at times) be difficult to differentiate clearly between 
policymaking, production and knowledge regimes. 
9.2.2 Selection Criteria 
The PROs have been selected in accordance with the following three 
methodological criteria. First, the PRO should have been operational and active 
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from the beginning of and throughout the period from 1993 until 2007. Thus 
PROs first established after 1993 or which went out of operation during this 
period were excluded.317 Second, the PROs should have produced at least one and 
preferably more of the three types of policy documents.318  
Third and finally, so as to mitigate potential selection bias, PROs were selected 
according to a principle of maximum typological variation319, that is, from each 
national knowledge regime, one of each of the three ideal-types of PROs as well 
as the ministry of economics was included. Maximum variation implies that the 
cases selected be as different from each other as possible. This is an important and 
necessary methodological criterion insofar as one as a researcher—as is the case in 
the present study—intends to ascertain relative similarity/homogeneity within a 
population of cases. As the exact aim of the present study is to examine how far it 
is possible to (re-) construct cross-nationally varying, yet internally consistent 
narratives of competitiveness in order to compare and contrast them, it is indeed 
vital to ensure a sufficient degree of variation.320  
However, the selection criterion is best described as a typological maximal 
variation, inasmuch as a maximum variation proper would entail the inclusion of a 
far greater count of PROs. As should be clear from the review of different type of 
PROs, these vary on a great many parameters, all potentially important, rather than 
just one or two. PROs vary (among other aspects) in terms of their size, funding, 
staffing, the number of policy topics they cover, whether they primarily target 
policymaking elites or the broader public opinion, whether they are avowedly 
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political and ideological in their orientation or claim neutrality and so forth. Proper 
maximal variation would require the examination of both small and big PROs, 
privately and publicly funded, ideological and neutral in each knowledge regime. 
However, this would amount to a vast dataset and a far larger research project (in 
terms of necessary coding capacity, time, financial resources etc.). The present 
study instead has sampled a set of PROs on the basis of the criterion of maximum 
typological variation. 
Moreover, the methodology has sought to achieve a balance between (quasi) state-
based organizations and private organizations (scholarly and advocacy). As will be 
clear, Campbell and Pedersen find that some types of national knowledge regimes 
are relatively more state-centered (reliant upon dominant state-based 
organizations) than others. Thus a comparative study of the ideas produced by 
knowledge regimes should take such differences duly into account.  In fact, the 
relatively dispersed literature on think tanks321 typically only examines private 
PROs (think tanks) at the expense of more state-based types and is thus inherently 
Anglo-centrically biased. To avoid such bias, this study has included two state-
based PROs (a ministry of economics and an economic council) and two market-
based PROs from each knowledge regime. This procedure resulted in a sample of 
12 PROs, each of which will be described briefly below. 
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9.2.3Two Caveats  
Before moving forward, a few caveats regarding the selection of particular PROs 
are appropriate. First, in methodological sampling exercises such as the present, it 
will always remain a significant challenge to select real-world PROs which neatly 
conform to the ideal-typical analytical categories of which they are supposed to 
constitute representative exemplars. Indeed, one might easily digress into endless 
quibbles of whether a particular PRO in fact can be characterized as this or that 
type of PRO. At the end of the day, if one as a scholar insists upon complete 
analytical rigor, each and every particular PRO probably could be characterized as 
a type of its own, as all blend and borrow features and characteristics from others 
and few, if any, pure types exist. But again, the categories are ideal-types, not real-
types, and the PROs included in the present study have been selected in order to 
approximate maximum typological variation, not maximum variation per se. A 
better approximation to the ideal is imaginable but so is a worse. At least the 
present study has advanced beyond the conventional Anglo-centric bias of most 
scholarship on think tanks.322 
Second, the present research design could perhaps be challenged323 for being 
ideologically biased to the left. Included in the sample, for example, is the Institute 
for Public Policy Research in the United Kingdom (commonly associated with 
New Labor), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Germany (legally associated with 
SPD) and the Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd in Denmark (funded by the 
Danish labor movement). On the one hand, such criticism seems unbalanced. In 
fact, as it happens, the Institute of Fiscal Studies in the U.K. (financed to a large 
extent by the British financial sector), SACH in Germany and Monday Morning in 
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Denmark are also included in the sample, none of which are easily squared with 
leftist ideology.  
But on the other hand and more importantly, the criticism is misplaced.  Neither 
leftism nor rightism (or neoliberalism) are independent, prediscursively given 
ontological categories “out there” which social scientists can control for but 
instead highly complex, heterogonous ideas harboring a plethora of often non-
explicated epistemological and ontological assumptions. The discourse-analytical 
approach continuously emphasizes the importance of not inadvertently 
predetermining the analysis by overimposing a particular meaning upon the 
discourse through the analytical categories one uses to study it.324 Purporting to 
control for ostensible ideological biases would exactly amount to this, that is, one 
would approach the study of political ideas with a preconceived conception of 
what those ideas are before one had studied them. That is, if the present study 
should control for an allegedly leftist (or rightist) bias, it would first have to define 
and analyze what leftism, rightism or neoliberalism “really” means. But in doing 
so, the entire discourse analysis would collapse in tautology.  
9.2.4 Sample of United Kingdom Policy Research 
Organizations 
Besides the HM Treasury (HMT), in the knowledge regime of the United 
Kingdom, the National Institute for Economic and Social Research, the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies and the Institute for Public Policy have been selected for 
analysis. 
In the knowledge regime of the United Kingdom, it has not been possible to 
identify a state-based economic council which is strictly similar and comparable to 
the quasi-public, corporatist and tripartite economic advisory councils present in 
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both Germany (SACH) and Denmark (DØR). In fact such an organization has 
existed in the U.K. The National Economic Development Council was established 
1962 and explicitly modeled with inspiration from the French Economic and 
Social Council. During the administrations of Heath, Wilson and Callaghan, this 
advisory body was engaged with the formulation of British economic policy. 
However Thatcher proved highly skeptical of the PRO (as of any other nonmarket 
institution) and the council was dismantled by her successor John Major in 
1992.325  
However the PRO which in the U.K. knowledge regime comes closest to this type 
of PRO is allegedly the National Institute for Economic and Social Research 
(NIESR). Upon the initiative of, among others, William Beveridge, NIESR was 
established in 1938 with funding from some of the largest and socially engaged 
foundations and trusts.326 As such, it is one of Britain’s oldest independent PROs. 
In 2013 it employed 32 academic staff and research fellows (with Ph.D. and MA-
level staff in disciplines such as economics, economic geography, mathematics 
and more) pursuing its self-proclaimed primary purpose of carrying out “economic 
and social research which is of high academic standard.”327 The PRO pursues 
research agendas in five broad thematic clusters: macroeconomics and finance, 
employment, productivity, innovation and skills, and labor markets and 
disadvantage.  
As such, the NIESR of course might be categorized as a scholarly organization. 
However, where the PRO mirrors the economic councils found in Germany and 
Denmark is in its development, maintenance and application of a highly 
sophisticated and complex macroeconomic econometric model (NiGEM) by 
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Halley Stewart Trust.  
327 NIESR, Annual Report 2012, p. 3 
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which it produces an authoritative quarterly economic forecast of the development 
of the U.K. economy. This is published in its quarterly, peer-reviewed journal 
National Institute Economic Review. (The model is also employed be IMF, 
OECD, and ECB.328) In terms of funding, it is funded from research grants from 
the Economic and Social Research Council, as well as state departments and 
agencies and the private sector, which commissions work from NIESR on a 
project-by-project basis.  
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) constitutes a good example of a scholarly 
organization. It was founded in 1969 and as of 2013 employed 35 full-time 
research staff (primarily Ph.D.-trained economists) along with additional 
associated Ph.D. students and visiting scholars. It engages in a range of policy 
issues, including analysis of the budget, public spending and finance, tax and 
benefits systems, investment and finance, productivity and competition, labor 
supply, employment, education and skills and more. The IFS’s self-declared goal 
is “to promote effective economic and social policies by understanding better their 
impact on individuals, families, businesses and the government’s finances” and 
itself claims to be “Britain’s leading independent microeconomic research 
institute.” 329  Thus as opposed to advocacy organizations. the IFS conducts 
independent research aimed at perceived public policy problems rather than 
merely spinning, synthesizing, condensing and communicating the research 
carried out by others. Nor is the institute (at least explicitly) committed to a 
particular political program, agenda or ideology, but claims to possess a 
“reputation for objectivity and impartiality.”330  
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 The IFS has a broad and heterogeneous funding base and receives research grants 
(British Economic and Social Research Council), public funding from a host 
group of public ministerial departments (Department for Transport, Education, 
Trade and Industry etc. as well as HM Treasury), private trusts and foundations, 
international organizations (World Bank, IMF, European Commission) and 
organizations and firms in the financial sector (The Hundred Group of Finance 
Directors, the Investment Management Association and Morgan Stanley331 ). 
Among IFS’s wide and varying research production and output, for several 
decades it has published its annual “green budget” report simultaneously with the 
HM Treasury’s publication of its Pre-Budget Report. In this report, the IFS, in its 
own words, presents “impartial and objective evidence” 332 in order to discuss, 
comment and not infrequently criticize the forecasts and econometric calculations 
underpinning the government’s budgetary dispositions. Often the economic 
assumptions underpinning the models are drawn into question and, more than 
often, alternative macro- and microeconomic courses of action are suggested to 
the government. Additionally, IFS publishes its own quarterly peer-reviewed 
journal entitled Fiscal Studies, which publish articles by policy practitioners and 
academics alike. In 2009, IFS was named “Think Tank of the Year” by the 
business and politics newspaper Prospect Magazine.333 
In contrast, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) constitutes a clear-cut 
example of an advocacy organization with an avowedly explicit ideological 
agenda.334  Founded in 1988, this PRO, in its own words, “seeks to promote social 
justice, democratic participation, and economic and environmental sustainability 
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somewhat unusual position in that its output is usually accepted as impartial by politicians 
across the spectrum.” 2012, p. 26.   
331 See preface, Green Budget 2007.  
332 Green Budget 2013, foreword.  
333 http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/thinktanks/the-awards/2009-awards/  
334 Denham and Garnett 2006, Pautz 2012, 2010. See also Bevir 2003.  
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in government policy” and thus clearly is committed to a particular political 
ideology. It employs 30 researchers with varying educational backgrounds (within 
economics but also in both the qualitative and quantitative branches of social 
science more broadly), primarily at the MA level, and issues reports and policy 
papers within a broad range of themes, including economic policy, families and 
work, migration, public services, climate change, energy and transport and more. 
However, instead of applying social scientific methodology to policy problems, 
these kinds of publications rather synthesize already existing research findings and 
package them in a well-written, accessible and digestible format intended to reach 
a wide audience of both journalists and public policymakers. Among the wide-
ranging output of reports, testimony, newspaper articles and commentary, the 
IPPR has initiated the establishment of several policy commissions with the 
participation of a range of external experts and representatives of various interest 
groups. The commissions are specifically designed to address more overarching 
and general policy themes. In particular, the Commission of Social Justice—under 
the patronage of the, at the time, shadow chancellor of Labor and main contender 
for party leadership John Smith—was initiated in 1992. The Commission had an 
explicit mandate to “analyze the relationship between social justice and other 
goals, including economic competitiveness and others goals”335 but worked with 
the implicit purpose of modernizing the political program of the Labor party after 
13 years in opposition. According to Pautz, through this commission “the IPPR 
was involved in remaking a political party.”336  
The IPPR also publishes the journal Juncture, which publishes shorter, polemic 
articles by its own researchers as well as external experts.  On a par with IFS and 
NIESR, IPPR is primarily funded by foundations and trusts but also garners 
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336 Pautz 2012, p. 65. However Pautz also somewhat contradictorily observes that “The report 
failed to have influence on the 1997 manifesto,” p. 65.  
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financial support from the private sector (firms and individuals) as well the 
European Commission. And likewise IPPR was named “Think Tank of the Year” 
in both 2007 and 2001.337 As further indirect testimony to this think tank’s 
influence, its current director, Nick Pearce, served as Head of the No. 10 Policy 
Unit from 2007 to 2010 and thus passed through the “revolving doors” of power, 
coming fairly close to the inner halls of public policymaking.338 
9.2.5 Sample of German Policy Research Organizations 
In the German knowledge regime, the economic ministry, BmWI, as well as 
SACH339 have been included in the dataset. Besides these two, an example of a 
scholarly organization  (the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) and an advocacy 
organization (Bertelsmann Stiftung) has been selected in the sample of PROs for 
the German case. These are briefly presented below.  
The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) is, as described earlier, the party foundation 
associated with the German Social Democratic party SPD and, as such, exemplary 
of the particular kind scholarly research organization prevalent in the German 
knowledge regime. Founded in 1925, it is both the oldest and as of 2013 the 
largest of the political party foundations in the German knowledge regime. As 
with other party foundations FES is also primarily funded by the federal 
government, topped up with additional financing from the Bundesländer, and has 
since the 1990s managed a budget of over 100 million euros, employing a staff of 
more than 600 in Germany and abroad.340 And on a par with the other foundations, 
these resources are spent to promote a clear, partisan ideology. The PRO, in its 
own words, pursues strategic goals of shaping the socioeconomic order and 
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338 Weaver 1989, Stone and Denham 2004.   
339 Described above. 
340 Pautz 2012, p. 101. 
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globalization in a social and just order, strengthening political participation and 
social cohesion as well promoting the renewal of social democracy.341 These goals 
are pursued through a wide-ranging plethora of activities besides the production 
and dissemination of policy research. For instance, the FES runs a political 
academy, helps deserving, impecunious youths finance their education, engages in 
international foreign aid and development projects to further democratization and 
more.  
However the foundation also spends a sizeable share of its budget (approximately 
10-20%) on the production and dissemination of policy research and other 
activities aimed at influencing public opinion as well as policymakers.  For 
instance, since 1991 the PRO has initiated, hosted and facilitated a 
Managerkreis—a economic policy forum designed to provide a platform for 
common debate between managers of major German firms, private organizations 
and high-profile economic policymakers.342 The outcome of these meetings is a 
long range of policy and position papers on various perceived policy challenges 
intended for the broader public. The FES—like IPPR in the U.K.—has also hosted 
a nongovernmental policy commission: the Zukunftskommission der Friederich 
Ebert Stiftung. This commission, initiated by the leading Social Democrat Oscar 
Lafontaine, is tasked to renew and rethink the Modell Deutschland in accordance 
with the goals of economic efficiency, social cohesion and ecological 
sustainability, which were to be balanced in a coherent and just manner.  
The Bertelsmann Stiftung (BS) in contrast is included as an example of a German 
advocacy organization. This PRO, founded in 1977, today employs 300 people, of 
which more than 180 are engaged in policy research production and dissemination 
activities.  Its activities are very much directed towards affecting public debate, 
 

341 http://www.fes.de/sets/s_stif.htm 
342 http://www.managerkreis.de/ 



*.
media and the wider public opinion in general, and they cover a wide range of 
themes. In 2013, the most prominent of these focus areas was demographic 
change, modern government, integration, health, education and Europe.343 For 
instance, BS has over the years excelled in producing various kinds of 
benchmarking reports, indexes, monitors and radars, where various aspects of 
German economy and society are contrasted and compared to other countries 
through a series of compiled and aggregated indicators—a type of document very 
popular among journalists. While BS itself proclaims to work as an independent 
and nonpartisan think tank344, it nonetheless also comes across as being a 
somewhat ideologically committed PRO inasmuch as its work, in its own words, 
“is based on the conviction that competition and civic engagement are essential for 
social progress.”345 Thus, in contrast to the party foundations, BS does not receive 
federal or Länder funding for its activities but instead is financed as a fund which 
holds the majority of stocks in the German-based multinational media corporation 
Bertelsmann.  
9.2.6 Sample of Danish Policy Research Organizations   
As discussed above, before 2004 the Danish knowledge regime was, from a 
comparative perspective, virtually empty and very few (not governmentally 
affiliated) scholarly and advocacy organizations were in operation. In fact, in the 
case of Denmark the sampling procedure was pretty much a question of selecting 
those PROs that were operational from the beginning of the period (1993) and 
throughout (until 2007).  Thus besides the Danish Ministry of Economics, Det 
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344 http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-6CC7151E-
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Økonomiske Råd, Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd and Mandag Morgen were 
also selected for analysis.  
Det Økonomiske Råd (DØR)—which in common parlance is referred to as “The 
Wise Men”— is a publicly funded but formally independent advisory body 
designed to bring economic-scientific expertise to bear on public debate on 
national economic questions. As such it constitutes a quintessential example of an 
economic council. Today the PRO is composed of a tripartite council (currently 
counting 25 representative members from the social partners, the Danish Central 
Bank and the Ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs) and a chairmanship of 
four university-based professorial economists appointed by the Danish Ministry of 
Economics. Since it was established by law in 1962, its mandate has been “to 
follow the country’s economic development and shed light on the long-term 
development perspectives, as well as contribute to the coordination of the various 
economic policies.” To this end, DØR, besides a range of media appearances and 
op-ed pieces, on a biannual basis publishes the economic report entitled Danish 
Economy (Dansk Økonomi). In these publications, the monetary and fiscal policy 
stance is assessed, evaluated and at times harshly criticized, just as structural 
issues such as labor market policies and tax policies are addressed on a regular 
basis. But other themes are also addressed. The specific themes of the report are 
decided by the chairman and subsequently produced by a secretariat staffed by 35 
employees, of which 20 are university-trained economists at the MA or Ph.D. 
level. In 2007 DØR expanded (again by law) as the Environmental Economic 
Council was established (Det Miljøøkononiske Råd). It has as its mandate the 
“task of elucidating the interaction of economy and environment as well as the 
efficiency of environmental policies.”  
The Economic Council of the Labor Movement (Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd 
or AE) was established in 1936 upon the initiative of then Social Democratic 
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prime minister Thorvald Stauning and, as such, is the oldest nongovernmental 
PRO in Denmark. It constitutes a hybrid of a scholarly, advocacy and party 
organization, of which it most closely resembles the scholarly variety. It is funded 
by the Danish Labor Movement and regularly conducts research for the Danish 
Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and the Social Democratic Party. For 
instance, the entire Social Democratic economic policy electoral platform, “Gang i 
90’erne,” upon which the party ran in 1993 for government and won was written 
by AE.346 AE publishes a range of different types of policy publications. Some of 
these are short policy briefs designed for media consumption and some are longer, 
more analytical and methodologically sophisticated reports. In these, policy issues 
such as employment, growth and prosperity, education, inequality, work-life 
balance, public finances and tax policy are addressed. 347  In particular, AE 
publishes an annual economic report entitled Økonomiske Tendenser (Economic 
Trends) that, besides conjectural analysis, highlights and discuss different selected 
economic themes deemed currently important by AE. It also holds a permanent 
seat on the economic council and on a biannual basis issues a thorough 
commentary on that PRO’s biannual economic report.   
Monday Morning (MM)— on a par with the political economy of Denmark—
constitutes a somewhat odd-sized PRO which perhaps best can be described as a 
hybrid. Originally founded as a weekly newspaper in 1989, the PRO has since 
sprouted through several organizational offspring and, as of 2014, combines 
elements of a news medium, a lobby organization, an NGO and a think tank. 
However of the four ideal-typical policy research organizations, MM most closely 
resembles an advocacy organization. According to the organization itself, it is the 
“leading independent think tank in Scandinavia” and describes its mission as the 
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creation of “an innovative society” where “sectors, institutions and leaders” 
cooperate for “new solutions to shared challenges.” Today it employs close to 50 
people, mainly individuals with MA degrees in the social sciences and 
communications (no economists), and claims policy expertise within a wide range 
of issues such as growth, welfare innovation, sustainability, management, 
education, digitalization, Europe and health.348 Frequently, MM has mimicked the 
Danish central administration and established external ad hoc policy commissions 
or independent knowledge councils. For instance, in 2003 it established an 
Innovation Council (Innovationsrådet) and in 2009 a Copenhagen Climate 
Council. Likewise, MM—on a par with IPPR—has served as a “revolving door” 
between the knowledge and policymaking regimes. In 2008, former editor Noa 
Reddington was recruited as special adviser for then-leader of the opposition Helle 
Thorning-Schmidt, who in 2011 was elected prime minister in Denmark.     
9.3 Sample of Policy Publications  
The methodological challenge of sampling data sources from PROs has 
traditionally occupied and caused significant trouble for scholars, as the amount of 
available data is despairingly vast. For instance, scholarly organizations such as 
IFS or FES349 within a month produce several highly specialized and detailed 
book-length reports on a range of different topics in addition to their commentary, 
op-eds, articles, conferences, public appearances and web content. Likewise 
advocacy organizations such as IPPR, BS and MM have being as widely cited in 
the public media as possible as their very raison d’étre. Thus each of these PROs 
has a tremendous oeuvre of media inputs, quotations and other types of 
appearances in the public media. In fact, some of these PROs even publish their 
own quasi-scientific journals (IPPR) or specialized newspapers (MM). Again the 
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amount of data produced by these PROs tends to become methodologically 
unmanageable within a matter of months, if not days. Thus for the purpose of the 
present study, some methodological choices have been made to delimit the amount 
of textual data material.  
For each of the 12 sampled PROs, three types of policy publications—annual 
economic reports, commission white papers and competitiveness indexes—have 
been included in the dataset insofar the PRO has published that particular type of 
document. 350  To allow for a diachronic discourse analysis—and thus the 
possibility of comparing similarities and differences as they evolve over time—
documents published in the rather recent period between the years 1993 and 2007 
have been included in the sample. Thus in terms of periodization, the year 1993 
was selected as the first year as this was the year that Bill Clinton and Jacques 
Delors officially set in motion the competition of nations. We selected 2007 as the 
final year as the global financial crisis, with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as 
its defining moment, erupted the year after in 2008.351 Of course, the discourse 
that nations compete has been present in public economic debates perhaps since 
the founding of the discipline of economics itself, and it has certainly been 
prevalent in, for example, European discussion of economic policies at least since 
the 1950s and 1960s. 352 However, this fairly recent periodization has been chosen, 
first, because it was assumed that by 1993 the discourse of “international 
competition of nations” had become sufficiently sedimented and well-established 
to allow for a reasonably systematic discourse analysis. Second, this period was 
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also chosen because the researcher wanted to examine whether significant changes 
had occurred in the discourse since its inception by Clinton and Delors.  
However, in the end, the periodization could have been otherwise and other 
periods could have been selected. Yet, it is an independent discourse theoretical 
point not to assume beforehand that a particular period is particularly important. In 
fact, these kinds of periodizations are exactly what the PROs themselves engage in 
in their attempts to interpret their social reality and carve out narratives of 
competitiveness.  
9.3.1Annual Economic Reports 
First and foremost, annual economic reports have been collected.  These types of 
reports are often published by state-based organizations (but at times also 
scholarly organizations) and are designed to provide an overall and balanced 
outlook for the general condition of the national political economy, usually 
entailing a wealth of econometric indicators and providing estimates of budgetary 
and fiscal stances, monetary policies, domestic and international growth prospects, 
export performance, inflation and more. While such indicators at times are 
assessed and described without further discussion as to why it is relevant to 
examine these particular indicators and not others, at other points particular 
econometric accounts of the state of the economy are accompanied by long and 
detailed descriptions of why it is worthwhile for economists to grant attention to 
such metrics, just as the interrelationships between different metrics also can be 
the object of lengthy discussion. But these reports at times also include elaborate 
passages explaining the international political economic context of the national 
economy and, for example, what constraints and opportunities increased 
globalization and international competition imply for national economic 
policymakers, just as they can be used to address particular standalone policy 
issues, themes and perceived challenges (e.g., labor market reforms, energy 
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policies, demographics etc.) found to be prevalent in the wider public political-
economic debate. As such, annual economic reports provide a great source for 
examining how the PRO makes sense of globalization, competitiveness and the 
economy in general. However, as this type of report is published once a year, if 
one were to include all annual economic reports from the period 1993 to 2007, the 
resulting data material would be unmanageable.  Hence, in the case of annual 
economic reports only issues published in the years 1993, 2000 and 2007 have 
been included. 
9.3.2 Commission White Papers 
Second, commission white papers have been included. Among the many different 
activities through which PROs produce, disseminate and promote their ideas, one 
of the most conspicuous is certainly the method of establishing a policy 
commission.353 These types of commissions—in contrast, for example, to the 
permanent economic councils—are temporary ad-hoc organizations established 
with a specific mandate to examine a particular predefined and delimited policy 
challenge or agenda prevalent in current debate and to report and provide 
recommendations upon it within a given time frame. Policy experts drawn from 
academics and politicians (often from opposing factions and parties) staff these 
commissions, as well as representatives of divergent societal interests (e.g., the 
labor movement, employer organizations, particular industries). Indeed these types 
of ad hoc commissions are frequently established by state-based actors (ministries 
and departments.) For instance in Denmark the Globalization Council and in 
Germany the Bündnis für Arbeit, Ausbildung und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit constitute 
widely debated exemplars of such commissions.354 
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Commissions and the white papers they produce thus clearly constitute a great 
empirical source from which to examine how PROs come to make sense of their 
socioeconomic context. Interestingly, not only state-based organizations set up 
these kinds of commissions. 355 During research, it became clear that scholarly and 
advocacy organizations mimic and copy this format from the state-based 
organizations and also establish such policy commissions. Thus the commission 
white papers produced from these types of PROs have also been included in the 
data set.  
Moreover a snowballing sampling method has been applied to identify additional, 
potentially significant policy white papers. If continuous references have been 
made to a particular white paper in the annual reports, that white paper has been 
included in the dataset.356  
9.3.3 Indexes of International Competitiveness  
Third and finally, national indexes of competitiveness have been included in the 
sample to the extent that they have been available.357 This type of publication is 
not reserved for state-based organizations. Advocacy organizations produce 
alternative indexes explicitly designed to challenge and compete with the indexes 
produced by the state-based organizations. For instance, in Germany BS publishes 
an annual International Standard Ranking and in Denmark the lobbyist 
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scholars to pay more attention to the work, output and impact of temporary policy commissions. 
He argues that governments by commissions “have proved attractive to domestic economic 
reformers because they promise to provide external disciplines that bind the hands of German 
governments, change expectations of elites, publics and markets about what needs to be done, 
and will be done, better enable governments to resist the claims of powerful domestic interests, 
and help to reduce the costs of carrying through reforms by shifting expectations.” See Dyson 
2005, p. 226. 
355 Pautz 2012.  
356 For instance, following this procedure, the two white papers on productivity in the U.K. 
(2000, 2007) were identified and included. 
357 Berger and Brislow 2009, Bruno 2009, Hospers 2004, Aiginger 1998, Lall 2001.  
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organization Danish Industry produces a set of indicators somewhat different from 
that of the government.358 As with the annual economic report, these indexes are 
published annually. Thus, similarly, only indexes published in 1993, 2000 or 2007 
were included in the dataset.   
This procedure provided the following sample of data sources.  
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9.3.4 Why Not Interviews? 
The dataset only includes textual data from policy publications. However, it could 
be argued that the study’s internal validity could be enhanced with the inclusion of 
additional data types to use for triangulation. The most obvious candidate is semi-
structured interviews with central experts situated within PROs.  
It is true that the majority of qualitative comparative case studies employ in-depth, 
semi-structured expert interviews as an important (if not the only) source of 
data.359 However, this methodological approach was for several reasons found 
wanting for the present purpose. First, the task has been to examine whether and to 
what extent cross-national similarities and differences occur and persist in 
different national narratives of competitiveness over a prolonged period of time 
and, moreover, whether changes occur within that time period. However, as actors 
embedded in a social context usually have a short memory and frequently are 
biased insofar as they engage in “retrospective rationalizations” of the past (i.e., 
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358 See Dansk Industri, 2007, Sådan ligger landet: Globaliseringsredegørelse.  
359 See Campbell, Osserman et al. 2013.  
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assess knowledge claims of earlier periods with the epistemological standard 
predominant in their own time), interviews would have constituted a less-reliable 
source of data for assessing the particular form that national narratives of 
competitiveness have taken in earlier periods. Publicized policy documents offer 
much more direct access to these.  
Second, doing semi-structured interviews in a case like this would entail a severe 
risk of obtaining “hyperbolic representations” from the interviewees. That is, the 
interviewees, in their capacity as directors of think tanks or other idea producing 
organizations, all possess a vested interest in influencing public opinion in a 
certain way, including researchers studying them. Thus these might deliberately 
present past, present and future objects or events in overly optimistic/pessimistic 
terms or radically over- or underemphasize their own involvement in such events.  
Finally and perhaps most importantly, employing interviews for the obtainment of 
data would entail the risk of the interviewer overimposing preconceived 
categories, concepts and analytical constructs upon the interviewee through the 
very way an interview question would be framed. As in the discourse-theoretical 
analysis already discussed several times, it is highly important not to succumb to 
theoreticism and instead remain open and attentive to the categorizations and 
concepts of the discourse itself. The use of interviews would probably 
compromise this ambition.   
For these reasons, semi-structured, in-depth expert interviews, which might prove 
very useful in different methodological contexts, were not adopted as a means of 
data collection in the present study.  
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9.4 Coding Procedure 
The collected data have been coded using the qualitative data analysis software 
application Atlas.ti 6. This software application allows researchers to code, 
analyze, assess and, most importantly, track and quickly retrieve large amounts of 
qualitative textual data. On the basis of this extensive coding procedure, a 
thorough comparative content analysis—one for each of the three national 
knowledge regimes—has been conducted.360 A semi-structured coding schema 
was devised and designed to enable the researcher to examine the occurrence of 
potential regularities (comparative similarities and differences) within the data 
material in accordance with the principles of discourse analysis.361  
9.4.1 Coding Categories 
The coding scheme was designed with categories derived from the dichotomies of 
discourse, and for each dichotomy two separate codes were included, totaling six 
general codes: Before and After, Object and Subject, Outcome and Sources. 
1. First, a set of temporal codes was included. Accordingly whenever a text 
differentiated between periods, episodes and occurrences which came before or 
after other such periods, episodes and occurrences, this paragraph was coded 
with either the temporal category “Before” or the category “After.” For 
instance, particular analytical attention was granted to discussions of 
globalization and the competition of nations to discern potential claims of 
different “phases” following each other in the competition of nations.   
2. Second, a set of codes distinguishing between subjects and objects was 
included in the coding scheme. On the one hand, paragraphs which contained 
descriptions of objects claimed to be in possession of the quality of 
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Danish knowledge regimes.  
361 See Paragraphs 4.11 – 4.1.5 above.  
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competitiveness were coded with the code “Object.” In particular, analytical 
attention was granted to paragraphs describing and discussing different types of 
economic metrics, econometric statistics and indicators through which entities 
were objectified. On the other hand, paragraphs which designated some actors 
as subjects (i.e., actors which describe the entity as an object of 
competitiveness and relates to it as such) were coded “Subject.” For instance, 
under the category of “Subject,” descriptions of the roles of various actors 
(e.g., governments, firms, unions, employers) vis-à-vis the task of furthering 
competitiveness of the nation (object) were coded.    
3. Finally, a set of functional codes was devised and applied. Whenever policy 
publications made explicit reference to how the competitiveness (of an object) 
was revealed and measured, then this paragraph was coded with the code 
“Outcome.”  Similarly any passage of text which discussed entities, 
phenomena or concepts constituting sources or inputs to competitiveness, these 
paragraphs were coded with the code “SOC” (Source of Competitiveness). 
Also when some phenomenon, actor, force, event etc. was cited as a cause of 
something, then the particular paragraph was coded “Cause.” Similarly, 
whenever texts described some entity or phenomenon as an effect of such 
cause, those paragraphs was coded “Effect.”  
As argued, according to discourse theory these generic dichotomies are the only 
categories sufficiently generic to prevent the discourse theorist from 
unintentionally or overtly “importing” predefined meanings into the discourse 
itself. If the data material were approached through an analytical lens deduced 
from theory, this would amount to nothing more than basing the study of social 
actors’ own first-order interpretations of social reality upon the preconceived 
categories of yet another first-order interpretation.  
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9.4.2 Coding Technique and Sequence 
A tentative pilot-coding schema was first pilot tested on a subset of the data. The 
count of macro-codes/general codes was intentionally from the outset kept as low 
as possible to protect inter-coder reliability—which as a rule of thumb tends to fall 
when the number of codes increase. However, after the initial pilot test, it became 
clear that the coding scheme was nonetheless a little too general to manage. Hence 
two modifications to the coding technique were devised after which the coding 
scheme was revised. On the one hand, additional subcodes were formed and 
introduced during the coding procedure and, on the other, entirely new codes were 
formed from a residual cat-flap code signed “Other.”  
First, for each of the six generic general codes, additional subcodes (post-fixed 
predicates) were introduced. For instance, during the coding procedure it quickly 
became clear that myriad phenomena by PROs are perceived as conducive (or 
detrimental) to competitiveness. Thus, to the extent that similar paragraphs with 
the general form “X is a source of competitiveness” began to occur regularly (i.e., 
saturate), a new subcode was introduced with the form “SOC: X” (e.g., “SOC: 
Education,” “SOC: Entrepreneurship,” or “Outcome: Exports”).     
Second, the coding process proceeded in a semi-structured manner in which the 
researcher remained open and attentive to paragraphs, statements and propositions 
which did not fit easily into the predefined general coding categories but somehow 
nonetheless appeared significant. Such paragraphs were initially coded with a cat-
flap code termed “Other.” If a sufficient amount of reasonably similar paragraphs 
appeared, these codes—initially ascribed to the cat-flap—were reassessed and 
assigned an additional representative code.362  
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Obviously, this more open and semi-structured approach (of assigning new codes 
to codes initially coded “Other”) entails the risk of coding bias and potentially 
impairs a study’s inter-coder reliability. Unfortunately, the research project had 
insufficient resources to employ additional coders and thus had to rely upon the 
principal investigator to conduct all the coding. However, not all problems of 
inter-coder reliability are managed just by employing additional coders. In fact, 
the cat-flap coding strategy does not per se and if rigorously followed impede 
inter-coder reliability. A dispersed group of coders could apply this technique and 
during the coding session meet and consult upon the collective residual cat-flap. 
The residual set of cat-flap codes could then be reassessed and recoded with a new 
subsidiary coding scheme devised in conjunction with the initial general coding 
scheme.    
After these two modifications, coding of the full dataset began. The coding 
procedure was carried out in two consecutive sequences in which first the 
subdataset of annual economic reports was coded and then subsequently the 
subdataset containing commission white papers and competitiveness indexes was 
coded. This sequence was chosen to enable an examination of whether a discourse 
of “international competition of nations” was present or emerged in the annual 
economic reports. Indeed, this analysis could not be carried out on the other types 
of commission white papers and competitiveness indexes, as these types of reports 
often take the discourse of “increasing international competition and 
globalization” for granted and instead are more analytically attuned to elaborations 
of what the concept of international competitiveness entails for a nation. 
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Throughout the coding process, the researcher kept a coding logbook to chart 
progress, developments and the researcher’s own reflections upon data and 
analysis.   
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10. How United Kingdom Came to 
Compete 
10.1 Before and After the Collapse of Bretton 
Woods 
In the British knowledge regime, all the four PROs examined in this study assert a 
temporal distinction between a time before late 1970s—a time often referred to as 
the Golden Age of Capitalism, characterized by high levels of growth and 
employment, led on by debt-financed, Keynesian demand-side management of the 
economy—and a time after, where the international political environment 
surrounding the U.K. underwent fundamental change. The temporal distinction is 
exemplary discussed by IPPR in its commission report Social Justice: Strategies 
for National Renewal published in 1994:   
“After the war, the U.K. had relied on a combination of national 
economic management, a mildly redistributive welfare state, and a 
mixed economy of public and private sectors. The system had seemed to 
work well enough until 1970, but during the next decade this post-war 
settlement came under increased strain. The Symptoms were clear: the 
economy suffered ‘stagflation’ (the previously unknown combination of 
rising unemployment and rising inflation); the state could no longer 
resolve conflicts between employers and labor.”363  
According to IPPR, “in the post-war years the central challenge was to sustain 
demand at a level commensurate with full employment.”364  
Likewise HMT in its white paper Competitiveness: Helping Business to Win, 
published in 1994, gazes back in history and finds that  
“By the late 1970s the U.K. suffered from high and seemingly chronic 
inflation. Strikes were common. Government intervention distorted 
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decision-making. Protected industries were unable to adjust to changing 
world conditions.”365 
The source of these vagaries was a marked change in the external political-
economic conditions facing the U.K. The character of these new globalized 
external conditions is discussed by NIESR, IFS366, IPPR367 and HMT.368 Albeit 
with a different emphasis all of these PROs claim that following the 1970s the 
external international environment substantially changed with deregulation of 
product markets (for instance with the establishment of the European Single 
Market369 and NAFTA) and the reduction of trade barriers through GATT, the 
entry of Eastern European and East Asian economies into the world economy, the 
liberalization of international capital markets and the herewith associated 
acceleration of trans-boundary flows of FDI, advances in production and 
communication technology, allowing for increased supply chain disaggregation 
and thus a more spatially dispersed international division of labor as well as the 
emergence of new multinational corporations.370  
10.1.1 The Role of Government after Bretton Woods  
This transformed international environment is perceived by British PROs to have 
implications for economic policymakers and hence the appropriate stance of the 
state vis-à-vis the market. In particular the potency of conventional 
macroeconomic policies is perceived as significantly curtailed after the collapse of 
Bretton Woods.  
First of all, monetary policy should independently target price stability, inasmuch 
as an accommodative monetary policy designed, for example, to enhance 
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366 IFS, 2000, pp. 135-141. 
367 IPPR, 1996, p. 33. 
368 See HMT, 2007b, pp. 34-37, HMT 2005 pp. 7-12.  
369 NIESR, 2007, p. 101. 
370 NIESR, 1994a, p. 44, HMT, 1994, pp. 6-7. 
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employment would tend to drive up inflation and hence interest rates, which in 
turn would reduce incentives to investment and thus ultimately counteract 
employment and job creation. For instance, an independent central bank charged 
with the task of ensuring price stability is, by the HMT in its 2000 pre-budget 
report, argued to constitute an important leg of a “new” macroeconomic 
framework designed to “achieve economic stability for the long term.”371 (This 
framework was presented by the newly elected Labor government in 1997, by 
which the Bank of England was made formally independent in 1998.372)    
Second, active and interventionist fiscal policy is perceived to be less effectual. 
Reduced trade barriers are found to render fiscal stimuli (e.g., through increased 
government expenditure) of domestic demand to boost growth and employment 
less efficient, as this in a new global setting more likely increases imports instead 
of domestic production, thus impairing the current account. Third, even if a 
government should want to employ large-scale fiscal demand-side stimulus, then, 
in a globalized environment characterized by free capital movements, that 
government would find it increasingly difficult to raise revenue to do so insofar as 
it should want to raise that revenue from an increasingly footloose, unencumbered 
global capital. IFS in its 2000 Green Budget373 questions the continued tenability 
of taxation of assets, which with globalization becomes far more mobile (in 
particular capital), and contends that 
“The globalisation of international markets and advances in technology 
have reduced the costs of seeking out lower tax rates and increased the 
likelihood that tax rates on mobile activities will continue to fall.”374   
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374 IFS 2000, p. 141. 



+,
Thus in the long run, accumulating budgetary and current account deficits will 
tend to run up interest rates. In this line IFS in its Green Budget published in 1993 
finds that “the lesson of the 1980s is that no government can be indifferent to a 
widening in the current account deficit.”375 Indeed, in its pre-budget report from 
2000, HMT argues that the other leg of the government’s new macroeconomic 
framework consists of a fiscal policy which as its primary goal has the objective to 
“ensure sound public finances” and “support monetary policy.”376 Objectives to be 
achieved by HMT adhering to what is termed a “golden rule of fiscal policy” 
according to which the current budget ought to be balanced or in surplus over the 
economic cycle.377 
By several PROs these newly imposed constraints on (macro)economic 
policymakers are articulated as a distinct policy choice or, employing the 
vocabulary of the PROs themselves, a  “trade-off” which they will have to 
address. For instance, HMT observes a “trade-off between output growth and 
inflation,”378 as does NIESR379 and IPPR. The latter PRO provides the most 
explicit account:  
“It is important to understand, that the presence of these two instruments 
does not allow us target independently both growth (full employment) 
and price stability, because the two instruments themselves are not fully 
independent. … The output/price or unemployment/inflation trade-off is 
inexorable; that is to say it cannot be eliminated or mitigated by altering 
the fiscal/monetary mix.”380 
Thus, as the efficacy of conventional macroeconomic measures in the form of 
demand-side stimuli is seen as significantly reduced, economic policymakers are 
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perceived to be confronted with an “inexorable” choice between either high 
growth (and employment) accompanied by high inflation or low growth and low 
inflation. Instead attention is directed to the supply side of the economy as the 
remaining viable source for enhancing long-term growth (simultaneously with 
stable development of inflation). For example, IFS expresses such a view in its 
1993 Green Budget claims:  
“The best way of achieving sustained non-inflationary growth without a 
deteriorating current account would be to adopt measures to improve the 
supply-side of the economy … there might be a policy bias in the 
direction of achieving further gains in competitiveness.”381 
Indeed, IFS here comes close to equating efforts to improve the supply side of the 
economy to the task of increasing competitiveness.   
10.1.2 A Competition of Nations  
These ostensibly new international conditions perceived to face U.K. firms and 
economic policymakers are by some PROs also interpreted and represented as an 
increasing competition among nations. For instance, HMT continuously makes 
reference to the heightened competition and the importance of improving domestic 
competitiveness.382 In 1993 it argued  
“Today, our companies face the most competitive environment they 
have ever seen. Change is relentless and swift. The global financial 
market never sleeps. Technology has shrunk the world. Free trade has 
opened new markets but it has also created new competitors. We cannot 
ignore these changes. To do so means certain decline.”383  
While it is acknowledged that such a shift presents “enormous opportunities,” it is 
conversely claimed that increasing competition is “a threat” where the U.K. is not 
 

381 IFS 1993, pp. 20-21. 
382 HMT 2007a, p. 2. 
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competitive.384 HMT warns that “for many decades, Britain has been behind other 
countries; and our rivals will not wait for us to catch up.”385 IPPR similarly, in a 
commission report published in 1996, finds that “national governments are in 
competition with each other in providing conditions which will encourage 
business to thrive”386 
Clearly the British PROs do not consider it a uniquely British pastime to ponder 
over the pressures implied by increasing globalization and competition. On more 
than one account a PRO notes how other national governments similarly perceive 
themselves as engaged in a competition of nations and how the competitiveness 
agenda is advancing abroad. HMT, for example, argues 
“Others recognise the importance of competitiveness. The European 
Commission has recently published a White paper. Germany has also 
published a report. The U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand all 
regard competitiveness as a key issue. The fast growing countries in the 
Far East already know that it is vital to economic success.”387  
Just as NIESR recognizes “Improving national competitiveness has become a key 
theme of the 1990s,” 388 noting that countries such as the U.S., Germany, Canada, 
and Spain have forestalled HMT in the U.K. and published extensive 
competitiveness white papers outlining their national competitive strategies.389  
However, just because some British PROs argue that growing competition among 
nations constitutes an important challenge for economic policy, this does not 
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389 That the international competitiveness of the U.K. comes to be perceived as increasingly 
important by PROs in the British knowledge regime is also evidenced by the two commission 
reports published by the IPPR two years apart.  When one compares the two, one finds that the 
entire theme—and title—of the first report published in 1994 is social justice, whereas the 
second report from 1996 presents itself as “a public policy agenda for a more prosperous 
Britain—an aim that calls for progress in business competitiveness.” 
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imply that this is the only challenge alluded to in data. In some reports the 
competition of nations is a far more prevalent idea than in others390, whereas in 
others the theme of increasing competition is merely touched upon in a sporadic 
fashion.391 In some reports, other political and economic challenges—such as 
demographic changes and aging populations, global climate change, international 
terrorism and conflicts as well as global poverty—besides competition are 
discussed and addressed.392 However, in the reports examined here the notion that 
nations are engaged in an intensifying competition is alluded to more often than 
not.  
10.2 How Competitiveness Is Revealed: Outcomes 
While all British PROs contend that the U.K. is engaged in competition with other 
nations, there appears to be some degree of variance as to interpretations of what 
the competitiveness of a nation is. Indeed, all PROs in one way or another 
conceptualize competitiveness as an economic function in which some set of 
inputs or sources are transformed into a competitive outcome by which relative 
national competitiveness can be ascertained and measured. However, 
interpretations differ with regard to just how and by what econometric indicator 
such an outcome should be measured, just as PROs are not always in agreement 
about what should count as a source of competitiveness.  
With regard to outcomes, there appear to be two general interpretations prevalent 
among the PROs in the British knowledge regime.393 On the hand, some PROs 
suggest that a competitive economy is most appropriately measured by its export 
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391 For instance, the subsequent Green Budgets of the IFS do not make frequent reference to the 
notion of a competition of nations but just address a range of conventional macroeconomic 
issues. But see IFS 2000, pp. 135-141, for an exception. 
392 HMT 2007a, p. 2. 
393 Where some PROs subscribe to both of these.  



,&
performance. For instance, in its 1994 white paper on competitiveness HMT 
addresses the question “what is competitiveness?” head on. In this discussion, it 
argues that for a firm “competitiveness is the ability to produce the right goods 
and services of the right quality, at the right price, at the right time.” Yet HMT 
claims that things are different with nations and invokes an OECD definition 
when it argues that national competitiveness consists of “the degree to which it 
can under free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services which meet 
the test of international markets.”394 NIESR echoes this view in its quarterly 
economic reports on the state of British economy, where it square 
competitiveness with  “price competitiveness” 395 , which it at times deems 
decisive for national export performance.396 
On the other hand, some PROs argue that competitiveness should be measured by 
a nation’s ability to advance economic growth and extend the average real 
incomes of its population. Such a view is expressed in several of the later reports 
published by HMT in 2000 and 2007.397 In fact, in the 1994 HMT white paper, 
national competitiveness is defined as the ability of a nation to export (as it were, 
“produce goods and services which meet the test of international markets”) “while 
simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real incomes of its people over the 
long term.” The same view is voiced by IPPR, which in its commission report 
from 1996 in the very opening chapter claims “at the heart of this report is a vision 
of a more prosperous Britain. Its central element is high and rising income per 
head.”398 Indeed, even NIESR in some of its publications shares such an emphasis 
upon growth and increasing living standards as the appropriate outcome measure 
 

394 HMT 1994, p. 9. 
395 An aggregate indicator composed of unit labor costs and exchange rates. 
396 See, for example, NIESR 2000, p. 15 and p. 20, NIESR 2007, p. 46. 
397 HMT 2000a, p. 3, HMT 2007b, p. 3, HMT 2000d, p. 71.  
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of competitiveness.399 Thus one might perhaps, albeit very cautiously, argue that a 
gradual shift is detectable among British PROs away from an understanding of 
competitive outcome as measured by export performance towards a view 
emphasizing growth performance.   
However, while this is a very coarse-grained generalization, it does not, however, 
imply that it is not occasionally questioned whether growth constitutes the most 
appropriate or for that matter only indicator of competitiveness. For example, 
IPPR in its 1996 commission report on the one hand admits that growth is the 
primary policy target but on the other hand that measures of employment and job 
creation performance should be included as supplementary outcome indicator:  
“While wealth creation is the primary objective and public policy should 
seek to promote it, we cannot ignore the distribution of economic 
activity and what it implies for employment. If two countries have the 
same GDP per head but in one everyone is employed while in the 
second there is high unemployment, we would presumably regard the 
first as better off.”400 
10.3 How Competitiveness Is Created: Sources  
In much the same way, the PROs of the British knowledge regime address a range 
of potential inputs or sources of the competitiveness “function” of the British 
political economy.  
10.3.1 SOC I: Macroeconomic Stability 
First, macroeconomic stability is asserted and by some PROs (such as HMT and 
IFS) almost taken for granted as a necessary, if not essential, condition of 
competitiveness.401 For instance, the 1995 HMT white paper on competitiveness 
considers it “the most important contribution that the government can make to 
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400 IPPR 1996, p. 15.  
401 HMT 2005, p. 13, HMT 2000d, pp. 12-14, HMT 2000b, p. 28, IFS, 2000, p. 15.  
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improving competitiveness.”402 Indeed, the temporal distinction between a time 
before and a time after the collapse of Bretton Woods is often substantiated with 
claims that after the collapse the U.K. in particular was haunted by significant 
macroeconomic instability and turbulence. For instance, in its 2000 pre-budget 
report, HMT gazes back in the past and argues that  
“Economic history clearly demonstrates that stability is an essential 
platform for achieving high and stable levels of growth and 
employment. Past instability in output, inflation and interest rates—as 
seen in the British Economy over the past 30 years—created uncertainty 
and led to short-termism in the savings and investment decisions of 
individuals and businesses alike.”403 
As should be clear, macroeconomic stability might mean different things to 
different PROs. As just seen, the HMT in its pre-budget report from 2000 argues 
that macroeconomic stability is best achieved through a monetary policy which 
concedes formal independence to the central bank, which in turn is entrusted with 
the primary task of ensuring stable inflation as well as a fiscal policy in 
observance of “a golden rule“ according to which the current budget should be in 
balance or surplus across the business cycle.404    
However, other PROs also address and discuss what kind of policy mix that best 
achieves macroeconomic stability. For example, NIESR, in its annual economic 
report from 1993, issues a comment on the general tenor of macroeconomic 
debates in the U.K. and finds it      
“Remarkable how the debate over economic policy has reverted to 
issues of demand management. … From about the mid-1970s, until last 
year it was at least mildly heretical to advocate discretionary counter-
cyclical policy, whether fiscal or monetary instruments were to be used. 
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Now everyone seems to assume once more that it is the government’s 
job to encourage and foster economic recovery.”405 
Thus, according to NIESR, the discussion of macroeconomic stability does not 
necessarily entail the complete abandonment of demand-side management 
exclusively in favor of supply-side measures—and NIESR observes that as of 
1993 governmental management of aggregate demand is once again considered by 
British economic policymakers. 
In a similar vein, IFS, in an elaborate discussion of fiscal policy occurring in its 
1993 Green Budget, argues that economists do not really disagree about the 
appropriateness of deficit spending per se: “Both Keynesian and classical 
economists would agree that a buildup of debt during a recession can enhance an 
economy’s long-term performance.”406 Rather, the IFS argues that the question of 
politics contention is whether additional discretionary fiscal spending beyond that 
implied by automatic stabilizers is warranted or not and contends that  
“The balance of economic evidence probably suggests that fiscal stimuli 
during recessions are reasonably successful in stabilising demand and 
activity, while the longer-term supply-side losses from higher tax rates 
are typically rather nebulous.”407  
According to IFS, while a balanced budget constitutes a desirable macroeconomic 
goal, it is balance across the business cycle (not the budget year) matters, and 
ample scope remains for fiscal policy to counterbalance economic upturns and 
downturns by deficit spending. Indeed, the IFS in 1993 gazes back into history to 
ascertain the extent to which the subsequent governments of Thatcher and Major 
in fact adhered to the policy of fiscal restraint (through curbed governmental 
expenditure), which one might expect in light of their publicly proclaimed 
political commitment to “roll back” the state. However the PRO finds that 
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Thatcher and Major in the period from 1979 to 1993 on average retained a 
government expenditure-to-GDP ratio of 45% and that real government 
expenditures on average increased 1.6 to 2% a year.408 In other words, the IFS 
does not find evidence of a significant rollback or retrenchment of the state in the 
U.K. and thus an abandonment of demand-side management through increased 
governmental expenditures in this period. 
In fact, even HMT appears to take a somewhat different position on the question 
of macroeconomic stability when it, in its white paper published in 1994, argues 
that “low inflation is not an end in itself, but one of the necessary conditions for 
sustained growth.” Apparently the HMT here expresses a view according to which 
competitiveness as an outcome should be measured by national growth 
performance and that stable inflation is perceived merely as a subsidiary 
instrument to achieve that goal , not as an end in itself.409  
10.3.1.1 Metrics of Competitiveness I: Output Gaps 
Hence the achievement of macroeconomic stability does not entail the complete 
abandonment of demand-side policy per se and active, interventionist (even 
discretionary) fiscal policy to offset economic cycles through stimulus of 
aggregate demand to some PROs appears warranted. Instead, the task confronting 
economic policymakers consists of conducting a fiscal policy in alignment with 
the real productive capacity of the economy as well as the current stage of the 
business challenge.410 The challenge of such a fiscal policy stance, of course, is for 
economic policymakers to    determine whether the economy is running above or 
below its real productive potential and thus whether a contractive or expansive 
fiscal stance is appropriate to achieve macroeconomic stability. 
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Hence in the reports of some of the PROs in the British knowledge regime, a 
distinct economic metric is employed to enable assessments of the current stage of 
the cycle: the output gap. This econometric means of estimation is discussed in the 
annual economic reports published by HMT, IFS and NIESR, in particular from 
2000 and onwards.411 For instance, NIESR devotes an entire article to what it 
terms “one of the principal indicators of inflationary pressures used in the current 
debate” and argues that 
“Many economists … have taken, or are quickly taking, a stand on the 
size of the output gap, so much that Gavyn Davis (The Independent, 
January 2009) compiled a list of ‘gapeologists,’ the leading proponents 
of this science.”412 
The output gap is designed to estimate how much the current actual level of 
production in an economy deviates from its potentially sustainable level. 413 If the 
actual level of production exceeds the potential level, the output gap is positive 
and the economy is considered to run above capacity (upswing). Conversely, if the 
potential level exceeds the actual level, the gap is negative and the economy runs 
below its capacity (downturn). With a negative output gap, an expansive fiscal 
policy is deemed appropriate and vice-versa for a positive output gap.  
As such the metric inter alia serves the function of a steering mechanism or target 
for macroeconomic policies, which make use of both supply- and demand-side 
measures. The output gap in turn is composed of two components414: a demand-
side component, which describes the level and type of demand (e.g., private and 
public consumption, private and public investment, as well as exports), thus the 
 

411 HMT 2000a, p. 146, HMT 2005 p. 10, IFS 1993, pp. 16-17, IFS 2007, p. 36 and p. 64, 
NIESR 2007a, p. 41 and p. 50, IPPR 1996, p. 246.  
412 NIESR 1995d, p. 65. 
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actual current level of production, and a supply-side component which estimates 
the potential capacity of the economy to serve this demand.415  
10.3.1.2 Metrics of Competitiveness II: Growth Accounting  
This latter component, which estimates the potential production capacity of the 
supply-side of the economy, is measured with another econometric technique: the 
technique of growth accounting. On a par with the output gap, this econometric 
methodology is applied in the annual economic reports published by HMT416, 
IFS 417  and NIESR. 418  For instance NIESR explains the growth accounting 
technique as one which 
“Seeks to decompose the growth in output into that part which is due to 
growth of the quantities of factors of production (physical capital and 
labor), their quality (for example, labor skills) and the efficiency with 
which they are combined. Key results are that the quality of factors is an 
important influence on growth.”419   
The idea behind growth accounting is to decompose (the potential) growth rate 
into its underlying sources or components, and is as such particularly helpful for 
economic policymakers, as it allows a more nuanced differentiation and 
discrimination between different sources or sub-components of growth, which 
then in turn can be singled out for singular policy intervention. For example, in its 
pre-budget report published in 2000, the government claims that 
“The factors that influence trend growth can be grouped under those that 
determine trend population growth, the trend employment rate and those 
that determine trend labor productivity.”420 
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While several of these components might contribute to the potential growth of the 
economy, the attention of all PROs in the British knowledge regime gathers 
primarily around productivity.  HMT in the pre-budget report from 2000 argues 
“productivity is the main driver of economic growth”421 and “the key challenges 
now facing businesses and Government is to secure significantly stronger growth 
in productivity.”422 IFS in its Green Budget report from 2007 similarly claims that 
productivity constitutes a “key determinant of the potential growth rate of the 
economy.”423 Likewise IPPR in its commission report published 1996 states “the 
most desirable forms of growth maintain or increase the productivity of capital as 
increasing the productivity of labor.”424 And NIESR in 1994 follows suit: 
“In assessing a country’s or a region’s competitiveness, attention usually 
focuses on wages (or more broadly labor costs) on the one hand, and 
labor productivity on the other.” 425  
10.3.1.3 Metric of Competitiveness III: Productivity Gap 
That the task of increasing productivity is highly prioritized by PROs in the U.K. 
is further evidenced by the fact that a separate additional economic metric is 
invoked to provide a measure of the U.K.’s relative performance vis-à-vis the 
enhancement of its productivity. With clear inspiration from the output gap, in 
some reports a distinct productivity gap is discussed. In the pre-budget report of 
2000, HMT devotes an entire chapter to “The Productivity Challenge” and finds 
that regardless of how productivity is measured, “the U.K. has long displayed 
lower productivity levels than its major competitor nations.”426 This shortcoming 
it dubs the “the productivity gap.”427 Where the output gap describes the estimated 
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difference between the actual and potential production of an economy, the 
productivity gap, however, constitutes a comparative cross-national metric which 
benchmarks U.K. productivity performance against other nations.  As it seems, the 
concept of productivity gap “migrates” from the HMT reports to the publications 
of other PROs in the British knowledge regime. Thus both IFS428 and NIESR429 
come to employ the concept.  
Indeed, the British emphasis upon productivity is so deep-rooted that in some 
reports productivity is straightforwardly equated to competitiveness. This is the 
case in the white paper U.K. Competitiveness: Moving to the Next Stage published 
in 2003: 
“To understand competitiveness, the starting point must be the sources 
of a nation’s prosperity. A nation’s standard of living is determined by 
the productivity of its economy, which is measured by the value of 
goods and services produced per unit of the nation’s human, capital and 
natural resources. … True competitiveness, then, is measured by 
productivity.” 430  
And in the HMT pre-budget reports from 2000, a conceptual vocabulary of 
competition between “competitor nations”431 is only invoked in the discussion of 
the U.K. productivity challenge.432   
Hence, it is a reasonably fair and empirically supported claim to argue that all 
British PROs quite consistently emphasize the importance of raising the 
productivity of the U.K. economy. However, somewhat different arguments are 
advanced as to why increases in productivity ought to be pursued by economic 
policymakers. First, HMT in 2007 claims that reforms aimed to enhance 
productivity are far preferable to other types inasmuch as productivity is the only 
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factor of the growth accounting equation which is perceived to be able to increase 
indefinitely. Other factors of the growth accounting equation are perceived as 
constrained by “natural” limits: 
“In terms of labor input, increases in the number of hours worked can be 
achieved by increasing the population, increasing the proportion of the 
population in work, or increasing the hours which people work. 
However, there is a constraint to the contribution of labor to long-run 
economic growth as there are obvious limits to the number of people of 
working age available to work, and to the hours that can physically be 
worked. … Alternatively growth can be achieved through raising the 
average amount produced for each hour worked or the amount produced 
per worker. … These mechanisms for increasing output are not limited 
in the way that employment and hours worked are.”433 
Second, IPPR argues that if one compares two economies with identical growth 
levels, then, all things equal, the economy in which the growth is due to higher 
rates of productivity is considered better off than the one where growth stems 
from higher working hours, as the “citizens of the second country would have 
more time for leisure and social activities.”434 Increases in productivity are more 
desirable per se compared to other means. In a somewhat similar vein, the 2003 
white paper asserts that “productivity allows a state to support high wages, a 
strong currency and attractive returns to capital, and with them a high standard of 
living.”435 
To be sure, the point is not that PROs in the British knowledge regime only 
consider productivity and thus neglect other potential factors of growth (such as 
labor supply, employment rates and working hours). These are also discussed in 
the policy reports. The cautious point is rather that, all things considered, the 
challenge of increasing productivity in the U.K. appears to receive the lion’s share 
of attention.  
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Indeed all of the British PROs perceive productivity as standing in an inverse 
relationship with another factor of the growth equation: the level of employment. 
For instance HMT in its pre-budget report of 2000 asserts that  
“Strong employment gains in recent years have been accompanied by 
subdued productivity growth, which has been below its long-run rate 
since 1995. This mainly reflects the temporary impact of bringing large 
numbers of people back into employment, as those entering work tend to 
have lower than average productivity levels.”436 
IFS in its Green Budget from 2000 observes a similar relationship when it 
contends that “higher employment growth might be expected to curb productivity 
growth”437, as do NIESR438 and IPPR.439 That is, just as some PROs perceive an 
inexorable “trade-off” between growth and inflation, they similarly perceive a 
trade-off between increases in productivity and increases in employment where 
improvements in one are obtained at the expense of the other. Thus, British PROs 
appear to perceive a policy choice confronting economic policymakers when faced 
with the (inverse) relation between productivity and employment but nonetheless 
appear to endorse policy measures intended to increase productivity.   
To briefly summarize, macroeconomic stability is perceived to constitute a 
fundamental necessary condition of competitiveness. And though macroeconomic 
stability is emphasized, this however does not imply an outright denouncing of 
demand-side deficit spending per se in favor of a strict supply-side approach. 
Some PROs perceive the requirement of a balanced budget to be stretched across 
the economic cycle, implying that demand- and supply-side measures can go hand 
in hand and complement one another depending on the current stage of the 
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business cycle. In turn, such an assessment depends upon whether the output gap 
(aided by the growth accounting metric) is negative or positive.  
10.3.2 SOC II: Open Markets, Deregulation, Taxes and 
Labor Markets 
However macroeconomic stability is not considered to constitute the only source 
of competitiveness. As argued by HMT in 2000, “Macroeconomic stability is a 
necessary condition for raising Britain’s long-term growth potential, but it alone is 
not sufficient.”440 In 1994 it claims that competitiveness is “about more then 
pulling macroeconomic levers.” 441  In the eyes of the PROs of the British 
knowledge regime, the list of sources of competitiveness is longer. They also 
variously emphasize the importance of open and competitive product, capital and 
labor markets and the structure of tax and regulatory regimes for the 
competitiveness of a nation.  
For instance in its 1994 white paper, HMT first argues that “strong competition at 
home to satisfy customers also enhances the international competitiveness of our 
companies” and thus commits itself to introduce competition wherever possible, 
“including in industries once considered natural monopolies.”442 Second, while it 
finds that some degree of governmental regulation of markets is necessary, it 
maintains that “its scope and implementation can affect the competitiveness of 
business.” Hence it proposes a policy to “minimise regulatory burdens on 
business.” 443  Third, HMT finds that “a country’s tax regime affects its 
competitiveness … a burdensome regime can stifle growth” and thus adopts a 
policy aimed at keeping “the overall tax burden as low as possible” through 
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reduction of marginal tax rates.444 Finally, it is not just product and capital markets 
which need to be open and unregulated. Likewise, HMT argues, “flexible labor 
markets play a key part in a competitive economy.”445  
Other PROs discuss the same sources of competitiveness. NIESR argues that both 
privatizations and the labor market liberalization policies since the 1970s have 
made a “favourable contribution” to the narrowing of what it terms the 
competitiveness gap of the U.K. For instance it finds that “privatised utilities have 
significantly raised productivity, particularly when exposed to competition”446 and 
elsewhere contends that “another important factor in determining the 
attractiveness of a nation as a location for production is the rate at which profits 
are taxed.”447 IPPR finds that “for any developed economy, effective competition 
in the domestic product market is the lifeblood of competitiveness.”448 In its 2007 
Green Budget, IFS analyzes the extent to which the British tax system can be 
considered “a competitive tax regime that will be attractive to international firms 
making location choices.”449 
10.4 Before and After the New Economy 
However, there is even more to international competitiveness than macroeconomic 
policy liberalization and deregulation of markets, low taxes and flexible labor 
markets. That is, in their respective accounts of political economic history, the 
PROs in the British knowledge regime assert an additional temporal distinction to 
argue that around the turn of the century the competition of nations changed in 
character. In particular, several British PROs have come to distinguish between a 
 

444 Ibid. p. 142 
445 Ibid. p. 50 
446 NIESR, 1995c, p. 77 
447 NIESR, 1994a, p. 44 
448 IPPR, 1996, p. 57 
449 IFS, 2007, p. 186 



-)
time before the late 1990s and a time after in which advanced political economies 
ostensibly came to take the form of “new” 450 or knowledge-based economies, and 
thus where a new stage or phase of globalization began implying a new set of 
competitive parameters for nations engaged in international competition.  
The idea that the British economy has (somehow) transformed and permutated 
into a distinctly “new economy,” implying fundamental alteration of the basic 
economic relationships within an economy is addressed and discussed, for 
example, by HMT. In its pre-budget report from 2000, it argues that during the 
1990s the United States experienced a rapid acceleration of productivity and thus 
growth and further claims that “most economists agree” that the acceleration in 
productivity is ascribable to diffusion of ICT technologies in the production.451 
Elsewhere, HMT argues that “most commentators now believe that trend growth 
in the U.S. has increased, which has led some to describe the U.S. as a ‘new 
economy.’” 452  Also NIESR ponders over the question of whether the U.K. 
economy has been “transformed by the Internet revolution, raising productivity 
growth rates above those experienced in the recent past” 453 and the extent to 
which the U.K. might emulate what is perceived as a “U.S. New-Economy labor 
productivity growth miracle.”454 
A core contention of the “new economy” thesis is the belief that the surge in U.S. 
productivity (associated with the ICT-led “growth miracle”) has loosened or even 
dissolved the supposedly “inexorable” trade-off between growth and inflation, 
which some British PROs observe as discussed above.455 That is, the U.S. is found 
 

450 See, for example, NIESR 2001a, p. 79, NIESR 2002, pp. 38-39, HMT 2000a, p. 38.  
451 The Internet reduces search and transaction costs, lowers barriers to the entry of new firms 
and thus enhances competition in most spheres. HMT 2000a, p. 33; see also IPPR 1996, p. 36. 
452 HMT 2000c, p. 13.  
453 NIESR 2000, p. 6. 
454 NIESR 2001a, p. 75. 
455 See p. 178 above. 



-*
during the 1990s to have raised both growth and employment, while 
simultaneously keeping inflation in check, and the reason for this is often found to 
be the increase in productivity. For instance, HMT finds that the U.S. has 
experienced an “exceptional combination of high GDP growth and low inflation 
since the mid 1990s. This has been underpinned by strong productivity growth.”456 
However, all PROs do not uncritically embrace the “new economy” and very 
diverging attitudes towards the concept can be discerned. For instance, in a NIESR 
publication from 2001 it is argued that “the new-economy phenomenon is as much 
a matter for social psychologists as for economists.”457  
Even so—and regardless of the relative intellectual cogency of the concept of a 
new economy—some PROs nonetheless still advance the argument that the 
character of the competition of nations has changed and thus new parameters of 
international competition have come to prevail. The white paper Building the 
Knowledge-Driven Economy published in 1998 is perhaps the document which 
most explicitly invokes this temporal dichotomy:  
“In the increasingly global economy of today, we cannot compete in the 
old way. Capital is mobile, technology can migrate quickly and goods 
can be made in low cost countries and shipped to developed markets. 
British markets must compete by exploiting capabilities, which its 
competitors cannot easily match or imitate. These distinctive capabilities 
are not raw materials, land or access to cheap labor. They must be 
knowledge, skills and creativity, which help create high productivity.”458  
Other PROs argue along similar lines, such as for instance IPPR and NIESR, 
which in 1995 suggest that “higher investment in physical capital alone is not the 
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route to permanently higher growth. Investment in people and ideas are also 
important.”459 
This temporal dichotomy is by some PROs substantiated by invocation of two 
distinct competitive national modalities, of which only one is argued to be 
sufficient in the allegedly new stage of international competition. That is, in 
slightly different forms, PROs argue that what used to be sufficient for 
competitive performance in the past is in the new stage no longer sufficient but 
merely a necessary condition for competitive participation. For instance, in 1994 
IPPR argued that “efficiency is necessary to win markets, but it is not in itself 
sufficient; innovation is the key ingredient,”460 a proposition which it expands with 
the temporal assertion:  
“In the past, countries have prospered on the basis of their natural 
endowment of raw materials. These are still important … But they 
cannot be the basis of competitive strength on their own. … The 
companies and countries that prosper are those that can add value to the 
raw materials by combining them with skilled workers and the latest 
technology.” 461 
And in 1996 IPPR maintained that “while market liberalisation and some 
deregulation were appropriate, even the strongest devotees of these policies do not 
claim that they alone, were, or are, sufficient to resolve Britain’s economic 
problems.”462  
Also IFS in its 2007 Green Budget raises the question of how much “a competitive 
tax regime” matters to a firm’s choice of location “given other factors that 
influence the attractiveness of the U.K. as a location for business investment.”463 
Indeed the entire white paper U.K. Competitiveness: Moving to the Next Stage 
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459 NIESR 1995c, p. 73. See also IPPR 1994, p. 99. 
460 IPPR 1994, p. 102. 
461 IPPR 1994, p. 99. 
462 IPPR 1996, p. 19. 
463 IFS 2007, p. 186. 
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from 2003—as the title suggests—addresses the ostensible move to a new stage of 
competition. The “most valuable message” the white paper conveys is: 
“the U.K. needs a new conception of competitiveness. In the past the 
U.K. has been very successful in implementing key market-based 
reforms: deregulation, privatisation and competition. But these aspects 
of industrial policy are now running into diminishing returns.”464  
Moreover, some PROs claim that, whereas in earlier periods wage and price levels 
constituted central parameters of competitiveness, in the new stage of competition 
the ability to produce higher-value-added quality goods is becoming still more 
important. For instance, IPPR in 1994 programmatically proclaimed that “in the 
new world economy, success is increasingly based on raising the quality of what 
we produce, rather than on trying to cut the costs.”465 NIESR expanded further 
upon this discussion when it, in a 1999 paper on competitiveness, invoked and 
discussed the analytical distinction between “price-competitiveness” and “non-
price competitiveness” in order to elucidate and distinguish important (generic) 
factors of competitiveness. It argued that back “in the 1960s and 1970s” the 
attention of economic researchers was drawn towards “data sets on relative prices 
or relative unit labor costs” when addressing the question of national 
competitiveness. In contrast 
“‘Non-price’ was a catch-all term to capture other dimensions of the 
ability to compete. … To say that the ‘non-price’ aspect was ignored 
would be wrong, but it was certainly the junior partner. Today the 
emphasis has subtly changed. Of course price or unit labor costs are still 
regarded as important. But … there is great stress on producing high-
quality or high-spec goods and services.”466     
This shift in emphasis, NIESR argued, stems from the observation that countries 
competing on low price “by definition” are producing low-value-added products, 
 
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464 HMT 2003, p. 1, p. 5 and p. 43.  
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and thus that workers employed in the firms of such a nation would be required to 
“accept poor pay conditions.” In 1994, NIESR with a somewhat similar argument 
suggested that in a new competitive context, new parameters will result in superior 
competitive performance and relativizes the importance of wage costs:   
 “Clearly, high wages, ceteris paribus, reduce competitiveness, low 
wages enhance it. But in reality things are not usually equal: high wages 
are frequently accompanied by high productivity, so what matters is the 
balance between the two.”467 
According to NIESR, not only wage levels but also the relation between wage 
levels and productivity are decisive for national competitive performance.   
10.4.1 SOC III: Education, Science, Innovation, 
Entrepreneurship 
The point that more than free markets, low taxes and flexible labor markets is 
required for a knowledge economy to remain productive and thus competitive in a 
new stage of competition also permeates the pre-budget report published by HMT 
in 2000. Here the key causes for the U.K.’s long-standing productivity gap are 
diagnosed, and HMT argues that the shortcomings stem from “lack of domestic 
competition, insufficient incentives and opportunities for enterprise and 
innovation, poor skills and a history of under-investment.”468 Similarly, HMT in 
its productivity white paper from 2000 identifies the “areas of investment, skills, 
R&D and innovation, competition and enterprise” as the key areas for addressing 
and closing the productivity gap.469 Also IFS discusses these “five drivers of 
productivity,”470 as does IPPR. In its 1996 commission report the latter finds an 
“unprecedented consensus among politicians and business leaders, that Britain 
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467 NIESR 1994b, p. 49. See also NIESR, 1995b, p. 85 
468 HMT 2000a, p. 3. 
469 HMT 2000b, p. 37. See also pp. 32-33. The same framework is discussed in HMT, 2007b, 
pp. 19-29.   
470 IFS 2005, p. 4.   
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must make a significant effort to match up in the skills stakes, and that this is vital 
for future competitiveness”471 and that “innovation is essential for success”472 just 
as the contribution of entrepreneurs and SMEs to growth is recognized.473  
10.4.2 SOC IV: Management, Migration, ICT and 
Infrastructure  
However, the range of supply-side policies considered necessary in the British 
knowledge regime still goes beyond the productivity framework of the 
government (e.g., investments in education and skills, entrepreneurship, 
innovation, science and technology). One regularly encounters claims that sources 
such as the general uptake and utilization of ICT in the wider economy474, the 
skills of managers (as opposed to the skill levels of employees), migration and the 
national ability to attract high-skilled workers as well as national infrastructure 
should be considered important sources of national competitiveness. For instance, 
in its pre-budget report from 2000, HMT expresses a commitment to engage in the 
competition to attract, not only FDI, but also migrants to ensure “U.K. competes 
for the best skilled workers in the world.”475 IPPR discusses the importance of 
management and systems of corporate governance to overall competitiveness and 
firm efficiency476, just as HMT in 2000 argues that “growth in an economy relies 
heavily on investment in physical capital to augment the productivity of labor” 
and suggests that a “major part of the explanation” of the U.K.’s poor productivity 
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471 IPPR 1996, p. 28. See also p. 49, 155, 157.  In IPPR 1994, the PRO claims “only lifelong 
learning can win us the prize of economic success.” (p. 120)  
472 IPPR 1996, p. 24.  
473 IPPR 1996, pp. 119-152. 
474 HMT 2000a, p. 38. 
475 HMT 2000a, p. 61. 
476 IPPR 1996, p. 88-118. 
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performance can be explained by the fact that the “stock of public infrastructure in 
the U.K. has been well below that of its main competitors.”477    
10.4.2.1 Metrics of Competitiveness IV: Competitiveness Indicators  
That a competitive nation constitutes a broad, complex and multifarious 
phenomenon and thus that competitiveness stems from more than one or a few 
sources in the eyes of British PROs is further evidenced by the competitiveness 
indicators. These documents have been published on an annual basis from 1998 
onwards.  
In contrast to the growth accounting and output-gap metrics—whose individual, 
mutually exclusive components are defined so as to constitute a collectively 
exhaustive description of a national economy (e.g., growth stems from either 
productivity, labor supply, employment rates and working hours but nothing 
more)—the competitiveness index in a accumulative, ad hoc manner (which 
according the report itself is “deliberately eclectic”478) combines and mixes a great 
host of econometric indicators in the construction of a more encompassing account 
of U.K. competitiveness. The index claims, “No single measure can capture all the 
dimensions of performance relevant to measuring the progress of the knowledge 
economy.”479 Hence the index includes no fewer than 80 econometric indicators of 
competitive performance. For instance, the index includes indicators for “the 
quality of management”480 and the availability of labor with ICT skills481 as well 
as the degree of digital connectivity of British firms.482  
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477 HMT 2000b, p. 9. See also HMT 2007a, p. 51.  
478 HMT 2000d, p. 6.  
479 HMT 2000d, p. 6.  
480 HMT 2000d, p. 36. 
481 HMT 2000d, p. 46 
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In the edition from 2000, the sources are classified in three main categories. The 
first, “Business Environment,” covers macroeconomic stability, competition, the 
labor market, the institutional and political environment483 and “the quality of life” 
of U.K. citizens. The second category, termed “Resources,” includes human 
capital484, physical capital485, finance486, and information and communication 
technology487 as well as science and technology.488 The third category is termed 
“Innovation Process”489 and contains technology commercialization, knowledge 
transfer, receptiveness to foreign ideas and entrepreneurship.  
Thus when examining the competitiveness index, it becomes clear that in these 
years the range of factors and sources deemed important for international 
competitiveness virtually “explodes.” Over time it seems that growing sets of 
policies and economic indicators come to be perceived as important sources of 
international competitiveness. This perception is shared by the PROs themselves. 
For instance, in 1995 NIESR argues that “The search for improved economic 
performance is never ending.”490 
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483 Which refers to “the institutional and legal framework, and the efficiency of the regulatory 
system.” See p. 11.  
484 A fairly broad concept encompassing indicators for lifelong learning, adult literacy and 
numeracy, intermediate and higher-level skills and management skills. HMT 2000d, pp. 30-36. 
485 Measured by indicators of business investment and government investment. HMT 2000d, pp. 
37-39. 
486 Measured by indicators of venture capital, parallel markets and main equity markets. HMT 
2000d, pp.  40-42. 
487 Measured by indicators of “connecting to the digital marketplace,” e-commerce and ICT 
skills. HMT 2000d, pp. 43-46. 
488 Measured by indicators of publications and citations of research in academic journals, 
government spend on R&D, business spend on R&D. HMT 2000d, pp. 47-50. 
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10.4.3 Competitive Advantages of the United Kingdom? 
Given this variety of sources of competitiveness, the distinct competitive 
advantages of the United Kingdom are at times recounted. For instance, HMT’s 
publications at times contain summary paragraphs where the competitive strengths 
of the U.K. are enumerated.491 And in the eyes of the ministry, the competitive 
strengths of the U.K. remain much the same from 1995 to 2007. In a 1995 white 
paper on competitiveness it is asserted that the U.K. 
“Offers a competitive environment with an open market and stable 
economy, a world-class science base, low taxes, superior international 
communications, a skilled work force and excellent labor relations, a 
regulatory regime which encourages innovation, making the U.K. a 
world-class center for high technology industries such as 
telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and bio-technology; and a cultural 
heritage which helps to make the U.K. an attractive place in which to 
live and work.”492 
In 2007, it is claimed, that the U.K. possesses a number of strengths: 
“Open and competitive markets; strengths in science; a transparent and 
well-respected regulatory regime; world-class universities; a 
sophisticated credit market; and the use of English as the international 
language of business. The benefits are underpinned by the U.K.’s high 
quality institutions, such as an open and transparent legal system for 
contesting commercial disputes and for the protection of property 
rights.”493  
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10.4.4 SOC V: Environmental Protection and Social 
Inclusion? 
However, despite the encompassing range of factors included, not everything 
constitutes a source of competitiveness in the eyes of British PROs.  
10.4.4.1 Environmental Protection 
First of all, it appears as if the PROs are split (and somewhat divided) in their 
perception of whether measures to protect the environment constitute a source or 
an impediment to competitiveness. That is, on the one hand whether the challenge 
of environmental deprivation confronts economic policymakers with yet another 
policy choice and “inexorable trade-off” where increased environmental 
protection can only come at the expense of competitiveness. Or on the other 
whether measures to further environmental protection and more energy-efficient 
production instead might further competitiveness and thus involve, as it were, a 
trade-in for policymakers (policies furthering environmental protection and 
energy-efficient production simultaneously further competitiveness).   
Consider, for example, HMT’s position on this question. In 1995 it argued that the 
way firms respond to environmental challenges 
“Will be of increasing importance to their competitiveness. Firms which 
understand the impact of their business on the environment, including 
the impact of their products at every stage of their life cycle, will be best 
placed to seize the opportunities offered by new technologies, 
management techniques, procurement strategies and so on. Such far-
sighted companies will secure competitive advantage by managing their 
impact on the environment and by minimizing their use of resources.”494 
However, in its later reports published in 2000 and onwards, HMT appears to 
argue that competitiveness and environmental protection exclude each other. In 
the pre-budget report from 2000, HMT insists that “environmental policies must 
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not threaten the competitiveness of U.K. business.”495 Here, HMT not only 
appears to assume a trade-off between measures to protect the environment and 
competitiveness but also prioritizes the latter over the former.    
The PROs in the British knowledge regime appear equally divided on this 
question. IFS, in its 2007 Green Budget, expresses skepticism with regard to the 
competitive benefits of government regulation to further environmental and 
energy-efficient production:  
“One concern over any business carbon tax would be the impact on 
national competitiveness, since it would clearly raise the production 
costs for domestic firms.”496 
Conversely IPPR in 1994 subscribes to the view that efforts towards increased 
environmental protection and energy efficiency might constitute a source of 
competitiveness: 
“There is ample evidence that companies and countries which lead the 
way in raising environmental standards gain a competitive advantage in 
increasingly environmentally-aware markets.”497  
Moreover, IPPR in continuation hereof finds that the relationship implies a 
responsibility for governments to regulate the economy and that intelligent 
regulation can generate “markets that work better” by providing firms with 
incentives to discover new, more energy-efficient production and less-polluting 
production technologies.498 
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10.4.4.2 Social Cohesion, Inclusion and Equality 
Second, not many British PROs explicitly argue that political measures furthering 
social cohesion, inclusion and equality constitute a source of competitiveness. 
Consider, for example, the discussion of labor markets as a source of 
competitiveness, where the emphasis is upon deregulated and more flexible labor 
markets. 499 For instance in its pre-budget report from 2000, HMT claims, that for 
labor market policies, the   
“aim is employment opportunity for all—the modern definition of full 
employment. … Achieving the Government’s aim requires … 
microeconomic reforms to improve the functioning of the labor 
market—helping people to compete effectively for jobs, increasing work 
incentives and addressing the specific labor market problems of 
particular groups of people or local areas.”500  
Thus, in short, the emphasis is on providing the incentives for labor market 
participation by making “work pay.” Complementary measures aimed at social 
protection and inclusion are not explicitly referred to as elements conducive to a 
nation’s competitiveness. While these workfare measures are perceived to be the 
best means of mitigating “social exclusion of which worklessness is often a key 
cause,”501 the prevention of social exclusion itself is not argued to improve U.K. 
competitiveness. 
To be sure, in the 2000 edition of the competitiveness index, the quality of life of 
the British population is in fact included as a distinct source of competitiveness: 
 “Quality of life can be an important determinant of economic 
performance as well as being a key goal of economic activity. It can be 
an important influence on firms’ location decisions and retain key 
knowledge workers.”502  
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In the competitiveness index, “quality of life” is measured by an additional arsenal 
of socioeconomic indicators on poverty, social exclusion, population health, crime 
levels, housing stock, air and water pollution, traffic and congestion, waste 
management and more. These indicators are aggregated into one single indicator, 
which then in turn is included as a source of competitiveness.  
However, when one compares the competitiveness index published in 2000 with 
the one published in 2007, one finds that not only have the number of indicators 
been significantly reduced (from 80 to 26) but also that the “quality of life” 
indicator has disappeared. In short, in 2000 the quality of life (absence of poverty, 
social inclusion, low crime etc.) is considered a source of competitiveness. In 2007 
it is not. It is not even discussed. Thus for a brief period, social inclusion, cohesion 
and equality were considered to constitute a source of competitiveness, but only 
for a brief period.  
IPPR, however, contests this view. In its 1994 commission report, it asks how far 
a “vision of social justice can coexist with economic success, or even with 
economic survival, in a competitive world”503 and then claims that these goals are 
co-constitutive.504 While it accepts that the United Kingdom “cannot have social 
justice without a decent measure of economic success,”505 it also contends that the 
“economic success of our country requires a greater measure of social justice.”506 
The rationale behind this contention is also laid out by IPPR:   
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503 IPPR 1994, p. 18. 
504 IPPR maintains that position in its commission report from 1996. Here it claims that a social 
“drag anchor” of persistent long-term unemployment and high levels of welfare dependency 
constitutes an impediment to business, that is, “unemployment is everyone’s problem. The 
apparent short-term advantages for business—an excess supply of labor and low wages—are 
illusory; in the long run every business pays, through higher taxes, reduced government 
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crime.” See IPPR 1996, p. 184.  
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 “Social inequality—low educational levels, unemployment, poor health, 
high crime—holds back economic growth. It does so directly through 
the costs to government (higher spending on benefits, low revenue from 
taxes) and also to business (higher spending on security, and on training 
workers in basic English.”507  
However, and somewhat curiously, this line of argument is not pursued further in 
IPPR’s subsequent commission report published in 1996.    
10.4.5 The Role of Government in a Knowledge-Driven 
Economy 
Just as the temporal dichotomy distinguishing history before and after Bretton 
Woods, is by PROs perceived to alter the scope for governmental intervention in 
the economy, similarly the observation of a change to a new, knowledge-based 
economy and stage of competition is by some PROs understood to have 
implications for the appropriate and legitimate stance of the state (and other 
actors) vis-à-vis markets in three ways. 
10.4.5.1 Correction of Market Failures  
First, HMT, IFS and IPPR address the concept of market failures.  HMT, for 
example, discusses market failures in its white paper on productivity from 2000 
and lays out the theoretical rationale for government intervention to correct such 
failures508:  
“Many markets are subject to imperfections or failures. Market failure 
exists when the competitive outcome of markets us not efficient from 
the point of view of the economy as a whole. … markets fail when the 
private returns which an individual or firm receives from carrying out a 
particular action diverge from the returns to the society as a whole—
resulting in a sub-optimal amount of it being done.”509   
 

507 IPPR, 1994, p. 98 
508 HMT, 1994, p. 16 
509 HMT, 2000, p. 30  



&.-
HMT argues that that microeconomic reform agenda of the government “is based 
on a strategy to correct market failures that obstruct productivity growth in the key 
areas of investment, skills, R&D and innovation, competition and enterprise.”510 In 
this line, it distinguishes between “four generic categories” of market failures.511 
The first is negative externalities or spillover effects, signifying costs that do not 
befall either of the participants in a market transaction and which the price 
mechanism will not price correctly. The second is positive externalities (public 
goods), where benefits befall non-involved third parties to an economic 
transaction. R&D activities, training and infrastructure are cited as examples of 
public goods, which a market would tend to underprovide if left alone.  
Third is “market power” or monopolies, where the predominance of one or a few 
firms within a sector raises the entry barriers for potential new market entrants to 
such an   artificially high level that effective competition is disabled and the price 
mechanism impaired. This allows monopolies to evade competition, set higher 
prices and thus obtain supernormal profits. Fourth is information asymmetries, 
which likewise distort the price mechanisms as the necessary information is not 
equally available to parties to an economic transaction.  
Market failures are discussed as well by other PROs in the U.K. In its Green 
Budgets, IFS addresses the market failures pertaining to insufficient investment in 
education512 and insufficient conditions for entrepreneurship513, as well as the 
negative externalities stemming from pollution.514 And IPPR bases most of its 
policy recommendations upon claims of market failures in the economy.515 Thus 
through various means of taxation and regulation, the government has a legitimate 
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role in intervening in the economy to alter the incentive structures facing market 
participants and thus to facilitate a behavioral change.  As it argues in 1994, 
 “markets (for labor, for finance, for goods and services) are not created 
by natural or divine forces. They are the product of the values, 
institutions, regulations, and political decisions that govern them. 
Markets are political—their structure determines their outcome. A 
minimum wage, for instance, raises the costs of the lowest-paying 
employers … but it also gives employers a powerful incentive to 
increase their productivity in order to justify the wages.”516  
10.4.5.2 Conversion of Mindsets  
Second, some PROs argue that beyond getting incentives structures right, a 
government also has a role in nurturing a particular mindset, set of values or 
culture within and among market participants. Again HMT is representative. In its 
white paper from 1998, for example, it argues that success in the knowledge-
driven economy is about more than “strengthening the science base and raising the 
education and the skills levels of the workforce.” More is required. Thus HMT 
claims that “success in the knowledge-driven economy requires a shift in 
mindset.”517 As an example, HMT notes that U.K. businesses need to become 
more outward oriented, receptive and able to learn from global best practices but 
that “many businesses do not recognize the need for best practice. … A sustained 
effort is needed to spread the culture of benchmarking and best practice 
throughout the U.K.”518 Elsewhere it claims that “without changes in cultural 
attitudes, it will be difficult to achieve significant improvements in the levels of 
innovation and overall economic performance.”519 In 2007, HMT stated that 
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“employers are being encouraged and supported to develop the skills and 
qualifications of their workforce by making a Skills Pledge.”520  
10.4.5.3 Coordination of Market Activities 
Third, in the British knowledge regime some PROs also assert the claim that the 
challenge of preparing the U.K. for increasing competition is not something which 
can be handled solely by the government but a task which involves the active 
involvement of a greater range of social actors and organizations such as unions 
and employer organizations. For instance, in a discussion of the challenge to raise 
U.K. productivity, HMT, in its pre-budget report from 2000, asserts that 
“The challenge—for business, unions, educationalists and other 
organisations across the regions—is together to tackle the productivity 
issues. … Closing the productivity gap cannot be achieved without a 
broader drive from workforces and managers across the country.”521 
A similar call for broader, cross-societal coordination of activities is made by 
IPPR in its 1996 commission report.522 
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11. How Germany Came to Compete 
11.1 Before and After the Collapse of Bretton 
Woods 
As seen in the British case, PROs in the German knowledge regime likewise 
identify a temporal shift by which they distinguish between a period before the 
late 1970s and a period after.   
For instance, the commission paper published by FES in 1998 extensively 
discusses this temporal shift in its opening paragraphs. It argues that Germany’s 
political economy—termed “Modell Deutschland” due to its particular 
institutional setup, in which a cooperative political system, a social state with 
broad social security system and a traditional division of labor between 
genders523—fit well with post-war capitalism as it provided good conditions for 
German firms to differentiate and specialize in technology-intensive, high-value-
added production in markets such as mechanical engineering, chemical production 
and automotive engineering. For many years this model yielded economic growth, 
strong export performance, full employment and security of jobs and a stable 
development of the currency.524 
However, from the late 1970s the ostensible model came under pressure. The 
collapse of Bretton Woods, two oil crises and the ensuing global recession with 
unemployment soaring posed significant challenges. With the Cold War grinding 
to a sudden stop in 1989, reopening Eastern Europe simultaneously with the 
completion of the European Internal Market, the pressure on the model from 
international competition only increased further. 
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11.1.1 Role of Government after the Collapse of Bretton 
Woods 
The international economic context facing Germany after the collapse of Bretton 
Woods is, in turn, by some PROs perceived to imply a diminished scope for 
tenable governmental policy vis-à-vis markets, particularly in terms of 
macroeconomic policy.  
SACH, in its 1993 report, engages in a lengthy discussion of the scope for tenable 
and expedient macroeconomic policy. The new international economic context 
imposes two constraints on economic policymakers. First economic policymakers 
are confronted with the choice between what it terms a “defensive” or “offensive” 
competitive strategy:  
“Basically there are two possible ways to react to the continual 
challenge of international competition among nations 
(“Standortwettbewerb”). The first possibility—which the 
Sachverständigensrat in earlier years has termed ‘defensive adjustment 
strategy’—boils down to trust in the adaptability of the exchange rate. 
Excessive domestic costs, a productivity growth slower than abroad, the 
falling behind in international competition on innovation could all be 
compensated … by real depreciation of the D-mark.”525 
However, SACH warns against the defensive strategy, since gains in 
competitiveness are merely nominal and come at the expense of stagnating real 
incomes. Hence,   
“The goal of also in the future ensuring high real incomes cannot be 
achieved by a ‘defensive adjustment strategy.’ We therefore reiterate our 
plea for a reorientation of economic policy in the sense of an “offensive 
adjustment strategy” … this aims at meeting the challenges of the 
international structural changes (“Strukturwandel”) primarily by 
improving the conditions for growth in the economy.”526  
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525 SACH 1993, p. 177 (AOT). 
526 SACH 1993, p. 177 (AOT). 
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SACH discuss two such approaches.  On the one hand, growth can be enhanced 
through demand-side fiscal stimuli; on the other, through structural improvements 
of the supply side of the economy. Yet again, only one of these paths is deemed 
viable for economic policymakers. SACH insists that 
"The possibilities for conventional demand management policies have 
been exhausted, inasmuch as fiscal policy is soon overdrawn in face of 
the high deficit. The attempt again to intensively field it would be 
counterproductive. Economic policy must aim at improving the 
conditions for firms’ preparedness to invest with a view to calculable 
profits in the light of future demand. This is the fundamental idea behind 
the supply-oriented policy in many years favored by the 
Sachverständigensrat.”527 
Thus, likewise the scope for interventionist fiscal policy is seen as significantly 
constrained. Hence, to SACH the task of enhancing growth and competitiveness 
can only be accomplished by reforms of the supply-side.  It finds that  
“The question of the quality of German competitiveness 
(“Investitionsstandortes Deutschland”) is posed against the backdrop of 
the medium-term supply conditions in other countries, which in a still 
more interdependent world economy compete with Germany for 
internationally mobile resources. In other Western industrial countries 
economic policy face the same challenge. 528 
It is not only in Germany that such approaches have become more prevalent. In a 
comparison of economic policy approaches in the U.S., the U.K. and France, 
SACH finds that a shift towards being less interventionist and more stability and 
competitiveness oriented. The “focal points of American economic policy have 
been displaced” away from demand-side stimulus through government spending 
to “the improvement of the competitiveness of the U.S. economy and 
consolidation of the federal budget.”529 
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527 SACH 1993, p. 17 (AOT). 
528 SACH 1993, p. 250 (AOT). 
529 SACH, 1993, p. 46 (AOT). 
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FES argues that German economic policymakers first attempted to apply 
conventional instruments of fiscal stimulus and industrial subsides which had 
earlier served Modell Deutschland well. But with the liberalization of global 
financial markets, these remained largely ineffective and exacerbated problems 
more than solving them. Complicating things further, the unification revealed a 
“construction flaw”’ in Germany’s contribution–based social security system, 
gradually leading to federal fiscal overreach in efforts to extend social transfers to 
Eastern Germany.530 Hence  
“In the 1990s the advanced Modell Deutschland lost capability 
(“leistungsfähigkeit”). Socio-economic structural change, changes in the 
international economic conditions, social-structural developments, the 
long-lasting employment crisis and ecological limitations began to 
impose new conditions upon and required processes of adaptation and 
reform in economy and society.”531  
Likewise BS in its commission report argues that a “paradigm change” occurred in 
the late 1980s and hence concurrently with the temporal shift. According to BS, 
this implied a fundamental shift in the basic macroeconomic theories and 
assumptions informing the policies favored by German economic policymakers: 
“A paradigm shift has occurred in the two major subfields of macro-
policy, monetary and fiscal policy, completed. Where fiscal policy in the 
1980s attempted to stimulate economic activity, through the expansion 
of public demand, acquiescing increasing public deficits and debt 
(“Deficit Spending”), then lately the insights of neo-Keynesian theory 
has gained attention since the beginning of the 1990’s. … In the course 
of this development fiscal policy has removed from direct demand 
steering and concentrated stronger on the establishment of incentives in 
the tax and duty policy.”532  
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530 SACH 1993, p. 16 (AOT). 
531 FES 1998, p. 45 (AOT). 
532 BS 2007a, p. 91(AOT). 
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11.1.2 A Competition of Nations 
Also some German PROs interpret and present the new international economic 
context after Bretton Woods as an increasing competition among nations.  
Indeed, SACH often invokes this image in its reports. In its annual economic 
report from 1993 it observes that the question of “Germany as an attractive site of 
investment (“Investitionsstandort”) has been discussed lively and controversially 
in the public.”533 Accordingly it devotes an entire chapter to a discussion of the 
competitiveness of Germany’s export sector.534 Also SACH finds that the debate 
about competitiveness recently has changed: 
“Today the question of German competitiveness (“das 
Standortproblem”) addresses a completely different dimension: the 
Globalization of markets is highly advanced, the European Single 
Market is in most aspects completed, the international price- and product 
competition has become more intensive, the Middle- and Eastern 
European countries consequently pursue their integration in the global 
division of labor, the competition between national economies 
(“Volkswirtschaften”) is increasing.”535     
In particular SACH finds that, due to global capital markets’ liberalizations as well 
as advances in ICT, both investment and human capital have become more mobile 
and open for a “transnational diversification of production.”536  
In much the same vein the BmWI in all of its annual economic reports, as well as 
its white papers, considers the challenge of international competition.537 In its 
annual economic report from 1993, it, in a characteristic paragraph, contends that  
“all decisions must take into account, how to strengthen ‘Standort 
Deutschland’ in light of the on-going integration and increasing 
international competition.”538 
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533 SACH 1993, p. 249 (AOT). 
534 SACH 1993, pp. 163-178 (AOT). 
535 SACH 1993, p. 250 (AOT). 
536 Ibid. p. 250 (AOT) 
537 BMWI 2000a, pp. 6-8; BmWI, 2007, p. 15 (AOT) 
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11.2 How Competitiveness Is Revealed: Outcomes 
As in the U.K., the German PROs also engage in discussions of what the 
competitiveness of a nation at all can be perceived to consist of. And they 
similarly address the concept in terms of a production function. With regards to 
competitive outcomes, PROs both embrace perceptions of competitiveness as 
revealed by relative export performance and as revealed by growth. 
Some PROs perceive competitiveness to be revealed by export performance 
measured by indicators of export rates, trade balance and international market 
shares. SACH in all of its reports discusses competitiveness in relation to 
Germany’s exports.539 In 1993 it claims that the “strength of the German economy 
… decisively reside[s] in its competitiveness in international trade” 540 and 
elsewhere observes that the “international competitiveness of German industry is 
in all respects strong” inasmuch as Germany has  “been able to defend its frontline 
position in world markets.”541   
Also BmWI subscribes to the view that competitiveness consists of export 
performance. In the very opening paragraph of the 2007 report, the ministry 
claims that  
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538 BMWI, 1993, p. 12, The same year, BmWI finds that this increased competition stems from:  
“The Globalization of markets (which) does not only imply a worldwide change of supply and 
demand, but also an intensification of the international competition among sites of company 
locations. (…) With increasing integration of the world economy, improved information 
capabilities and greater flexibility of investors, parts of the value chain can easier be relocated.” 
BMWI, 1993b, p. 9. For a similar account of the challenges posed by increased globalization 
and international competition see BMWI, 1994, p. 2 (AOT) 
539 SACH 1993, p. 4; pp. 163-177 and p. 250; SACH 2000, p. 2, SACH 2004, p. 467 and SACH, 
2007, p. 8  
540 SACH, 1993, p. 202  (AOT) 
541 SACH 1993, p. 250. See also p. 26 and p. 163-164, where SACH argues that the public 
debate about competitiveness in Germany revolves around the question of relative export 
performance (AOT). 
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“The high competitiveness of German firms should bring gains in 
market shares of world trade. The good business conditions Germany 
offers are increasingly bearing fruit. This is evident in a clear 
improvement in the competitiveness of German firms.”542 
11.2.1.1 World Trade Champion and Domestic Growth Laggard 
However, for some PROs, this view of international competitiveness (i.e., as 
revealed by export) is questioned and even criticized. In the report Benchmarking 
Deutschland, BS emphasizes growth at the expense of export performance as a 
proper measure of competitive performance. It argues that “GDP per capita is the 
lead indicator of the economic prosperity of a nation”543 and considers growth all 
the more important since increasing growth frequently carries increasing 
employment with it. 544 With regard to export performance, BS does provide a 
comparison of national trade balances545, but it quickly dismiss trade-balance 
figures as appropriate indicators of competitiveness since it finds that   
“the level and change in the balance of trade provide no clear indication 
of the growth and employment success of a nation.”546  
FES also questions whether what it terms the “ability to sell” is the proper way to 
understand competitiveness and provides a comprehensive argument as to why. 
First, according to FES, world market shares are inappropriate for measuring 
competitiveness since declining or stagnating market shares do not necessarily 
imply its decline in the context of a growing world market.547  
Second, FES echoes BS in its assertion that strong exports do not necessarily 
translate into growth and jobs. It finds that  
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542 BmWI 2007, p. 7 (AOT). 
543 BS 2007a, p. 98 (AOT). 
544 BS 2007a, p. 95 (AOT). 
545  Where it finds that Germany is performing mildly well and above the average. 
546 BS 2007a, p. 119 (AOT). 
547 FES, 1998, p. 83 (AOT). 
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 “despite high competitiveness, in the sense of extremely positive trade 
data, the German growth dynamics of the 1980s was too weak.”548  
It provides two potential explanations for this weakness. On the one hand, 
insufficiencies of the supply-side of the economy might drive up wage costs and 
public spending and “crowd out” private investments and thus the prospects for 
growth.549 On the other, and conversely, insufficient demand might hold back 
growth where too low domestic wages, while improving exports, prevent domestic 
consumption from taking hold. Thus FES concludes that competitiveness is more 
appropriately measured as an “ability to earn,” i.e., a nation’s relative ability to 
increase the real incomes of its citizens. 
SACH also questions export performance as an outcome indicator of 
competitiveness. For example, in its annual economic report from 2000 it observes 
that 
“for a long time German economic policy has not taken up the challenge 
of international competition, not seldom reassured by the export success 
of the German economy, by which the balance of trade year for year has 
exhibited a considerable surplus with an upward trend. The 
Sachsverständigensrat has repeatedly ... pointed out that the 
competitiveness of an economy (“Standortqualität einer 
Volkwirtschaft”) is not merely determined by the development of 
exports.”550     
It expands upon this discussion in its annual economic report from 2004551, where 
it finds that a tenacious question has begun to puzzle German economists: 
Germany’s  combination of strong export performance simultaneously with weak 
 
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548 FES, 1998, p. 109 (AOT). 
549 FES, 1998, p. 109 (AOT). 
550 SACH 2000, p. 181 (AOT). 
551 In this annual economic report, it devotes two full chapters to address the question “what is 
international competitiveness” head on. In fact, this is one of the most comprehensive 
discussions of the concept of competitiveness found in the dataset. See SACH 2004, pp. 461-
511 (AOT). 
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domestic growth and job creation. And it asks whether Germany is “world trade 
champion but domestic growth laggard?”552 
To answer SACH, we present a three-fold typology of ways to understand 
international competitiveness. The first type simply claims the concept to be 
meaningless. Competitiveness is a feature of firms, not nations. 553 The second 
understanding equates national competitiveness with the ability to sell products in 
international competition. With this definition, “it is emphasized, that the absolute 
price advantages relevant for export, are not only determined by firm-specific but 
also macro-economic variables.”554 Finally, a third understanding emphasizes that 
beyond macroeconomic indicators a range of microeconomic factors affects export 
and growth potential.  
“As part of this third concept, international competitiveness is equated 
with a country’s ability to sustainably maximize its income or achieve 
an increase in living standard.” 
These are measured by economic indicators such GDP per capita, growth rates of 
GDP or unemployment.555 Hence, according to SACH, one does not simply once 
and for all have strong competitiveness or not. “Things are slightly more 
complicated.”556 With these concepts, SACH reassesses the issue of simultaneous 
high exports and low growth and contends that Germany does not have a problem 
of competitiveness in the second sense557 but has in the third:  
 

552 SACH 2004, p. 472-473. See also p. 499 (AOT). 
553 SACH 2004, p. 461 (AOT). This position perceives an inherent danger in the very 
application of the term to nations, since this might suggest that international trade is a zero-sum 
game with winners and losers, which might prompt domestic protectionist responses to 
globalization, international competition and free trade. Recall Paul Krugman’s criticism of 
competitiveness applied to nations. See p. 63. 
554 SACH 2004, p. 464 (AOT). 
555 SACH 2004, p. 464 (AOT). 
556 SACH 2004, p. 467 (AOT). 
557 SACH 2004, pp. 499-500 (AOT). 
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"Germany is internationally competitive, but competitiveness as the 
ability to increase domestic living standards has only very limited to do 
with international competitiveness. Here, domestic determinants are far 
more important even for an economy as open as Germany’s, and it is 
also here that the main causes of Germany’s difficulties are.558 
To recapitulate briefly, while several German PROs discuss competitiveness in 
terms of a nation’s ability to export, they also question this as the most appropriate 
indicator and instead direct attention to competitiveness understood as the ability 
to grow as well as the herewith associated problems present in the German 
economy.    
11.2.1.2 Metrics of Competitiveness I: From RCA to Output Gaps  
This is further supported by the shift in types of macroeconomic metrics. For 
instance, in its report from 1993 SACH employs a particular economic metric 
termed RCA analysis (the acronym stands for Revealed Comparative Advantage). 
On a par with the growth accounting technique559, the RCA analysis seeks to 
separate the aggregate export performance of an economy into its underlying 
subcomponents to achieve a more fine-grained picture of a nation’s pattern of 
specialization and relative cost advantages.560 However, what is most notable 
about this metric is that it apparently disappears in SACH’s subsequent annual 
economic reports. Nor does it appear in any other of the documents analyzed in 
this study.561 Instead, the PROs of the German knowledge regime, on a par with 
their British counterparts, adopt and apply the dual economic metrics of output 
gaps and growth accounting. For instance, SACH invokes the output gap in its 
 

558 SACH 2004, p. 501 (AOT). 
559 See p. 188 above. 
560 SACH 1993, pp. 170-172 (AOT). 
561 A caveat is in order here. Obviously, in discourse analysis one should be very careful not to 
generalize too extensively from the observation of the absence of a particular instance or unit of 
meaning, as for instance the RCA analysis. It might very well be the case, for example, that the 
Sachsverständigensrat (or other organizations) employ the econometric technique elsewhere in 
documents not analyzed in this study.   
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2000562, 2004563 and 2007564 annual economic reports, just as it also begins to 
apply the growth accounting methodology in this period.565 Likewise BS addresses 
the output gap.566 And in 2007, BmWi employs the methodology of growth 
accounting to isolate those variables perceived to be primarily responsible for 
what it terms Germany’s “prosperity gap” compared to the U.S.567   
11.2.2 Is Competitiveness about More than Growth?  
Some PROs, however, even question competitiveness understood as growth. In its 
annual economic report from 2000, SACH invokes a uniquely German concept 
when it argues that success in exports and growth is not sufficient for national 
“zukunftsfähigkeit,” a largely untranslatable wordplay on the German term for 
competitiveness (“wettbewerbsfähigkeit”).  
“Germany’s oft-cited ‘zukunftsfähigkeit’ is not secured by the fact that 
the economy presently exhibits export, increasing investment and 
production and decreasing unemployment. This does not automatically 
eliminate the structural weaknesses, which have burdened Germany’s 
economy for years. … Sustainability in the economic development is 
needed so that people can realize their interests and visions with regards 
to solid social security, a good education system and an environmental 
quality of high level.”568   
Similarly FES considers the appropriateness of measuring competitiveness in 
terms of growth. Although it contends competitiveness is best measured by GDP 
per capita, it holds that this is an incomplete picture. It is also necessary to include 
 
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562 SACH 2000, p. XIV. See also the discussion at p. 174, which addresses the underlying 
productive potential of the German economy without explicitly invoking the output-gap concept 
(AOT). 
563 SACH 2004, p. 152, p. 176, and p. 439 (AOT). 
564 SACH 2007, p. 3, pp. 63-68. See also the extensive discussion on pp. 439-455 (AOT). 
565  SACH 2000, p. 68. See also SACH 2007, pp. 439-455. But also see for instance 
Sachsverständigensrat Annual Economic Report 2002, Chapter 4, p. 205, for a very thorough 
account of the use of growth accounting in economic forecasting.  
566 BS 2007a, p. 19 and p. 100 (AOT). 
567 BmWI 2007, p. 20 (AOT). 
568 SACH 2000, p. 174 (AOT). 
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factors of the quality of life, which include “social and ecological factors.”569 It 
finds that one-sided strategies to enhance growth might come at the expense of the 
ecological environment as well as the social balance, integration and cohesion of 
the economy.570 Thus FES concludes that the  
“challenges of the German economy and society can only be overcome 
by strategies able to balance economic efficiency, social cohesion and 
ecologic sustainability.”571  
11.3 How Competitiveness Is Created: Sources 
As seen in the U.K., a long list of factors is perceived to constitute sources of 
competitiveness by German PROs. But where PROs in the U.K. at times analyze 
competitiveness as a neat, finite and clear set of sources572, in the German 
knowledge regime SACH is explicitly more hesitant and cautious (and sometimes 
even reluctant) to reduce competitiveness to simple formulas. In its annual 
economic report from 1993, it argues that 
“despite a big palette of imaginable indicators, the empirical 
ascertainability of international competitiveness is too fuzzy.”573  
Competitive strengths and weaknesses, it suggests, are “elusive categories. The 
determining factors are manifold and carry different weight and are occasionally 
not quantifiable.”574 And in a white paper addressing Germany’s competitiveness 
since 1994, it is claimed that it is impossible to obtain an “only halfway complete” 
account of the many aspects conducive to competitiveness. The question of 
competitiveness is not sufficiently answered by the examination of one indicator 
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569 FES 1998, p. 95 (AOT). 
570 FES 1998, p. 151, p. 21, p. 134 and p. 149 (AOT). 
571 FES 1998, p. 21. See also p. 122 (AOT). 
572 See p. 199 above. 
573 SACH 1993, p. 40 (AOT). 
574 SACH 1993, p. 249(AOT). 
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and “it is important to have an overall view of all the essential economic and 
societal factors which determine a country’s competitiveness.”575     
11.3.1 SOC I: Macroeconomic Stability 
German PROs also address a range of sources of competitiveness. First and 
foremost macroeconomic stability is treated as important SOC.576 BS, for instance, 
argues that  
“macro policies aimed at stable, low inflation and consolidation of 
public finances in international comparisons makes a contribution to 
growth which should not be underestimated.”577 
Yet, exactly what macroeconomic stability should be interpreted to mean and 
achieve is also debated within the German knowledge regime. As already seen, the 
shift to a internationalized and increasingly competitive international economy 
following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system is by some PROs believed to 
entail a necessary shift in macroeconomic policy orientation of governments vis-à-
vis economic policy.578  
However, not all PROs in the German knowledge regime find this to imply a 
complete reversion to supply-side economic policy. Most notably, BmWI in 2000 
explicitly contests SACH’s claim that only supply-side reforms constitute a viable 
economic policy in conditions of increasing international competition. In direct 
opposition, it makes clear that it  
“does not share the opinion of the Council, that the current employment 
crisis in Germany exclusively is attributable to dysfunctions in the 
market economic adjustment, and thus that supply-side policy 
consequently is the only effective policy. … Hence, the policy of the 
federal government focuses on both the supply and the demand side, as 
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575 BmWI 1994, p. 2 (AOT). 
576 BmWI 2007, p. 13, SACH 1993, pp. 17-18, SACH 2004, pp. 734-794 (AOT). 
577 BS 2007a, p. 95 (AOT). 
578 See p. 214 above.  
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does the policy in the countries with successful employment 
tendencies.” 579 
Thus, while German PROs perceive macroeconomic stability to constitute a 
necessary condition for competitiveness, some also discuss whether that is best 
achieved through supply-side reforms only.  
11.3.2 SOC II: Open Markets, Deregulation, Privatization 
and Taxes 
Thus, among the additional sources considered important for competitiveness is 
the tax regime. BmWI continuously makes reference to the importance of ensuring 
tax levels attractive enough to attract investments. In its annual economic report 
from 1993, it observes that other industrial nations have been improving their tax 
framework conditions at the expense of Germany580 and in 2007 it maintains this 
emphasis: 
“On Global markets with mobile production factors the tax burden on an 
investment is increasingly also determining the attractiveness of a 
location and the competitiveness of companies.”581 
BS argues that private investments constitute the key driver of growth and that an 
investment-friendly environment in particular characterized by low corporate 
taxes secures this.582 Also SACH discusses tax levels as a competitive factor in all 
of its annual economic reports.583  
However, SACH contends that low tax levels alone do not secure competitiveness. 
In its 2000, it states that  
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579  BmWI, 2000a, p. 83. The ministry repeats the commitment when it states that the 
government addresses unemployment with an approach that “reciprocally improves the supply- 
and the demand-side of the economy.” See p. 17 (AOT). 
580 BmWI 1993, p. 16. See also 1993b, p. 13 and p. 41 (AOT). 
581 BmWI 2007, p. 31; see also p. 9 (AOT). 
582 BS 2007a, p. 95 (AOT). 
583 SACH 1993, p. 252, SACH 2000, p. 172, SACH 2004, pp. 748-767, SACH 2007, p. 270 
(AOT). 
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“the Sachsverständigensrat has always pointed out that the investment 
conditions of an economy relevant to international competition involves 
more than just the tax system. Again it must be emphasized how 
counterproductive it would be to leave labor markets too rigid, 
educational systems inefficient and the regulatory density too high.”584 
Also, BS points out that taxes do not solely have detrimental effects upon 
investments and competitiveness as, for example, the taxes are used to finance 
public investments in infrastructure which will benefit firms. 585 
Liberalized, deregulated and privatized markets are also discussed as sources of 
competitiveness. SACH, in its 1993 annual report, states that it for a long time has 
advocated a “policy of opening markets,”586 underlining that  
“all markets as far as possible are opened to competition, that market 
regulations constraining competition, apart from a few justified cases, 
disappears, that the states’ own economic activity in all respects is rolled 
back through privatization, by which more can be enacted through 
dynamic competition.”587  
Also BmWI recognizes the need for increased deregulation of markets and 
privatization of former public enterprises in all of its annual economic reports.588 
11.3.3 SOC III: Flexible Labor Market 
In the German knowledge regime, PROs also discuss the relative flexibility of the 
domestic labor market as a significant factor of competitiveness. For instance, 
BmWI in its annual economic report from 2000 argues that a wage policy 
governed by reliability and predictability “constitutes an indispensable 
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584 SACH 2000, p. 182 (AOT). 
585 BS 2007a, p. 41 (AOT). 
586 SACH 1993, p. 253 (AOT). 
587 SACH 1993, pp. 201-202 (AOT). 
588 BmWI 1993, p. 21, BmWI 2000, p. 42, and BmWI 2007, p. 29. In 1993, BmWI moreover 
argues that “experience home and abroad reveals” that public enterprises are less efficient, less 
economic and slower than private enterprises. That is, competitive markets are considered to be 
more economically efficient than public bureaucracies, to the advantage of consumers, just as 
state intervention in the form of price regulations or subsidies are described as introducing “false 
incentives” into the market. See BmWI 1993b, p. 35 (AOT). 
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precondition for the securement of competitiveness.”589 SACH continuously refers 
to the labor market as an important source of competitiveness590, just as labor 
markets stand in the center of the BS report Benchmarking Deutschland.591  
Indeed, all German PROs allude to Germany’s poor employment record as a 
central economic challenge. In 2000, BmWI contended that low growth and high 
unemployment remains the main challenge.592 In the same year, SACH applauds 
the government for elevating unemployment to the central economic policy 
task.593  
BS observes that the problem of unemployment is worse in Germany than 
elsewhere594 and engages in a detailed, comprehensive discussion of the current 
travails of Germany’s labor market. The poor employment performance, according 
to BS, stems from a too densely regulated labor market, one with too high direct 
as well as indirect labor costs595 as well as low level of wage differentiation, too 
generous opportunities for workers to withdraw from the labor market and too low 
average annual working hours as well as insufficient opportunities to organize 
working hours more flexibly.   
In particular the dense regulation of the German labor market is perceived as 
barrier to job creation as it mitigates against unemployed gaining foothold and 
thus generates a dualized labor market of “insiders” and “outsiders.”596 Thus the 
report observes “an unambiguous relation” between densities of labor market 
regulation and employment, where higher regulation reduces employment 
 
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589 BmWI 2000a, p. 14 (AOT). 
590 SACH 2004, p. 467 (AOT). 
591 BS 2007a, p. 15 (AOT). 
592 BmWI 2000a, p. 10. See also BmWI, 1993, p. 2 (AOT). 
593 SACH 2000, pp. 174-175 (AOT). 
594 BS 2007a, pp. 11-12 (AOT). 
595 BS 2007a, p. 42 (AOT). 
596 BS 2007a, p. 26 (AOT). 
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prospects.597 BS likewise considers average wage levels as well as the level of 
wage dispersion prevailing in Germany problematic. The comparably higher 
German average wage levels598 and the compressed wage structure599 are blamed 
for the bleak employment prospects of the lesser qualified.600 Again BS observes a 
positive relation between high degrees of wage dispersion and employment 
growth.601 
Other PROs observe similar relationships. BmWI and SACH both observe an 
inverse relation between average wage levels, relative wage dispersion and job 
creation. This implies that wage growth in excess of productivity can only come at 
the expense of additional jobs. In 1993, the BmWI called for responsibility on 
behalf of the social partners for achieving wage growth in alignment with 
productivity growth to allow for job creation.602  
Likewise SACH argues that the social partners—in particular the unions—are 
confronted with a policy choice between job creation and wages increases. 
Therefore SACH encourages wage negotiators to steer a course where “average 
increases in wages remain below the productivity growth in the medium term.”603 
11.3.3.1 Metrics of Competitiveness II: Growth Accounting 
The importance ascribed to labor markets by German PROs becomes further 
evident by the way the economic metric of growth accounting is applied. Where in 
 
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597 BS 2007a, p. 27. To bolster this point, the relative regulatory density in Germany is 
compared to that of the Netherlands, Denmark and the U.S., which all, albeit due to different 
institutional features, are examples of less-regulated labor markets and stronger employment 
records. For example, it is argued, that the high share of SMEs in Denmark might explain the 
greater need for more flexible regulation of employments and dismissals (AOT). 
598 BS 2007a, pp. 54-56 (AOT). 
599 BS 2007a, p. 42(AOT). 
600 BS 2007a, p. 13 (AOT). 
601 BS 2007a, p. 24 (AOT). 
602 BmWI 1993a p. 17, BmWI 1993b, p. 13, BmWI, 2000, p. 14 (AOT). 
603 SACH 1993, p. 23, SACH, 2000, p. 177, as well as pp. 213-217 for similar statements 
(AOT). 
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the British knowledge regime the main growth challenge was perceived to be a 
comparatively poor domestic performance in terms productivity growth604, this is 
not perceived to trouble Germany. The high productivity of German firms is, on 
the contrary, believed to be a distinct national competitive advantage. In 1993 
SACH observed that Germany was outperforming other nations in terms of 
productivity: “Measured as GDP per employed only a few countries display a 
higher productivity level.”605 
Germany’s challenge is different. In its annual economic report from 2007, SACH 
devotes an entire analytical appendix to growth accounting. SACH suggests that 
Germany’s potential growth rate can be decomposed into six components: capital 
stock, “technological improvements,” share of population of working age 
(“Bevölkerung im erwerbsfähigen Alter”), labor force participation rate  
(“Partizipationsquote”), employment rate (“Beschäftigungs-quote) and working 
hours per employed (“Stunde je Erwerbstätigen”).606 SACH finds that capital 
stock, technological progress and the labor force participation rate contribute to 
the growth potential, while the share of the population of working age and annual 
average working hours per employed have reduced it. The employment rate 
reduces growth potential from 1991 to 2000 but then increases it.    
In 2007, BmWI also applied the growth accounting methodology, if in a less fine-
grained form. It argues that growth stems from the  
“combination of labor, capital and technical progress. The more work is 
performed, and the more efficiently it is done, the greater will be the 
result. In Germany the total number of hours worked since 1991 has 
 
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604 See p. 188 above. 
605 SACH 1993, p. 250 (AOT). Similarly BS observes that, despite the structural problems, 
Germany is still among the richest countries in the world, due to its highly adaptable industrial 
basis, which delivers competitive goods and services with high levels of productivity. See BS 
2007a, p. 7. 
606 SACH, 2007, p 451, See pp. 439-455 for the full discussion of how the production potential 
is estimated by SACH (AOT). 
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fallen continuously. Too few people are integrated in working life. Too 
many of those who are looking for work remain unemployed for a long 
time or even permanently. The prosperity gap to other industrial 
countries in past years is mainly due to this lower input of labor.”607     
Again the potential growth rate of Germany is perceived to fall behind comparable 
countries due to a lower labor supply, lower employment rate and lower average 
annual working hours.  
In fact German PROs regularly direct attention to the challenge of declining 
average working hours as well as an aging population. BmWI, in its 1993 white 
paper, suggests that the weekly and lifetime working hours are low compared to 
other nations.608 SACH similarly emphasizes this issue in its annual economic 
reports from 1993609 and in 2004 it observes that, while Germany has kept pace in 
terms of productivity, it has from a comparative perspective fallen behind in terms 
of working hours.610  
BS introduces an additional temporal distinction by which it discerns two distinct 
approaches to labor market policies. The two approaches, it is claimed, have been 
predominant in two different periods. “In the past,” BS argues, several countries 
(including Germany) have addressed unemployment problems “through various 
labor market and social-political instruments which reduce the labor supply” such 
as overly generous early retirement policies.611 By this, unemployment rates fell 
but not as a result of increases in employment. But such an approach BS believes 
has lost viability “for the present” due to the dire fiscal consequences of 
transferring an increasing share of the population out of the labor market.612 Hence 
 
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607 BmWI 2007, p. 20 (AOT). 
608 BmWI 1993b, p. 5, p. 10, pp. 32-33 and p. 45. In the U.S., annual working hours are found to 
be 15% higher (AOT). 
609 SACH 1993, p. 245 (AOT). 
610 SACH 2004 (English edition), pp. 48-49. 
611 BS 2007a, p. 5 (AOT). 
612 See p. 227 above. 
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BS instead favors an approach based on instruments that make it less attractive for 
workers to withdraw from the labor markets and which increase the opportunities 
for firms to increase working hours as well as plan working time more flexibly.613   
11.4 Before and After the New Economy 
As in the U.K., in Germany competitiveness is perceived to be about more than 
taxes, open markets and flexible labor markets. And similarly, the German PROs 
assert another temporal distinction by which they distinguish between different 
stages in the international competition of nations.  
In 2000, BmWI found the U.S. economy to “have led many observers to speak of 
a new economy.” The U.S., it claims, has demonstrated a “high dynamic” and 
“practically full employment“ due to flexible labor and product markets as well 
innovation within ICT.614  
Also SACH in 2000 pays “special attention” to the new economy615 and devotes 
an entire chapter to the topic. The council suggests economic policy faces a “new 
challenge” in the “deep-rooted economic and technical transformation” associated 
with “the concept new economy,”616 which it explains as follows: 
“The new results from the fact that now, due to the availability of cross-
cutting technology through digital networks, market participants … in 
principle are allowed to simultaneously communicate with each other 
without temporal or spatial restrictions at extremely low costs. … The 
transparency of the market is thus heightened enormously. … The 
competition thus approaches the model of perfect competition.”617 
SACH also observes that “new economy” also is invoked in the public debate to 
express “hope and expectations” that the aggregate productive potential of 
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613 BS 2007a, p. 42 (AOT). 
614 BmWI, 2000a, pp. 11-12 (AOT). 
615 SACH 2000, p. XV. See also pp. 127-145 and pp. 182-186 (AOT). 
616 SACH, 2000, p. 1 (AOT) 
617 Ibid. p. 182 (AOT) 
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advanced economies has increased permanently given the emergence and 
diffusion of ICT. 618  SACH observes that the “increasing efficiency and 
productivity” of the U.S. economy “improves the chances for a steady 
development of production and employment with high capacity utilization without 
inflationary tensions.”619 In particular the latter effect—that productivity increases 
apparently curb inflationary pressures—has the interest of SACH, as it finds that  
“beneath the productivity increase the peculiarity of the New Economy 
seems to be that the traditional conflict between the goal of stability and 
the goal of employment can be disarmed (“Entschärft”).620 
German PROs, also on a par with their U.K. counterparts, present the shift as a 
change in international competition, in particular with regard to the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for competitiveness.  
Several PROs point out how international competition in human-capital, 
knowledge-intensive production has intensified. 621 FES claims that 
"for a research economy (“Forschungsstandort”) the presence of a 
qualified workforce is of paramount importance. Of ever greater concern 
is that the willingness of German firms to invest in education decrease. 
… With the growing mobility of research and human capital knowledge 
acquisition, an efficient educational system and lead markets become 
still more important.”622 
Similarly SACH in 2000 finds the competition in markets for technology-intensive 
products has intensified.623  
 
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618 I.e. the contention, that due to its inherent competition-enhancing and market-correcting 
features (i.e. by levelling out information-asymmetries in markets to allegedly near-perfect 
equal distribution of market knowledge) the economy will experience a permanent boost in 
growth potential from the emergence of IC-technology – not only from that sector itself (hard- 
and software production) but from that technologies transference to all other sectors of the 
economy (AOT) 
619 Ibid. p. 183 (AOT) 
620 Ibid. P. 143 (AOT) 
621 BMWI, 2007, p. 16. See also p. 10, 27 and 37 (AOT) 
622 FES, 1998, p. 104, see also p. 119 (AOT) 
623 SACH, 2000, p. 181 (AOT) 
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11.4.1 SOC III: Education, Science, Innovation, 
Entrepreneurship and Infrastructure 
Thus German PROs address an additional set of sources of competitiveness First, 
a highly skilled workforce and well-functioning educational institutions are by all 
PROs considered important. BmWI, in all of its annual economic reports, stresses 
how a high level of education of the workforce counts among the competitive 
advantages of an economy.624 And in its white paper published in 2000, it is 
characteristically claimed “that Germany’s most important raw material is the 
competences and skills of its people.”625 SACH in 2004 noted that 
“Human capital is a key factor for future growth in Germany and the 
welfare of every individual. To ensure that it is available of sufficient 
quantity, a high-performing education system is indispensable.”626 
Similarly FES627 and BS emphasize the importance of the education system to 
competitiveness. In particular BS stresses how a highly educated workforce can 
increase average productivity, growth and competitiveness and furthermore how 
Germany’s dual educational system serves as “an international role model”628  
Also science, technology and innovation are considered important.629 For instance, 
BmWI in 2000 claimed that “the conditions for innovation and technological 
progress must be improved, if the process of globalization and path to the 
knowledge society is to be mastered.”630 Likewise BS emphasizes that 
 
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624 BMWI, 1993a, p. 20, BMWI, 2000a, p. 49-52; BMWI, 2007 p. 53. BMWI 1993b p. 17 
(AOT) 
625 BMWI, 2000b, p. 34, see also p. 47 
626 SACH 2004, p. 35 (AOT) 
627 FES, 1998, p. 130. (AOT) 
628 BS, 2007a, pp. 47-49 (AOT) 
629 BmWI 1993a, p. 32, BmWI 1993b, p. 16, BmWI 2000b, p. 17, BmWI 2007, p. XX, SACH, 
1993, p. 261, SACH 2000, p. 181, SACH, 2004, p. 464, FES, 1998, pp. 97-105. 
630 BmWI 2000a, p. 50 (AOT). 
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 “the system of innovation as an important precondition for international 
competitiveness and sustained economic growth.”631 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (“Mittelstand”) are also considered 
important.632 BmWI finds that such firms contribute to the competitiveness of 
Germany through their high levels of innovation and flexibility.633 And likewise 
physical infrastructure is discussed as an important parameter of 
competitiveness.634 
11.4.1.1 Price Competitiveness and Quality Competitiveness 
Not only has price-sensitive competition in labor-intensive production increased, 
quality-sensitive competition has also gained in strength and thus a new set of 
economic factors comes across as increasingly important. SACH contends that 
“human capital is the pacemaker (“Schrittmacher”) in the knowledge and 
information society”635 and that “new economy first and foremost poses new 
challenges in terms of education and the adaptability of employees.”636 
As observed in the British knowledge regime, PROs in the German knowledge 
regime likewise invoke a distinction between price and nonprice competitiveness. 
On the one hand the general price level (as determined by direct and indirect wage 
costs, tax levels) of the factors of production is deemed important. BS claims that 
“The costs of the different production factors, which firms employ, are a 
significant competitive factor. To these in first line belong costs of the 
factor work and the tax burden for firms.”637 
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
631 Bertelsmann, p. 46 (AOT). 
632 SACH 2000, p. 135 (AOT). 
633 BmWI 1993, p. 29, BmWI 2000b, p. 15, BS 2007a, pp. 44-45 (AOT). 
634 SACH 1993, p. 18, SACH 2004, p. 464, FES 1998, p. 130, BS 2007a, p. 7, p. 41, BmWI 
2000, p. 53 (AOT). 
635 SACH 2000, p. 7(AOT). 
636 SACH 2000, p. 1 (AOT). 
637 BS 2007a, p. 41(AOT). 
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SACH in 1993 argued that price competitiveness stems from the exchange rate 
and unit labor costs.638 In 1994, BmWI considered unit labor costs and the size of 
the public budget to be important determinants of competitiveness.639   
However, besides this emphasis on prices and labor costs, BmWI in a white paper 
from 1993 urges economic policymakers to take more than “hard” quantitative 
economic factors into account: 
“Beneath these cost-relevant figures qualitative factors 
(“Standortfaktoren”) play a still more important role for firms’ decisions 
on where to locate. These include a positive climate for the 
establishment and the expansion of industrial production, openness to 
technology and appropriate support from the public administration, in 
particular fast administrative decisions.”640 
Also SACH prompts caution not solely to emphasize factor prices since the 
structure of the German export sector is concentrated in investment goods:  
“The majority of German exports belongs to high technology goods, in 
which price is the not the decisive purchase criterion; crucial for these 
goods are rather factors such as the features and quality of the 
manufactured product.”641   
FES is the most vocal critic of reducing competitiveness to a question of price. It 
distinguishes between two “pathways to growth” as a response to “the problem of 
globalization and competition.” It terms these a “cost reduction strategy and a 
“consistent growth strategy,” respectively. The former, FES argues, constitutes 
“the position of firms and associations as well as individual politicians, 
which emphasize the imperative to reduce social benefits, reductions of 
wages and diminishment of public expenditure. As increasing 
globalization leads to a direct comparability of different economies 
production conditions, an adaptation at a lower cost level is required.”642 
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638 SACH 1993, p. 166 (AOT). 
639 BmWI 1994, p. 2 (AOT). 
640 BmWI 1993b, p. 11 (AOT). 
641 SACH 1993, p. 168 and p. 261(AOT). 
642 FES 1998, p. 76 (AOT). 
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FES, however, opposes such a strategy. First, reminiscent of SACH, it suggests 
that costs are not the most important indicator for German firms inasmuch as “the 
majority of German firms are not engaged in price but in quality competition.”643 
Rather than costs, the “competitiveness of an economy is largely determined by its 
technological prowess,” which allows firms to compete in markets for high-priced 
quality goods as well increase their productivity.644 Second, a cost-based growth 
strategy can only be successful in the short term, since in a market as integrated as 
the European Inner Market, other nations follows suit and re-level their costs. 
Third, wage restraints more likely constrain domestic consumption and demand, 
hence inhibiting growth as well as a firm’s expectations of future growth.645  
Hence, FES deems the cost-reduction strategy “mistaken,”646 labeling it a “false 
truth” in public debate.647 Instead, FES proposes a “consistent growth strategy,”648 
which builds upon, modifies and extends the traditional “advantages of the Modell 
Deutschland.” 649  In particular, it would aim to “remove all obstacles to 
investment”650 through the “renewal and further development of the institutional 
and material infrastructure,” 651  where “the state assumes a role in the 
modernization of the production site.”652  
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643 FES 1998, p. 125 (AOT). 
644 FES 1998, p. 98 (AOT). 
645 FES 1998, p. 126. See also p. 98. Specifically, it argues that it is in no sense clear that the 
positive effects of increased investments and export gains will fully outweigh and supersede the 
negative impulses to aggregate demand from a reduction of costs and wages. (AOT). 
646 FES 1998, p. 127 (AOT). 
647 FES 1998, p. 76 (AOT). 
648 FES 1998, pp. 129-134 (AOT). 
649 FES 1998, p. 118 (AOT). 
650 FES 1998, p. 20 (AOT). 
651 FES 1998, p. 129 (AOT). 
652 FES 1998, P. 130 (AOT). 
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But this is not the last word. In its 2007 annual economic report, BmWI claims 
that countries formerly characterized by low-cost, low-productivity and labor-
intensive production begin to engage in high-value-added production.  
“China, India and other emerging economies are successfully 
penetrating international markets. They are increasingly offering higher 
quality goods at attractive prices, and they have developed into major 
participants in the world economy and in international trade and capital 
transactions. International competition has become more intense and 
fierce.”653 
In fact SACH already in 1993 observed that “still more competitors enhance their 
supply range with products of high-quality standards.”654 FES shares the view of 
BmWI and SACH. Having first denounced the idea of price competition, it 
nonetheless argues that if a nation falls behind in terms of innovation and human 
capital formation, price competition might eventually catch up with quality 
competition with the advent of the new economy and the herewith-associated ease 
with which knowledge, human capital and technology can move between 
countries:  
“Price competitiveness can play a big role in the growth phase of 
various innovation goods. With decreasing technological 
competitiveness due to lack of innovation, price competition 
prevails.”655  
Thus, price might “again” become a decisive competitive factor if investments are 
not made in innovation and education, and if the German economy does not adapt 
to a new form of competition, then price competition might catch up with quality.  
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653 BmWI 2007, p. 15 (AOT). 
654 SACH 1993, p. 250, SACH 2000, p. 181 (AOT). 
655 FES 1998, p. 91 (AOT). 
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11.4.2 SOC IV: Migration, ICT and Public Sector 
Yet, as in the U.K., the list of sources perceived as important to competitiveness 
grows in the German knowledge regime. Some PROs draw attention to the 
positive contribution of increased migration to Germany.656 BmWI in 2007 argued 
that  
“The immigration of skilled labor from abroad can also help to ease the 
shortage of skilled workers in certain areas and reduce the decline in the 
number in employment due to demographic causes. Immigrant highly 
qualified personnel can stimulate economic growth. … An active 
integration policy is essential. It serves both to increase social cohesion 
and strengthen Germany economically.”657    
In the same line, SACH in 2000 suggested that a part of a “future-oriented” labor-
market policy consists of modern immigration policy to enhance labor supply.658 
At times PROs suggest that the quality of the public sector is becoming a factor of 
competitiveness. Again BmWI serves as an example.  
“An efficient and well-functioning public sector combined with sound 
public finances is essential for growth, innovation and employment. … 
The organizational structure of our state and the processes in the public 
administration need to be made more flexible to be able to react in time 
to changes. In a rapidly changing internationalized economy that is 
increasingly becoming the decisive factor in business decisions.”659   
Likewise the general uptake of ICT in skills and production processes is, in light 
of the shift to a new economy, likewise argued to be important to international 
competitiveness by PROs such as SACH and BmWI.660  
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656 BmWI 1993, p. 8 (AOT).  
657 BmWI 2007, p. 44 (AOT). 
658 SACH 2000, p. 7 and p. 186 (AOT). 
659 BmWI 2007, p. 23 (AOT). 
660 SACH 2000, pp. 180- 186, BmWI 2007, p. 39. 
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11.4.2.1 Metrics of Competitiveness III: Competitiveness Indicators 
Hence in Germany the number of sources also enhances over time, rendering the 
picture of competitiveness increasingly complex. However, where the economic 
ministry in the U.K. engages with such complexity through its competitiveness 
index661, the BmWI in Germany abstains from such a practice. This does not 
imply, however, that no indexes emerge in the German knowledge regime. In 
2004, BS commenced the publication of its Internationales Standort Ranking.662 
In the introduction, the PRO motivates the publication: 
“International comparisons become still more important for the political 
discussion of structural reforms of the labor market and social state. … 
The international comparative analysis of different labor market models 
and welfare systems encourages national decision makers to domestic 
structural reforms in two ways. First, by the success of particular 
countries the public perceives a pressure to level differences, enhance 
strengths and eliminate weaknesses. Furthermore, the solution space 
(“Lösungsraum”) for reforms is extended by the international 
comparative perspective, by feeding additional approaches already 
proven abroad into the policy debate, which can be used in the design of 
reforms in a domestic context.”663 
Thus in this index Germany is compared with 20 OECD countries on a range of 
benchmarks. As with its U.K. counterpart, the German index is composed of a set 
of outcome indicators and a set of input indicators. The outcome indicators 
measure GDP per capita, growth potential, and unemployment rate and 
employment growth.664 The input indicators consist of 12 economic indicators 
categorized in three groups665:  “labor market,” containing indicators of long-term 
unemployment, youth unemployment, old age unemployment and labor market 
participation rate; “business cycle and state,” containing indicators of the public 
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661 See p. 201 above. 
662 A second edition was published in 2007.  
663 BS 2007b, p. 7 (AOT). 
664 BS 2004, p. 14 (AOT). 
665 BS 2004, pp. 19-20 (AOT). 
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budget’s share of GDP, state debt, marginal tax and social contribution rate 
(“Grenzabgabenbelastung”) 666 ; and “business cycle and economy and wage 
negotiation partners,” containing indicators of total investments as a share of 
GDP, part-time employment, wage restraints and strike quote.   
Thus when compared with the U.K. index, this German variety puts much more 
emphasis upon labor market indicators and macroeconomic indicators but omits 
indicators of, for example, education, science and migration.  
Yet, the absence of a competitiveness index published by a public (or for that 
matter semi-public) PRO does not mean that this type of publication has slipped 
their attention. Quite the contrary. SACH extensively discusses the accuracy and 
utility of these indexes. In its annual economic report from 2004, the council 
expressed a highly skeptical attitude to their value as knowledge basis for 
economic policymaking: 
“In relation to these indicator-based approaches some fundamental 
methodological difficulties should be pointed out. That is, the selection 
of indicators applied in these studies is not theory-free and not divorced 
from subjective and normative considerations. Therefore, the position of 
a country in an index depends significantly upon the way individual 
indicators have been aggregated. In sum, skepticism is well placed 
against such studies.”667 
11.4.3 SOC V: Environmental and Social Inclusion 
Nor in the case of Germany does everything come to be counted as a source of 
competitiveness. As in the U.K., PROs address whether policy measures to 
increase environmental protection or social inclusion, equality, protection and 
cohesion constitute an impediment to or an improvement of international 
competitiveness.  
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11.4.3.1 Environmental Protection as Source of Competitiveness?   
First the case of environmental protection. BmWI in all of its annual economic 
reports addresses the relationship between competitiveness and environmental 
protection. In its annual economic report from 1993, it argued that a social market 
economy requires stronger attention to “the interdependence of climate and 
economic politics,”668 but also that environmental problems ought to be addressed 
at the international level to “mitigate too strong disturbances to competition.”  
The Zukunftssicherung white paper suggests that in the “long-run” firms and the 
economy might benefit from a transition to a more environmentally friendly mode 
of production: 
“In the social market economy environmental protection provides an 
opportunity for developing an efficient, future-oriented economy. ... In 
the long run a preventive environmental policy saves state and firms the 
costs caused by the use and damage to the environment, creates 
competitive advantages in the field of environmental technology and 
promotes the necessary long-term transition to a more environmentally 
friendly and resource-saving circuit economy  (“Kreislaufwirtchaft”).669 
Subsequently the federal government urges policymakers as well as market 
participants not to consider environmental protection strictly as “zero-sum game” 
between the environment and competitiveness.  
Even so in the white paper it is nonetheless contended that measures to protect the 
environment  
“should, however, simultaneously be designed as environmentally 
effective and economically efficient, so that it does not overreach the 
economy. Important measures to protect the environment should be 
pursued through international coordination and take conditions of 
competition into account.”670  
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668 BMWI, 1993a, p. 33 (AOT) 
669 BMWI, 1993b, p. 59 (AOT) 
670 BmWI 1993b, p. 19 and p. 28  (AOT). 
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One and a half decades later, the BmWI changes position. Now it finds that 
measures to protect the environment through more energy-efficient production 
processes constitute a source of competitiveness. In a discussion of globalization 
in 2007, BmWI furthermore suggested that the 
“global thrust in industrialization and growth are causing rising demand 
for resources and rising raw material prices. German firms must adjust 
to this. For a country poor in raw materials like Germany that is an 
opportunity. Production using fewer resources will help to increase 
industrial competitiveness. Moreover, German industry is best placed to 
strengthen its traditional lead in environmental technology even 
further.”671 
But the issue is also addressed outside the pages of the BmWI’s annual economic 
reports and white papers. As seen above, FES also addresses different pathways to 
growth. In contrast to BmWI, FES considers environmental sustainability as a 
distinct and inherently desirable policy outcome and moreover that improvement 
in terms of one comes at the detriment to the other.672 Indeed, what is most notable 
is FES’s view that the goals of social cohesion and environmental sustainability 
are perceived to be in conflict with the goals of achieving growth. In particular it 
claims that  
“It is clear that the rigorous pursuit of one goal without regard for the 
others impedes that goal itself. … In reality and in the political 
weighting trade-offs between these components are normal.”673  
On this basis, FES proposes a policy approach which takes into account and 
balances these three apparently irreconcilable policy goals. This is reflected in the 
very title of the report: “Drei Ziele, Ein Weg” (“Three Goals, One Way”).  
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671 BmWI 2007 p. 20 (AOT). See also BmWI 2007 p. 11, pp. 44-45, BmWI 2000a, p. 30.  
672 FES 1998, p. 21, p. 95, p. 134 and p. 151.   
673 FES 1998,  p. 21, p. 122 and p. 146 (AOT). 
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11.4.3.2 Social Inclusion as a Source of Competitiveness?  
Also the relation between social protection, inclusion, cohesion and equality and 
international competitiveness is addressed. For instance BS considers the extent to 
which measures to ensure social inclusion and security as well as a degree of 
equality and welfare impedes or improves growth prospects. It finds that such 
measures have an “ambivalent character.” On the one hand, these ensure that 
lesser successful market participants do not “immediately fall into a bottomless 
pit” and thus consolidates public acceptance of a market economic system. On the 
other hand, social welfare and inclusion comes at a cost, and thus economic policy 
ought to balance social justice and economic efficiency:  
“Financing through taxes and duties, depending on their configuration, 
reduces the incentives to save, to invest or to work. This effect dampens 
growth (Okun 1975). The goal of economic policy must be to achieve 
the societally desired level of justice with the greatest possible 
efficiency.”674 
In the Zukunftssichering white paper, a social market economy is perceived to be 
the “most successful socioeconomic order” 675  due to the high degree of 
coordination and collaboration between labor and capital. This builds social peace 
and is considered a “wichtiger Bestimmungsfaktor für die Standortattraktivität.”676 
As such, “market economic efficiency and social balance stand in a 
complementary relationship (“Wechselverhältnis”).677 BmWI nuances this view 
somewhat in its annual economic report from 2007, which also addresses the 
concept of a social market economy: 
“In a social market economy growth, innovation and employment are 
interrelated with social and environmental policy aims. On the one side 
economic success provides the financial basis of environmental 
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674 BS 2007a, pp. 24-25 (AOT). 
675 BmWI 1993b, p. 11 (AOT). 
676 BmWI 1993b, p. 10 and p. 38 (AOT). 
677 BmWI 1993b, p. 10 (AOT). 



&()
protection and social security. On the other secure supply of existential 
goods—like energy, raw materials and a clean environment—
contributes to social security and individual commitment, helping people 
to identify with the economic and social system. They are at the same 
time important factors in sustained economic growth.”678   
Thus, even if the government stops short of explicitly suggesting that social 
inclusion and security also might be perceived as a source of competitiveness and 
economic efficiency, it nonetheless goes halfway with an argument for the 
mutuality and compatibility of the three policy goals of growth, environmental 
protection and social cohesion. 
Even so, BmWI in the same report nonetheless observes limits to distribution and 
maintains that 
“Even when competitiveness is increasing, earning must precede 
distribution. Germany’s competitiveness by international comparison 
must be increased and the dynamic of the domestic market strengthened 
to increase the chances of work and prosperity for each and every 
individual.”679 
And the white paper makes clear that “limits of social politics are drawn” where 
social policies and income distribution come to endanger macroeconomic 
performance.680   
Similarly, SACH often discusses the economic efficiency of the social market 
economy. In its annual economic report from 2000, it discusses different 
inequality indicators to assess whether Germany has become a less-social social 
market economy. SACH finds inequality to have risen but not substantially. Even 
so SACH reminds critics of growing inequality, that too much redistribution 
distorts economic efficiency: 
 

678 BmWI 2007, p. 19 (AOT).  
679 BmWI 2007, p. 13 (AOT). 
680 BmWI 1993, p. 11 (AOT). 
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“An excessive redistributive policy stands in conflict with the goal of 
growth because the driving forces of economy and society become 
paralyzed. The Sachsverstädigensrat in these findings sees no indication 
of the erosion of the social in our market economy.”681   
Thus neither SACH, BS nor BmWI find that competitiveness and social protection 
can be enhanced simultaneously and constitute mutually reinforcing factors. 682 
11.4.4 The Role of Government in the New Economy 
11.4.4.1 Correction of Market Failures 
As in the U.K., the PROs in Germany perceive the new economy and herewith-
associated new stage of international competition to entail changes in the role of 
states vis-à-vis markets.  
BS notes the market failures in education, science and infrastructure:  
“The creation of new knowledge, which primarily depends on basic 
research, is associated with the difficulty, that such knowledge in 
principle can be freely transferred. Hence, the social returns on new 
knowledge are greater than private returns. Absent corrections by the 
state, this would lead to an undersupply of new knowledge. … A similar 
situation applies in the formation of human capital. Positive external 
effects emerge particularly in the case of school education but also 
vocational training.”683   
BmWI also recognizes that market failures (negative externalities684) are likely to 
be present in the sphere of environmental policy and on this basis suggests that 
strong regulation (“Ordnungsrecht”) might be utilized to engender the necessary 
behavioral change in market participants.685 
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681 SACH 2000, p. 176 (AOT). 
682 Recall also that FES found social cohesion and growth to constitute two independent, 
mutually incompatible goals.  
683 BS 2007a, p. 95 (AOT). 
684 Understood as instances of market transactions in which the parties to a transaction do not 
adequately price and take into account the adverse effects of that transaction on the surrounding 
environment and third parties.  
685 BmWI 1993a, p. 33 (AOT). 
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But all PROs do not uncritically embrace the idea of market failures. In particular 
SACH discusses the theoretical possibility of market failures but quickly 
dismisses the option. While SACH believes it to be “shortsighted, if firms with 
reference to a high cost pressure, decreased their training activities,”686 and thus 
does perceive a role for the state to intervene in the market to finance basic science 
and facilitate knowledge transfer from scientific institutions to SMEs and 
investments in education.687 It however questions whether the state should do 
more than that. SACH finds it rare that market failures in fact are present.  
“The Sachverständigensrat has repeatedly argued in favor of a policy of 
market opening. ... We maintain this view. Most market regulations are 
not economically well justified. Strictly speaking, if one ignores 
redistributive goals, there is only need for statist regulation when the 
market or the competition fails, that is, when no efficient steering of 
supply and demand and the use of productive factors can take place. 
Examples of this are natural monopolies, external effects that could 
ensue from production or consumption, problems of unequal distribution 
of information between market participants or the risks of contract-
violating, opportunistic behavior by one party to a contract. However, as 
numerous studies have shown, there are only a few cases in which such 
special market conditions obtain.”688   
Thus, SACH accepts market failures in theory but remains skeptical as to whether 
market failures in fact occur in practice.689 
11.4.4.2 Conversion of Mindsets  
Moreover the new competitive conditions are by some PROs perceived as a 
broadening of government’s approach to markets. Where the state in its effort to 
liberalize markets and correct market failures intervenes in the market to establish 
expedient frameworks of incentives for market participants, with the new 
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686 SACH 1993, p. 251(AOT).  
687 SACH 1993, p. 261 (AOT). 
688 SACH 1993, p. 253 (AOT). 
689 SACH 2000, p. 183 (AOT). 
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economy PROs also perceive the role of the state to entail the inducement of 
certain attitudes, culture, values and inclinations in market actors.  
In the Zukunftssicherung white paper from 1994, the quality of Germany’s 
Standort is found to rely on more than macro and microeconomic framework 
conditions:  
“Standort Deutschland is not only about designing the macroeconomic 
framework conditions, about costs and prices, about expenditure and 
incomes of firms, citizens and state, but also about the openness and 
adaptability of society to new developments and challenges. The 
economy is embedded in the society. It creates the material basis for 
human beings. These in turn are the actors of all economic activity. 
Their attitude, their motivation, their qualification, their customs and 
virtues, their traditions and expectations have an immeasurable long-
term impact upon economic activity.”690 
With a similar emphasis, BmWI in its annual economic report from 2000 
underlines the importance of inducing particular mindsets into market participants:   
“People’s attitude towards entrepreneurship as vocation is changing. 
Today, every second a German school leaver takes self-employment into 
consideration. The Federal Government supports the process not only 
through the promotion of start-ups, but also by anchoring 
entrepreneurship stronger in the education and training system.”691    
And also in 2007, BmWI claims that “in a constantly changing world, and with an 
ageing population” education must take the form of lifelong learning. But such an 
approach, it argues, “requires a change in attitudes, especially in compatnies.”692   
SACH in 2000 contends that if Germany is to seize the opportunities of the new 
economy, more new German high-tech firms must be established. But this in turn 
depends upon the cognitive predispositions, in particular the attitude toward risk, 
in the population: 
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690 BmWI, 1993b, p. 22 (AOT). 
691 BmWI 2000a, p. 46  (AOT). 
692 BmWI 2007, p. 53 (AOT). 
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“Whether companies are founded and innovative projects invested in 
depend primarily on the risk appetite of market participants. This is ... in 
this country lower than in the United States. The degree of risk appetite 
in a country is on the one hand culturally determined, but can on the 
other hand be influenced by legal and other conditions.”693 
11.4.4.3 Coordination of Market Activities  
The task of improving competitiveness is not perceived to be the state’s 
responsibility alone. Other political, market and societal actors are considered to 
have a role as well.  
FES  considers whether states have lost the ability to maneuver as a consequence 
of increasing international competition  globalization.694 But it denies that states 
have lost “Steurerungsfähigkeit” with the advent of globalization and to the 
contrary argues that the scope for government intervention in the economy 
remains. And while it acknowledges that societal actors and movements taken in 
isolation have been weakened, FES suggests that these—that is, “unions, 
employers, political parties, churches, academia, federal and state governments”—
when taken together have retained collective capacity for political action.695  
Likewise BmWI and SACH make continuous references to a broader host of 
actors co-responsible for competitiveness.696 Not only are the social partners/peak 
organizations are considered responsible for achieving a productivity consistent 
aggregate wage formation697, but also other actors are ascribed responsibility for 
securing Germany in the future.698 The Zukunftssicherung white paper claims that   
“All societal forces are encouraged, now in their respective area of 
responsibility, to do what is necessary and pave the way for necessary 
changes: families, schools and universities, churches, cultural 
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693 SACH 2000, p. 135 (AOT). 
694 FES 1998, p. 112 (AOT). 
695 FES 1998, p. 114 and p. 120 (AOT). 
696 SACH 1993, p. 261. 
697 SACH 1993, p. 20 (AOT). See p. 229 above. 
698 BmWI 1993a, pp. 11-13, BmWI 1993b, pp. 15-16. 
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institutions, including the media, associations, companies, workers, 
political parties and all state departments.”699 
In 2000 BmWI argued that the challenge associated with “ecological 
modernization” requires active involvement and participation of more than just 
state and market participants: 
“The necessary offensive of environmental innovation is not only 
limited to the design of political framework conditions, but must also 
include non-state actors. Decision makers in politics, economy, science 
and societal groups are all equally required to act.”700 
Thus also in the German knowledge regime, PROs ascribe responsibility for 
securing competitiveness to a whole range of actors beyond state and market 
participants.   
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12. How Denmark Came to Compete 
12.1 Before and After the Collapse of Bretton 
Woods 
Also in the Danish knowledge regime, as in both the U.K. and German knowledge 
regimes, several PROs invoke a temporal distinction between a phase before the 
collapse of Bretton Woods system and a phase after it in which a more 
competitive and internationalized global environment emerged and began to face 
firms, states and economic policymakers. 
For instance DØR in its annual economic report from 1993 devotes a 20-page 
analysis to an elaborate account of this shift. Here the council takes a retrospective 
view on post-war economic policy and argues that history “naturally” can be 
divided in two parts.701 A first period stretching from the end of the war up until 
1980, characterized by relative macroeconomic stability, steady growth rates and 
“long spells of expansion” as well as regulated international financial and product 
markets. A central feature of this was the Bretton Woods system, according to 
which most industrial countries from 1944 had committed themselves to a fixed 
but adjustable exchange rate policy with the U.S. dollar serving as anchor. 
However this system, according to the council, from the 1960s and onwards, 
increasingly came under strain due to mounting inflationary pressures which spilt 
over from country to country and led to growing imbalances between domestic 
balance of payments as well as diminishing trust in the dollar as reserve currency. 
Thus the first period is contrasted with a second—after the abolishment of Bretton 
Woods in 1973—characterized by unstable, fluctuating business cycles, 
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accelerating inflation and interest rates, soaring unemployment and stagnant 
growth. 
Similarly, the Danish Ministry of Economics observes a shift in the international 
political economy. It devotes an entire chapter of its annual economic report from 
1993 to the analysis of the increased mobility of international capital and 
investment flows. And it suggests that history can be separated in two periods. 
First it recalls that  
“The growing internationalization and integration of the economies is 
one of the most significant features of the Post War period. The process 
began in the 1950s and 1960s, first with the phasing out of restrictions 
on trade and reduction of tariff rates. Later a liberalization of capital 
movement began. Following some standstill in the 1970s the remaining 
capital restrictions in the OECD countries were abandoned in the 
1980s.”702 
Also MM in 1993 observes a shift in the international political economy beginning 
in the 1980s. That is,  
“During the 80s governments of the world have shown an increasing 
interest in free market economy and demonstrated greater political will 
to deregulation, privatization and liberalization, which all have provided 
freer conditions for firms. On the global level the frames of the GATT-
agreement have for instance been significantly expanded to create better 
conditions for investment and trade, while groups of countries have gone 
even further on the regional level and introduced free trade agreements, 
e.g., the EC’s internal market and the North American NAFTA.”703  
Thus the PRO finds that FDI in the Danish economy increased from 48 billion 
dollars in 1981 to 210 billion dollars in 1990.704 Also it observes that the 
possibilities for firms to diversify their production chains and outsource 
production to the most advantageous sites have increased705 just as the emergence 
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702 ØEM, 1993, pp. 90-91 (AOT)   
703 MM, 1993, p. 23 (AOT)  
704 Ibid. p. 9 (AOT) 
705 Ibid. p. 10, p. 19 and pp. 24-25 (AOT) 
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of new market economies in China, East Asia and South America alters trade and 
production patterns.706 
12.1.1 The Role of Government after Bretton Woods 
This new and more globalized external environment is also perceived to entail an 
alteration in the scope for economic policy and change in the role of states vis-à-
vis markets.  
The Ministry of Economics in 1993 argued that one can generally distinguish 
between two basic approaches to economic policy: “a rule-based” as opposed to 
an “active (discretionary) economic policy.” 707 And while it admits, that in 
practice “there is no clear dividing line between the two,”708 it finds that after the 
1980s a shift towards more rule-based approaches to economic policy occurs. 
Thus, after the 1980s, the emphasis is laid on “stable economic frameworks,” the 
determination of medium-term targets for the central macroeconomic variables 
money supply, inflation and GDP to ensure stability and predictability for firms 
and consumers’ investment decisions and reforms of the economy’s supply-side 
(what it terms “structural policy”) to achieve these medium-term targets.709  
This shift is explained by the “unfortunate experiences” of active economic 
policies before the 1980s leading to high inflation, low growth and high 
unemployment. 710  Following these experiences, active and discretionary 
macroeconomic policies came to be perceived as decreasingly viable, and the 
scope for domestic policy autonomy in macroeconomic matters was significantly 
reduced. With regard to monetary policy, the ministry argues that “fixed-
exchange-rate policy within the EMS in combination with free capital 
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707 ØEM 1993, p. 91. See also DØR 2007, p. 110. (AOT) 
708 ØEM 1993, p. 91. (AOT) 
709 ØEM 1993, p. 92. (AOT) 
710 ØEM 1993, p. 91. (AOT) 
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movements”711 implied that de facto only Germany possessed monetary policy 
autonomy712 and also that fiscal policy has lost potency. First because with 
increasingly open economies, a growing share of an eventual demand-side fiscal 
stimulus will tend to spill over to neighboring trading partners leading to 
increasing imports and an impaired balance of payments. Second, because this in 
turn will lead to increased levels of sovereign debt, which financial markets will 
require higher interest rates to finance.713  
However, while the ministry observes a general “shift” towards rule-based supply-
side policies (or what it terms structural policies) it also claims that 
“It is a challenging task to decide on a strategy for increased, growth, 
employment and competitiveness … because of differences in … 
perceptions of what measures to employ and what the effects of these 
will be.”714  
It contrasts and compares the various policy measures employed by Germany, 
France, Italy, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Spain as a 
response to the European white paper on competitiveness published in 1993. 
Among these it recounts restrictions on wage increases for the publicly employed, 
modifications of unemployment benefits, higher charges on gas and oil, increased 
privatization, health-care sector reform, more flexible planning of working hours, 
pension system reforms, reduction of employers’ social contributions and 
measures to increase the independence of central banks.715 And it finds that 
different countries applied different measures.   
Likewise DØR argues that the new period implies a change in economic policy 
orientation among most OECD-countries. Following a thorough review of past 
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712 AE 2000, p. 21, DØR 2007, p.  110. (AOT) 
713 ØEM 1993, p. 114. (AOT) 
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macroeconomic policies in the U.S., the U.K. and Germany716, it contends that 
“two very different concepts of economic policy”717 have been applied in the 
foregoing four decades. In the first half of the period, the overarching policy goal 
was full employment, which was to be achieved by countercyclical fiscal and 
monetary policies. The main emphasis was put on fiscal stimulus but monetary 
policy played a supportive role by aiming to maintain low interest rates. Yet in, 
the second half,  from the 1980s onward, policies designed to regulate the business 
cycle were abandoned and policy priorities reversed. Monetary policy took the 
driver’s seat, and fiscal policy was relegated to a support role. 
 In particular, the DØR finds the above-mentioned collapse of Bretton Woods 
spurred growing public aversion to inflation, which in turn paved the way for the 
advent of more monetarist and supply-side policies among policymaking elites. 
Now the aim of fiscal policy was balanced public budgets in the long term (as 
opposed to full employment), monetary policy targeted stable and non-inflationary 
growth of the money supply (as opposed to low interest rates), and growth and 
employment was to be secured through reforms of the supply side of the economy 
(product and labor markets) through the improvement incentive structures (as 
opposed to discretionary, countercyclical fiscal demand-side stimuli). 718 
According to DØR, “the main emphasis beyond tight monetary policy was put 
upon stimulus of labor supply, savings, improvements of infrastructure etc.”719  
While the challenges pertaining to demand-side policy are recognized, DØR 
nonetheless maintains that the main principal disagreement dividing economists is 
the question of whether  
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716 DØR 1993, pp. 23-44. (AOT) 
717 DØR 1993, p. 23. (AOT) 
718 DØR 1993, p. 28. (AOT)  
719 DØR 1993, p. 42. (AOT) 
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“supply-side policies should be perceived as a supplement to demand-
regulating policies or as a means, which can entirely replace that 
policy.”720  
DØR itself, however, rejects wholesale abandonment of demand-side policies. 
Rather it proposes a more pragmatic policy mix combining both structural and 
demand-side policies.  
“The experience has thus shown that none of the two main types of 
economic policy alone manages to solve the economic problems of 
balance. Simultaneously the contradictions, which historically have been 
expressed between different theory and policy conceptions, have in 
many instances shown themselves to rely upon wrong assumptions. This 
goes for instance for the assumption that fiscal policy in all situations 
should have lost its efficiency as an instrument to regulate, including 
stimulate demand and activity.”721 
And it moreover argues that ideological differences have in many instances 
blocked more pragmatic solutions to macroeconomic problems. Thus where most 
OECD countries, according to DØR, perceive the shift to a new, more globalized 
and competitive international economic order to imply a turn to supply-side 
policies at the expense of demand-side policies, the DØR itself argues that the 
shift does not necessarily need to imply the wholesale abandonment of demand-
side policy as such.722 
That DØR appears to have a favorable view of the beneficial macroeconomic 
effects of demand-side interventions is further underlined by its emphasis upon the 
“strong automatic stabilizers” of the Danish economy. 723  That is, with the 
progression of the Danish tax system as well the comparatively generous social 
security benefits, the Danish economy has a set of automatic countercyclical 
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720 DØR 1993, 29.  (AOT) 
721 DØR 1993, p. 43. However the council does emphasize that this does not imply a return to a 
demand-side policy of an intensity equivalent to that following the Second World War, both due 
to the risk of overheating as well as the growing budget deficits and debt.   
722 DØR 2007, p. 111. (AOT) 
723 DØR 2007, p. 110. See also p. 9, pp. 117-118 and p. 121. (AOT) 
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elements built into it. In an economic upswing, the tax system will curb fiscal 
overreach, just as aggregate demand will be supported in recessions given the 
generous social security system. And when DØR discusses fiscal policy, it is 
typically posed as a question of the appropriateness of additional fiscal (non-
discretionary) stimulus beyond that already implied by the automatic stabilizers.724 
Similarly in 2007, AE introduced a concept to describe the potential 
macroeconomic benefits of increased public investments in the supply-side of the 
economy. For economists it is a commonplace assertion that tax-reductions exhibit 
“dynamic effects” (i.e., that tax decreases are (partly) self-financing, since the 
change of incentive structures herewith implied spurs additional (taxable) 
productive activities in the economy). Along this line, AE argues that a range of 
public investments similarly is self-financed and thus also exhibits “dynamic 
effects.”725  That is,  
“The effect of increased service can in several cases fully match the 
effect of lower tax on income. For instance will increased education and 
elimination of closing days in daycare institutions increase employment, 
because education leads to more active years in the labor market and 
elimination of closing days releases the labor of parents. A series of 
public expenditures on service, investments and transfers on a par with 
taxes affects the population’s opportunities for and desire to work more 
or less.”726  
12.1.2 A Competition of Nations 
And as in the case of the U.K. and Germany, in Denmark these new international 
conditions—floating currencies, liberalized international capital markets, advances 
in production, communication and transportation technologies etc.—are 
understood as putting increased competitive pressure on nations. For instance, in 
its annual economic report from 2000, ØEM suggests that  
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“international mobility of capital implies, a certain pressure upon Danish 
capital tax, particularly the corporation tax … the increased 
globalization additionally makes demands upon the ability of firms to 
adapt.” 727 
In the white paper “Denmark and Globalization” published in 2004, it is similarly 
argued that the increasing globalization first and foremost is characterized by 
growing international competition. That is,  
“The result of the economic globalization and technological 
development is first and foremost stronger competition. Stronger 
competition between firms in all countries about having the best goods 
at the right price. Competition about knowing the most and best utilize, 
what we know. Competition about attracting the best heads.”728 
In 2007, globalization is addressed as one of the two “central challenges” facing 
Denmark. Globalization “provides new opportunities to expand prosperity, but the 
growing international competition also puts great demands on the competitiveness 
of Danish firms.”729 In 2000, ØEM moreover published a white paper entitled 
“DK.21: En Ny Strategi for Danmarks Erhvervspolitik” (“A New Strategy for 
Denmark’s Industrial Policy”) and specifically designed to present the 
government’s “vision and strategy for a competitive business community.”730 In 
this publication a vivid picture of the competition of nations is drawn:  
“The international market conditions are changing rapidly. Globalization 
implies increased competition both at home and on international 
markets, a competition which has not only increased but also changed in 
character. On the global market, it becomes still more difficult to attach 
national labels on goods. They are not produced in one single country. 
Production is split up, and tasks handled where they can be done best for 
the least expense.”731   
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730 ØEM 2000b, p. 5. (AOT) 
731 ØEM 2000b, p, 63. (AOT) 
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In 1993, MM, in characteristic colorful language, argued that the new political 
economic environment—characterized by “bulging production capacity,” low 
demand, high unemployment and enduring stagnant growth rates—entails a 
“brutal elimination race” between wage earners, employers, firms and nations.732 It 
also argued that the cold war has been followed by a “Cold Peace”733 and asserted 
the following:  
“In other words we speak of a global economically structural 
transformation of a format and significance, which without exaggeration 
can be compared to the transition from an agrarian society to an 
industrial society in the last century. This time it is a transition to a high-
technological service society.”734 
In particular, the impact of globalization is discussed in relation to the Danish 
labor market.  
In its annual economic report from 2007, the DØR similarly address the 
consequences of increased international competition:  
“Increased international integration affects the Danish labor market 
through changed competitive conditions on the product market, as well 
as better opportunities for the outsourcing of tasks and the general 
displacement of economic activity across borders. These conditions pull 
in the direction of increasing the wage sensitivity of the labor demand, 
which in a higher degree ties domestic wages to follow the wages 
among the trade partners.”735 
The council discusses several international studies of this relationship and, while 
noting that an unambiguous view of the consequences of globalization on labor 
markets does not exist, nonetheless concludes that “globalization to a certain 
extent has disciplined wage formation in recent years.”736   
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732 MM 1993, p. 33. See also p. 9, pp. 24-25, p. 35, pp. 48-49 and p. 171. (AOT) 
733 MM 1993, p. 50. (AOT) 
734 MM 1993, p. 29. (AOT) 
735 DØR 2007, p. 275. (AOT) 
736 DØR 2007, p.  277. (AOT) 
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12.2 How Competitiveness Is Revealed: Outcomes 
Also in the Danish knowledge regime, the appropriate way to measure the 
outcome of a competitive nation is discussed. While the Ministry of Economics 
only addresses this question implicitly in its annual economic report from 1993737, 
in a subsequent economic report (1996) it explicitly discusses in what particular 
way the concept of competitiveness could be applied to a nation. In a chapter 
entitled “Competitiveness and Market Shares of Industrial Export,” the ministry 
compares and contrasts the competitiveness of a firm with that of a nation and 
suggests that    
“The concept of competitiveness describes the ability to accomplish a 
profitable production and selling of goods and services in a market 
subject to competition. For the individual firm good competitiveness 
will reveal itself in high revenue and probably also growth in production 
and employment through new investments in increased production 
capacity.”738 
But the ministry contends that when competitiveness is discussed at a “societal 
level it becomes more difficult to provide a unequivocal determination of the 
concept.”739 However, as the title of the chapter suggests, ØEM apparently leans 
towards a perception of competitiveness in which its outcome is measured as 
export performance (market shares). Thus in 1996 the ministry argued that  
“Socioeconomic symptoms of unsatisfactory competitiveness vis-à-vis 
foreign countries will be problems with the simultaneous maintenance of 
high employment (…) healthy public finances and a satisfactory balance 
on the balance of payments.”740  
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737 ØEM 1993, p. 53. (AOT) 
738 ØEM 1996, Chapter 5. (AOT) 
739 Ibid. 
740 Ibid. 
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The same emphasis upon exports as appropriate outcome indicator of 
competitiveness is expressed in the ministry’s annual economic report from 2000. 
In this report, it is, for example, argued that 
“Despite the significant export growth, Danish industrial firms are still 
losing market shares on export markets. This is connected with the 
deterioration of wage competitiveness.”741 
Similarly, DØR in its 1993, 2000 and 2007 annual economic reports addresses the 
international competitiveness of Denmark’s political economy in terms of its 
ability to export as measured by indicators such as international market shares and 
rates of export growth.742  
However, the ØEM also expresses a different view of how the competitiveness of 
nations should be measured. In the white paper “Dk.21,” the ministry first 
observes that “the ability of firms to compete on international markets is reflected 
in the Danish market shares.”743 Yet, it is also claimed that “a fall in the market 
share is not necessarily indicative of poor competitiveness” since older industrial 
nations will “naturally” cede some of their market shares to new, emerging and 
industrializing countries in Asia, Southern America and Eastern Europe. Thus 
second, the report examines alternative measures to assess competitiveness and 
proceeds to examine growth as the proper outcome of a competitive nation. That 
is,  
 “The economic capacity of nation is normally assessed as the total 
production (GDP) per capita. Here Denmark is among the best nations. 
It is a position, which Denmark must maintain.”744 
Also MM in its commission report published in 2007 finds that  
 
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741 ØEM 2000a, p. 123. (AOT) 
742 DØR 1993 p. 47 and p. 52, DØR 2000, p. 23, DØR 2007, p. 63. (AOT) 
743 ØEM 2000b, p. 29. (AOT) 
744 ØEM 2000b, p. 14.  (AOT) 
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“Denmark is one of the world’s ten richest countries measured in 
purchasing power per capita, and in later years Denmark has bathed in 
good positions upon the international rankings in the Global 
Competitiveness Report.”745 
Thus this PRO also appears to associate a relation between competitive nations 
and growth rates. 
12.2.1 Is Competitiveness about More than Growth?  
But besides growth, as in the German knowledge regime, some Danish PROs also 
ponder over the question of whether competitiveness perhaps consists of even 
more than good growth performance. Most notably, ØEM on several occasions 
addresses this issue. In a lengthy passage of the white paper “DK.21,” for 
instance, the ministry explicitly addresses and challenges that perspective, which 
elevates economic growth to the end-all-be-all goal of economic policy and 
political striving in general: 
“For more than 100 years, the most important goal for all nations has 
been steady material progress. … There is a clear risk that a society 
which one-eyed gambles on material growth will do irreversible damage 
to the environment and jeopardize the social cohesiveness. Thus there is 
good reason to consider whether material prosperity still should be the 
most important goal?”746 
The report itself provides a clear answer to this rhetorical question. The ministry 
emphasizes that the central goal of economic policy still is 
“A competitive business sector which can compare with the best in the 
world. But the economic progress shall not just be turned over in higher 
material consumption. We shall also utilize the progress to create a 
society with lifelong education for all, work for all, good public health 
care, social justice and a good environment. In short, a sustainable 
welfare society.”747 
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745 MM 2007, p. 17. See also p. 9. (AOT) 
746 ØEM 2000b, p. 12. (AOT) 
747 ØEM 2000b, p. 12. (AOT) 
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Similarly, in the white paper “Denmark and Globalization” from 2004, it observes 
the risk that  
“Globalization will divide the Danish society, because not all possess 
the education and ability to adapt as necessary to make it well on the 
labor market, especially the unskilled risk being left behind by the 
development. Therefore we must strengthen our competitiveness and our 
cohesiveness.”748  
12.3 How Competitiveness Is Created: Sources 
12.3.1 SoC I: Macro-Economic Stability 
In terms of sources of competitiveness, as in the other knowledge regimes, the 
Danish PROs also emphasize macroeconomic stability as an important 
precondition for competitiveness.  
For instance, in 2000 ØEM finds that countries which have exhibited strong 
growth performance in the prior years also are those which have “conducted a 
sound macroeconomic policy.”749 According to the annual economic report from 
2007, a “responsible fiscal policy” is required if competitiveness is not to be 
impaired750, just as ØEM in 2007 argued that a “stable macroeconomic framework 
is essential for incentives to investment.”751 In the “DK.21” white paper it is 
claimed that 
“The platform for good business conditions is a healthy and stabile 
macro economy. It gives firms the required security to invest and make 
long term decisions.”752  
However, the interpretations of Danish PROs vary as to just how such 
macroeconomic stability is to be achieved, both in terms of the appropriate mix of 
 

748 ØEM 2004, p. 5. (AOT) 
749 ØEM 2000a, p. 122. (AOT) 
750 ØEM 2007a, preface.  (AOT) 
751 ØEM 2007b, p. 53. (AOT) 
752 ØEM 2000b, p. 16. (AOT) See also ØEM 2007c, p. 8 and pp. 221-230, for a more detailed 
account. 
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demand and supply-side policies as well as the type of supply-side measures 
required.753 
12.3.1.1 Metrics of Competitiveness I: Output Gaps and Growth 
Accounting 
In the Danish knowledge regime, attention is devoted to the question of how 
policymakers can ensure sound macroeconomic steering of the economy and 
achieve low inflation and steady growth rates. Here the PROs also employ the 
metrics of output gap and growth accounting.  
In both its annual economic reports from 2000 and 2007754, ØEM employs the 
output gap. Both DØR755 and AE756 follow suit and invoke this economic indicator 
in their respective annual economic reports from 2007. In its annual economic 
report, DØR explains the function of the output gap in the following way: 
“To describe the current cyclical position, the output gap is often used, 
which is calculated as the relationship between actual GDP and the 
‘normal GDP’ level, the so-called structural GDP. ... A negative output 
gap implies that actual GDP is lower than structural GDP and thus that 
the economies is in a slump with available production capacity in the 
form of available labor and incomplete utilization of the capital 
stock.”757 
Danish PROs also apply the growth accounting methodology. For example, DØR 
argues that 
“An increase in the effective workforce can happen through a greater 
number of people in the workforce, higher working hours, or through 
higher productivity.”758 
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753 See p. 253 above. 
754 ØEM, 2000a, pp. 103-104 (AOT) 
755 DØR, 2007, p. 92 (AOT) 
756 AE, 2007, p. 16 (AOT) 
757 DØR, 2007, pp. 113-116 (AOT) 
758 Ibid. 2007, p. 6 (AOT) 
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Similarly AE addresses the various sources of growth in its annual economic 
report from 2007, arguing that growth basically ensues from increases in 
employment, increases in productivity and demographically caused changes in the 
labor supply.759 
Finally ØEM, in its annual economic report from 1993, analyzes growth and 
argues that it stems from increases in productivity, employment and the size of the 
labor force.760 In its annual economic report from 2000, it claims that  
“it is not merely interesting, how high the economic growth is now, but 
to a higher degree what factors lie behind it today. Basically one can 
attempt to break down growth in GDP per capita into contributions from 
the share of persons in the able-bodied (“arbejdsdygtige”) age, the 
participation rate, the productivity.”761 
 
In its annual growth report (“Vækstredegørelse”) from 2007, ØEM presents a 
diamond-shaped diagram in which the growth performance of Denmark first is 
broken into four parameters—structural unemployment, labor market participation 
rate, working hours per employed and productivity—and then compared to the 
best-performing OECD countries.762 
 
	
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
 
As seen in the other knowledge regimes, in the Danish case several PROs also 
discuss the potential relationships between components of the growth account, just 
as the methodology is used to contrast and compare domestic growth performance 
with other national economies in order to highlight particular domestic challenges.  
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759 AE, 2007, p. 5. See also, pp. 15-16 (AOT) 
760 ØEM, 1993, p. 56 (AOT) 
761 ØEM, 2000a, p. 118 (AOT) 
762 ØEM 2007b, p. 44. (AOT) 
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However, while the U.K. PROs, as seen763, put much emphasis upon the challenge 
of raising productivity, in Denmark things are somewhat different. Consider the 
discussion by ØEM throughout its annual economic reports. In its annual 
economic report from 1996, for example, the ministry argues that   
“For the sake of the future development of competitiveness—and thus 
employment and unemployment—it is therefore important, that the 
domestic wage increases remains short of those abroad. … Besides the 
stability-oriented economic policy, a long-term structural policy 
particularly aimed at the labor market, including education, is today 
perceived to be the most essential means to secure high employment and 
prosperity without harming the competitiveness.”764 
Thus, labor supply—understood to be the share of the population of working age 
available for employment in the labor market—should be increased through labor 
market reforms to mitigate inflationary pressures in the economy and by bringing 
more employable labor into the labor force. Curbing wage demands through 
increases in the labor supply in the medium term, wage levels come to be aligned 
with underlying productivity. The same concern is voiced in the annual economic 
report from 2000. Here ØEM again argues that “it is important, that the labor 
supply is increased”765 since there still is “a certain pressure on the labor market” 
766 and  
“it is crucial, that wage and price development again are aligned with 
foreign countries if Danish competitiveness is not to deteriorate.”767  
And in its annual growth report from 2007, ØEM claims that “here and now labor 
shortages are the main challenge.”768 MM mirrors this sentiment when, in its 
 

763 See p. 188 above. 
764 ØEM 1996, Chapter 5. (AOT) 
765 ØEM 2000a, p. 8. (AOT) 
766 ØEM 2000a, p. 7. (AOT) 
767 ØEM 2000a, p. 7. (AOT) 
768 ØEM 2007b, preface. ØEM, 2007a, p. 2. See also p. 10. (AOT) 
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commission report from 2007, it also highlights the challenge of increasing labor 
supply:  
“Denmark’s growth today lies in the worst end in the field of Western 
economies, and Danish economy is hit by the largest shortage of labor 
and knowledge workers in a decade. ... the shortage of qualified labor 
represents a serious barrier to Denmark’s competitiveness.” 769 
Similarly DØR in all of its annual economic reports770 ascribes great importance to 
the task of increasing the labor supply, by making more people available for 
employment. For instance in 2000 it claims that:   
“The retention of the labor force comprises henceforth a great challenge 
of Danish economy, not least in the light of the demographic 
development. Increased focus on structural improvements, e.g., by 
making the labor market more flexible and thereby curbing 
marginalization and exclusion, will therefore be beneficial.”771 
And in 2007, it states that 
“the continued shortage of labor is a significant risk factor in Danish 
economy. Therefore there is a need for measures … which quickly can 
enhance the labor supply.”772  
DØR, in its annual economic report for 1993, also briefly touches on the question 
of whether the employment component of the growth account—and hence 
growth—could be increased through measures which reduce rather than enhance 
labor supply (through measures such a temporary or permanent leave 
arrangements, early retirement benefits, longer holidays, reduced work week etc.). 
While DØR contends that such measures might reduce the number of long-term 
unemployed, it however urges policymakers to observe that such an arrangement 
“By itself does not increase the demand for labor. … Regards for 
competitiveness, however, set narrow limits for permanent solutions to 
 

769 MM 2007, p. 9, p. 24. (AOT) 
770 DØR 1993, p. 5. (AOT) 
771 DØR 2000, p. 69. (AOT) 
772 DØR 2007, p. 92. (AOT) 
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employment problems through arrangements, which for a large part will 
be equivalent to an increased public or publicly financed employment. 
To the extent that the public sector through subsidies retains a share of 
the work force in a form of protected employment, it will 
simultaneously reduce the flexibility of the labor and ability to solve 
long-term competitiveness problems.“ 773 
In its annual economic report published the year after (1994), DØR in fact 
expands further upon this discussion. In this report, the organization reviews 
Danish labor market policy from 1970 to 1994 and schematically summarizes that    
“Measures to fight unemployment can coarsely be classified in three 
categories: i) increased demand for labor, ii) reduced supply of labor, 
and iii) structural improvements in the labor market.”774 
Before 1994, it argues, the second category of labor market policies took “central 
position.” However, DØR also argues that this class of measures directed towards 
ensuring high employment rates in the long run will turn out to be 
counterproductive, since permanent leave arrangements will lead to wage 
increases due to increased pressures in the labor markets and impaired public 
finances, which must be financed either by increasing taxes or increased debt.  
Thus while such arrangements are intended to reduce unemployment—and might 
do so in the short term—in the long term they will instead lead to  “reduced 
employment as a consequence of loss of competitiveness.”775   
Thus, clearly the enhancement and retention of a large supply of labor is 
continuously emphasized in the Danish knowledge regime. However, this does not 
mean that other factors of the growth account such as productivity and working 
hours are ignored. With regard to productivity, in the early reports this growth 
component does not appear to be granted much attention. Again consider ØEM. In 
one of its early annual economic reports, while attentive to productivity it clearly 
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773 DØR 1993, pp. 78-79.  (AOT) 
774 DØR 1994, p. 53. (AOT) 
775 DØR 1994, p. 57. (AOT) 
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prioritizes the task of enhancing the labor supply over the task of raising 
productivity:  
“To the future development of market shares of the industry, it will be 
essential that the tendency to somewhat faster wage increases than 
abroad is brought to an end, since in the longer term a positive 
contribution from developments of the exchange rate can be expected. 
Nor can it be expected that the long-term development in the 
productivity at home can be faster than that of our trading partners.”776 
It deemed unlikely that productivity can be increased comparatively more than 
Denmark’s trading partners. ØEM in its annual economic report from 2000 gazes 
back into history and recalls that 
“In the 1990s there has been a far larger contribution from productivity. 
There has been a negative contribution from the participation rate but a 
better utilization of the labor force in the form of lower 
unemployment.”777  
However, from around the middle of the period, the perception of the primary 
Danish growth challenge appears to change somewhat. For example, ØEM in its 
annual growth report from 2007 reaches a different conclusion as to which sources 
account for Denmark’s growth performance: 
“The current position of Denmark among the 10 richest OECD-countries 
is particularly due to the fact that a very large proportion of the 
population of working-age is active on the labor market. Denmark also 
has low unemployment when compared internationally. In return 
Denmark is quite far behind the best OECD countries when it comes to 
productivity and working hours per employed.778 
Whereas Denmark, according to ØEM in 1993 and 2000, was performing 
reasonably well in terms of productivity, in 2007 the claim was that Denmark was 
performing well in terms of increasing the labor supply and employment but 
comparatively poorly in both productivity and working hours.   
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776 ØEM 1997, Chapter 4, ØEM 1996, Chapter 5. See also ØEM 1993, p. 56.  (AOT)  
777 ØEM 2000a, p. 118. (AOT) 
778 ØEM 2007c, p. 4. (AOT) 
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In fact, the 2004 white paper appears a little vexed with regard to Denmark’s 
productivity performance. On the one hand, it ascribes the current high level of 
Danish wealth to the fact that “we have been good at creating greater and greater 
value for each hour we have worked. We have had a high productivity”779 and thus 
been able command a higher price of exports than for imports. Yet on the other 
hand, the government also, despite the observation of high Danish productivity, 
asserts that  
“We should become better at increasing productivity. In the last 15 years 
we have not been increasing productivity as well as other countries. The 
productivity in Denmark has grown slower than the EU-countries and 
the U.S.”780  
MM mirrors this in 2007 when claiming that “Denmark in later years has 
exhibited too low growth, and the productivity has not been world class.”781 Also 
AE in 2007 begins to highlight productivity as a pathway to higher Danish 
growth: 
“Growth can also be enhanced by productivity. Increased productivity 
implies greater wealth per employed, and can be achieved by, e.g., 
investments in education, science and development, better utilization of 
new technology, investments in infrastructure.”782  
Yet, where AE contends that productivity increases might enhance the potential 
growth rate of the Danish economy, it conversely contests ØEM’s assertion that 
Denmark’s subdued potential growth stems from low working hours:  
“It is a myth that Danes are among those who work the least in the 
OECD. When one considers working hours, one does not take into 
account the division of labor and how many participate in production. If 
one takes into account that both men and women, young and old, strong 
and weak etc. are employed in Denmark, the comparative picture of 
working hours is changed. The annual working hours per capita of 
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779 ØEM 2004, p. 16. (AOT) 
780 Ibid. 
781 MM 2007, p. 16. (AOT) 
782 AE 2007, p. 22. (AOT) 
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working age is approximately eight hours higher in Denmark than on 
average in the OECD countries. Among the old EU countries, we are 
one of the countries in which people work most.”783 
Similarly, as observed in the U.K. and Germany, Danish PROs also invoke a 
particular set of arguments as to why policymakers should focus their efforts upon 
increasing one component of the growth account and not another. First, ØEM in 
its annual growth report from 2007 asserts that while former efforts increased the 
labor supply,  
“In a global world with increasing international competition that is not 
enough. If Danish competitiveness is to be maintained, we must be 
become still better at increasing the value-added per hour worked.”784   
Thus the report emphasizes the need to direct economic policy towards enhancing 
productivity, as further increases in labor supply are perceived to be unlikely: 
“There are no prospects for growth in the working effort per capita in 
the coming decades. The economic growth per capita will therefore 
solely have to be drawn from growth in productivity in contrast to the 
development since the middle of the 1990s.”785   
In the same discussion, it is similarly claimed that increases in working hours 
“should not be abandoned as an opportunity to increase the prosperity.” 786 
However, ØEM deems this strategy less likely and observes that  
“There are probably limits to how much working hours can be 
increased. In this way, historically there has been a general tendency to, 
that working hours decrease concurrently with, we become richer.”787 
And in a footnote ØEM argues that in the long run, it is only increases in 
productivity which might enhance growth, as economic theory assumes some 
 
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783 AE 2007, p. 35. (AOT) 
784 ØEM 2007b, p. 9. (AOT) 
785 ØEM 2007b,  p. 8. (AOT) 
786 ØEM 2007b,  p. 46. (AOT) 
787 ØEM 2007b,  p. 46. (AOT) 
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natural limits to the other sources of growth (employment, labor supply and 
working hours.)788  
Second, also in the Danish knowledge regime, some PROs claim that growth 
components stand in an inverse relationship. For instance, in the competitiveness 
index ØEM argues that productivity and employment might have a non-
complementary relationship. In a comparison of the growth performance of the 
U.S. economy with other OECD countries, ØEM finds that most countries “fall 
behind” the U.S. due to slower productivity growth. It, however, also notes that it 
is only in few countries  
“where both productivity and work effort have developed more 
favorably than in the U.S. There appears in other words to be a “trade-
off” between productivity and work effort. … In the case of Denmark, 
the marked fall in unemployment since 1994 has contributed to the raise 
in work effort per capita but has probably curbed productivity growth 
since more with relatively weak qualifications have been employed.”789   
The same inverse relationship is observed by DØR in its annual economic report 
from 2007. Here the organization observes that Danish performance in terms of 
productivity growth was subdued in 2006, and it points to the simultaneous strong 
increase in employment and fall in unemployment as the explanation for this: 
“The increase in hourly productivity was merely ¾ pct. in 2006 and in 
2007 the hourly productivity is expected to stagnate. A contributing 
cause to the poor development of hourly productivity might be that there 
exist groups with lower qualifications which have gained employment in 
later years.”790  
Also AE observes an inverse relationship between productivity and employment. 
Furthermore, it sees this relation as a policy choice facing economic policymakers:  
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788 ØEM 2000a. See the footnote at p. 120. (AOT) 
789 ØEM 2007c, p. 33. (AOT)A similar argument is advanced in the 2007 growth report, where 
it is claimed that  “an increased participation rate, where for instance more on the edge of the 
labor market are drawn into the labor force, probably affects both productivity, unemployment 
and working hours, all things being equal.” See ØEM 2007b, p. 44 and p. 9. 
790 DØR 2007, p. 30. (AOT) See also p. 70. 
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“It is natural that those who are last employed have a lower productivity. 
In Denmark we have chosen that we would rather want that a larger 
share of the population is employed rather than merely a small high-
productive share of the population is employed. The price for that choice 
is that we have a somewhat small growth in productivity per 
employed.”791 
12.3.1.2 Metrics of Competitiveness II: Competitiveness Index 
As observed in other knowledge regimes, policy research organizations also direct 
attention to the international ranking and benchmarking publications designed to 
compare and contrast the relative competitive performance of nations. For instance 
MM in 1993 notes that WEF has ranked Denmark as the 2nd most competitive 
economy.792 In 2007, it similarly argues that Denmark in later years has been  
“showered in great rankings upon the international ranking lists of the 
Global Competitiveness Report, IMD’s World Competitiveness 
Yearbook and the European Innovation Scoreboard.”793  
Moreover, as in the British and German cases, a distinct Danish competitiveness 
index also emerges. In 2006, the ØEM commenced the annual publication of its 
competitiveness report (“Konkurrenceevneredegørelsen”). In the first of edition of 
the index, ØEM motivates its publication in the following way:  
“In a world with increasing international competition Denmark’s 
competitiveness must be in the top ... to achieve these goals, the 
government has prepared a strategy for Denmark in the global economy. 
... The government will continuously follow the implementation of the 
strategy and each year present a competitiveness report, which provides 
a picture of whether Denmark’s position is strengthened and the goals 
met. The competitiveness report for 2006 describes the baseline for the 
strategy. Where does Denmark lie compared to other countries in the 
areas, which are decisive for Denmark’s competitiveness and 
cohesiveness? What are strengths? What are weaknesses?”794  
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791 AE 2007, p. 20. (AOT) 
792 MM 1993, p. 31. (AOT) 
793 MM 2007, p. 17. (AOT) 
794 ØEM 2006, p. 7.  (AOT) 
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In this Danish version of the competitiveness index, Denmark’s competitive 
performance is decomposed into 12 underlying source of competitiveness795 
measured by no fewer than 66 econometric indicators.796  
12.3.2 SoC II: Open and Competitive Markets, Low Taxes 
Besides macroeconomic stability, other factors are counted as sources of 
competitiveness. First, open and well-functioning markets characterized by 
sufficient degrees of competition are considered an important precondition for 
competitiveness. In its annual report from 2000, ØEM suggests that “countries 
with well-functioning markets, in which a high degree of competition prevails,” 
exhibited the best growth performance in the 1990s. The “DK.21” white paper 
similarly emphasizes the importance of well-functioning markets and proper 
regulation,797 as does the 2007 growth report and the 2004 white paper. In the 
latter document, it is claimed that 
“Competition in itself creates competitiveness, because competition 
furthers quality, efficiency and renewal. Increased competition in our 
business community is hence one of the paths to enhance the dynamic 
and our ability to compete.”798 
Second, the tax system is perceived as a source of competitiveness. For instance, 
ØEM in 2007 argues that “incentives to continually improve and make an extra 
effort … is of fundamental importance to competitiveness and productivity.”799  
 

795 Primary, secondary and tertiary educational institutions, public science and universities, 
private science and R&D, competition, openness to the outside world, entrepreneurs, flexible 
labor market, well-functioning financial markets, efficient public service, and sound macro 
economy. ØEM 2007c, p.7. (AOT) 
796 ØEM 2007c, p. 9. (AOT) 
797 ØEM 2000b, pp. 20-21. See also pp. 93-117. (AOT) 
798 ØEM 2004, p. 40. (AOT) 
799 ØEM 2007b, p. 11, p. 22 and pp. 53-55. See also ØEM 2007a, p. 161, ØEM 2004, p. 34. 
(AOT) 
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In 1993 DØR engages in a longer discussion of what it terms a “special, if 
somewhat populist variety of supply-side-theories”800 which assert that tax cuts are 
fully self-financing.801 And it argues that the Reagan administration from its 
inception in 1981 built its fiscal policy upon just such an hypothesis, leading to a 
very expansionary fiscal policy. However, the results were not what the “populist 
variety of supply-side theory” had predicted. Instead DØR observes, that the U.S. 
“from its fiscal expansion had to draw the lesson that unfinanced tax 
cuts to increasing extent generated higher imports and lower exports. 
The positive effect of the tax breaks thus gradually benefitted abroad; 
thus the U.S. in addition to the problem of an unbalanced federal budget, 
obtained a growing balance of payments problem. Within a short time 
the U.S. changed its status from the world’s largest creditor nation to a 
great debtor nation.”802    
A development which came to threaten the competitiveness of the “U.S. balance-
of-payments business.”803 Hence the DØR argues that the above “theory only 
holds true given completely implausible circumstances.”804 MM in 2007 argues 
that Denmark’s  
“historically high tax burden has not prevented us from developing one 
of the world’s most competitive economies.”805 
12.3.3 SoC III: Labor Markets 
Also in Denmark, a great emphasis is put upon the organization of the labor 
market as a source of competitiveness. ØEM, in its annual economic report from 
2000, emphasizes the importance of a flexible and well-functioning labor market 
for the expedient alignment of wages, prices and productivity levels so as not to 
 

800 DØR 1993, p. 29. (AOT) 
801 That is, the view that the positive effects on incentive structures of product and labor markets 
fully outweighs or even supersedes the fiscal drag caused by such tax cuts as expressed by the 
Laffer curve. 
802 DØR 1993, p. 33. (AOT) 
803 DØR 1993,  p. 33. (AOT) 
804 DØR 1993,  p.29. (AOT) 
805 MM 2007, p. 35. (AOT) 
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impair Danish competitiveness.806 In the “DK.21” white paper, the ØEM claims 
that  
“The supply of labor, the qualifications of labor and the flexibility of the 
labor market have great significance for how fast and precisely the 
business sector can adapt to new conditions on the market. … The 
Danish labor force is among the three biggest in the world in proportion 
to the number of adults. International statistics also reveal that Danes’ 
qualifications can match the competitors.”807    
In 1993, the DØR argued that solutions to improve competitiveness must be 
sought in “functionality of the traditional labor market.”808 In fact DØR in its 
annual economic report from 2007 engages in a lengthy discussion and 
comparison of the relative merits of different “labor market systems.”809 Here it 
distinguishes between “flexicurity” systems characterized by generous 
unemployment benefits and liberal rules for employment and dismissal, 
continental European systems with restrictive rules of dismissals but low levels of 
compensation, and the Anglo-Saxon systems which have neither. DØR finds that 
in terms of job creation, employment performance and productivity increases, the 
latter model is superior “since there are few restrictions upon the reallocation of 
labor.”810 But it also observes the drawback, that unemployment insurance in such 
a regime is comparatively limited. Thus DØR ultimately concludes that  
“It is not obvious which model is optimal in socioeconomic terms. The 
Anglo-Saxon model yields the highest efficiency in the labor market, but 
it is not given that it provides the highest welfare, since a private system 
of insurance not necessarily includes weak workers.”811 
 

806 ØEM 2000a, p. 7. (AOT)See also p. 122. 
807 ØEM 2000b, p. 23. See also ØEM 2004, p. 6, p.11, ØEM 2007a, p. 119, ØEM 2007c, pp. 
179-195. (AOT) 
808 DØR 1993, p. 5 and p. 79. (AOT) See also DØR 2007, p. 91, for a similar emphasis upon the 
impact of the functionality of the Danish labor market upon competitiveness.  
809 DØR 2007, pp. 194-198. (AOT) 
810 DØR 2007, p. 196. (AOT) 
811 DØR 2007, p. 197. (AOT) 
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However, other PROs are less reticent, and without much hesitation proclaim the 
Danish flexicurity model a successful contribution to Danish competitiveness. For 
instance, AE in its annual economic report suggests “the Danish labor market 
model is revered around in Europe for its contribution to a well-functioning labor 
market.” In a no less self-celebratory tenor, MM agrees that “the unique Danish 
flexicurity welfare model is an international story of success”812 and goes on to 
argue that as a consequence Denmark in 2007  
“ranks number three on World Economic Forum’s global ranking of 
national competitiveness. The Danish model, which builds upon a 
unique combination of flexibility and social security, has shown itself 
able of increasing prosperity concurrently with increased 
globalization.”813 
12.4 Before and After the New Economy 
Danish PROs also address the new economy. ØEM in its annual economic report 
from 2000—in light of the perceived strong macroeconomic performance of the 
U.S. in the 1990s—addresses the question of the emergence of a new economy 
understood as the “hypothesis of permanent higher economic growth without 
increasing inflation.”814 It argues that discussions of a potential new economy 
center on the question of whether it is possible for economies to achieve a 
permanently higher productivity growth. Yet, ØEM cautiously concludes that “it 
is yet too early to pass a judgment” on whether new economies in fact have 
emerged.815  
 
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812 MM 2007, p. 7. (AOT) 
813 MM 2007, p. 15-16. See also pp. 31-32. (AOT) 
814 ØEM 2000a, p. 117. (AOT) 
815 ØEM 2000a, p. 122. (AOT) 
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Also DØR in its annual economic report from 1998 addresses head on the 
question of whether the advanced political economies of the world have 
transformed into “new economies.”816 It observes that  
“Within recent years the hypothesis of “New Economy” has emerged. 
The hypothesis entails that essential economic relationships have 
changed qualitatively as well as quantitatively.”817  
In the chapter, the organization examines whether seven significant political-
economic developments—the transition to a service society, the digital revolution, 
globalization, changes in the financial sector, market liberalizations, changes in 
labor markets and changes in macroeconomic policies 818 —have caused 
fundamental changes to the functionality of the macro economy in the U.S., the 
U.K., Denmark and Germany. In particular DØR examines whether such 
developments have caused a permanent increase in productivity growth and thus 
potential growth rates in these economies, and relatedly, whether it with the 
emergence of the (allegedly) new economies now has become possible to maintain 
high growth and employment rates without the evil twin of inflation. However, 
following a series of analyses, DØR dismisses such optimism and rejects the 
hypothesis of a new economy with the following conclusion:  
“The productivity does not appear to increase extraordinarily in the 
1990s. ... Overall, there is thus no reason to believe that one can 
maintain high growth in a long period without it having in impact 
through accelerating wage and price increases.”819  
Even if the new economy hypothesis is rejected by ØEM and DØR, some PROs 
(including ØEM) nonetheless argue that the competition of nations has entered a 
new stage and that what is needed for a nation to remain competitive has changed.  
 
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816 DØR 1998, pp. 95-174. (AOT) 
817 DØR 1998, p. 95. (AOT) 
818 DØR 1998, p. 100. (AOT) 
819 DØR 1998, p. 167. (AOT) 
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In the white paper “DK.21” published in 2000, ØEM asserts that 
“we are heading into a new kind of society which functions in a different 
way than the industrial society we know.”820  
It further argues that in the old “industrial society” all advanced economies have 
“concentrated on aligning a range of fundamental framework conditions for 
business,”821 that is, macroeconomic stability, competitive cost levels, a tax system 
which incentivizes work effort and investments, flexible labor markets and good 
infrastructure. Denmark has performed well on these parameters but now what is 
required to stay ahead in the competition has changed:   
“Exactly because all western nations have focused upon the same, it is 
not sufficient to give Danish business a national lead in the long run. 
More is needed.”822  
ØEM claims that the decisive competitive factor in the “competition of the new 
world”  
“is not so much the access to raw materials or capital, which sort out the 
sheep from the goats. It is the human competences, knowledge and 
creativity, which determine what firms and what societies perform the 
best.”823 
The white paper from 2004, “Denmark and Globalization,” maintains the view 
when it suggests that 
“In the global knowledge economy our competitiveness and 
cohesiveness to a high degree depends upon our level of knowledge—
upon education and science. We compete upon knowledge and upon 
new ideas. We compete upon our ability to use new knowledge and new 
ideas to create production and new jobs.”824 
 
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820 ØEM 2000b, p. 10.  (AOT) 
821 ØEM 2000b, p. 17. (AOT) 
822 ØEM 2000b, p. 17. (AOT) 
823 ØEM 2000b, p. 10. (AOT) 
824 ØEM 2004, p. 38.  (AOT) 
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Along the same line, MM in 1993 also finds that the “traditional political-
economic strategies” are less successful in the 1990s than they used to be in the 
1980s and observes the emergence of a new generation of “political growth 
strategies,” according to which 
“Now more emphasis is put upon stationary, structural conditions, 
because capital and firms easily locate across borders. Therefore 
competitiveness is no longer perceived as a question of having the 
largest natural resources, most capital or the cheapest labor, about 
having the skills, the knowledge and the infrastructure, which 
contributes most value to firms’ production. In other words, good 
macroeconomic conditions are no longer perceived as sufficient for 
ensuring a strong competitiveness in the global market economy.”825  
12.4.1 Price or Quality Competitiveness 
As seen, Danish PROs, on a par with their British and German counterparts, tend 
to vacillate between export performance on the one hand and growth performance 
and increases in living standards on the other as the most appropriate outcome 
indicator of a competitive nation. 
In the cases where an organization equates competitiveness with export 
performance, it tends to argue that comparative wage levels and increases, the 
exchange rate and (at times) rates of productivity constitute the decisive factors of 
competitiveness. For instance, ØEM in 1993 estimates Danish competitiveness on 
the basis of relative wage costs and the exchange rate.826 In 2000 ØEM similarly 
claims that there is “no doubt, that there is a clear connection between wage 
competitiveness and how industrial firms perform on export markets”827 and urges 
that “wage and price alignment is again aligned with abroad, if Danish 
 

825 MM 1993, p. 47. See also p. 9, p. 12, p. 19, p. 26, p. 51 and p. 61. (AOT) 
826 ØEM 1993, pp. 52-53. See ØEM 1996, Chapter 5, for an account where productivity is 
included. (AOT)  
827 ØEM 2000a, p. 130. (AOT) 
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competitiveness is not to deteriorate.”828 In the same line, DØR in its early annual 
economic reports (1993 and 2000) deems relative wage developments as well as 
the exchange rate as central determinants of national export performance.829 
However, in 2007 DØR argues that relative wage costs, exchange rates and rates 
of productivity constitute decisive determinants of competitive performance.830 
AE, also in its annual economic report from 1993, equates competitiveness with 
relative wage levels and the terms of trade831 (i.e., the relative price difference 
between national exports and imports). 
However, contrasting claims as to the decisive factors of competitiveness are also 
made. In the white paper “DK.21” from 2000, ØEM explicitly contests whether 
wages are decisive in this new competition:    
“What will seriously distinguish the rich countries in the future global 
competition is not low costs or low taxes. Nations who are good at 
creating high productivity and renewal will perform best.”832 
It maintained this view in 2004: 
“We cannot—and we shall not—compete upon wages alone. … It will 
only make us poorer. We can—and we shall—compete upon knowledge 
and skills. When others get cheaper, we get better.”833 
MM in 1993 contends that  
“it is not the price of labor which constitutes a fundamental competitive 
parameter for Denmark, but instead the quality of that labor—and its 
mobility, understood as, the right labor being present where it is 
needed.”834  
 

828 ØEM 2000a, p. 7. See also 2007a, p. 104. (AOT) 
829 DØR 2000, p. 46, DØR 1993, pp. 50-51. (AOT) 
830 DØR 2007 p. 63. (AOT) 
831 AE 1993, pp. 87-88. See also p. 7. (AOT) 
832 ØEM 2000b, p. 17. (AOT) 
833 ØEM 2004, p. 17. See also p. 6. See also ØEM 2007b, p. 9. (AOT) 
834 MM 1993, p. 70. See also p. 9, p. 13, p. 27 and p. 51. (AOT) 
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And in 2007, the organization cited Michael Porter’s The Competitive Advantage 
of Nations for its demonstration that the ability to compete in spite of high wages 
and high costs is more preferable for nations which intend to increase their 
prosperity. It finds that “Denmark is one of those countries which in a historical 
perspective has shown that it is possible.”835  
12.4.2 SoC IV: Education, Science, Innovation, 
Entrepreneurship 
The emphasis upon the ability to compete upon knowledge and quality production 
is mirrored in the range of sources perceived by Danish PROs. 
First and foremost education policies are continuously alluded to as important 
sources of competitiveness. For instance, AE in its annual economic report from 
1993 contends that the main task for policymakers consists of the improvement of 
the structures of the economy through supply-side measures.  But this, it argues, 
“happens best first be betting on investments in education and 
infrastructure rather than tax cuts and secondly generally be 
strengthening competition as much as possible.”836 
In fact, AE continuously makes reference to the positive correlation between 
increased investments in education, employment and thus macroeconomic stability 
as it claims investments in human capital, on a par with tax reductions, exhibits 
dynamic effects.837 For instance, it argues the “Denmark’s success with high 
prosperity and small inequality is mainly due to our high supply of 
competences.”838   
 
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835 MM 2007, p. 18. (AOT) 
836 AE 1993, p. 13. (AOT) 
837 AE, 2007, p. 6, p. 22 and p. 63(AOT) 
838 Ibid. p. 77 (AOT) 
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ØEM, in its annual economic report from 2000, considers education “extremely 
important” 839; in the 2007 growth report it finds that “educated labor is an 
important competitive parameter for Danish firms and decisive for high-quality 
public services.”840 In its white paper published the same year, it argues  
“The raw material in the new global economy is the ‘ability to learn.’ 
That is the ability to acquire new knowledge and to improve those 
products and services which did well on the market last year. Hence, 
firms will come to compete upon human resources and their ability to 
create innovation.”841 
Similarly MM with reference to the Danish educational system finds that 
Denmark possesses a “cultural strength” in that 
“Danes belong to the most independent-minded peoples in world, and 
the Danish labor force thus fits exceptionally well with the new 
decentralized organizations and production systems, in which flexibility 
and productivity are keywords.”842  
Second, science, R&D and innovation are claimed to constitute sources of 
international competitiveness. For instance, in the 2007 competitiveness index, 
ØEM claims that “research and development is one of the keys to continued 
growth and prosperity,”843 just as it argues that “the ability of firms to innovate 
and apply new knowledge is a decisive international competitive parameter.”844 
MM in 1993 argues that “advanced and specialized knowledge resources are 
decisive for attracting investments,”845 which is echoed in 2007 where it claims  
“Denmark is confronted with a new phase of globalization, where the 
ability to build innovative networks across national boundaries and build 
 

839 ØEM, 2000a, p. 122; See also ØEM, 2007b, p. 10  (AOT) 
840 ØEM, 2007b, p. 14, see also p. 10, p. 52 and pp. 65-67 (AOT) 
841 ØEM, 2000b, p.35, see also p. 31, p. 37, p. 40. See also ØEM, 2004 pp. 14-16 and p. 38; and 
ØEM, 2007c, pp. 59-107 (AOT) 
842 MM, 1993, p. 63. See also pp. 70-73 (AOT) 
843 ØEM, 2007c, p. 107 (AOT) 
844 ØEM, Ibid. p. 117. See also ØEM, 2000a, p.120 and ØEM 2000b p. 17 (AOT) 
845 MM 1993, p. 75. (AOT) 
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a new generation of Innovative Globals becomes decisive for 
success.”846  
Third, good conditions for small and medium-sized firms and entrepreneurship are 
also argued to be a potential source of competitiveness. In the annual growth 
report from 2007, ØEM argues that  
“entrepreneurs play an important role for the dynamism and growth in 
the economy. Continuous testing of new ideas occurs through new 
firms. At the same time entrepreneurs strengthen competition in the 
economy.”847  
In fact ØEM in its annual growth report from 2007 neatly summarizes the 
discussion:  “Education, knowledge, innovation and entrepreneurship are key to 
maintaining the competitiveness of Danish firms.”848 
12.4.3 SoC V: Management, Migration, Public Sector, 
ICT, Finance  
However, there appears to be more to international competitiveness than 
education, innovation and entrepreneurship in the eyes of Danish policy research 
organizations. 
First, the general uptake and utilization of ICT is deemed of high importance for 
the enhancement of productivity and growth potential and hence competitiveness 
by organizations such as ØEM849 and MM.850  
Second, PROs argue that the ability to attract labor from abroad and further 
migration increase Danish labor supply and thus its growth potential and 
competitiveness. ØEM, in its growth report851, the government white paper852 and 
 

846 MM 2007, p. 7. (AOT) 
847 ØEM 2007b, p. 30. See also ØEM 2000b, p. 59, and ØEM 2007c, pp. 167-179. (AOT) 
848 ØEM 2007b, preface. (AOT) 
849 ØEM 2007b, p. 51, ØEM 2004, p. 34, ØEM 2000b, p. 26, ØEM 2007c, pp. 215-219. (AOT) 
850 MM 2007, p. 9 and p. 31. (AOT) 
851 ØEM 2007b, p. 26. (AOT) 
852 ØEM 2004, pp. 16-17. (AOT) 
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its competitiveness index points to the competitive benefits of increased 
migration. For instance in the competitiveness index it suggests that 
“Sufficient labor is a decisive precondition if Denmark is still to remain 
one of the world’s richest countries. Thus it is important that we are able 
to attract and retain labor in competition from abroad.”853    
Also DØR is attentive to how increased migration might contribute to increase the 
Danish supply of labor when it observes that a “relative new dimension of 
globalization is that the labor force is extended with pendlers and migrants”854 and 
expresses the need to examine whether there exist “inappropriate restrictions” for 
the opportunity of foreigners to come to Denmark.855 MM in 2007 finds that 
“targeted import of competences” is needed to sustain Denmark’s innovative 
capabilities.856 AE in 2006 suggests  
“new Danes should be given a special focus in the discussion of Danish 
competitiveness and cohesiveness. It is this part of the population, which 
to a high degree is the key to the challenges, we are faced with.”857  
Third, an efficient public sector is considered an important source of 
competitiveness, just as efficient health-care provision also is considered to 
constitute a potential positive contribution to the enhancement of labor supply. 
ØEM’s competitiveness index from 2007, for instance, devotes an entire chapter 
to “efficient public service,”858 while the issue is discussed more briefly in its 
other publications.859 In the white paper “Denmark and Globalization,” it is 
claimed that 
“The public sector is large in Denmark and has an important role to play 
in value creation. In many cases the public sector constitutes a link in 
 
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853 ØEM 2007c, p. 158. (AOT) 
854 DØR 2007, p. 282. See also p. 290. (AOT) 
855 DØR 2007, p. 304. (AOT) 
856 MM 2007, p. 31. (AOT) 
857 AE 2006, p. 3. (AOT) 
858 ØEM 2007c, pp. 209-221. (AOT) 
859 ØEM 2007b, p. 64, ØEM 2004, p. 34 and p. 40. (AOT) 
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the chain from when an idea emerges until it is visible on the bottom 
line in the bank account of a firm or employee.”860  
MM already in 1993 claimed that the public sector constitutes a potential 
competitive advantage for Denmark:  
“Denmark differs from other countries by having a more service-heavy 
public sector, which exactly concentrates on welfare. Many of these 
services are produced by the private sector in other countries—often 
much cheaper due to lower quality. A high quality of public service is 
however not just a good for the citizen. It is an important precondition 
for many Danish firms’ competitiveness.”861    
With regard to health care, for instance, AE in its 2007 report argues that health-
care costs exhibit “dynamic effects through prevention of absenteeism as well as 
faster returns to the labor market following sick leaves.”862 (In fact AE argues that 
similar effects accrue to public spending upon childcare.863) DØR in 2007 argues 
that average annual time worked per employee “besides weekly working hours 
also depends upon illness and other absence.”864  
Fourth, the relative skill and quality of managers is also addressed as a potential 
source of competitiveness. For instance, ØEM in 2000 argues that 
“It requires a skillful and determined management to navigate a firm 
through changes to technology and markets in the coming years. For the 
Danish business community as a whole it is important to have access to 
relevant methods of management.”865 
Similar claims can be discerned in the commission report published by MM in 
1993.866 
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860 ØEM 2004, p. 34. See also ØEM 2007c, pp. 209-219. (AOT) 
861 MM 1993, p. 157. See also p. 17 and. p. 163. (AOT) 
862 AE 2007, p. 68. (AOT) 
863 AE 2007, p. 66. (AOT) Also ØEM asserts that sufficient childcare provision is a necessary 
condition for increasing the labor supply. See ØEM 2007b, p. 111.   
864 DØR 2007, p. 282. (AOT) 
865 ØEM 2000, p. 45. (AOT) 
866 MM 1993, pp. 73-73. (AOT) 
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Finally, the importance of well-functioning financial markets to competitiveness is 
likewise emphasized. Again, ØEM constitutes an example. In its annual economic 
report from 2000 it claims that 
“Well-functioning financial markets are of great importance for 
business, investors, households as well as the public sector. … The 
financial sector thus plays a substantial role for growth and prosperity in 
a modern society.”867  
12.4.4 SoC VI: Environmental Protection and Social 
Inclusion 
12.4.4.1 Environmental Protection vs. Competitiveness?  
As observed in the other knowledge regimes, PROs in Denmark also discuss the 
relationship between policy measures to protect the environment and international 
competitiveness. And as seen elsewhere, basically two different perceptions 
flourish: on the one hand the view that environmental protection impedes 
competitiveness and on the other the view that environmental protection in the 
long run improves competitiveness. For instance, DØR in its annual economic 
report from 1993 addresses this question and subscribes to the former view when 
it finds that environmental protection has an inverse relationship with 
competitiveness:  
“The environmental policy ought ideally to reflect a balancing of costs 
and advantages by the concerned measures and simultaneously be 
subjected to the consideration to coordinate with other policies ... to 
realize the goals of environmental policy costly dispositions are imposed 
upon households and especially the business community, which can 
deteriorate Danish competitiveness.”868 
Thus, here DØR clearly envisions a trade-off between the two and that policy 
measures for increasing competitiveness and policy measures to protect the 
environment should be counterbalanced. Yet, DØR later in the same report 
 
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867 ØEM 2000a, p. 66 and p. 120. See also ØEM 2000b, p. 31. (AOT) 
868 DØR 1993, p. 134. (AOT) 
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suggests that “environmental efforts can at least in some areas also improve the 
prospects for economic activity” 869  and claims that in some cases strict 
governmental environmental regulation might in fact be beneficial to the 
competitiveness of firms:  
“High or rather early introduced environmental regulation does not 
necessarily only have a negative influence on competitiveness in the 
longer term. Strict national environmental regulation can further new 
niche productions and provide firms with a technological head start.”870  
However, DØR maintains that such forms of regulation should only be 
implemented gradually over the long term to allow for the piecemeal adaptation to 
the stricter demands; otherwise such efforts would hurt unemployment.871  
AE also addresses this question. In its annual economic report from 1993 it first 
claims that for a small country it is “relatively disadvantageous” to take the lead in 
relation to problems of trans-boundary pollution. Mirroring DØR, it finds that “the 
environmental advantages will only marginally benefit the country, and besides 
that problems with competitiveness can emerge.”872 However, AE also recounts 
two reasons for why the implementation of strict governmental regulation might 
nonetheless prove beneficial and “achieve advantages” in the medium and longer 
term. First, it advances a transformation of the industrial structure which according 
to AE will occur anyway: 
“To take the lead in environmental regulation is in itself a way to obtain 
a head start in the technological and thus industrial development. Thus, 
there are several examples of the emergence of successful Danish firms 
in the aftermath of farsighted environmental policy because the stricter 
 
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869 DØR 1993, p. 85. (AOT) 
870 DØR 1993, p. 130. (AOT) 
871 DØR 1993, p. 134. (AOT) Yet DØR also maintains that trans-boundary pollution should be 
regulated internationally and observes limits to what individual countries can achieve on their 
own. It finds that “isolated national initiatives against trans-boundary pollution will impair 
competitiveness without being offset by sufficient national environmental advantages.” See p. 
136. 
872 AE 1993, p. 89. (AOT) 
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Danish environmental regulations later have been followed 
internationally. As examples, one could mention district heating, smoke 
cleaning, cement production and water purification.”873  
However, AE follows the line of DØR when it contends that such regulation ought 
to be phased in over the long term to allow for the gradual adaptation of firms. Yet 
it differs from DØR when it asserts that  
“One should however not let short-term considerations for 
competitiveness dominate to the extent that one blocks for a market 
economic—and environmentally—appropriate displacement in the 
industrial structure in the long term. ... The problem of balancing 
between short-term considerations for firms’ competitiveness and the 
long-term renewal of industrial structure is perhaps greater then most 
will admit. This is because existing industries’ points of view (e.g., 
farming), due to natural reasons, are far more strongly represented in the 
actual political game than the firms of tomorrow.”874  
Also ØEM in 2000 argues that consumers as well as the society increasingly will 
come to emphasize how firms relate to the environment. These aspects, it asserts, 
constitute the “new competitive parameters in the global knowledge economy.”875  
12.4.4.2 Social Cohesion vs. Competitiveness? 
Similarly PROs also addres the relation between societal cohesion and 
international competitiveness in the Danish knowledge regime. As seen already876, 
the white papers as well as the competitiveness index published by ØEM include 
various indicators for social cohesion as a measure of the outcome of a 
competitive nation. However, social inclusion, cohesion and equality is at times 
also addressed as an impediment and source of competitiveness.    
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873 AE 1993, p. 91. (AOT) 
874 AE 1993, p. 90. (AOT) 
875 ØEM 2000b, p. 17. (AOT) 
876 See p. 262 above. 



&-.
In its annual economic report from 2007, DØR undertakes a thorough review and 
comparison of the Anglo-American, continental European and Scandinavian labor 
market models. With regard to the latter kind, it finds problems. Specifically,  
“The disadvantage of this arrangement of the labor market is the tax 
financing, which decreases labor supply and wage formation. High 
unemployment compensation in addition increases minimum wages, 
which might marginalize weak groups on the labor market and put high 
demands on the distribution of qualifications in the work force and thus 
the educational system.”877   
That is, the “security part” of the flexicurity system is seen to have a potential 
negative impact upon labor supply and wage formation to the detriment of 
competitiveness (understood as growth and/or export performance) as well as 
employment and jobs creation.  
However, DØR apparently took a different position seven years before in its 
annual economic report from 2000. There it adopted a somewhat different 
perspective of the nexus between social cohesion and competitiveness:   
“A reinforced and reoriented effort against marginalization and 
exclusion will possibly overload the costs and competitiveness of firms 
in the short term. However, the economic advantages in the form of 
lower public expenses and increased labor supply will benefit firms in 
the long term. Add to this the major personal and social gains from 
reduced marginalization and exclusion.”878  
Indeed, the argument that social cohesion, equality and inclusion constitute a 
source of the competitiveness of the Danish political economy can be found in the 
publications of several organizations. For instance, ØEM in its white paper 
“DK.21” published in 2000 asserts such a claim when it, in a prolongation of the 
observation that the conditions of international competition of nations has 
changed, suggests the following: 
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877 DØR 2007, p. 195. (AOT) 
878 DØR 2000, p. 212. (AOT) 
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“To create a sustainable (“holdbart”) society is not in contrast to the 
challenges from the global knowledge economy. On the contrary, a 
sustainable society will contribute to secure that the business community 
also in the long term can stand strong in the global competition because 
such a society utilizes the resources of all citizens, not just the elite’s 
and because firms in global competition will locate in nations and 
regions which provide the best framework conditions. They do not only 
encompass hard economics but also values. That applies to, for example, 
equal opportunities for education, equality among men and women, 
great social security, low crime, human rights, sustainable environment 
and the ability of society to solve conflicts.”879 
In fact this contention is maintained in the commission white paper published in 
2004:  
“Competitiveness and cohesiveness are not mutual contradictions. On 
the contrary, both competitiveness and cohesiveness will contribute to 
secure that the business community also in the future can maintain a 
strong position in the still fiercer global competition. Dedicated and 
creative people thrive best in societies which simultaneously provide 
security and good conditions for innovation and expression. And 
dedicated and creative people are a decisive resource in the global 
knowledge economy.”880 
Similarly in the competitiveness report from 2007, ØEM argues that the Danish 
labor market, characterized by a “combination of flexibility, relative high social 
benefits and active labor market policy,” constitutes a source of competitiveness 
which also leads to “relatively equal distribution of income.”  
In fact, the same set of considerations appears to have informed the construction 
of the Danish competitiveness index published in 2007. This index measures the 
outcome of a competitive nation in terms of prosperity and cohesiveness. Thus the 
index finds that  
“Danish cohesiveness is supported by a generally high living standard, a 
high labor market participation rate and high educational levels. There 
are many circumstances which have influence upon cohesiveness, 
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
879 ØEM 2000b, p. 13. (AOT) 
880 ØEM 2004, p. 37. (AOT) 
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including participation in the democratic process, tolerance and respect 
for other persons and cultures, as well as equal access to education.”881 
AE in its annual economic report from 2007 also addresses this relationship when 
it observes that 
“The development in Denmark has just shown that it is possible to 
combine social security, equality and economic growth. Danish 
economy has thus by many been likened to the bumblebee, which 
should not be able to fly, but nonetheless does it.”882 
In fact, in 2006 AE published an independent policy brief directly addressing the 
relation between cohesiveness and competitiveness entitled “Cohesiveness and 
Competitiveness” (“Sammenhængskraft og Konkurrenceevne”). In this brief 
policy paper, the AE first reasserts the common claim that the Danish flexicurity-
model is “one of the explanations of the competitiveness of Danish business.”883 
This assertion is supported by the following argument, which in its essence 
constitutes a claim about the complementarity between social equality and 
international competitiveness: 
“Danes are relatively equal; not just because we redistribute through 
taxes and transfers, but also because competences are not as unequally 
distributed in Denmark. This form of equality should be expanded 
because equality through subsequent redistribution is expensive but also 
because a population with good qualifications creates cohesiveness and 
competitiveness.”884    
MM in 1993 on the one hand argues that the perceived “brutal elimination race” 
between both firms and nations “raise a debate … about the price of welfare 
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881 ØEM 2007c, p. 47. (AOT) In the index, the outcome of competitiveness understood as social 
cohesiveness is measured with five different econometric indicators: unemployment for less 
educated, (low) level of wage dispersion among educational groups, small proportion with 
relatively low incomes, low risk of continuous low income and integration on the labor market.  
882 AE 2007, p. 22. (AOT) 
883 AE 2006, p. 1. (AOT) 
884 AE 2006, p. 1. (AOT) 
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societies”885 and recognizes that more competitive international conditions imply a 
“colossal challenge” for the public sector since governments, not without further 
ado, can raise taxes due to heightened capital mobility.886 But it on the other hand 
also argues that a well-functioning public sector for the provision of welfare 
constitutes a competitive advantage. A view it maintains 15 years later when it in 
2007 contends that Denmark has always achieved the best results when “free 
markets, communities and competences” work together887 and asserts  
“effective and well-functioning welfare institutions are simultanously 
contributing to the securement of Denmark’s institutional 
competitiveness.”888  
12.4.5 The Role of Government in a New Economy? 
12.4.5.1 Correction of Market Failures 
As in the case of Germany and the U.K., the temporal shift is by some PROs also 
perceived to imply a shift in the legitimate role of the state vis-à-vis the market. 
First, the Danish organizations also argue that the potential presence of market 
failures (in particular positive and negative externalities) might warrant 
intervention by the state in the market through the means of regulation. ØEM in its 
white paper “DK.21” from 2000 implicitly embraces the concept of the market’s 
failure in its ability to supply public goods such as sufficient levels of investment 
in education: 
“The government shall not intervene in the decisions of firms. But we 
should contribute to create those framework conditions which make 
markets function effectively and decent. And we shall invest in skills 
and resources which markets do not build up themselves.”889 
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885 MM 1993, p. 33. See also p. 9, pp. 24-25, p. 29, p. 35 and pp. 48-49. (AOT) 
886 MM 1993, p. 157. (AOT) 
887 MM 2007, p. 33. (AOT) 
888 MM 2007, p. 10 and p. 35. (AOT) 
889 ØEM 2000b, p. 16. (AOT) 
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Also DØR in 1993 argues that there persist negative externalities with regard to 
environmental politics:  
“The normal market mechanism cannot without certain measures solve 
problems of pollution. This is because many environmental goods in 
greater or lesser degree are public goods, thus no clearly defined 
property right exists for the goods, which, e.g., applies to clean air and 
water. In such cases external effects (externalities) will occur in 
connection to the environmental goods, so that the activity of a producer 
or consumer impairs (negative externality) or improves (positive 
externality) the environment for others.”890 
AE in 1993 addresses the presence of negative externalities, arguing that if the 
economy is to function efficiently in the long term firms must carry the full costs 
of their production. Hence it finds it “illogical” if society 
“On the one hand accepts that firms must close if they can’t carry wage 
and interest costs, but on the other hand will not accept closures because 
they can’t carry the environmental costs. If society indemnifies firms for 
environmental costs, it will cement an industrial structure with 
environmentally harmful firms.”891 
Finally, MM in 1993 also posits a claim in favor of state intervention in markets to 
secure the provision of public goods such as health care for the elderly and 
education, which are claimed to enhance both social stability and carry a “range of 
positive external effects.”892  
12.4.5.2 Conversion of Mindsets 
Second, it is likewise argued that supply-side reforms might consist of more of the 
state than the creation and maintenance of the right set of incentives for market 
participants through various measures of (de)regulation and reform. In the Danish 
case, one also observes claims of the need to affect the culture, values, mindsets 
and the like of various groups of actors.  Again ØEM is a case in point. In its 
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annual growth account from 2007, it for instance argues that the problems of a 
diminishing labor supply could be mitigated if the “employed put in an extra 
effort.” This, ØEM argues, could be done if the individual employee  
“created higher quality by continually improving oneself, assuming 
greater responsibility or in other ways displaying initiative and 
dedication.”893  
In the white paper “DK.21” from 2000, ØEM expresses the need to “stimulate an 
entrepreneurial culture, which furthers risk appetite” through reforms of the 
primary school. And in 2004, the Danish government argues that 
“We should be “sneaky” (“snedige”) and not be afraid to experiment and 
take new paths. In a rapidly changing world we should be open to new 
opportunities and ourselves contribute to their creation. We cannot rely 
on doing things “as we used to.” Thus our educations should further 
creativity.”894 
MM shares the view that certain cultural traits and dispositions of a workforce 
might constitute a generic competitive advantage: 
“Culture will ... inevitably come to uphold a central role within 
organization and management in the coming years. ... Therewith the 
demand for everyone in a firm to agree about what values, norms and 
goals one is working towards grows—in other words the business 
culture must be strong. Otherwise the measures might end in chaos and 
impaired competitiveness. In the light of this development the Danish 
cultural particularities—especially the pronounced autonomy—might 
give Danish firms a competitive advantage.”895 
12.4.5.3 Coordination of Market Activities 
Third, some Danish PROs also hold that more societal actors, organizations and 
groups besides the state ought to play a role in furthering competitiveness of the 
nation. As the 2004 white paper argues, “the government alone” cannot achieve 
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893 ØEM 2007b, p. 22. (AOT) 
894 ØEM 2004, p. 38. (AOT) 
895 MM 1993, p. 75. (AOT) 
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the securement of Danish competitiveness. Instead this constitutes a responsibility 
for  
“young and old, employees and managers, private firms and public 
institutions. All shall contribute to secure the future of Denmark as a 
prosperous and cohesive society.”896  
 In its annual economic report from 2000, DØR, in relation to labor market issues, 
claims that to build an “inclusive labor market” requires the “active participation 
of the social partners,” and it asserts that  
“the development of the inclusive labor market in future years can be 
perceived as a test of the social responsibility of private and public 
employers as well as the unions.”897  
MM in 2007 expresses the belief that 
“Strong trust and knowledge sharing among the different partners—
between firms, unions and public decision makers—have historically 
given Denmark a position of strength within social innovation, which 
can be further developed.”898 
12.5 Before and After Knowledge Competition?  
Some Danish PROs even invoke a third temporal distinction. While it is 
frequently claimed that national decisive competitive advantages will come to 
consist of a nation’s relative investments in education, R&D and innovation so as 
to strengthen the preconditions for knowledge- and skill-intensive quality 
production, later in the period assertions such as these begin to be questioned. 
ØEM in its 2004 commission white paper, observes that  
“The outsourcing of production to low wage countries has occurred for 
many years. But the speed of the outsourcing might increase in the 
future. And as something new service tasks and knowledge intensive 
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jobs can also be outsourced, especially because communication across 
borders can occur quickly, safely and cheaply.”899 
And in 2007 MM again argues that “globalization has entered a new phase which 
makes growing demands upon the ability to innovate.”900 In this, once again, new 
phase   
“The Chinese and Indians will no longer settle with fabricating our 
cheap shirts, toys and computers, and as they ascend in the global value 
chain ... China and India will educate millions of scientists, designers, 
and engineers and establish new growth centers in the Silicon Valley 
class.”901 
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13. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
In light of the three analyses above it should by now be clear, that PRO’s in both 
the British, German and Danish knowledge regime participated in a common 
discourse of an “international competition of nations”. As seen, the PRO’s applied 
the three discursive dichotomies of temporality, subjectivity/objectivity and 
functionality with a reasonable degree of similarity, to “carve out” generically 
similar, if nonetheless distinctly different national narratives of competitiveness, 
sufficiently comparable to allow one as a social scientist to argue for the presence 
of a discourse.  
 
	
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13.1 National Similarities 
13.1.1 Dichotomies of Temporality  
First of all, PRO’s in the three knowledge regimes asserted sufficiently similar 
temporal dichotomies to carve out narratives of political economic history. As 
seen 10 out of 12 PRO’s902 assert a temporal distinction between a period before 
the late 1970’s and a period after. And the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
is by some PRO’s invoked as an important temporal differentiating the two 
periods.903  
The period before the late 1970’s is perceived to consist in a long initial spell of 
economic expansion, growth and increasing (if not full) employment (brought 
 
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902 IPPR, NIESR, IFS and HMT in the British knowledge regime (see p. 175 above); FES, 
SACH and BmWI in the German knowledge regime (see p. 213 above) and DØR, ØEM and 
MM in the Danish knowledge regime (See p. 251 above) 
903 See e.g. FES or DØR  
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about by a.o. Keynesian-inspired expansionary fiscal policies accompanied by 
accommodative monetary policies.)  The period after the late 1970s, on the 
contrary, is perceived as a macro-economically more turbulent time, with 
mounting inflation, stagnating growth rates and increasing unemployment. The 
new international context following the late 1970’s is variously found to be 
characterized by liberalizations of the rules for international capital movement; 
abolishment of restrictions and barriers on trade and establishment of common 
markets such as the European single market or NAFTA; the appearance of newly 
industrialized, developing and emerging economies in Eastern Europe, Asia and 
Southern America as well as technological improvements allowing for increased 
global differentiation and location of production. 904 
Moreover, these arguably new international politico-economic conditions, are by 
several PRO’s interpreted as implying an increasing competitive pressure upon 
nations.905 For instance, this ostensibly intensifying competition is with a colorful, 
almost belligerent vocabulary by some PRO’s characterized as a “cold peace”, 
“threat” or “elimination race” in which “our rivals will not wait for us to catch 
up.“906 In several knowledge regimes, PRO’s further support their claims of 
increasing competition of nations and a growing emphasis upon competitiveness 
among domestic economic policy makers, with the observation that the same shift 
in emphasis can be discerned among policymakers abroad. 907 
However, PRO’s perceive history to take a turn at some point, by which the 
character and nature of international competition change. That is, on a par with the 
dichotomy distinguishing a time before and after the late 1970’s, another temporal 
dichotomy distinguishing between before and after the late 1990’s also comes to 
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904 SACH 
905 SACH, BmWI, HMT, IPPR, NIESR, ØEM and MM 
906 MM and HMT 
907 See p. 175, p. 213 and p.  251 above 
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be regularly asserted from the year 2000 and onwards. Indeed, a majority of 
PRO’s (9 out of 12) addresses the question, whether an ostensibly ‘new’ or 
knowledge-based economy has emerged, and thus significantly altered the 
character of international competition.908 
The concept “New economy”, understood as an economy in which fundamental 
macro-economic relationships has changed or ceased to function909, is skeptically 
scrutinized, criticized and even outright rejected by some PRO’s 910. E.g. NIESR 
in U.K. argue that it is "as much a matter for social psychologists as for 
economists". Nevertheless the somewhat related idea of a transition to a new, 
more knowledge-intensive stage of international competition between nations is 
maintained and endorsed by several PRO’s. 911 As seen, several PRO’s of different 
knowledge regimes (6 out of 12) - in some form or another - invoke the argument, 
that what in the past used to be sufficient for a nations successful competitive 
performance, is in the future merely a necessary condition for participation. It is 
often argued, that the factors, which will separate future “winners” from “losers”, 
are different in the new stage of competition 912 and thus, that the nations which 
most quickly adapt to this new reality will prove most successful. 
This certain ‘je ne sais quoi’ of international competition – the ostensible X-factor 
of competitiveness, which according to e.g. ØEM will come to “sort sheeps from 
goats”913 - varies in the policy reports. Some PRO’s argue, that in earlier periods 
attention of policy-makers was directed towards issues of relative production 
costs, wages and exchange rate (at times termed “price competitiveness”), but that 
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908 HMT, NIESR and IPPR in United Kingdom (see p. 194 above); BmWI, SACH and FES in 
Germany (see p. 232 above); and ØEM, DØR, and MM in Denmark (see p. 277 above) 
909 See p. 178  
910 DØR, ØEM, SACH and NIESR 
911 HMT, NIESR and IPPR  
912 FES, SACH, IPPR, IFS, MM and ØEM  
913 See p. 279 above 
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in the present this is complemented or replaced with a focus on national ability to 
produce quality, higher-value added goods. Such forms of production can obtain 
better prices in international trade through more beneficial terms of trade, but 
requires higher inputs of capital, technology and skilled labor, and thus holds the 
promise of potentially sustaining higher wages and living standards.914 In short, 
some PRO’s contend, that if a nation is to succeed in the new competition, it must 
compete on quality as well as price.915  
In fact, some PRO’s vehemently oppose a national competitive strategy based on 
cost-reductions. Recall how FES distinguishes between a “cost reduction-strategy” 
and a “consistent growth strategy”, and provide a negative argument for the latter, 
by demonstrating the insufficiency of the former. According to FES price is not a 
decisive determinant for export of high-quality goods; improvements in cost levels 
are quickly offset through exchange rate movements and might prompt retaliation 
from trading-partners; stagnant or declining wage levels might suppress domestic 
demand and imperil growth prospects, firms expectations of future profits and thus 
their willingness to invest etc.916  
Some PRO’s relatedly argue, that “in the future” stage of competition, 
competitiveness consists in the ability to integrate knowledge, skills, innovation 
and new technology in the production processes, and hence emphasize the 
importance of national institutional arrangements for the provision of skills and 
acquisition of knowledge.917 Some PRO’s - again relatedly - suggest that future 
competitiveness is a question of the national ability to increase domestic 
productivity.918 However, the important observation is not that PRO’s disagree 
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914 E.g. NIESR.  
915 NIESR, BmWI, SACH and FES. 
916 See p. 235 above 
917 HMT, NIESR and IPPR 
918 NIESR and HMT.  
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about the specifics of an ostensible “winning parameter”. Rather the point is, that 
so many PRO’s perceive such a parameter to exist. In short PRO’s assert the same 
generic discursive dichotomy of temporality – the competition of nations has 
entered a new stage, and what is required to remain successful in this new stage, 
has changed - even if their particular substantiation of this argument varies.   
13.1.2 Dichotomies of Objectivity and Subjectivity: 
Metrics and Role of Government  
Secondly, the PRO’s in sufficiently similar ways employ the dichotomies of 
objectivity and subjectivity. It is possible to discern a similar pattern and hence 
compare how PRO’s in the three knowledge regimes objectify the immensely 
complex, qualitative political-economic social reality they face by transforming it 
into a similar set of measurable quantitative econometric statistics; and 
simultaneously subjectify that social reality by designating and ascribing actors 
with potential agency and responsibility vis-a-vis such objects.  
13.1.2.1 Three Metrics of Competitiveness 
While several PRO’s readily contend, that national competitiveness is a devilishly 
tricky business to comprehend, measure and assess – indeed both BmWI and 
SACH in Germany express skepticism with regards to whether it for economists at 
all makes sense to attempt to provide an analytically adequate and unequivocal 
account of the multi-facetted, heterogeneous and “fuzzy” concept of national 
competitiveness919 - there is nonetheless a reasonable degree of consistency in the 
types of metrics which PRO’s in all three knowledge regimes apply to quantify 
and objectify the competitiveness of a nation. 
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First, 8 out of 12 PRO’s at some point employ the econometric methodology of 
Output-gap estimation.920 Indeed, NIESR in 1995 finds that the use of this macro-
economic indicator has become so widespread, that it coins the term a “science of 
gapeologists.”921 As seen the metric is devised to measure the distance or gap 
between a political economy’s current, demand-side determined level of capacity 
utilization and the potential, supply-side determined productive capacity at any 
given point in time.  
Recall, how some PRO’s observe – in the words of IPPR – observe an “inexorable 
trade-off” between growth and employment on the one hand, and inflation on the 
other.922 I.e. economic policymakers are perceived as confronted with a necessary 
policy choice between high growth and high inflation or low growth/low inflation. 
In a sense, the output-gap serve as a macro-economic steering mechanism for 
economic policy makers, which allow them to adjust the macro-economic policy 
mix to achieve a growth and employment rate as high as possible under the 
constraint of stable inflation.  
However, the output-gap is used to more than merely securing stable inflation. 
Indeed it implies a dual task for policymakers. The task consists in demand-side 
management through macro-economic measures to align actual, current levels of 
consumption, investment and export with the sustainable supply-side level in the 
short term; simultaneously with the continuous implementation of supply-side 
reforms to enhance the economy’s underlying, sustainable (i.e the level of growth 
consistent with stable inflation) growth potential in the long-term. In short, the 
task for economic policy-makers consists - perhaps paradoxically – in the 
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920 NIESR, IFS and HMT in the British knowledge regime (see p. 186 above); SACH and BS in 
the German knowledge regime (see p. 222 above); ØEM, DØR and AE in the Danish 
knowledge regime (see p. 264 above) 
921 See p. 187 above 
922 HMT, NIESR and IPPR in the British knowledge regime (see p. 176 above) 
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simultaneous opening and closing, widening and narrowing of the out-put gap - as 
an archer asked to hit a target while trying to move it.923 
Secondly, also 8 out of 12 PRO’s, apply the distinct – if related – economic metric 
of growth accounting.924 As seen, the Out-put gap itself is composed of a demand-
side component as well as a supply-side component, and it is to estimate the latter 
component, that PRO’s turn to growth accounting. The growth account itself – in 
an almost a priori fashion - is composed of a limited set of mutually exclusive and 
necessary, collectively exhaustive and sufficient growth accounting items – i.e. 
generic sources of potential growth. 
However, in spite of its apparent a priority, different PRO’s operate with different 
numbers of accounting items when applying growth accounting. For instance, 
HMT in the U.K. operate with three (population growth, employment and 
productivity); ØEM in Denmark operate with four (structural unemployment, 
labor market participation rate, working hours and productivity) and SACH in 
Germany wields no less than six such items (capital, productivity, share of 
population of working age, labor force participation rate, employment rate, 
working hours.) Hence, while all growth accounts invoke the picture of analytic 
completeness (i.e. are presented as mutual exclusive and collective exhaustive) 
some accounts nonetheless appear more complete than others. Again, the 
important point – for now - is not that different PRO’s substantiate the metric of 
growth accounting differently. The point is, that PRO’s in all three knowledge 
regimes objectify social reality in roughly the same way with the invocation of the 
same type of metric.  
 
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923 Of course, the paradox is not as paradoxical as it sounds. The paradox is resolved by the 
invocation of different temporal concepts. The moving of the target – supply-side – takes place 
over the long-term, the target practice – demand-side management – in the short-term.  
924 HMT, IFS and NIESR in the British knowledge regime (see p. 188 above); BMWI and 
SACH in the German knowledge regime (see p. 229 above); ØEM, DØR and AE in the Danish 
knowledge regime (see p. 264 above) 
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Thirdly, in all three knowledge regimes, one PRO publishes a competitiveness 
index – while several other PRO’s cite and discuss these kinds of metrics.  Where 
the indexes in U.K. and Denmark are published under the auspices of their 
respective ministries of Economics925, in Germany the advocacy organization BS 
from 2004 commence the publication of its International Standort Ranking.926 As 
seen, these indexes serve a somewhat similar purpose as the metric of growth 
accounting. But where growth accounting appears to be the product of a 
deductive, a priori exercise the indexes, in contrast, seems designed according to a 
more haphazard, accumulative and inductive logic. Indeed, each of these comes 
across as a somewhat ad hoc hotchpotch of sources and factors assumed 
empirically correlated with competitiveness. In fact, the HMT explicitly terms the 
construction method behind its index as “deliberately eclectic”.   
Hence, the composition and comprehensiveness of the individual indexes also 
vary – not only between knowledge regimes – but also over time. The Standort 
ranking hence field 12 economic indicators divided the three categories of labor 
market, business cycle and government, economy and social partners; ØEM’s 
index contains 12 different sources of competitiveness measured by 66 economic 
indicators; and HMT’s Productivity and Competitiveness Indicators in 2000 
boasts an impressive 80 indicators classified into three categories of business 
environment, resources and innovation process. However, in 2007 the latter index 
has shrunk to a less impressive 26 indicators. Yet, once again, the point is not how 
these indexes vary – telling as it might be – but that they vary according to a 
similar pattern.  
Thus, in all three knowledge regimes PRO's apply one or more of the three 
econometric techniques in order to objectify, quantify and commensurate the 
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925 See p. 201 and p. 273 above 
926 See p. 240 above 
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concept of competitiveness in a particular way. The three metrics are related. Thus 
the less general growth accounting metric, constitute the potential supply-side 
component of the more general output-gap; just as the less general 
competitiveness index constitute a more fine-grained, detailed and empirical 
decomposition of the seemingly a priori growth factors, added up in the more 
general growth account. Hence taken together the three metrics form, what might 
be termed, a general triadic metric of competitiveness, depicted in the following 
three-level figure. 

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Depending on PRO and knowledge regime in question, the particular elements 
included can vary, but that variation nonetheless occurs within a recognizable 
patterned structure. 
13.1.2.2 Four Roles of Government 
Likewise the PRO’s engage in sufficiently similar processes of subjectification, by 
which roles and responsibilities for the provision of the object of national 
competitiveness is assigned and ascribed to different classes of actors.  
First, the observed temporal shift to a more competitive and macro-economically 
more turbulent international political and economic environment after the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system, are by PRO’s presented as having implications for 
appropriate role (or viable economic policy stance) of the state vis-a-vis the 
market. In fact, BS describes this ostensible shift in thinking – which suggest a 
narrowed scope of viable, appropriate and efficient forms of economic policy 
available to governments - as a “paradigm change.“927 
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The adverse development in the late 1970’s is by several PRO’ believed to be a 
consequence of failed governmental attempts to apply formerly successful (macro-
) economic policies in a new, fundamentally transformed international 
environment. According to this line of reasoning, conventional Keynesian-inspired 
demand-side stimulus to bolster growth and employment is less effectual – if not 
even counterproductive - in a new, more globalized economic context, as 
increased public expenditure spills over to neighboring countries, increase imports 
and impair the current account balance instead of expanding the domestic 
economy.  To make matters worse, the resulting mounting of government debt is 
more difficult to finance with open and unrestrained international capital markets, 
which will interest rates on sovereign debt to rise. 
Instead, PRO’s argue that real growth in incomes, living standards as well as jobs 
generation and reductions in unemployment can only be achieved through reforms 
of the supply-side of the economy.928 Recall, for instance, how SACH dismiss 
both a “ defensive strategy” to enhance competitiveness through currency 
depreciation and a growth strategy based on fiscal demand-side stimulus. Instead, 
almost as a matter of logical exclusion, it contends that the only viable growth 
path is paved with reforms of the supply-side. Thus in light of the perceived 
“inexorability” of the inflation-growth nexus, it might prima facie seem as if 
conventional demand-side policy is abandoned, in favor of strict supply-side 
policy. 
However, this would be to jump to conclusions. Not all PRO’s argue for an 
economic policy exclusively oriented to reforms of the supply-side and a complete 
abandonment of demand-side measures. In fact a sizable minority of PRO’s (5 out 
of 12) in one form or another argue in favor of combinations of supply and 
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demand-side policy. In U.K. NIESR express surprise how demand-side 
management again is being discussed among economic policy making elites; IFS 
rejects that any real disagreement persists among classical and neo-Keynesian 
economists about the appropriateness of deficit spending in a recession; HMT 
claim that stable inflation is not a goal in itself, but a means to achieve growth929; 
in Germany BmWI explicitly oppose the supply-side approach proposed by SACH 
and argue in favor of a more balanced mix of the two930; and in Denmark DØR 
favor more pragmatic, context-dependent combinations of demand-side and 
supply-side policies, with the contention that ideological commitments often 
obstructs such pragmatism at the detriment of the economy.931  
Indeed, the widespread adoption of the economic metric of output-gap can be 
perceived as the PRO’s employment of analytical means, allowing a more 
targeted, precise fiscal policy in congruence with the underlying, structural 
capacity of the economy through an estimation of the current stage of the current 
cycle. I.e. the output-gap is harnessed to determine whether a fiscal contraction or 
expansion constitute the appropriate macro-economic stance 932. Surely the output-
gap does not per se exclude demand-side management. Quite to the contrary it 
makes demand-side stimulus - and even deficit spending - possible (within the 
constraints implied by the threat of inflation.) 
Secondly, in the reports published from 2000 and onwards, and thus 
approximately simultaneously with their observation of temporal shift towards a 
new economy and mode of competition, PRO’s comes to ascribe yet another set of 
roles and responsibilities for ensuring market efficiency and functionality. First 
and foremost these responsibilities concern the appropriate role of governments, 
 
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929 See p. 183 above 
930 See p. 225 above 
931 See p. 256 above  
932 See p. 186, p. 222 and p. 264 above 
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but also address the need to involve other societal actors. As seen governments are 
by PRO's perceived to posses a legitimate, appropriate role vis-a-vis markets in 
three distinct ways: as correctors of market failures, converters of mindsets and 
coordinators of economic activities.  
First, 8 out of 12 PRO’s advance argue that governments should correct market 
failures. That is, intervene in, reform and regulate markets to correct their inherent 
tendencies to deliver inefficient outcomes.933 E.g. recall how HMT distinguish 
between “four generic categories” of market failures - negative externalities, 
public goods, monopolies and market information asymmetries – which all 
provide a distinct rationale for government intervention in the economy. In fact, 
only SACH in Germany argue explicitly against the concept of market failures 
(which apparently are not much discussed by PRO’s in Germany), and suggest 
that while market failures are possible in theory, in practice they rarely occur.  
Secondly, a sizable minority of PRO’s (5 out of 12), argue that governments 
besides correcting market failures – through re-alignment of market incentives – 
also posses a legitimate role in the conversion of mindsets.934 That is, not only are 
governments perceived to have a role in altering conditions exogenous to market 
participants (i.e. incentive structures), likewise governments are perceived to have 
a legitimate role in inducing, nurturing and culturing a particular set of values, 
mind-sets and culture endogenous to market-participants. Recall e.g. how HMT 
argue that innovation is difficult to achieve without changed “cultural attitudes”; 
how ØEM suggest that Danes need to be “sneaky”; and how MM believe that the 
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933 HMT, IFS and IPPR in the British knowledge Regime (see p.208 above); BS in the German 
knowledge regime (see p. 246 above); and ØEM, DØR, AE and MM in the Danish knowledge 
regime (see p. 293 above) 
934 HMT in the British knowledge regime (see p. 208 above); BmWI and SACH in the German 
knowledge regime (see p. 247 above); ØEM and MM in the Danish knowledge regime (see p. 
293 above)  
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(ostensible) national cultural trait of independence constitute a distinct Danish 
competitive advantage.  
Thirdly, 7 out of 12 PRO's argue that governments should coordinate the activities 
of indeed a long range of societal actors. As seen, at several occasions PRO's - in 
particular ministries - plea, that the task of improving national competitiveness, is 
not one of governments alone - but one which requires the active involvement and 
participation of a burgeoning plethora of societal and economic actors. Most often 
the shared responsibility of employer associations and unions - e.g. for achieving a 
balanced wage-formation aligned with productivity - is emphasized, but a broader 
troop of actors are also enlisted under the banners. In the reports variously private 
firms, public institutions, political parties, regions, employees and managers, 
families, schools and cultural institutions, media, educationalists, public decision 
makers, young and old – not to mention the odd bedfellows science and churches - 
are called upon to do their part. It is not an understatement, when BmWI argue 
that “all societal forces” are called upon to aid the government.  
Perhaps it should not come as the biggest of surprises that PRO's in Germany - 
conventionally characterized as a coordinated market economy - calls for 
comprehensive and wide-spanning coordination among societal actors to mitigate 
antagonistic relations, and further cooperation to mutual benefits. But it is perhaps 
somewhat surprising, that calls for coordination is made by both IPPR and HMT 
in the U.K.935 - an archetypical liberal coordinated market economy. 936 
In sum, just as a majority of PRO’s in all three knowledge regimes invoke similar 
temporal dichotomies, it is equally evident that they also invoke the dichotomies 
of subjectivity and objectivity in sufficiently similar manner. Most PRO’s 
objectify their social reality through the triadic metric of competitiveness and 
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936 See p. 85 above 
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subjectify it, by ascribing four responsibilities and roles to governments vis-a-vis 
competitiveness. I.e. to combine supply- and demand-side policies to close the 
output gap; to correct market failures, to convert the mindsets of market 
participants, and to coordinate activities between otherwise potentially rivaling 
and antagonistic market participants – employers and employees, social partners 
etc. to ensure mutually beneficial outcomes.   
13.1.3 Dichotomy of Instrumentality: Sources and 
Outcomes.  
Thirdly, PRO’s in all three knowledge regimes likewise assert the dichotomy of 
instrumentality in a sufficiently similar way, inasmuch as they all conceptualize 
and assess the international competitiveness of nation as some form of economic 
function, in which a range of inputs or sources of competitiveness can be 
manipulated, reformed and changed by politico-economic actors, so as to produce 
a certain competitive outcome. 
13.1.3.1 The Goal of International Competition: Outcomes of 
Competitiveness 
First, with regards to competitive outcomes PRO’s in all three knowledge regimes 
appears divided and oscillates between two generic interpretations: On the hand 
competitiveness as measured by export performance; on the other competitiveness 
measured by growth performance.  
In the British knowledge regime PROs937 throughout the period seems somewhat 
vexed between the two, and some PRO’s at times combine these two measures.938 
However, it appears as if growth over the course of the period analyzed here 
nonetheless take the upper hand in the U.K.939  In Germany, several PRO's 
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937 HMT, NIESR and IPPR  
938 see p. 181 above  
939 See p. 181 above   
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acknowledge the relevance of examining competitiveness in terms of exports940 
but most nonetheless contend, that competitiveness is more appropriately 
measured in terms of growth pr. capita.941 In particular some German PRO's such 
as FES invoke the analytical concepts “ability to sell” and “ability to earn”, and 
questions whether the former necessarily led to the latter. This is for instance 
evidenced by SACH's discussion of the German performance paradox i.e. strong 
exports combined with weak growth and employment. FES even argue that strong 
export performance on the basis of sustained wage moderation prevents an 
increase in domestic demand, and thus ultimately hampers growth prospects. In 
the Danish knowledge regime a similar pattern occur. In early economic reports 
competitiveness is squared with national ability to export, later with the ability to 
grow.942   
In sum, where 6 out of 12 PRO's at some point equate competitiveness with 
export, 8 out of 12 at some point argue that it is most appropriately assessed in 
terms of growth.943 Thus on the balance of things, it can (however cautiously) be 
claimed, that PRO's in all three knowledge regimes come to emphasize growth as 
the appropriate way to assess and measure the competitiveness of a nation 
relatively more than export performance. This contention is further corroborated, 
by the fact that a majority of PRO’s944 examined in this study employ the metrics 
of out-put gap and growth accounting, which both are designed to measure 
growth. In fact, one PRO - SACH in Germany - does employ a distinct metric 
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940 BmWI and SACH 
941 SACH, FES and BS (See p. 218 above) 
942 See p. 260 above 
943 HMT, NIESR, SACH and ØEM express both points of view throughout the period.   
944 HMT, NIESR and IFS 
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(RCA-analysis) to decompose export performance in 1993. However, it abstains 
from that practice in later reports. 945   
However this observed, "growth turn", does not imply that growth is not 
questioned or contested as appropriate indicator of competitiveness. A third of the 
PRO's - from all knowledge regimes - at some points explicitly questions whether 
growth sufficiently captures what is meant by a competitive nation. In the U.K. 
IPPR argue that employment performance should be included as a subsidiary 
performance metric; In Germany SACH invoke the term 'Zukunftsfähigkeit' to 
denote the importance of social security, good educational institutions and 
environmental quality, and argues that this is not simply achieved by growth in 
exports, production and employment, just as FES argue that "factors for the 
quality of life" should be included in the assessment of competitiveness.946  In 
Denmark ØEM repeatedly advance arguments, that a competitive nation also - 
besides growth performance - should be assessed by its ability generate social 
cohesiveness, a sustainable welfare society, lifelong education, work for all, public 
health, social justice and a good environment.947    
13.1.3.2 Sources of Competitiveness  
Secondly, in all three knowledge regimes PRO's consider and discuss a wide range 
of ostensible sources, factors or inputs to the competitiveness function. And as 
seen, this list grows and expands over time.  
Not only does PRO’s argue privatization of formerly publicly owned enterprises, 
deregulation of markets for goods and capital, low tax rates on income and profits 
and flexible labor markets constitute important sources of competitiveness.948 The 
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946 See p. 223 above 
947 See p.  262 above 
948 See p. 193, pp. 226-229 and pp. 274-277 above 
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PRO’s also over the course of the period analyzed – approximately concurrent 
with their observation of an ostensible new stage of international competition - 
increasingly emphasize how educational institutions for the provision of skills, 
scientific production and R&D (in the private as well as the public sector), the 
relative propensity of citizens to become entrepreneurs, the extent to which firms 
engage in various forms of innovation activities as well as investments in 
infrastructure constitute important sources of competitiveness949 For instance, with 
almost identical formulations BmWI in Germany and ØEM in Denmark, argue 
that it is not access to land, cheap labor or raw materials, which will be decisive 
parameters in the new competition, but education, skills and creativity which will 
come to constitute the “most important raw material”.  
Yet, the list of sources does not stop there. Thus, PRO’s in the British knowledge 
regime also highlight the U.K.’s ability to attract migrants, the quality of 
management in British firms, ICT and infrastructure as potential sources of 
competitiveness950; PRO’s in Germany likewise assert that increased migration of 
qualified labor from abroad, general propensity of firms and labor to employ ICT 
in production processes as well as the relative efficiency of the public 
administration and sector might further Germanys competitiveness 951 . In 
Denmark the relative quality of the management in private firms, the efficiency of 
the public sector, ICT and migration (and integration) are variously articulated as 
additional sources of competitiveness.952 
In short, the list of sources of competitiveness identified by PRO's in the British, 
German and Danish knowledge regimes is highly complex, multifarious, grows 
over time and from an analytical point overwhelming. At times, it seems as if the 
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950 See p. 200 above 
951 See p. 239 above 
952 See p. 284 above 
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list grows infinitely, and that as time goes by ever more sources emerge adding 
additional layers to an already kaleidoscopic mosaic. Indeed, at times NIESR's 
assertion that "the search for improved economic performance is never ending" 
rings true.  This complexity is perhaps the reason why some PRO’s – but not all – 
begin to publish competitiveness indexes, which in a more ad hoc, accumulative 
manner combines a wider range of different economic metrics and indicators to 
produce one unitary indicator of competitiveness.  
Even so, it is not every societal phenomenon or policy that constitutes a potential 
source of competitiveness in the eyes of the PRO's. In fact, remarkable national 
differences obtain, with regards to how PRO’s interpret policy measures, which 
enhance social cohesion, inclusion, equality and environmental protection, as 
either improvements or impediments to national competitiveness. A point returned 
to just below. However, for the moment the important point is, that just as PRO's 
in the three knowledge regimes with a sufficient degree of regularity apply the 
discursive dichotomies of temporality, objectivity and subjectivity, they also apply 
the third dichotomy of functionality, inasmuch as they all discuss a reasonable 
similar - if varied - set of competitive outcomes and a reasonable similar - if varied 
- list of sources of competitiveness.  
Therefore, on the basis of the observation that 12 different PRO's in three different 
national knowledge regimes "carve out" historical narratives of competition and 
competitiveness by sufficiently similar invocations of the three discursive 
dichotomies of temporality, subjectivity/objectivity and instrumentality, it is now 
demonstrated that a discourse of "international competition of nations" in fact was 
present in the period from 1993 to 2007.  
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13.2 National Differences 
However, as continuously emphasized, the presence of a common discourse does 
not imply that all PRO's necessarily conceptualize the competitiveness of nation in 
exactly the same way. In fact, it is only in virtue of variation between national 
narratives of competition and competitiveness (if however a patterned and 
comparable form of variation), it can be claimed that a discourse is present. This 
distinct national variation is discussed in the following.  
13.2.1 Dichotomies of Temporality 
As just seen, while most PRO's in all three knowledge regime invoke the two 
temporal dichotomies before and after the collapse of Bretton Woods; as well as 
before and after the new economy, then at times additional temporal 
differentiations are made.   
First, in response to the claim, that the competition of nations has taken a turn 
towards a more knowledge-intensive stage, some PRO’s – particularly in 
Germany but also in Denmark – argue, that an already obtained competitive lead 
in technology, capital- and knowledge-intensive sectors, might only provide short 
respite for advanced political economies. These PRO’s, while recognizing the new 
stage of competition, claim that not only have newly emerging economies in 
Eastern Europe, Asia and Southern America begun to participate in globalization 
through low-cost, labor-intensive competitive strategies. Increasingly these 
economies also have begun to engage in the production of high-value added and 
quality production strategies, facilitated e.g. by technological advances in ICT, 
allowing for a considerable more easy transference of knowledge, ideas and new 
production technology to new production sites across the globe. As put by ØEM in 
Denmark “it is something new, that service and knowledge-intensive tasks can be 
outsourced.” 
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Indeed, a sizable minority of PRO’s (5 out of 12) particularly in the later part of 
the period analysed in this study (i.e. 2000-2007), observes another temporal shift 
in the competitive conditions.953 In short, globalization is perceived to have 
entered yet a new phase – after knowledge-intensive competition - where still 
more emerging economies engage in high-quality production, with the 
consequence, that price and wages –also in the knowledge-intensive sectors of the 
economy - again becomes decisive competitive factors. As argued e.g. by FES, if a 
nation falls behind in technological competition, it will revert to a state in which 
“price competition takes the upper hand” and thus - once again - must compete on 
price and wages at the detriment of average domestic wages and living standards.  
Secondly, a few PRO’s954 – in the discussion of labour markets – invoke a 
temporal distinction between labour market policies of the past, aimed at 
increasing the employment rate through measures designed to reduce the labour 
supply e.g. through generous opportunities for permanent or temporary leave as 
well as early retirement from the labour market. These are contrasted with policies 
of the present, which recognize, that success of past labour market policies were 
merely ephemeral – as the unemployment rate was not decreased due to increases 
in employment, but decreases in labour market participation  - and implied dire 
fiscal consequences, and thus that increases in employment can only be secured 
through improvements of national competitiveness and structural reforms to 
enhance the functionality of the traditional labour market.  
Thus some – if limited - variation occur in how PRO’s conceptualize time and 
assert temporal dichotomies in their construction of narratives of competition and 
competitiveness, as a minority of PRO’s (particularly in Germany and Denmark) 
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954 BS in the German knowledge regime (see p. 229 above); and DØR in the Danish knowledge 
regime see (12.3.1.1 p. 264 above) 
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invoke additional temporal dichotomies beyond the two invoked in all three 
knowledge regimes. 
13.2.2 Dichotomies of Objectivity and Subjectivity 
The same cannot be said about the dichotomy of objectivity and subjectivity. As 
seen there is a remarkable – and nationally specific - variation with regards to 
which item of the growth account PRO’s claim constitute the most important 
source of potential growth and competitiveness. While two thirds of all PRO’s 
apply the method of growth accounting, they nonetheless differ in the conclusions 
they draw from it. Simply, where PRO’s in one knowledge regime tends to argue 
that one particular component of the growth account – e.g. labor supply, 
employment, working hours, productivity - constitutes the main competitive 
challenge confronting economic policy makers, PRO’s in another knowledge 
regime tends to emphasize other components. 
The British knowledge regime is perhaps the case where this is most evident.955 
Among British PRO’s there is a clear tendency to give priority to the national 
political economic challenge of raising the rate of productivity as the best means to 
raise long-term growth potential and competitiveness. Variously they assert, that 
productivity is the “main driver of growth”, constitute a “key challenge” for 
policymakers or constitute the  “most desirable” way for a nation to grow. 3 out of 
4 British PRO’s, but no PRO’s in the other regimes, invoke the concept of 
“productivity gap” - a metric measuring the productivity performance of U.K. vis-
à-vis foreign countries. Indeed, competitiveness is at times even equated with 
productivity, as e.g. is the case in the 2003 white paper, which contends, “true 
competitiveness is measured by productivity.” And the British competitiveness 
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index published by HMT is tellingly entitled Productivity and Competitiveness 
indicators.  
Of course, this does not mean, that other items of the growth account are not 
granted attention in the British knowledge regime. They are. But productivity is 
clearly prioritized. In fact, at times alternative growth components are explicitly 
excluded from consideration. For instance, after closer scrutiny and comparison it 
becomes clear, that HMT in its version of the growth account include the items 
population growth, employment and productivity, but exclude both labor market 
participation rate and working hours – items, which are granted much attention in 
other knowledge regimes.   
In the German knowledge regime things are different. One PRO956 even suggests 
that Germany possess a competitive advantage in its comparatively superior 
productivity performance. Thus, low productivity is not seen as the cure for an 
ailing German competitiveness, and the attention of PRO’s centers on other items. 
As seen most German PRO’s allude to the poor employment performance of 
Germany, as its core economic challenge.957 And 3 out of 4 German PRO’s argue, 
that the growth prospects of Germany can be enhanced through policies which 
enhance the number of average working hours and labor supply (i.e. the share of 
the population active on the labor market, and thus available for employment but 
not necessarily employed.)958 As seen also one PRO (BS) explicitly oppose policy 
measures aimed at increasing the employment rate, by lowering the labor force 
participation rate, considering such an approach a relic of the past.    
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In the Danish knowledge regime yet another pattern appears. Throughout the 
period analyzed most Danish PRO’s 959  ascribe great importance and policy 
priority to the task of enhancing labor supply (i.e. the share of population available 
for employment) But other components of the growth account are also addressed. 
Indeed, a shift appears to occur in the Danish knowledge regime during the period. 
For instance ØEM in later reports (2004-2007) argue that “Denmark is quite far 
behind the best OECD-countries, when it comes to productivity and working 
hours.“ Both MM and AE echoes these observations, even if the latter PRO 
characterize the ostensible low Danish average working hours as “a myth.” In 
short, in the Danish knowledge regime, PRO’s consistently favor labor supply, but 
also during the period begin to consider productivity and increases in working 
hours as viable pathways to enhance growth potential. 
However, even if PRO’s in different knowledge regimes emphasize different 
aspects of the growth account they invoke structurally similar arguments, as to 
why one component should be prioritized at the expense of others.  
First, some PRO’s argue, that there exist what is at times termed “natural limits” 
to the potential growth obtainable from one or several of the components in the 
growth account and therefore (by a exercise of seemingly logical exclusion) 
continued growth in the long term will have to stem from components not 
hampered by such limits. E.g., HMT in 2007 observe “obvious limits to the 
number of people of working age available to work, and to the hours that can be 
physically worked” and thus contends, that future British growth must come from 
productivity increases “which are not limited in the way employment and hours 
worked are.”960 The same year ØEM in Denmark present virtually the same 
argument, when it observes “limits to, how much working hours can be increased” 
 
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959 ØEM, DØR and MM (see p. 264 above) 
960 See p. 188 above 
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and argue that growth potential “have to be solely drawn from growth in 
productivity”. However, just 15 years before in 1993 ØEM advance the 
structurally similar claim, that “the long-term development of domestic 
productivity cannot be faster than among our trading partners”, and thus 
apparently perceive a set of natural limits to from increases in productivity.  
Secondly, just as several PRO’s observe a macro-economically ‘inexorable trade-
off’ between high growth and low inflation, and thus perceive economic policy-
makers as if they are confronted with a necessary policy choice prioritizing one 
leg of the trade-off at the expense of the other; similarly some PRO’s observe an 
inverse relationship (or trade-off) between different components of the growth 
account, and thus argue as if policy-makers is confronted with additional 
necessary policy choices, where one item must be enhanced at the expense of the 
other.  
In the British knowledge regime all PRO’s at some point find (here with the words 
of IFS) that  “higher employment growth might be expected to curb productivity 
growth”961. Similarly in Denmark 3 out of 4 PRO’s discuss the ostensible “trade-
off between productivity and work effort” and that Danish productivity has 
remained subdued “since more with relatively weak qualifications have been 
employed.962“ A variety of this argument is employed by several German PRO’s, 
which argue that economic policy-makers (and in particular unions) are faced with 
a choice – or trade-off  - between jobs creation and wage growth, the sum of 
which cannot exceed underlying productivity growth.963 
In short, while there is a fairly systematic variation with regards to how PRO’s 
situated in different knowledge regimes prioritize different items the growth 
 
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962 ØEM, DØR and AE (See p. 264 above) 
963 BmWI, SACH and BS (See p. 227 above)  
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account – i.e. productivity in U.K., labor supply and working hours in Germany, 
labor supply and to a degree productivity in Denmark – they nonetheless invoke 
structurally similar arguments (“natural limits” and “trade-offs”) as to why these 
particular components should be prioritized.   
Besides these differences, there also appear to be diverging national interpretations 
of the analytical value of objectifying and commensurating competitiveness in the 
form of an aggregative, accumulative competitiveness index. What is perhaps 
most interesting about the index in the German knowledge regime, is not so much, 
that it is published by an advocacy organization (i.e. BS) and not the ministry of 
economics as seen in the British and Danish knowledge regime. The most 
interesting aspect is rather, how vociferously the analytical value and relevance for 
matters of economic policy-making of that index is contested and rejected by other 
PRO’s.  
SACH express “skepticism” with regards to both the methodology of such an 
econometric exercise, as well as the implicit normative assumptions underpinning 
their form and composition. Assumptions which tend to weigh some kinds of 
political economies more favorably than others - a polite way for German 
economists to characterize something as complete nonsense.964  
13.2.3 Dichotomies of Instrumentality: Sources and 
Outcomes 
Similarly, there is a remarkable – and nationally specific – variation with regards 
to which sources of competitiveness PRO’s in the three knowledge regimes takes 
into account – and which are left out of the equation.  
As noted, while the list of potential sources of competitiveness in the eyes of 
PRO’s seemingly grows longer over time, not everything is included. Indeed, 
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highly varying – even contradictory – answers to the question of whether 
regulatory policies to further environmental protection and energy efficiency as 
well as policies aimed to enhance social cohesion, inclusion and equality 
constitute a competitive source or barrier can be found. Whether environmental 
sustainability and/or social protection improve or impede competitiveness clearly 
divide the minds of PRO’s.  
As such the discussions about the potential relationships between different 
competitive sources and outcomes resembles the discussion of ‘trade-offs’ 
between components of the output-gap and growth account. That is, where some 
PRO’s perceive environmental and/or social protection to stand in an inverse 
relationship with competitiveness, thus invoking the picture of necessary trade-off 
and policy choice (where one have to be traded in for the other); others deny this 
and conversely assert that competitiveness and environmental and/or social 
protection stand in a mutually complementary relationship (what could be termed 
a ‘trade-in’). 
Moreover, this variation is national. Indeed, when one compares and contrasts the 
statements of PRO’s situated in different knowledge regimes it becomes clear, that 
some factors, which PRO’s situated in one knowledge regime believes further 
competitiveness, are believed to be detrimental by PRO’s situated in another.  
13.2.3.1 Environmental Protection: Source or Barrier of 
Competitiveness? 
First, consider policies to further environmental protection and energy efficient 
production processes. In the British knowledge regime PRO’s are clearly vexed 
upon the question. In its early reports HMT appear briefly to endorse a view of 
environmental protection and competitiveness as mutually complementary, but in 
2000 argue that “environmental policies must not threaten” competitiveness, and 
thus apparently shift position from assuming a complementary relationship to 
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assuming a trade-off. Other PRO’ are divided as well. Where IFS observe a trade-
off, IPPR instead suggest a trade-in.965  
In the German knowledge regime PRO’s are likewise divided. As seen FES argue 
for a trade-off between environmental protection and competitiveness when it 
observes “goal conflicts” (“Zielkonflikte”) between the two. The same position is 
endorsed by the BmWI in its early reports, where the ministry recognize, that a 
“preventive environmental policy (...) creates competitive advantages” but 
maintains that such measures cannot put “excessive demands upon the economy.” 
However, in its later reports the Ministry change position, and in 2007 
unequivocally advocates a view of environmental protection and competitiveness 
as mutually complementary, when it states “production using fewer resources will 
help to increase industrial competitiveness.“966  
In the Danish knowledge regime a greater degree of consensus prevails between 
the PRO’s. ØEM e.g. argue that environmentally sustainable production processes 
constitute “new competitive parameters of the global knowledge economy” and 
thus envisions a trade-in. And both DØR and AE – albeit cautiously – contends 
that ambitious, strict environmental regulation in some cases can “improve the 
prospects of economic activity” within a nation as well as provide it with “head 
start in the technological and thus industrial development” – even if both prompts 
caution not to overestimate such effects. 967  
13.2.3.2 Social Protection: Source or Barrier of Competitiveness?  
Consider next, how PRO’s perceive the relation between measures to enhance 
social cohesion, inclusion and equality on the one hand and competitiveness on 
the other. In the British knowledge, PRO’s - with the exception of IPPR – does not 
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explicitly address the question of a potential relationship between social 
protection, inclusion and competitiveness. While the competitiveness indicators 
published by HMT in 2000 include a source of competitiveness termed “quality of 
life” – covering socio-economic aspects such as poverty, social exclusion, 
population health etc. – and thus here for a moment appear to assume, that a 
complementary relationship upholds between a high quality of life of U.K. 
citizens and competitiveness; then this ostensible source of competitiveness 
disappears in the 2007 edition of the index. Nowhere in the HMT’s (or other 
British PRO’s) annual economic reports or white papers does one find claims 
comparable to those of e.g. ØEM in Denmark, where social cohesion explicitly is 
endorsed as a source of competitiveness (see below). However, IPPR constitute an 
exception. In 1994 it argues, that economic success depends upon social justice, 
and moreover  “social inequality – low educational levels, unemployment, poor 
health, high crime – holds back economic growth.“ In short, IPPR was the only 
British PRO out of 4, which explicitly contended, that social protection and 
competitiveness are mutually complementary.968 
The PRO’s in the German knowledge Regime, in contrast, explicitly address this 
question. But there is consensus among all 4 German PRO’s that policy measures 
to enhance social protection, inclusion and equality comes at the expense of 
competitiveness, and hence perceive a trade-off between the two. That is, BS finds 
that such measures “dampens growth”. SACH warns that “an exaggerated 
distributional politics conflicts with the goal of growth” and FES observe “goal 
conflicts” between social cohesion and competitiveness. BmWI, less equivocally, 
observes a “complementary relationship” between “market efficiency and social 
balance”, but maintains, “the limits of social politics is drawn” where macro-
economic performance is endangered.   
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In the Danish knowledge regime, things are different still. Also here a consensus 
prevails between PRO’s. But it is a different consensus than in Germany. Here 
competitiveness and social cohesion, inclusion and protection are perceived as 
mutually complementary. ØEM continuously and explicitly argues, 
“Competitiveness and cohesiveness are not mutual contradictions.” And while 
DØR does recognize, that “efforts against marginalization and exclusion” might 
impede competitiveness in the short term, they will nonetheless be outweighed by 
benefits in the longer term due to “lower public expenses and increased labor 
supply”. Such views are largely echoed by AE and MM.   
To summarize, the different positions taken by different PROS – which in the case 
of some PRO’s change during the period from 1993 to 2007 – are depicted in the 
following 2-by-2-matrix. 969  
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While, the figure is clearly incomplete, inasmuch as not all of the study’s 12 
PRO’s (for methodological reasons970) can be placed within the four quadrants of 
the matrix, and thus should be approached with strong methodological caution, it 
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been possible to detect claims or statements in the dataset as to whether the PRO in question 
perceive a trade-off or trade-in between environmental protection and/or social protection and 
competitiveness. Thus it has not been possible to discern the position of IFS on the question of 
the relation between social protection and competitiveness. Nor has it been possible to discern 
the position of SACH, BS and MM on the question of the relation between environmental 
protection and competitiveness. And in the case of NIESR no indications of either relationship 
have been detected.    
970 For some PRO’s it has not been possible to discern their view upon the relation between 
social cohesion, environmental protection and competitiveness on the basis of the available 
dataset 
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nonetheless provides tentative indications of national patterns in the perception of 
competitiveness.  
As it seems, PRO’s in the German knowledge regime tends to cluster in the left-
hand side of the table. Thus apparently there is consensus among German PRO’s 
that measures to enhance social protection, inclusion and equality stand in an 
inverse relationship with competitiveness and thus implies a trade-off. However, 
there is some disagreement (between FES and BMWI) as to the impact of strict 
regulatory measures to protect the environment on competitiveness. In the British 
knowledge regime greater disagreement prevails, as PRO’s do not seem to cluster 
in any particular quadrant of the matrix – even if a majority of PRO’s appear to be 
situated in the upper-left – trade-off/trade-off – quadrant. PRO’s in the Danish 
knowledge regime are perhaps those who most consistently cluster in one quadrant 
(trade-in/trade-in.) Indeed there appear to be a reasonably strong consensus 
between ØEM, DØR and AE (and to a degree MM) that political, regulatory 
measures to mitigate social exclusion and environmental degradation can 
constitute sources of competitiveness. 
Of course such generalizations should be made with outmost caution – and indeed 
much more research would be required to determine whether these PRO’s in fact 
consistently and over time maintain these position – and would do so, if directly 
asked through interviews.  
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14. DISCUSSION AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
14.1 Immediate Implications for Cultural Political 
Economy 
14.1.1 Implications for the Knowledge Regimes Approach 
First, the study advances our knowledge of the knowledge that knowledge regimes 
produce. In short, the study have demonstrated, that the ideas - i.e. national 
narratives of international competitiveness - expressed by the PRO's situated in the 
three national knowledge regimes of United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark in 
the period 1993-2007 in many ways were similar and converging, but nonetheless 
did differ significantly depending on national context. Thus, it strengthens 
Campbell and Pedersens claim, that ideas tend to vary according to national 
knowledge regime, and hence tentatively salvages the knowledge regime approach 
from the criticism that while national knowledge regimes might vary in their 
organization, they might nonetheless produce the same ideas. 
In particular it finds, that most PRO's regardless of knowledge regime in 
sufficiently similar ways assert the discursive dichotomies of temporality, 
objectivity/subjectivity and functionality:  
1. A majority of PRO's distinguish between a historical period before the collapse 
of Bretton Woods and a period after, as well as a period before the new stage 
of international competition and a period after971;  
 

971 See p. 299 above 



''.
2. A majority of PRO's objectify their social reality through the metrics of output-
gaps; growth-accounting and a competitiveness index emerge in all knowledge 
regimes;  
3. A sizable majority of PRO's subjectify social reality in similar ways i.e. 
advance the arguments that governments possess a legitimate and appropriate 
role as corrector of market failures and coordinator of economic activities, just 
as sizable minorities (including a few ministries of economics) hold that 
governments can legitimately intervene in markets to convert mind-sets as well 
as combine supply- and demand-side policies972;   
4. A majority of PRO's perceived the competitiveness of a nation to be revealed 
by indicators of export or growth performance; just as most PRO's perceive 
open and deregulated markets, privatization, low taxes, flexible labor markets, 
educational institutions, science and innovation, entrepreneurship, 
infrastructure, migration, ICT, public sector efficiency and management as 
important sources of competitiveness. 973   
But the study also finds, that national narratives diverge according to knowledge 
regimes. It has observed how different items of the growth account are prioritized 
differently in different national contexts. 974 And it has demonstrated, that PRO's 
situated in different national knowledge regimes tends to interpret the relationship 
between competitiveness and social as well as environmental protection 
differently.975  
As such the study further corroborates Campbell and Pedersen’s claim that the 
pace with which ideas changes varies according to knowledge regime. That is, the 
study provides – cautiously – an indication that different degrees of consensus 
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973 See p. 312 above 
974 See p. 319 above 
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prevail in different knowledge regimes when it comes to perceptions of the 
relationship between competitiveness, environmental and social protection. In 
particular, PRO's situated in the British knowledge regime tends to disagree about 
how to interpret the relationships, PRO's in Germany exhibit a limited degree of 
consensus, inasmuch most PRO's perceive a trade-off between social protection 
and competitiveness. In Denmark a more stark degree of consensus appear to 
prevail, inasmuch as most PRO's appear to perceive a trade-in between 
environmental protection, social cohesion and competitiveness.     
Moreover, the study strengthens Campbell and Pedersen’s claim that PRO's in 
different knowledge regimes have converged, inasmuch as they all have adopted 
advanced and sophisticated econometric methodologies and techniques for socio-
economic analysis. The study has found this to be the case for at least three kinds 
of econometric statistics - i.e. output-gaps, growth accounting and competitiveness 
indexing. However, the study also demonstrates, that while these economic 
metrics prima facie look alike, they nonetheless exhibit nationally distinct 
characteristics. In short the study demonstrates that PRO's adopted similar 
analytical means but gave them different forms and put them to different use. 
14.1.1.1 But You Have Not Explained the Differences? 
Even so additional questions remain. To be clear, the present study has merely 
described similarities and differences in the narratives of competition and 
competitiveness as expressed in the three knowledge regimes, it has not explained 
them. As argued from the outset, this has been beyond the scope of the study. 
However, it seems that the particular national organization of knowledge regimes 
tends to structure and thus can explain whether and the extent to which 
contestation or consensus prevails in terms of ideas - and thus in turn the relative 
pace with which ideas prevalent in a knowledge regime tends to change or not. 
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Yet, it is less obvious, what particular features of a knowledge regime, that 
explains national differences in the substantive content of ideas.  
Perhaps these differences are better explained by differences in national 
production regimes. For instance, prima facie relative national differences in 
terms of whether measures to further social protection, inclusion and equality is 
perceived to constitute a source of competitive advantage, appear to co-vary with 
whether the political economy in question can be characterized as either a 'liberal', 
'conservative' or 'social-democratic' welfare regime.976  Likewise, whether PRO's 
in different national knowledge regimes tends to perceive regulatory measures to 
further environmental competitiveness and energy efficiency as commensurate 
with competitiveness or not, seems to co-vary with the relative independence and 
security of national energy supply. However, these conjectures are merely 
speculative, and should be investigated by further research. 
14.1.2 Implications for Commensuration 
Moreover, the findings of this study demonstrate the usefulness of the theoretical 
concept of commensuration as an analytical prism for the study of ideas. As 
discussed above, with this theoretical innovation Espeland and Sauder have 
recently drawn the attention of social scientists towards the study of economic 
metrics and ranking systems, and how these structure and constrain the cognition 
of actors. 977 
This study have found, that PRO's - regardless of knowledge regimes - have made 
sense of their social reality through (different) processes of commensuration, by 
which they have transformed a dispersed multitude of heterogeneous qualities into 
discrete quantities measurable by a common metric. For instance, in all three 
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knowledge regimes the triadic metric of competitiveness - i.e. the combination of 
output-gap, growth accounting and competitiveness index - is employed as means 
to quantify and subsequently measure those features of a political economy which 
(ostensibly) render it macro-economically stable as well as prone to long-term 
economic growth.978Likewise, the concept of international competitiveness of 
nation is commensurated in form of a competitive function, in which a discrete 
and varying set of sources of competitiveness is perceived as determinants for 
varying competitive outcomes. 979 But also nationally unique metrics - such as e.g. 
the 'productivity gap' - occurs. 980 
Through the invocation of these metrics of competitiveness PRO's both renders 
alternative ways to objectify social reality irrelevant, redundant or irrelevant by 
unitizing social reality in a particular way (recall e.g. how the "Quality of life"-
indicator and RCA-analysis apparently disappeared in the British981 and German 
knowledge regime982), but simultaneously hierarchize it as the objectified units 
now can be compared and assessed according to a common scale or standard.  
However, the findings of the study also advance the ongoing exploration of 
Espeland and Sauder’s theoretical propositions and invite to further exploration of 
three neglected aspects of commensuration. First, the findings of the study 
demonstrate that not only does PRO's objectify social reality through 
commensuration. Likewise they engage in what, with inspiration from Espeland 
and Sauder can be termed in-commensuration - I.e. a cognitive process by which 
already commensurated objects are represented and interpreted as standing in an 
inverse or incommensurate relationship to other such objects. The best example of 
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in-commensuration is perhaps the PRO's repeated observation of an  'inexorable 
trade-off" between inflation and growth983. In this process of incommensuration 
the entity of inflation is represented as necessarily inversely related to the entity of 
growth. Accordingly, the one can only be obtained at the expense of the other, and 
thus confronts economic policy-makers with a policy-choice. But other examples 
of incommensuration can be discerned. For instance, in the British knowledge 
regime productivity is frequently imagined as incommensurate with 
employment984 just as some PRO's in the German knowledge regime observe 
wage growth and dispersion as standing in an inverse relationship to jobs 
creation985. Indeed several (but not all) PRO's believe measures to enhance social 
cohesion, inclusion and equality and/or environmental protection to be 
incommensurate with competitiveness986 - and hence perceive economic policy-
makers as faced with an additional trade-off and policy choice. 
Secondly, however, the outcome of such processes of commensuration and 
incommensuration is not left uncontested by PRO's. In fact, as seen, several PRO's 
directly engage and attack so as to re-construct already present commensurations 
and incommensurations, through the related processes of de- and re-
commensuration i.e. the processes through which a given analytical object (itself 
the product of prior commensuration) is discursively re-opened and re-assembled 
in a new form.  
Again, the dataset is abundant with examples. For instance, the entire thesis of a 
New Economy can be understood as an attempted (if failed) de- and re-
commensuration of the otherwise necessarily incommensurate relationship of 
inflation and growth (the 'inexorable trade-off'). Recall, how some PRO's observe 
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that the US Economy apparently have overcome the trade-off and during the 
1990's begin to exhibit simultaneous high growth, high job creation and low 
inflation. A development they explain by the increased uptake of ICT in the US 
economy, which in turn is labeled a "new" economy.987 As such these PRO's 
engage in a cognitive process of de- and recommensuration, to challenge the 
apparent inexorability of a prior incommensuration.  
Also, some PRO’s (with greater success) de-commensurate the outcome of 
competitiveness as revealed by export performance (world market shares, trade 
balance etc.), in order to re-commensurate it as growth performance. And some 
PRO’s goes further with the suggestion that competitiveness – besides its ability to 
generate growth in real incomes also ought be measured by its ability to generate 
social cohesiveness and environmental sustainability. 988 
Similarly, some PRO's arguments that social cohesion, inclusion and equality 
and/or environmental protection and energy efficiency in fact constitute a source 
competitiveness, can be understood as an exercise of de- and recommensuration. 
Recall as an example how ØEM in the Danish knowledge regime continuously 
argue, that "competitiveness and cohesiveness are not mutual contradictions. On 
the contrary."989 As such the Ministry explicitly contests the implied converse 
view, that competitiveness and social cohesion constitute incomensurate economic 
entities. That is, it attempts to de-commensurate an assumed already by others 
commensurated competitiveness function (which does not include "cohesiveness" 
as a source of competitiveness), in order to re-commensurate that function in a 
new form.  
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Thirdly, the study underscores and makes vivid that it is not merely static-spatial 
entities, which comes to be objectified through processes of commensuration. 
Similarly, with the words of Ricoeur "time becomes human to the extent that it is 
organized after the manner of a narrative"990 - and such national narratives invokes 
various forms of temporal commensuration, by which a multitude of temporally 
scattered and disordered events and occurrences, are quantified and re-ordered 
according to a common timescale.  
For instance, most PRO's in all three knowledge regimes makes sense of the 
history of international competition as composed of discrete subsequent periods. 
According to this timetable the golden age of capitalism is followed by a more 
macro-economically turbulent and internationally competitive period after the 
collapse of Bretton Woods, which again is followed by another period, in which 
"what nations used to compete upon is no longer sufficient" and so on ad 
infinitum.991 But, PRO's also diverge in their temporal commensuration of the 
concept of competitiveness. That is, there are subtle, but significant differences in 
the timescales by which different PRO's assess and evaluate competitive 
performance. Where some PRO's suggest that competitiveness is revealed and 
most appropriately measured over the short- or medium-term others contend that 
competitiveness is revealed over the long-term.  
To illustrate this point, consider the debate of whether policy measures to enhance 
social protection, inclusion and equality as well as environmental protection 
should be perceived as commensurate or incommensurate with competitiveness. 
On the one hand, PRO’s, which perceive such measures as incommensurate with 
competitiveness, apply a comparatively shorter timescale to evaluate 
competitiveness by and policies to enhance social and environmental protection 
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are accordingly typically understood as implying additional costs to firms. On the 
other hand, PRO’s, which perceive them as commensurate assess competitiveness 
according to a longer time-scale and (re-) interpret short-term costs as long-term 
social and environmental investments.  
Indeed that such a long-term perspective on competitiveness is present is 
particularly evident in the Danish knowledge regime. Here PRO's continuously 
invoke analytical temporal distinctions to distinguish a given policy's potential 
consequences in the short as well as the long term. DØR is a case in point, when it 
e.g. claims that strict environmental regulation “not necessarily exclusively has a 
negative impact upon competitiveness in the longer term" or when it similarly 
suggests that "a re-enforced effort against marginalization and exclusion (...) will 
benefit firms in the long term".992  
Put metaphorically, even if all PRO's come to perceive nations as engaged in an 
evermore fierce and relentless international competition to forge ahead, catch up 
or fall behind993  - apparently different ideas are held as to when it should be 
assessed whether a nation have forged ahead or fallen behind. Some PRO's 
contend that a slow starter nonetheless might turn out as a long-term winner.  
In short, PRO's in the three knowledge regimes continuously has been engaging in 
an ongoing contestation of international competitiveness through processes of 
spatial as well as temporal commensuration, in-commensuration, de-
commensuration and re-commensuration. The further exploration of these 
neglected aspects of commensuration opens promising avenues for future 
research.  
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14.1.3 Implications for Cultural Political Economy  
As such, the present study contributes to and significantly advances scholarship on 
ideas. In particular the study do so through its elaboration and application of a 
research design, methodology and analytical framework, which explicitly address 
and provide a response to the three challenges of conceptual clarity, attention to 
actors and transparent methodology raised by John Campbell. 994  
First, the study has, with the above analytical framework developed an analytically 
clear, rigorous and operational theoretical conceptualization of discourse and 
narrative, and demonstrated how these can be fruitfully applied to the study of 
ideas. The analytical categories of discourse and narrative as invoked in the 
present study have proven productive analytical prisms, through which scholars 
might approach the study of ideas in the future. For instance, the analytical 
framework have rendered a range of nuances and differences in the national 
narratives of competitiveness visible, such as the idea of demand-side 
management, which – as it is sometimes argued – does not become completely 
abandoned after the 1970’s.  
Moreover, the study has with a methodology995 developed on the basis of the 
research on knowledge regime by Campbell and Pedersen, examined four different 
(ideal-typical) PRO’s in three different (ideal-typical) knowledge regimes, and 
thus produced an analysis which aids scholars of ideas in their ongoing and 
already far advanced efforts to study and understand who the actors are, which 
ostensibly bring ideas to bear on institutions.  
Finally, the study has carried out a detailed, meticulous coding and content 
analysis of more than 10.000 pages of policy documents through the application of 
the qualitative data analysis software Atlas.Ti, and thus devised a viable 
 
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methodology for carrying out discourse analysis of relevance not only to cultural 
political economy but also the larger enterprise of comparative political economy. 
14.2 Wider Implications for Comparative Political 
Economy  
Besides the implications for the study of knowledge regimes, commensuration and 
cultural political economy, the findings of the study are also of potential relevance 
to wider theoretical debates within comparative political economy. In particular 
the findings of the study are potentially relevant to three theoretical questions, 
which puzzles cultural and comparative political economists alike: 
• First, how and through what causal mechanisms do ideas assert a potential 
influence upon socio-economic institutions - if they do so at all?  
• Secondly, have contemporary advanced political economies as a response to 
increasing economic globalization and growing external pressure converged (or 
are they in the midst of converging) on the same ostensible neo-liberal socio-
economic model?  
• Thirdly, does systemic, dynamic or teleonomic institutionalism constitute the 
most viable, productive and/or appropriate theoretical framework for 
comparative political economists to study the development of advanced 
political economies through? 
14.2.1 Can You Really Say Anything About This? 
However, before venturing any further an important methodological caveat is 
required. Since the present study have approached ideas through a discourse-
theoretical analytical framework, which essentially underscores the inherent 
never-once-and-for-all-giveness of knowledge claims about social reality and 
accordingly contends, that all such purported objective knowledge claims  - 
including those proposed by a discourse theorist - constitute interpretations by 



'(.
historically situated subjects and not scientific truths, it would be 
methodologically very inappropriate now to purport to provide the in some sense 
true answers to these questions.  
Strictly speaking the present analysis cannot tell anything about these questions. 
As argued, the propositions of the discourse theorist can in epistemological terms 
never be considered to constitute more than second-order interpretations of the 
first-order interpretations held by social actors themselves - and the approach 
certainly not confer a privileged epistemological vantage point from which to 
study the world "as it really is".996    
It would amount to the crossing of an inviolable epistemological Rubicon, at this 
stage to assert e.g. how ideas influence institutions. Having first claimed that 
causal and functional relationships are not objective, necessary or real but 
constitute context-dependent perceptions held by historically situated actors, and 
then propose, that political ideas universally asserts influence upon institutions 
would constitute a blatant self-contradiction. Once the lid of Pandoras hermeneutic 
Box is lifted it is not easily closed again. And have one first employed a discourse 
theoretical perspective the ensuing propositions cannot achieve stronger 
epistemological status than Gianni Vattimo’s weak thinking.  
Weakness, however, does not imply irrelevance. And the foregoing discourse 
analysis of how PRO's in the knowledge regimes of United Kingdom, Germany 
and Denmark have made sense of international competition and competitiveness 
have not been completely in vain. Indeed, the very epistemological weakness of 
the present analysis can arguable be turned into a strength, if it herewith becomes 
possible to emphasize and explicate the historical contingency – as it were the 
never-once-and-for-all-givenness - of the very analytical categories employed 
 
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within the discipline of comparative political economy in order to encourage 
stronger theoretical and epistemological reflexivity and sense of own historical 
situatedness on behalf of this discipline.   
14.2.2 How Ideas Matter – If They Do 
In fact John Campbell in his elaboration of a research agenda for scholars of ideas 
and discourse asserted an additional fourth challenge for the scholar of ideas. 
According to him she must be able to identify and demonstrate empirically (rather 
than assume) the causal mechanisms through which ideas assert influence on 
institutional processes of stability and change.  
While it within cultural political economy is generally accepted, that scholars 
studying ideas should begin to ask ‘how’ rather then ‘whether’ ideas matter997, 
most scholars 998  have in fact been hard-pressed to provide convincing and 
empirically detailed accounts of just how ideas of various sorts comes to assert an 
influence upon policy processes. Generally, two approaches to address this 
question have been tried.  
14.2.2.1 A Mono-Causal Approach to the Influence of Ideas 
On the one hand, scholars have observed how ideas in the less general end of the 
spectrum of ideas comes to be influence policy-processes by being implemented in 
concrete policies and regulation. For instance Blyth argues:  
“New institutions are derivative of new economic ideas. (…) It is 
cognitively impossible for agents to construct economic institutions 
without having an idea as to what has caused a given crisis. Therefore, 
any notions as to what institutions are in fact supposed to do must be 
 
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998 See Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1996, Weidenbaum 2009, as examples of this single-idea, 
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predicated upon those same ideas; hence ideas are blueprints for 
institutional design.”999 
However, while ideas in this fairly intuitive sense might assert an influence on 
institutions, it has proven methodologically difficult for scholars to demonstrate 
empirically the underlying causal mechanism. Frequently scholars have employed 
single case study methodologies and through detailed process tracing exercises 
sought to illuminate how one distinct idea proposed by one particular organization 
(or actor) in one particular policy setting at one particular time travelled unscathed 
into policy-making processes, where it ultimately become adopted by official 
policymakers and implemented in concrete policies.1000  
Empirically the most convincing demonstration of an ideas influence, is probably 
written, explicit documentation in the form of e.g. policy publications or 
statements by high-rank policy makers that a certain policy has been implemented 
in the exact form of an idea suggested by an external actor. However, such 
documentation is indeed rare. Most politicians and policymakers prefer taking 
credit for their ideas themselves. Short of such “smoking guns” the scholar of 
ideas face several severe methodological challenges in her demonstration of 
mono-causal influence.1001  
It is obviously not sufficient to interview the actors from which ideas originate, 
and ask whether their ideas have been influential. These actors are obviously 
biased, as they often have a vested interest in appearing as influential as possible. 
Nor is it sufficient to demonstrate, that a certain idea was present in wider public 
discourse at the time of the implementation of a certain policy. Because an 
organization manages to make itself heard, this does not necessarily imply that its 
ideas becomes implemented in policy. Even if it might be demonstrated that an 
 
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idea has in fact been implemented, it is often the case that several actors have held 
and proposed similar ideas, which make it inherently difficult to trace an idea back 
to just one source of origin.  
14.2.2.2 A Structural Approach to the Influence of Ideas 
Given the inherent difficulties associated with the above approach, scholars have 
instead pursued a line of inquiry, where they have sought to demonstrate, how 
more general ideas (such as e.g. policy paradigms, discourse, cultures, public 
philosophies) have a capacity to, in the words of Campbell, “influence decision 
making and institutional change by constraining the range of programs that can be 
articulated in the first place.”1002  In the same vein, Blyth suggests, that discourses, 
paradigms etc. serves as a form of “cognitive locks” which predisposes 
policymakers to understand certain policy problems in particular ways, or consider 
some types of policy instruments as more efficacious, expedient, relevant and/or 
appropriate means to address a certain problem.1003  
In this line, Campbell and Pedersen suggests, that scholars interested in the 
potential influence of ideas shifts focus from mono-causal analysis – one 
organization, one idea, one policy setting, one effect – to the analysis of how 
knowledge regimes qua fields of organizations assert structural influence upon 
broader sense-making processes within a given political economy. They instead 
encourage scholars of ideas to ask:   
“do knowledge regimes as fields policy research organizations affect the 
nature of the ideas that policy research organizations tend to produce in 
the first place and then disseminate to policymakers and others? Put 
differently, does the nationally unique character of a knowledge regime 
tend to produce nationally unique policy analysis and advice?” 1004 
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However, even if a structural approach to the influence of ideas is adopted, the 
causal mechanism involved nonetheless remains to be demonstrated. The question 
is how less general ideas (settings, instruments, programs) in fact comes to be 
constrained by more general ideas (such as discourses and narratives of 
competitiveness). Put differently, by what evaluative yardstick, does a 
policymaker or social actor under ostensible influence of a particular discourse 
ascertain whether a given idea would be too much, too little or just right for 
addressing a particular policy challenge?  
14.2.2.3 Commensuration and the Influence of Ideas 
Here the expanded concept of commensuration might come in hand.1005  In their 
research on commensuration, they suggest that metrics - such as e.g. international 
rankings for the benchmarking and comparison of international competitiveness - 
might assert influence upon human behavior by prompting what they term 
reactivity on behalf of the objects and subjects being measured by such a metric. 
By reactivity they understand  
”… How people react to efforts to study them, how being cast as 
subjects of investigation changes the behaviors of both subjects and 
investigators. (….) Emphasizing reactivity encourages scholars to make 
more explicit how actors make discourse meaningful in ways that shape 
their behavior. “1006 
Indeed, a given social practice is seldom (if ever) measured and evaluated on its 
capacity to generate some randomly selected outcome. It is evaluated exactly 
because that outcome is deemed valuable in itself. As put most eloquently by 
James C. Scott, by a “Social Heisenberg Principle” efforts to objectify, quantify 
and measure a supposedly stable, static social human practice, posses the perhaps 
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paradoxical capacity to change that very practice while measuring it.1007 This 
happens since social actors in virtue of being essentially reflexive sentient beings 
continuously interpret the products of commensuration (metrics, timescales, 
identities) as carrying a normative expectation. Expectations, which they 
continuously seek to decode, adapt and conform to through continuous miniscule, 
incremental adjustments of own practice and behavior.  
Drawing upon the sociologist of science Robert Merton, Espeland and Sauder 
furthermore argue that metrics (and thus perhaps also timescales, functions etc.) 
can come to function as self-fulfilling prophecies, defined as:   
“… Processes by which reactions to social measures confirm the 
expectations or predictions that are embedded in measures or which 
increase the validity of the measure by encouraging behavior that 
conforms to it.”  1008 
Thus, to apply the vocabulary of Robert Merton, narratives might influence 
institutions in virtue of being “false definition of the situation evoking new 
behavior which makes the originally false definition of the situation come 
true“1009 and thus over time come to obtain a greater degree of verisimilitude as 
social actors gradually begin to adapt and conform their behavior to the normative 
expectations they perceive to be ingrained and embedded in the metrics, 
timescales etc. integral to the narratives. 
This study demonstrates it to be likely, that one causal mechanism through which 
general ideas influence institutions is the mechanism of reactivity by which 
narratives come to serve as self-fulfilling prophecies. As seen, the present study 
has demonstrated that the national narratives competitiveness in fact is ripe with 
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metrics, timescales, and identities. For instance, in all national knowledge regimes 
PRO's apply the triadic metric of competitiveness.   
Of course, just because a given economic metric occurs in a national narrative, 
does not necessarily imply that Scotts “social Heisenberg principle” is at play. But 
consider as a brief tentative illustration, how British PRO's were comparatively 
more vocal about the importance of raising national productivity than German and 
Danish PRO’s, and compare that with Eurostat’s (ostensibly objective) account of 
productivity developments in United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark from 1993 
to 2012.   
 
	
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British productivity appears to have grown comparatively faster in the examined 
time period. In short, it seems that United Kingdom – the self-proclaimed 
productivity laggard – not only have “caught up” up with Germany but also 
significantly “surpassed” Denmark, which have begun to “fall behind” in the 
productivity “race”. The PROs of the British regime only described and devised 
metrics to measure the relative competitiveness of United Kingdom. Perhaps they 
even changed it while measuring it.  
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14.2.3 Not As Neo-Liberal As One Might Think 
The findings of the analysis is also potentially indicative vis-a-vis broader debates 
within comparative political economy. Recall, how a body of scholarship within 
comparative political economy in various forms has claimed stronger or weaker 
versions of the neo-liberal convergence thesis. I.e. the related claim that all 
advanced political economies have converged or are in the process of converging 
upon the same neo-liberal model – and that the ideas of actors situated within 
them have succumbed to an ostensibly neo-liberal paradigm.1010   
The findings of this study are more than a little difficult to reconcile with such 
claims. That neo-liberal ideas since the late 1970’s have come to assert a cognitive 
hegemony on the political and economic thinking of economic policy makers in 
all political economies pushing rivaling ideas aside in the process is not readily 
evident in the above analyses.1011 
Of course, in all knowledge regimes a great deal of discussion centers on how 
more mobile international capital and investments puts pressure upon the ability of 
governments to collect revenue from firms to finance their expenditures; of the 
desirability and gains in efficiency to be harvested from the privatization of 
formerly public enterprises as well as the deregulation of capital, product and 
labor markets; of the need to balance public budgets, and for labor unions (an 
others) to observe underlying productivity development in questions of wage 
negotiation and formation.  
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And of course such claims essentially hinges upon just what one as a comparative 
political economist means, when one apply the epithet neo-liberal to some social-
scientific phenomenon.1012 
However if one takes Hays account of the “neo-liberal paradigm” at face value – 
which probably covers the intuitions of many scholars reasonably well – it 
becomes clear, that not all of the ideas held by PRO’s are easily squared with the 
neo-liberal label.  
First, while all PRO’s1013 at some point discuss the merits of privatization as well 
as the value of open and deregulated markets for capital, goods and labor, and 
therefore might be understood as expressing with Hays term “confidence in the 
market as an efficient mechanism for the allocation of scarce resources”; then, 
nevertheless, almost as many PRO’s (8 out of 12) address, discuss and endorse the 
concept of “market failures”1014 i.e. the idea that markets have inherent, inbuilt 
tendencies to deliver inefficient or undesirable results, when left unregulated. In 
fact the Ministries of Economics in both Denmark (ØEM) and United Kingdom 
(HMT) subscribe to the idea of market failures, and accordingly perceives a need 
for governments to intervene and regulate markets to correct such failures.  
Secondly, it is difficult to interpret these findings as representative a wide-spread 
and pre-dominant belief in the “ the desirability, all things equal, of a limited and 
non-interventionist role of the state.” But as seen 8 out of 12 PRO’s argue that 
governments has a role and responsibility for correcting market failures, 5 out of 
12 PRO’s that it is legitimate for governments to interfere in markets to convert 
the mindsets of market participants, 7 out of 12 PRO’s holds that governments 
should facilitate and foster coordination of activities of a wide range of economic 
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and societal actors, to their mutual benefit, just as 5 out 12 claim that an 
appropriate macro-economic stance consists in the governments combination of 
demand-side and supply-side approaches. Roughly half of the PRO’s examined in 
this study, thus, envisions a rather interventionist state – apparently at odds with 
Hays suggestion.   
Thirdly, if neo-liberalism is thought to imply the “rejection of Keynesian Demand-
management” in favor of a turn to supply-side economics, nor is it obviously 
evident that ideas about macro-economic management as expressed by these 
PRO’s have succumbed to a neo-liberal paradigm. While full employment as a 
target for macro-economic (fiscal and monetary) policy is viewed upon with 
skepticism, and most PRO’s argue that macro-economic stability is (best) 
achieved through fiscal policies aimed at balanced budgets (across the cycle), and 
monetary policies designed to achieve price stability then several PRO’s argue for 
the enduring tenability and need for active, interventionist fiscal policies – through 
governmental demand-side management and deficit spending.   
On the one hand, some PRO’s such as DØR in Denmark and BMWI in Germany 
explicitly argue in favor of a combination of demand-side and supply-side 
measures. Moreover, the widespread adoption of economic metrics of output-gaps 
and growth accounting, might be interpreted as the embrace of an instrument 
which allows policy-makers to conduct a more interventionist, precise and 
targeted, fiscal policy in alignment with the business cycle, and the underlying 
productive capacity of the economy (its supply-side). Such a fiscal policy could be 
expansive, contractive or neutral depending on the size of the output-gap. Indeed, 
several PRO’s argue, that the real question dividing the waters in terms of fiscal 
policy, is whether additional, (discrete) fiscal stimulus beyond that implied by an 
economy’s inbuilt “automatic stabilizers” is warranted. E.g. IFS in the U.K. 
observe a consensus between Keynesians and classical economists agree that 
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increasing government debt during a recession can “enhance an economy’s long-
term performance.”  
On the other hand, while supply-side reforms of course are emphasized1015 it is 
equally clear that national variation remains with regards to what aspects of the 
supply-side a government should reform, in what way and with what economic 
outcomes in mind. Indeed, squaring neo-liberalism with an observed “turn to 
supply-side policies” is not entirely accurate, as supply-side policies as well and as 
seen might come in many different forms and guises. While enhanced productivity 
is emphasized as a desirable outcome throughout the period by PRO’s in the 
British knowledge regime, in Denmark attention gathers around increasing the 
labor supply but gradually comes to emphasize productivity as well. German 
PRO’s similarly directs attention towards enhancing labor supply as well as the 
length and flexibility of average working hours as the desired outcome of reforms 
of the supply. Also PRO’s holds diverging views as to whether government 
intervention and regulation of the supply-side of the economy with the intention to 
further environmentally sustainable, energy-efficient production as well as social 
inclusion, cohesiveness and equality constitutes a source or impediment to 
competitiveness.  
Fourthly, Hay suggests that neo-liberalism implies a "subordination of the 
principles of social justice to those of perceived economic imperatives." While this 
prima facie sounds more in line with the study’s findings - inasmuch as many 
PRO's perceive ostensibly necessary and incommensurate relationships between 
some economic objects (such as e.g. growth and inflation, growth or equality etc.) 
which in turn are understood to confront policymakers with an imperative policy 
choice between one or the other - then neither, can this effortlessly be argued to 
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constitute a completely representative description of the ideas held by all PRO's. 
For instance, 4 out of 12 PRO's argue that the competitiveness of a nation should 
be measured on more parameters than merely growth (such as e.g. social cohesion, 
environmental sustainability etc.)1016, just as PRO's regularly - in particular in the 
Danish knowledge regime - argue, that policy measures and regulations to further 
social and environmental protection, in fact might enhance competitiveness in the 
long term. As such the former group of PRO's explicitly contests that social justice 
should be subordinated to economic imperatives, the latter group contends that 
social justice and economic imperatives at all are at odds.1017 
Finally, Hay argues the neo-liberal paradigm to entail a commitment to "labor-
market flexibility and the promotion and nurturing of cost competitiveness." 
Indeed, labor market flexibility is alluded to as a central source of competitiveness 
in all of the three knowledge regimes.1018 However - as argued by Thelen1019 - 
while there might be a "family resemblance" between the ways PRO's in the 
knowledge regimes of United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark conceptualize 
such flexibility, there nonetheless appear to be substantial national differences. 
Where PRO's in United Kingdom favors an approach directed towards the 
increase of productivity, PRO's in Germany argue in favor of enhancing labor 
supply and working hours and PRO's in Denmark suggest a combination of 
increases in the labor supply and productivity.1020 Moreover, price competitiveness 
is often questioned as (sufficient) condition of competitiveness. More often than 
not PRO's contend that in "the new stage of competition" the ability to produce 
high-value added quality goods; the ability to increase productivity or the ability 
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to integrate skills, knowledge and technology in production will come to constitute 
the new "winning parameter."1021 In short, if neo-liberalism entails a commitment 
to price competitiveness, it is not obvious that all - or even the majority - of the 
PRO's examined here can be characterized as espousing neo-liberal ideas.  
Therefore, while it is certainly clear that some neo-liberal elements can be 
detected and that some of these constitute central components of the overarching 
discourse of ‘international competition of nations’ – indeed the very idea of a 
competition of nations perhaps constitute the zenith of neo-liberal thinking – it 
should however also be clear, that “neo-liberalism was not a blanket laid out over 
the world” as recently suggested by Hall and Lamont. 1022  Several different 
ideas1023 were present. Hence the findings of this study echoes Campbell and 
Pedersen’s conclusive remarks, that the spread of neo-liberal thinking where 
"incomplete, gradual and uneven", did not become a "hegemonic paradigm" nor 
constituted a radical, abrupt break with Keynesianism. 1024 
14.2.4 Systemic, Dynamic and Teleonomic 
Institutionalism 
The ideas expressed by PRO’s in the three knowledge regimes are not easily 
squared with the epithet of neo-liberalism. But what light does the findings of the 
present study then shed upon the ongoing comparative political economic debate 
between proponents of systemic, dynamic and teleonomic institutionalism - if 
any? 
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First of all, the ideas expressed by PRO’s to some extent reflect and correspond to 
central tenets of systemic institutionalism.1025 Scholars who discern and observe 
different national socio- and politico economic systems or models, can find some 
consolation from the fact that also PRO’s in the three knowledge regimes 
conceptualize and perceive their social as constituted of different national models 
and systems. For instance in the British knowledge regime – short of describing it 
is a model – HMT continuously outline a set of distinct British competitive 
advantages such as open markets, low taxes, a world-class science-base, a skilled 
workforce and excellent labor relations.; in the German knowledge regime PRO’s 
address the political economy as a “Modell Deutschland”1026; and in the Danish 
knowledge regime the “flexicurity-Model” is heralded and celebrated as an 
internationally unique and competitive model of organizing labor market 
relations1027. Moreover, the findings lends some support to that branch of systemic 
institutionalism, which in contrast to bi-modal systemic accounts contends that 
more than two ideal-typical socio-economic systems – for instance the 
Scandinavian “variety of capitalism” – can remain viable in a context of increased 
globalization and international competition. As seen three – not two - nationally 
distinct narratives of competitiveness prevail in the three knowledge regimes of 
United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark.  
But as noted, the central contention of systemic institutionalism, that more than 
one institutional model is viable in conditions of increasing globalization, is left 
unscathed, if not even re-enforced by demonstrations, that more than two such 
models are viable. Hence, systemic institutional accounts cannot easily be 
dismissed as artificial theoretical armchair abstractions since socio-economic 
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actors situated within contemporary advanced political economies themselves 
perceive their reality as made up of models.  
Of course the findings are merely indicative of potential differences, and thus 
further research is needed to determine, whether these narratives are in fact as 
predominant as suggested. And to have demonstrated that actors embedded within 
a given social context, perceive and regard that context as real, does of course not 
itself suffice as an argument vis-a-vis the inherent ontological status of that social 
context – i.e. whether institutional systems in fact exist persist and remain viable 
in some strong ontological sense.  
However, the findings are at odds with other assertions of systemic 
institutionalism. First, Comparative political economists working within the VOC-
framework typically consider five institutional sub-systems (corporate governance 
and finance, industrial relations, social policy and institutions for the provision of 
education and skills.) But as seen, PRO’s in all three knowledge regimes - besides 
labor markets, social policy, corporate management, educational institutions - 
address national institutional subsystems of science and R&D, innovation, 
entrepreneurship, migration and integration, ICT-prowess, infrastructure, public 
sector efficiency and environmental protection as important sources of 
competitiveness. Indeed, in 2000 the economic ministry in (the ostensible liberal 
market economy) United Kingdom even publish a competitiveness index in which 
relative levels of poverty and equality, social exclusion, population health, crime 
levels, housing stock, air and water pollution, traffic and congestion and waste 
management are argued to constitute sources of competitiveness. Findings such as 
these, draws attention to the importance of careful explication and motivation of 
the often-implicit assumptions about what institutional subsystems to include in 
analysis and which to leave out, when composing explanations of socio-economic 
outcomes.  
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Thus the study compels proponents of systemic institutionalism to carefully 
scrutinize and re-consider which institutional ‘sub-components’ to include in their 
theoretical elaborations of models to explain socio-economic phenomena within 
comparative political economy. To be sure, the theoretical elaboration and 
methodological operationalization of such a more comprehensive systemic 
institutionalism renders the work of comparative political economists 
excruciatingly more complex and painful than it already is. Even so parsimony is a 
social-scientific ideal, which should give us less things to keep track of ex post 
analysis - not an excuse to ex ante assume away potentially significant explanans 
through over- or underdetermined research designs.  
Encouragingly, prominent systemic institutionalist scholars have already begun 
these highly commendable endeavors. In recent work Peter Hall have begun to 
address political economies in terms of four institutional regimes – i.e. an 
production regime, an industrial relations regime, an socio-economic policy 
regime and international regime1028; Hall and Lamont examines how institutions 
affect public health1029 and Seabrooke and Schwarz study “Varieties of Residential 
Capitalism”1030.  
Secondly, the findings – as an echo of the critique emanating from dynamic 
institutionalism 1031  – fits less well with systemic institutionalist claims to 
immovable, impermeable institutional statics. Virtually all the policy publications 
– annual economic reports, commission white papers and competitiveness indexes 
– are ripe with an exuberant multitude of policy-proposals and measures for how 
nations can cope, adapt, transform and change in response to increasing pressures 
 

1028 Hall 2010, p. 2 
1029 Hall and Lamont, 2009, 2013. 
1030 Seabrooke and Schwartz 2008 
1031 See p. 87 above 
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from globalization and international competition, and thus bears witness to a 
myriad of ideas for miniscule changes, transformations and adjustments. 1032 
As such, the findings prima facie appears to correspond more to dynamic 
institutionalisms central contention that apparently stable institutional systems 
nonetheless are in a process of gradual, incremental institutional change. PRO’s 
are continually tinkering on the edges of existing institutional arrangements with 
ideas for their continuous reform and alteration – some of which perhaps become 
implemented at some point and thus foster change.1033 Ideas for change, which in 
turn could be described as blueprints for displacement, layering, conversion or 
drift.  
However, for two reasons this would be to jump to conclusions. First, as 
suggested, proponents of dynamic institutionalism must be analytically precise in 
terms of theoretical unitization and specification of temporal scope conditions. 
The mere observation of changes in terms of specific policies (or in this case ideas 
for policy change) is not sufficient to establish that systemic institutional change 
has occurred.1034 More is needed. Put crudely, it takes more than one adjustment in 
the setting of social security benefits to change a variety of capitalism.  
Instead, the proponent of dynamic institutionalism must be able to demonstrate, on 
the one hand, that a multitude of discrete, incremental and by themselves 
seemingly inconsequential policy changes when considered in toto reveals a 
common pattern or logic by which they on aggregate and over time move in 
tandem to gradually hollow out or replace an institutional system; and on the 
 

1032 Indeed, the sheer number of such policy proposals far exceeded, what the researcher (given 
resource constraints) was able to keep track off in a methodologically reliable manner. Note, 
that such proposals have not been discussed in any systematic way in the above analyses. 
1033 Again, to be sure, the study has only demonstrated that a great variety of policy ideas are 
present in the three knowledge regimes, not the presence of institutional change and even less 
that these policy proposals in fact have caused institutional change.   
1034 Understood as a transformation from one ideal-typical institutional system to another. 
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other, that this movement is not countered by an oncoming cascade of counter-
changes offsetting the incremental sequence. For all we know, the ideas proposed 
by PRO’s for changes of policies might be nothing more than ripples on an 
otherwise stable institutional surface, just as a great deal of them might be (ideas 
for) reverting unfolding institutional changes to a prior status quo (through 
mechanisms of institutional peeling, anchoring and so forth). Thus the mere 
observation of a plethora of policy changes (and even less the observation of ideas 
for such changes) does not support dynamic institutionalism per se. 
In short, the proponent of dynamic institutionalism should take care not to commit 
the typological fallacy of interpreting every event within a political economy (or 
ideas for bringing about such an event) as an instance of gradual, incremental 
change – as there might be stability. Moreover, she must be able to provide a 
reasonably clear theoretical picture of – to use a metaphor - the institutional 
building, which each incremental change can be understood as yet another 
building block in the piecemeal construction or demolition of - insofar as that 
process is to be recognizable as such. In the absence of such an account, it is 
difficult to tell whether – and by what logic - the dominoes are aligned to form a 
sequence of genuine systemic institutional change.  
It is of course far from impossible to provide such a blueprint. It might very well 
be the case that the manifold of ideas for policy change in fact adds up to form a 
common discernable pattern. And thus gradual systemic institutional changes 
might in fact occur. Indeed, the present study’s demonstration of distinct national 
narratives of competitiveness – by which different items of the growth account are 
emphasized, and different (commensurable or incommensurable) relationships 
between competitiveness and social/environmental protection are perceived – 
provides a tentative picture of potential underlying logics or patterns behind the 
myriad of miniscule changes taking place in contemporary political economies.  


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But, secondly, the particular character and variation of these narratives – which as 
already argued are difficult to square with the neo-liberal epithet - immediately 
questions the second central tenet of dynamic institutionalism. Namely, that 
diverse national sequences of gradual, incremental change – if through different 
mechanisms - lead to convergence of formerly divergent national institutional 
systems or models. Rather, the narratives seem to reflect the theoretical claim that 
political economies evolve along Kathleen Thelen’s “divergent trajectories of 
change”.  
Recall, how proponents of teleonomic institutionalism1035 recently have begun to 
criticize dynamic institutionalism for not paying sufficient attention, to the 
direction, trajectory or telos of institutional change, and thus potentially neglects 
that such processes could take place on a “two way street”, or – more sophisticated 
- “at a crossroads” between one  -or even several - trajectories of institutional 
change. 
The findings could be interpreted to correspond with both of these theoretical 
possibilities. With regards to the former, the study finds examples of PRO’s (even 
an economic ministry) situated in the knowledge regime of United Kingdom – a 
political economy conventionally referred to as an archetypical LME – argue, that 
“quality of life”, absence of poverty and social exclusion, population health and a 
clean environment “can be an important determinant of economic performance” 
1036 ; that the government should combine supply-side policy with demand; should 
correct market failures; should convert mindsets, and should coordinate  the 
activities of market and non-market activities. In short, that government should 
assume a fairly interventionist role vis-a-vis markets. Hence ideas for policy 
changes, which one cannot effortlessly characterize as (market) liberalizations, are 
 
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1035 See p. 91 above 
1036 See p. 206 above 
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in fact present and eagerly discussed in the least likely of the three knowledge 
regimes. Thus ideas for institutional change against the stream – by which e.g. 
LME’s could become more like CME’s – are present in the United Kingdom. 
With regards to the latter, the findings reflect the contention that processes of 
institutional change unfolds within a 2-dimensional teleonomic “terrain” stretched 
out between different socio-economic telos (outcomes). Indeed, the findings 
mirrors this perspective, as e.g. some PRO’s in all of the three knowledge regimes 
address whether the outcome of a competitive nation is most appropriately 
measured in terms of relative growth performance or in terms of extra-economic 
variables such as social cohesion, inclusion, cohesion and equality and/or 
environmental sustainability.1037  
However, the findings also lay bare theoretical avenues for carving out alternative 
teleonomic theoretical terrains. First, besides growth and social cohesion, the 
PRO’s in the three knowledge regimes – as seen – also address competitiveness 
qua outcome in terms of export capacity and environmental protection.1038  
Thus, secondly, the findings of the study might suggest that teleonomic 
institutionalists develop and employ theoretical frameworks, which include 
additional telos and thus additional dimensions within which to analyze and trace 
trajectories of institutional change. For instance one might imagine a 3-
dimensional teleonomic terrain with the inclusion of environmental protection 
	
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
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1037 See p. 312 above 
1038 Of course, export capacity could be considered an aspect of the Williamsonian capacity and 
environmental protection an aspect of the Dürkheimian capacity of a political economy. But for 
instance in the German knowledge regime, PRO’s  (in particular BmWI) appear to endorse the 
idea, that policy measures to enhance environmental protection and resource efficiency might be 
commensurate with and enhance competitiveness; but express more skepticism as to the 
commensurability of social cohesion, equality and competitiveness. Hence such a coupling is 
not theoretically unproblematic. 
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Finally, the findings prompt proponents of teleonomic institutionalism to carefully 
consider the relationship between different telos. Different telos might be 
unrelated. But then again, as the study has made vividly clear, different 
interpretations are possible. Where some PRO’s perceive incommensurate 
relationships and thus trade-offs between export, growth, social cohesion, 
inclusion and equality and/or environmental protection while other PRO’s argue 
for their potential commensurability and the presence of “trade-ins”.  
In more general terms, just as the findings prompts proponents of systemic 
institutionalism to ponder and consider what putative explanans to include in its 
theoretical models designed to explain particular politico- and socio-economic 
outcomes; the findings should equally compel proponents of teleonomic 
institutionalism to carefully consider, motivate and explicate their theoretical 
choice of   explanandum.1039  
If anything the findings of this study speak more to the emerging literature on 
teleonomic rather than dynamic institutionalism. To the extent that the study lends 
any support to either systemic, dynamic and teleonomic institutionalism the ideas 
expressed by the PRO’s in the three knowledge regimes more closely reflects and 
resembles the contentions of the latter branch. That is, the growing body of 
scholarship, which accepts that institutional changes have occurred within recent 
decades, but rejects the monolithic equi-finality of such change corresponds the 
 

1039 Indeed, this applies to systemic institutionalism as well. For instance, the VOC-framework – 
in an exercise of mid-range theorizing – proposes to analyze diverging national innovation 
patterns (incremental vs. radical innovation) as explanans. But in a more comprehensive 
competitiveness-perspective, nationally divergent institutionalized practices of innovation, 
would perhaps constitute one source of intermediate explanans to the explanandum of export 
performance, growth or other extra-economic outcomes such as social cohesion, inclusion, 
equality and environmental sustainability. Of course, it is not per se wrong to construct such 
mid-range theories. But one as obviously left wondering, whether such differences in innovation 
practice in fact lead to different outcomes in terms of export, growth or other extra-economic 
outcomes.   
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most with the ideas held by the PRO’s situated in the knowledge regimes of 
United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark.  
Regardless, the study encourages both systemic, dynamic and teleonomic 
institutionalism to be more attentive to the historical givenness or situatedness of 
the theoretical concepts and categories through which they propose to study of 
contemporary advanced capitalist political economies. If in no other way, ideas 
certainly matter theoretically.    
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15. CONCLUSION 
”So if you really love me say yes  
But if you don’t dear confess  
And please don’t tell me  
Perhaps, perhaps, perhaps” 
- Doris Day 
  
Therefore, with due regard to the methodological, theoretical and discourse 
analytical limitations and constraints to generalization outlined in the 
introduction1040, the study have now justified that ideas held by PRO’s vary in 
accordance with the different national knowledge regimes they are situated in. In 
particular the study has justified, that in the period from 1993 to 2007 policy 
research organizations in the knowledge regimes of United Kingdom, Germany 
and Denmark all participated in the discourse that nations compete, but 
nonetheless did so through distinct national narratives of competitiveness. 
More specifically, it has been shown, that PRO’s in all three knowledge regimes 
commensurated social reality in sufficiently similar ways. First, they periodized 
the international competition of nations through the invocation of the discursive 
dichotomy of temporality and differentiated between a time period before and 
after the collapse of Bretton Woods, as well as a period before and after the New 
Economy. Secondly, they invoked the dichotomy of objectivity and subjectivity, 
by which they on the one hand objectified competitiveness with similar economic 
metrics i.e. the triad of output-gaps, growth accounting and competitiveness 
indexes; on the other subjectified it by ascribing distinct roles and responsibilities 
 
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1040 See p. 43 above 
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to the state as either corrector of market failures, converter of market participants' 
mindsets, coordinator of their activities and/or combiner of supply-side and 
demand-side policies. Thirdly, they applied the dichotomy of functionality, by 
which competitiveness was commensurated as a particular function. In this 
function both open, deregulated markets, privatization, low taxes and flexible 
labor markets as well as institutions for the provision of skills and education, 
science and innovation, entrepreneurship, infrastructure, migration, ICT, public 
sector efficiency and management was argued to constitute sources or inputs. And 
they argued that the outcome of the function ought to be measured more in terms 
of a nations growth performance, less in terms of export. Therefore, on this basis 
one can as a social scientist reasonably assume, that a distinct discourse of 
competition between nations – even if it has no been “observed” directly – was 
present in the period from 1993 to 2007. 
Even so the national narratives of competitiveness nonetheless diverged and 
retained nationally unique features. First, depending on the national knowledge 
regime in which they were situated, PRO’s tended to emphasize one growth 
accounting item comparatively more than others. In particular British PRO’s 
tended to emphasize productivity, German PRO’s labor supply and working hours, 
and Danish PROs labor supply supplemented with productivity. Secondly, 
whether a PRO perceived policy measures to enhance environmental sustainability 
and/or social protection, inclusion, cohesion and equality as either an impediment 
to (trade-off) or distinct source of competitiveness (trade-in) to some degree also 
depended upon what national knowledge regime it inhabited. Danish PRO’s 
expressed a comparatively stronger consensus and tended to cluster more around 
the view that both environmental and social protection constitutes sources of 
competitiveness (trade-in/trade-in). The consensus in the German knowledge 
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regime was less pronounced than in Denmark, but PROs nonetheless seemed to 
cluster in the two left quadrants of the matrix – i.e. most German PRO’s explicitly 
considered social protection to stand in an inverse relationship with 
competitiveness, and was difficult to interpret with regards to environmental 
sustainability. And in United Kingdom disagreement generally prevailed on these 
questions, as PRO’s tended to crowd all four quadrants of the matrix.  

	
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Indeed, underpinning these national differences - both in terms of growth account 
emphasis and the competitiveness/social protection/environmental sustainability-
nexus – are different (national) views of the timescale according to which the 
competitiveness of a nation ought to be assessed, measured and evaluated. While 
all PROs perceived nations as engaged in international competition, different ideas 
were held about just when the points of the scoreboard should be added up. If 
PRO’s perceived measures of social and environmental protection as a cost, they 
tended to measure competitiveness according to a comparatively shorter timescale. 
If PRO’s perceived them as investments and as holding promise of future 
economic and societal returns, they tended to assess competitiveness according to 
a comparatively longer timescale.  
As such the study hopefully has pushed the research frontier just a modest step 
further into uncharted lands with a contribution to three strands of literature. 
Besides advancing our knowledge of the knowledge that knowledge regimes 
produce - providing the approach with a preliminary bulwark against the 
potentially devastating criticism, that only knowledge regimes vary, but the ideas 
remain the same - the study has demonstrated the concept of commensuration to 
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be a highly productive and nuanced analytical prism, through which scholars of 
cultural political economy could study ideas in future research. In the same breath 
it however cautions scholars not to neglect how social actors reversely make sense 
of their social world through cognitive processes of in-, de- and re-
commensuration, just as commensuration is not only at play in actors cognitive 
efforts to quantify and objectify the spatial and functional dimensions of social 
reality but its temporal and subjective features as well. Thus the study urges future 
scholarship to pay attention to the specific timescales and collective identities 
(such as for example coalitions) which social actors themselves discursively 
conjure up in order to render their complex social reality more groomed and 
governable. Finally, the study further strengthens the ongoing endeavors of 
scholars to endow cultural political economy with greater conceptual clarity, more 
attention to the bearers of ideas, and rigorous and operational methodologies. As 
such it has hopefully further increased the likelihood that scholarship, which takes 
ideas seriously, itself is taken more seriously within comparative political 
economy.     
However, several challenges lie ahead for cultural political economy before it can 
be admitted as a full and equal member in the halls of core comparative political 
economy. First, it must be explained why  – not just described how – ideas vary 
across nations. Secondly, scholars of ideas must specify and identify empirically 
the causal mechanisms by which ideas presumably influence processes of 
institutional stability and change. However, due to both resource, methodological 
– and perhaps even intellectual constraints - the present study has not, beyond 
brief tentative speculations pursued these questions any further.  
Even so the study – by gauging the relative correspondence between ideas held by 
PRO’s in the knowledge regimes of United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark and 
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central tenets of systemic, dynamic and teleonomic institutionalism – nonetheless 
has proposed a few conclusive remarks regarding the relative fit – or lack thereof 
– between them. 
First, it is have proven more than a little difficult to reconcile the preceding 
discourse analysis with the prevalent theoretical claim, that neo-liberalism in 
recent decades have ascended as a predominant, monolithic behemoth worming all 
rival ideas off the edge of the cognitive horizon of social actors. 
To be sure, ideas about social reality, does not necessarily tell us much about 
social reality itself. In fact, they might say nothing at all. And of course ideas held 
by PROs might be nothing more than an epiphenomenal smokescreen which 
depicts contemporary capitalism as far more considerate, compassionate and 
patient than it really is, and behind which a much more pristine neo-liberal 
puppeteer continues to pull the strings. The discourse analytical approach has no 
way to tell.  
Even so, the very presence of systemic, dynamic and teleonomic institutionalist 
ideas and tenets within national narratives of competitiveness explicitly contradict 
the theoretical claim of a complete neoliberal hegemonic regime of ideas! Thus, 
the study concur with Hall and Lamont’s recent assertion that ”neo-liberalism 
should not be seen as a blanket laid over the world”, and as Evans and Sewell 
encourage scholars to carefully disentangle normative value judgments from 
analytical categories when purporting to approach and study those social-scientific 
entities and processes which perhaps – perhaps not – could be described as neo-
liberal.  
For instance, the recent burgeoning score of scholarship, which essentially 
contends that the financial crisis of 2008, has not – or has not yet - prompted a 
full-blown abrupt paradigm change bringing neo-liberalism to its knees and 
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Keynesianism back in, would surely benefit from Evans and Sewell’s prescribed 
exercise. To be sure, it is hard to contest that no change has happened. But it can 
be reasonably questioned first whether what went before is best described as neo-
liberalism, and secondly whether it is at all reasonable to expect that a potential 
successor should bear even remote resemblance to the full-blown Keynesianism of 
characteristic of the Golden age Capitalism? As David Hume famously reminds 
us, we really have no good reason to expect the future to look anything like the 
past – and what comes after the Great Recession might look nothing like 
Keynesianism nor Neo-liberalism.  
Indeed, perhaps we don’t even have good reasons to expect the past to look 
anything like the past. Perhaps the description of ideas prevalent before the crisis 
as neo-liberal does not capture the full picture of the many different forms neo-
liberalism might assume – of which some perhaps are even difficult to square with 
neo-liberalism in the first place? 
In fact, reflections such as these only further accentuates the call for systemic, 
dynamic and teleonomic institutionalists to consider even more carefully the 
institutional building blocks and telos to include as putative explanans and 
explanandum in their theoretical models.1041 And while this admittedly renders the 
work of comparative political economists excruciatingly more cumbersome than it 
already is, it must be maintained that parsimony is a social-scientific ideal, which 
gives social scientists less to keep track of ex post analysis – not ex ante. But 
perhaps a more constructive mutual dialogue between systemic, dynamic and 
 
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1041  A work, which will also, will aid dynamic intstitutionalists in specifying the unit and 
temporal scope of institutional change, and perhaps grant more attention to potential 
countervailing mechanism of reverse change. 
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teleonomic institutionalism even holds the promise for comparative political 
economists to devise even more parsimonious theoretical models? 
 
* * * 
 
Therefore the present study - perhaps paradoxically – ultimately draws a 
somewhat back-to-front conclusion. While it has not been shown, that ideas matter 
as causes of institutional stability and change, the study of ideas have been found 
to matter theoretically to comparative political economy. And comparative 
political economy – in turn – is found to matter to politics. Thus the study 
essentially does nothing more than reiterating Pedersen’s recent plea for 
comparative political economists to assume a greater reflexive responsibility for 
their own historical situatedness and active involvement in the ongoing discursive 
contestation of central political ideas. As suggested by Pedersen: 
“Analyses of institutions have become a policy tool, and reflections on 
how to promote comparative advantages and to do so by the 
management of institutional complementarities, have become an 
everyday matter for national governments and international 
organizations. Knowledge of institutions has come to be understood as a 
tool – and even as a functional imperative – for governments in 
competition with other nations.”  1042 

* * * 
On this final note, it is indeed only all too enticing, to point out - with all due 
respect - the striking temporal coincidence between the time of publication of two 
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1042 Morgan, et. al, 2010, p. 649 
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of comparative political economy’s seminal works and developments beyond 
social-scientific academia.  
First, the central tenets of Peter Hall and David Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism 
(2001) - according to which a particular set of institutional subsystems famously 
was argued to perform equally well vis-a-vis a particular type of economic 
outcome (innovation) – corresponded very well with the heightened attention 
which PRO’s in United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark at the turn of the 
century begun to devote to the ostensibly New Economy and along with it their 
frequent observations of a new stage of knowledge-intensive competition, where 
ability to compete on production of high-quality goods and innovation, facilitated 
by state interventions in the market were perceived as a new decisive “winning 
parameter”. Its amazing merits, results and profound academic impact 
notwithstanding, VOC certainly seemed to be at the right place at the right time 
and apparently gave words to - with Kingdon’s phrase – an idea whose time had 
come.  
Secondly, and perhaps more interesting, the recent attention devoted by Hall and 
Lamont to the study of social resilience understood as “the capacity of groups of 
people bound together in an organization, class, racial group, community or nation 
to sustain and advance their well-being in the face of challenges to it”1043, 
Wolfgang Streecks recent analysis of the inherent tensions between democratic 
capitalisms dual commitments to the (perhaps) incommensurable principles of 
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marginal productivity and social entitlement1044 and Kathleen Thelens recent turn 
to teleonomic institutionalism1045 curiously coincide with developments elsewhere. 
In fact, none other than Michael Porter – one of the ostensible origins of the idea 
which Paul Krugman once derided as dangerous – appear to have changed his 
mind regarding how one should understand competitiveness. Whereas he earlier 
has asserted that competitiveness can be equated with productivity1046 since 2012 
he and his co-workers have begun to study what they term foundational 
competitiveness:  
“the expected level of output per working-age individual given the 
overall quality of a country as a place to do business. This definition 
goes beyond the expected level of productivity per employed worker, 
because prosperity is ultimately rooted in the ability to both achieve high 
productivity as well as mobilize a high share of the available 
workforce.”1047  
Essentially Porter and colleagues now combine central tenets of the British and 
Danish narratives of competitiveness and emphasize the simultaneous increase of 
productivity and increase of labor supply.  
Also World Economic Forum has since 2011 begun to devote attention to how 
“sustainability relates to competitiveness” for which purpose they have developed 
a sustainability-adjusted “Global Competitiveness Index”. That is a economic 
metric designed to measure: 
 “the set of institutions, policies and factors that make a nation remain 
productive in the longer term while ensuring social and environmental 
sustainability.”1048  
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1044 Streeck 2011, see footnote at p. 35 above 
1045 Kathleen Thelen 2012, 2014 
1046 Porter 2004 
1047 Delgado, Ketels, Porter and Stern  
1048 WEF, 2014 
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OECD in 2011, against the backdrop of the Stieglitz Commission, has begun to 
publish a “Better Life Index”. United Kingdom publishes an annual national 
“Index of Well-being”. And even Michael Porters own Institute for Strategy and 
Competitiveness has in 2013 begun the publication of an annual Social Progress 
Index.1049 In short, the idea of competitiveness is apparently being de- and re-
commensurated all over again. And once again these developments coincide with 
important groundbreaking innovations in comparative political economy. Perhaps 
the time has come for yet another seminal idea?  
 
* * * 
 
To re-emphasize just one last time. The epistemological assumptions of the 
discourse theoretical approach emphatically preclude any ontologically strong 
claims about the social world “as it really is”. Once the genie of Ricoeur is out of 
the bottle, it is not easily re-encapsulated. Indeed, the present study might say 
nothing at all about political economies as they really are, and the preceding 
analysis might have been in vain.   
However, epistemological weakness does not necessarily imply 
inconsequentiality. The inherent methodological weakness of the present study 
can arguably be turned into its very strength, if comparative as well cultural 
political economists comes to endorse, that even their own theoretical propositions 
are enmeshed in an ongoing, inevitable and potentially infinite political struggle to 
settle the exact meaning of a – once dangerous - idea.  Whether a nations 
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competitiveness is essentially a question of being alike – or different – remains a 
matter of deep and enduring political contestation. But the sheer heterogeneity of 
national narratives of competitiveness suggests, that there is more to the idea, than 
what first meets the eye, and suggests that comparative political economists begin 
to take such differences duly into account.   
Perhaps competitiveness - at the end of the day - is not a question of being alike. 
Perhaps significant systemic institutional change – after all – is in the offing, but in 
a different form than one might expect. And perhaps comparative political 
economists finally ought to begin taking the study of ideas – and thus themselves 
– just a little more seriously. Perhaps, perhaps, perhaps.   
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